In the eight years that have passed since the Africa-Europe Summit in Cairo, Egypt, in April 2000, dramatic geopolitical developments have impacted on the relationship between Africa and Europe. This report examines the relationship between the two continents in the 21st Century, exploring three key issues: the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt) between Africa and Europe; peacekeeping and military co-operation; and migration.
EURAFRIQUE?
AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

POLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR REPORT
CO-ORGANISED BY THE CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION (CCR), CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG (FES), MAPUTO, MOZAMBIQUE
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VINEYARD HOTEL, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

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About the Co-organisers:

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) is affiliated to the University of Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa. Established in 1968, the organisation has wide-ranging experience of conflict interventions in the Western Cape and southern Africa and is working increasingly on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations, as well as on policy research on the United Nations’ (UN) role in Africa; South Africa’s role in Africa; African Union (AU)/New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) relations; and HIV/AIDS and Human Security.

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) is a German private non-profit organisation committed to the principles and values of social democracy. Today, FES supports education, research and international co-operation from its head offices in Bonn and Berlin, as well as through its offices in more than 90 countries, including Mozambique. In view of the FES mandate to promote international understanding, the organisation works directly with host and partner countries, as well as through multilateral fora. FES activities are designed to promote the participation of its partners in the South through dialogues with multilateral organisations.

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) office in Maputo, Mozambique, held a policy advisory group meeting in Cape Town on 31 October and 1 November 2007 on the theme, “EurAfrique! Africa and Europe in a New Century”.

The aim of the seminar was to examine the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century. The meeting explored three key issues:

1. The unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt) between the two continents;
2. Peacekeeping and military co-operation; and
3. Migration.

The General Context of the Africa-Europe Relationship

Eight years have passed since the Africa-Europe Summit was held in Cairo, Egypt, in April 2000. Since then, many geopolitical developments have impacted on the relationship between Africa and Europe. These include: the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 – that is, the European Union (EU)-African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) treaty – and the initiation of trade talks between Africa and Europe, namely the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations; and the stalling of the Doha Development Round at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks by 2005.

Both development and security agendas in this relationship have shown themselves to be closely intertwined, and the issue of migration is increasingly raised at international fora. The dramatic impact of the September 2001 attacks on the United States affected global perceptions of security in light of America’s “war on terror”, all of which caused re-appraisals in both Africa and Europe. The firm policy belief in “no foreign boots on African soil” has given way to a number of successful and not-so-successful military interventions in African conflict situations involving the African Union (AU); the United Nations (UN); and the EU. Moreover, the rich North and the poor South are being confronted by issues of climate change and renewable energy, and the world is becoming more aware of the catastrophic impact of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria on Africa’s development and security agenda.

In December 2005, EU leaders adopted a new strategy for Africa with the title, “The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership”, with the aim of giving Europe a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework of relations with Africa. This was, however, a one-sided policy document, developed and refined within the EU Commission in Brussels, with little or no input from partner states in Africa. In consultation with the AU, this document was subsequently refined into a joint Strategy and Action Plan, with substantial follow-up and monitoring mechanisms. This was duly approved at the Lisbon summit of December 2007, but it still remains to be seen whether the resources and the political will can be mustered, in both Africa and Europe, to achieve the ambitions set out in the Strategy.
1. Trade, Aid and Development

The trade, aid and development relationship between Africa and Europe is undergoing major change. Previously, these three dimensions were captured under the auspices of the Lomé Convention of 1975, which has historically symbolised Europe’s ambitions to establish new relations with the South. In the area of trade, Lomé offered the 79 members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific states non-reciprocal, beneficial access to the EU market. A development package was negotiated within Lomé, which resulted in the European Development Fund (EDF) envelopes. Given the large and diverse membership of the ACP group and its pioneering political position, the ACP-EU relationship has historically been of great significance, particularly to developing countries. However, during the 1980s and 1990s, the ACP group’s political standing, and the operation and rationale of both the trade and aid aspects of Lomé, were steadily eroded.

In addition, the rise of the World Trade Organisation, and the EU’s role within the WTO, resulted in the Lomé trade preferences becoming something of an embarrassment to Europe. The Lomé Convention gave way to the Cotonou Agreement by 2000, with the major change being the move away from non-reciprocal trade preferences – disallowed by the WTO. For the purpose of negotiating free trade agreements with the ACP, the group was split into six negotiating units – Western, Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa; as well as the Caribbean; and the Pacific – in a move it was feared would weaken the ACP’s relative political position within the EU’s network of foreign relations.

While regional groupings are strongly favoured in principle by the ACP, there have been problems of overlap and identity. Concerns over EPAs and the EU’s initial insistence on the 31 December 2007 deadline for concluding these agreements, were a major source of tension and distrust between the ACP and the EU. While ACP members called for greater trade flexibility and understanding, EU members showed little patience for what they saw as the belated and inadequate preparations on the part of ACP members. The situation worsened in December when some ACP countries signed individual interim free trade agreements, with most of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) opting for trade access to the EU through Europe’s duty-free and quota-free ‘Everything But Arms’ imports initiative. But this only left numerous ACP countries reverting to the Generalised System of Preferences scheme, which effectively saw an increase in tariffs on their exports.

Over the last three decades, development aid has become a fiercely debated issue, with Western critics pointing out that, despite millions of euros being poured into development initiatives in Africa, the continent has not been able to throw off the shackles of under-development, corruption, poverty and instability. From Africa, there are calls for a strategy to end aid dependency and the endless EU policy directives and documents that do little to change conditions on the ground. The motives behind the selection by donors of certain recipients for political and strategic objectives, rather than for socio-economic development and poverty alleviation goals, have also been questioned. But, there has been a renewed interest in what the provision of aid is able to achieve in an era in which the Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – are losing international credibility. While development aid has serious limitations, it is still part of the solution rather than part of the problem. The EU’s $50 billion-a-year Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and American agricultural subsidies of $100 billion-a-year were particularly criticised for hampering Africa’s development prospects, since an estimated 70 per cent of the continent’s population work in this sector.
2. Peacekeeping and Security Co-operation

In the area of peace and security, two case studies were discussed at the Cape Town seminar: the African Union Mission in Sudan’s (AMIS) troubled Darfur region, and the EU’s involvement in peacemaking and peacekeeping in Africa’s Great Lakes region. Problems highlighted in the Darfur mission included: the multiplication of armed factions, which complicated peacemaking efforts; and the inadequate numbers of AU troops (about 7,000) and equipment, a situation that, it was hoped, would improve once AMIS transformed into the hybrid UN/AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) by December 2007. More time and effort were needed for African and European mediators and peacekeepers to relate to the local population, regarded as an essential part of peacekeeping.

In the Great Lakes region, the chequered performance of the UN was discussed, from Rwanda to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as well as the circumstances and motivation of the EU’s involvement, first with Operation Artemis in Bunia, northern Congo (2003), and also the EU Force’s (EUFOR) mission at the time of the Congo elections (2006). Although the AU had broadly viewed both European interventions to be beneficial, the reasons for both initiatives were also internal to the EU, as its members sought a testing ground for their European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and its Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM). There is a need for a discussion on the right balance between African and European forces in the future, especially since, in some circumstances, non-African forces are more vulnerable to attacks from rebel leaders. However, there remains an urgent need for greater burden-sharing and the involvement of well-resourced Western troops in Africa.

More general discussions revolved around the issue of human security. The AU’s Common Defence Pact of 2004 specifically uses this term. It was recalled that 10 million people had died in over 40 conflicts in Africa over the last four decades. The broad definition of human security as a precondition of development also highlighted the problem of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria. Health systems must be supported in Africa to ameliorate this problem.

The question of military interventions also engaged considerable debate, in view of many reservations over the performance of some EU member states, notably France, in the past. Perceptions are widespread in Africa that France, having been discredited by unilateral interventions in Rwanda (1994) and Zaire (1997), may be seeking multilateral EU cover for future interventions. These suspicions have been reinforced by the French-led EU intervention in the DRC in 2003 and the EU force in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) which had started deploying by 2007 to support the AU/UN mission in Darfur – all interventions staged in francophone Africa. In view of the developing common European defence and security policy, EU member states should not only seek to intervene under the EU umbrella, but also seek UN authority and African support. UN missions would be well advised to avoid suspicions and to ensure that the primacy of the world body in maintaining international peace and security is not eroded through EU actions.
3. Migration

The issue of migration has recently been included on the agenda of most international meetings. Although the subject has been hotly debated, Africa and Europe are still a long way from a clear and jointly-owned strategy on migration. These issues must be addressed intelligently through long-term strategies using mechanisms such as the AU/EU troika meetings and the EU/Mediterranean process that focuses on the countries of North Africa.

Three broad approaches to migration have become discernible within Europe: one focuses on containing migration and on physically intercepting and halting would-be immigrants to Europe; a second approach sees migration as a fact and a potential positive contributor to development in Africa and Europe; while the third approach examines the root causes of migration and tries to address them in developing countries, as well as by encouraging nationals to remain in their countries of residence.

Containing migration is seen as the first knee-jerk reaction to a phenomenon generally perceived to be a problem in Europe. Increasing numbers of foreigners are regarded as a burden on European social budgets and a threat to local cultures and norms. A more liberal approach to migration would regard the process as a catalyst for development, especially as both skilled and unskilled labour from Africa is contributing to societies in Europe. Proponents of this view argue that an African Diaspora could contribute to influencing the Africa policy of European governments, as well as to the building of a knowledge base and economies in Africa as migrants return home. Migration contributes to economic wealth in Africa through remittances from family members abroad. Where and how these remittances are spent is still not well understood, and this remains an area that could benefit from additional research.

But the question remains how to encourage Africans in general not to contribute to the "brain drain" to the West and to apply their acquired skills where they are most needed. The arguments put forward here include: improving governance at home and increasing peace and stability, and increasing the standard of living and creating economic opportunities, thus discouraging citizens from migration. However, there are strong arguments that the opposite is actually true and that, as countries start to develop and improve their governance, education and economic growth, migration occurs as a natural phenomenon.

Policy Recommendations

The Cape Town meeting resulted in 14 policy recommendations in the three areas of economics, peacekeeping, and migration. These were presented as a contribution to the shaping of discussions at the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon, Portugal, in December 2007. The recommendations have been revised in light of the Lisbon summit, and the expiry of the EU deadline on Economic Partnership Agreements at the end of 2007.

The Africa-Europe Economic Relationship

- Despite numerous policy documents, summit declarations and strategy papers between Africa and Europe, not enough was done in the past about the implementation and monitoring of these agreements. The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership adopted in Lisbon in December 2007 sought to create
a framework by which declarations and decisions can be implemented and monitored. This will still have been in vain in the absence of sufficient attention being paid to capacity and resources, but, above all, political will in both Africa and Europe.

- The adoption of the joint strategy paper and action plan at the Lisbon summit of 2007 should be a step towards deepening trust and confidence in the Africa-Europe relationship. This should apply to the issue of EPAs, and, although these relate to Cotonou and the ACP relationship, they should be consistent with the philosophy of the joint EU-AU strategy. The way EPAs threatened to spoil the atmosphere in Lisbon highlights the importance of such a co-ordinated approach.

- A broad review of problems surrounding EPAs should therefore be undertaken to ensure the building and maintenance of trust between Africa and Europe. This could grant an extended time-frame before ACP countries are expected to sign the EPAs, which, in any case, would be an acceptance of present realities, since less than half the ACP group signed up to EPAs on 1 January 2008. Strategic documents should be jointly developed to maximise ownership by both partners and to enhance real partnership between the two continents.

- The ambition for regional integration, which goes back to the Lomé Convention of 1975, is close to the heart of African states. The EU is to be commended for supporting this aspiration, in both Cotonou and the Lisbon strategy, but there is merit to the concern of the ACP ministers that the Cotonou approach to regional groupings has, in fact, given rise to unfortunate divisions. This needs to be urgently rectified.

- The spirit of the AU’s inclusion of the African Diaspora as its sixth region (including Caribbean members of the ACP) should be invoked in efforts to ensure the cohesiveness and unity of the ACP group, as well as to make sure that the EU’s new Africa strategy, and that contained in Cotonou, remain in harmony with each other.

- African leaders should call on Europe to implement reforms agreed to in its Common Agricultural Policy, an initiative that is still widely perceived by Africans to be a profligate programme that contradicts the EU’s fair trade policies in an area in which Africa has a comparative advantage.

- The impact of climate change in Africa should be investigated, especially on the continent’s vulnerable and marginalised communities: mutual policies should be developed to avoid Africa’s development being adversely affected.

**Peacekeeping and Security**

- Relations between the AU and the EU in the field of peace and security have to be based on mutual self-interest. Therefore, through the 5-member African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) and sub-regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Africa must contribute significantly to defining and supporting its own security agenda.

- Both Africa and Europe should put increased weight and political will behind the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010, currently described as a ‘work in progress’ in need of continuing material and capacity-building support. The €250 million provided for the African Peace Support Facility (APSF) by the EU between 2004 and 2007, and subsequent provision of €300 million, must be sustained. Pledges made by the UN and the Group of Eight (G8) industrialised countries, involving EU countries France, Britain, and Italy, must also be urgently met.

- Peacekeeping missions in Africa must be provided speedily with better resources and equipment, particularly attack and utility helicopters, the lack of which have often impeded operations in difficult circumstances. This has now become more important with the arrival of the hybrid UN/AU mission in Darfur.

- Africa’s human security needs, including tackling HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, which are all major obstacles to development, must be urgently addressed. Health systems must be strengthened and resources increased through bodies like the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

- Given the strong link between security and development, Africa and Europe should work for the conclusion of an international arms treaty. This could build on such initiatives as the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 1998 and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies of 1996 which limit arms exports from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.

Migration

- Finally, in the area of migration, the EU should finance training in African countries that are home to migrant doctors and nurses in order to replace skills lost to these countries.

- More research financing should also go towards understanding the phenomenon of migration and its impact on both the host countries and the countries of origin. This could help ensure that migration policies are more effective and mutually beneficial. It could also address the rise in xenophobic immigration policies and of racism in Europe.
1. Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) office in Maputo, Mozambique, held a policy advisory group meeting at the Vineyard Hotel in Cape Town on 31 October and 1 November 2007 on the theme, “EurAfrique? Africa and Europe in a New Century”.

Senior policymakers, civil society activists, and academics participated in the seminar, including: General Martin Agwai, Force Commander, United Nations (UN)/African Union (AU) Hybrid Mission in Sudan; Peter Katjavivi, Ambassador of Namibia to Germany; Martin Uhomoibhi, Ambassador of Nigeria to the United Nations in Geneva; Kingsley Mamabolo, Special Envoy of South Africa to the Great Lakes region; Njongonkulu Ndungane, Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, South Africa; Soumano Sako, Director, African Capacity Building Foundation, Harare, Zimbabwe; Dan Frederiksen, Ambassador of Denmark to South Africa; Dieter W Haller, Ambassador of Germany to South Africa; Rob de Vos, Ambassador of Netherlands to South Africa; Holger Bernt Hansen, Centre for African Studies, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; Lodewijk A E Briët, Head of the European Union (EU) Delegation to South Africa; Aldo Ajello, former European Union Special Representative for the Great Lakes region; and Joan E Thomas, Acting High Commissioner of Jamaica to South Africa; and Solomon Gomes, Senior Political Affairs Officer at the African Union.

The aim of the seminar was to examine the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, and to investigate whether this relationship is one of habit or is of real strategic importance to both parties. The meeting explored three key issues: first, the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt) between the two continents; second, peacekeeping and military co-operation; and third, migration. Guided by these three thematic areas, the policy advisory group discussed and debated the context of the Africa-Europe relationship in detail, examining particularly the interests of Europe in Africa and the political, economic and security roles that Africa expects Europe to play on the continent. The perspectives included in this report emerged from the diverse views expressed at the seminar, as well as from additional research, but do not necessarily represent a consensus position by the group.
1.2 The General Context of the Africa-Europe Relationship

Nearly eight years have passed since the Africa-Europe Summit was held in Cairo, Egypt, in April 2000. In the interim, many geopolitical developments have impacted on the relationship between the two continents. First, the African Union was established to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Its first summit was held in Durban in July 2002, and the pan-African continental body was welcomed as a positive sign of the Renaissance promised for Africa in the 21st century. On the economic front, recent developments included: signing and implementation of the Cotonou Agreement of June 2000, and the subsequent initiation of trade talks between Africa and Europe involving the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations. The same period has seen the stalling of the Doha Development Round at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks by 2005.

A new global balance of forces has emerged, and the post-Cold War “unipolar moment” of United States domination is being increasingly replaced by a multi-polar international system. The “Washington Consensus” of the early 1990s on reducing the role of the state and increasing the role of the private sector has been eroded by two decades of difficult economic reforms in the developing world. Africa is now receiving special attention from China, which has become the third largest investor on the continent and has held three summits of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) between 2000 and 2006. India and Brazil are also increasingly developing a new interest in Africa as a source of raw materials for their rapidly developing economies. For some European governments, especially those that thought of Africa as a traditional priority area for Europe, this was considered a major reason for relaunching the Africa/Europe relationship.

The EU-Africa summit in Cairo in 2000 involved 53 African countries, and the then 15 EU member states (there are now 27 members in the EU). The meeting was held on the African side “under the aegis of the AU”, a delicate formula to permit Morocco (not an AU member) to attend, even as the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), though an AU member, was not present. This formula was maintained in Lisbon in 2007. Since 2000, the EU-Africa dialogue was confined to meetings between ministerial troikas, which, since 2004, have been co-organised by the European Commission in Brussels and the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa. An AU/EU ministerial meeting was held in Luxembourg in April 2005, while both the AU and EU Commissions met in Brussels in October 2005, but no head of state summit had taken place since 2000 before the Lisbon summit of 2007. This situation was largely due to the impasse over the invitation to EU/Africa summits of Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe. An earlier attempt by the Portuguese, in April 2003, to host a Europe-Africa Summit foundered on this issue, over which British objections to Mugabe’s presence at the meeting obtained wide support. However, in February 2003 France had obtained a waiver of EU sanctions to permit Mugabe to attend the France-Africa Summit in Paris.

In this seven-year period (2000-2007), security has also developed as an important issue between Africa and Europe, just as the question of migration has increasingly moved to centre stage. The firm policy belief in “no foreign boots on African soil” that prevailed in the mid-1990s has given way to several successful and not-so-successful military interventions in African conflict situations involving the AU, the United Nations and the

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2 See Kwesi Arampah and Sanusha Naidu (eds), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China (Scottsville: UKZN Press, 2008).
European Union. The rich North and the poor South are increasingly being confronted in multiple fora by issues of climate change and renewable energy. Finally, the world is increasingly aware of the catastrophic impact of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria on Africa’s development and security agenda.

In December 2005, in the wake of the Gleneagles Group of Eight (G8) Industrialised Countries Summit, EU leaders adopted a new strategy for Africa with the title “The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership”. The purpose of this strategy was to provide Europe with a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with Africa. However, this was a one-sided policy document, developed and refined within the EU Commission in Brussels, with little or no input from partner states in Africa. While the post-Cold War era has witnessed dramatic changes, the Africa-Europe relationship has too often seemed stuck in old patterns of relations in which Africa reacts to policy directives from Europe, rather than one in which Africa is involved as an equal partner actively participating in policy developments that will fundamentally affect the continent.

Although officially approved in 2006 by the African Union Summit, it was only more recently that there has been input from the AU into the Joint Strategy and Action Plan, which was eventually adopted in Lisbon in December 2007. Compared with the Cairo Declaration of 2000, the Lisbon Joint Strategy and Action Plan agreed in 2007 was a much more comprehensive document with more systematic provisions for follow-up, although the accompanying Lisbon Declaration itself was comparatively brief.

For the text of the Strategy and Action Plan and other Lisbon documents see the websites http://europafrica.org/lisbon-summit/ and www.europafrica.org
2. Deconstructing “Eurafrique”

The idea of Eurafrique was originally coined by a French writer, Eugène Guernier, in a work published in 1923, and was developed in a 30-year career writing about Africa. The idea was particularly popular in Italy, where one of its main advocates, Paolo Orsini, regarded the development of Eurafriwan co-operation as a counter-weight to the rise of both Bolshevism and Pan-Islamism.

The idea also gained currency in Germany in the 1930s, in part as a reaction to the economic “Great Depression” of the era. One of the best-known early advocates of “Eurafrique” was German Chancellor Adolf Hitler’s Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht, who pleaded for the restitution of Germany’s colonies in Africa as a prelude to a pan-European economic policy in Africa. Schacht saw Europe as a whole deriving its industrial strength from Africa’s raw materials. The post-1940 Vichy regime in France, in alliance with Nazi Germany, saw similar attractions in “Eurafrique”, which, though sometimes viewed in racist terms, resonated with the still prevalent belief of the European powers in their “civilising mission” in Africa.

After 1945, a new generation of politicians, while rejecting the “Eurafrique of Hitler and Vichy”, asserted an organic link between Africa and Europe that could see both continents potentially being integrated into an international sub-system. In the relationship that developed after 1957 between the new European Economic Community (EEC) and the Associated States (which evolved into the two Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969), the “Eurafrique” expression was in common usage during this epoch, even if the ‘Afrique’ component was mostly francophone (though it included Somalia). The term became indelibly linked with what was often reverentially called “the Association”. However, both ‘Eurafrique’ and ‘Association’, having been widely criticised as being expressions of neo-colonialism, were discarded during the revision and expansion of European development policy in the 1970s. The Lomé Convention of 1975, therefore, although not fully “global”, effectively spelled the end of ‘Eurafrique’. There was thus more than a little surprise when French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, revived the expression on a visit to Senegal and Gabon in July 2007 when he said in a controversial speech in Dakar: “What France wants from Africa is to prepare the advent of Eurafrique, a great common destiny which awaits Europe and Africa.”

Africa and Europe have a long history, dating back to the sombre eras of the slave trade and colonialism between the 16th and 20th century, and continuing into the post-colonial recasting of the relationship. But is simply having had a long and complex connection sufficient today to ensure a strategic partnership of real substance? Both continents are keen to emphasise the “partnership” aspect of their relationship, but how can real partnership exist if Africa is dependent on Europe for aid; preferential access to its markets; military assistance; and leadership on humanitarian issues? The comparative size and capacity of the AU and EU Commissions are good examples of this imbalance.

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6 Paolo Agostina Orsini di Camerota, L’Italia Nella Politica Africana Licino Cappelli, Bologna, Italy, 1926.
9 See www.elysee.fr/francais/interventions/2007/juillet/allocution_a_l_universite_de_dakar_7984.html
The asymmetrical economic ties between Africa and Europe forged during the colonial era are undoubtedly still strong, but what is the basis for EU Development Commissioner Louis Michel’s often repeated statement that ‘Europe and Africa are natural allies’? In the same quotation, Michel states that “an indispensable partnership, strong and sincere, between these two large and beautiful continents, can build a future of peace and prosperity. Together they can decisively create a new world order, fairer, more equitable, and freer.”

This statement, apparently visionary and benign, still needs to be deconstructed in order to unearth any possible pitfalls. Certainly, Africa’s interest is still in having a constructive and fruitful relationship with Europe, but surely not one that should give rise to new European fantasies of a ‘special connection’ that still contains within it the seeds of the occult and atavistic ambitions embodied in the idea of “Eurafrique”. The paradox of Cotonou compared with Lisbon is that, as Europe normalises and ‘banalises’ this relationship – especially in its trade aspects – it renders the ambition for a ‘special relationship’ more unlikely.

Former Malian AU chairperson, Alpha Konaré, had called for an ‘equitable and equal’ partnership between Africa and Europe in November 2007. Not surprisingly, the tensions around the subject of Eurafrique, especially as an extension of the peculiar special relationship between France and its former African territories known sometimes as ‘Françafrique’, found expression in the Cape Town seminar. On the one hand, ‘Eurafrique’ was described as ‘the worst possible word’ to describe the Europe-Africa relationship, while, on the other hand, it was seen as a ‘perfectly chosen expression’.

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10 See www.europafrica.org
12 See Jean-François Médard, ‘Crisis, change, and continuity: Nigeria-France relations’, in Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha (eds), Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Scottsville: UKZN Press, 2008), pp. 34-133.
2.1 Trade, Aid and Development

The Cape Town seminar examined closely the existing and developing relationship between Africa and Europe. Often compared to that of a marriage, the policy advisory group debated what type of marriage existed, if any. Was it of the ‘shotgun’ type or an ‘arranged’ marriage in which the power relationships were skewed towards the stronger party? Or was it a marriage of convenience without much substance? And if lobola (bride price) were to be paid, who was the bride and who the groom? Of course, the relationship between Africa and Europe has a very long history, which partly defines the parameters within which new relationships are forged today.

Although participants at the Cape Town seminar warned against viewing the EU as a monolithic entity, but rather to recognise the individual member states, the core of the existing relationship rests on the several legal texts signed by the EU and 79-member African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group. (Only 75 ACP countries negotiated the EPA.) And although there are many diverse and dynamic aspects to the EU-ACP relationship, the trade and development dimension of the relationship now threatens the overall goodwill that existed among both sides. The trade, aid and development relationship between Africa and Europe is organised and contextualised within the current Cotonou Agreement of 2000. Cotonou has its origins in the Lomé Convention of 1975, hailed in its day as a model of international co-operation. This is a connection with Africa dating back to the Treaty of Rome of 1957 that established the European Economic Community (EEC). The then EEC committed itself, in Article 38 of Part IV of the Rome Treaty of 1957, to its member states’ Associated territories and their economic development. This was later translated into the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969, between the six EEC states (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) and 18 former colonies. Limited ‘Associations’ were also negotiated with Nigeria and the East African Community (EAC), but the former aborted because of the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970. On British entry into the EEC in 1973, there was an unrivalled opportunity to broaden the base of this connection, and to include most of the 48 sub-Saharan African countries in the scope of a new Convention, signed in Lomé, Togo, in 1975. At the time, the Caribbean and Pacific islands wanted to group themselves with African states, the better to wield some political clout with the EEC on matters of common concern. The comprehensive contractual package of Lomé, with its trade and aid linkages, its concern for industrial co-operation, and its pioneering scheme for stabilising export earnings, were praised as a model for the much-touted New International Economic Order (NIEO) of the 1970s. The original 46-member African, Caribbean and Pacific group remained intact, and over the course of two-and-a-half decades, developed into one of the largest instruments of North-South co-operation of its day, involving 79 ACP countries, many of which fell into the new category of least developed countries (LDCs).

Because Europe did not offer the same preferential access to its market to all developing countries – since Lomé had a regionally circumscribed membership – the Lomé Convention of 1975 had to be legitimised through a waiver from international trade obligations, first within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and then within the more powerful World Trade Organisation, which became increasingly difficult for the new free-trade-minded European Union to defend. This position eventually became untenable, and the EU-ACP partnership entered a two-year period of intense negotiations, which started in 1998.

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13 CCR thanks Mareike Meyn, of the Overseas Development Institute, England, for her useful comments and suggestions on this section of the report.

Over the last few decades, development aid has become a fiercely debated issue, and was so again at the Cape Town meeting, with Western critics pointing out that, despite millions of euros being poured into development in Africa, the continent has not been able to throw off the shackles of under-development, corruption, poverty and instability. From Africa, voices called for a strategy to end aid dependency and the endless EU policy directives and documents that do little to change conditions on the ground. The motives behind the selection by donors of certain recipients for political and strategic rather than for socio-economic development and poverty alleviation goals have also been questioned. On the other hand, there has been a renewed interest in what the provision of external funds are able to achieve, notably in the work of private foundations such as the Ford, Rockefeller and Macarthur foundations, and the Carnegie Corporation as well as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Clinton Foundation in an era in which the Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – are losing international credibility. The sentiment that emerged from the Cape Town seminar was that, while development aid has serious limitations, it is still part of the solution rather than part of the problem. The EU’s $50 billion-a-year Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and American agricultural subsidies of $100 billion a year were particularly criticised for hampering Africa’s development prospects, since an estimated 70 per cent of the continent’s population work in this sector, though African exporters benefit from high EU prices for commodities like sugar, bananas and horticulture.

The decline in development aid from 0.33 per cent of gross national income to 0.22 per cent between 1990 and 2001, despite a UN target of 0.7 per cent set as far back in 1970, was also criticised, as was the large percentage of aid that returns to donor countries in the form of the purchase of goods from donor countries and technical assistance. Calls were made for donors, as well as recipients, to be held accountable. There were also calls for the annulment of Africa’s external debt of $290 billion, which was seen by some as unsustainable and immoral, since much of these debts were accumulated during the Cold War-era by unelected western-backed autocrats such as Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko, Somalia’s Siad Barre and Liberia’s Samuel Doe. It was noted that a key factor in realising development objectives is to deepen trust between Africa and Europe and (for) Africa to set the agenda in crafting its own development goals...

The Cotonou Agreement was signed in June 2000 and replaced all the old accumulated Lomé and Yaoundé conventions. Like Lomé before it, Cotonou provides for aid and trade with ACP countries. Under aid, three main areas of support were identified: economic development; social and human development; and regional integration and co-operation. In addition, emphasis was placed on the pivotal role that the private sector can play in development. An Investment Facility was created to assist the banking sector to finance local business ventures, and provisions were made for the establishment of an ACP-EU Private Sector Business Forum. The agreement also had an important political chapter, dealing with such areas as governance and human rights, with a tighter regime of sanctions against backsliders.6

Under the area of trade it was agreed that the ACP and the EU would negotiate trade agreements with six regions (four in Africa, as well as the Caribbean and the Pacific) to replace the old Lomé provisions by December 2007, at which point a further WTO waiver on the firm Lomé principle of non-reciprocity – now abolished – would expire. The Cotonou Agreement, as part of the same process, also provided that Lomé Protocols, giving privileged access to certain commodities – notably sugar, beef, bananas and rum – would also be phased out. But it was the return to the reciprocity principle that had been enshrined in the former ‘Association’ arrangement of the 1960s that was the key reversal of Cotonou, and was accepted with much reluctance by the ACP.

At the Cape Town seminar the point was raised several times that the ACP states wanted to look into an alternative to the EPA option for a future relationship, and, despite repeated calls and requests for alternatives, the EPA negotiations had become a ‘dialogue of the deaf’. The question was asked how donors could prescribe solutions without listening to the opinions that stem from African experiences.

This would explain the outbreak of resistance by 2007, as evidenced by the critical statements made by some African leaders, notably President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, in Lisbon. This could also be seen in the statements from the ACP ministers’ meeting in Brussels in December 2007 when, after deploiring enormous pressure on ACP states by the EU to initial EPAs “against the spirit of the EU-ACP partnership”, the ministers “regretted that the EU’s mercantilist interests have taken precedence over the ACP’s developmental and regional integration interests.” Regional integration is viewed as a key component to economic development and as a necessary step to building a functioning African Union. However, participants at the Cape Town seminar noted that local efforts towards integration were being undermined by the EPA negotiations. African leaders therefore also, unusually, complained that statements and pronouncements by the European Commission to the media and other fora were “at variance” with the demands being made by ACP negotiating regions and states. This was a polite reference to some of the bullying postures adopted by the two EU Commissioners involved – Peter Mandelson, the EU Trade Commissioner, and Louis Michel, the Development Commissioner – in the run-up to the 31 December 2007 expiry of the WTO waiver.

"Regional integration is...a key component to economic development and...a necessary step to building a functioning African Union, (but) local efforts towards integration (are) being undermined by EPA negotiations."

The overall aim of the EU is eventually to establish Free Trade Areas (FTA) between Europe and ACP countries. These FTAs would have to be WTO-compatible, and therefore cover the WTO stipulation of ‘substantially all trade’, though the exact definition of what constitutes ‘substantially all trade’ is still up for debate. During the South Africa-EU negotiations between 1995 and 1999, the EU stated that this means, on average, 90 per cent or more of all bilateral trade flows. South Africa eventually managed to secure an 86 per cent liberalisation level of its trade with Europe, with Brussels gradually liberalising more substantially to reach the 90 per cent average. Given South Africa’s comparative economic strength, ACP countries can probably look forward to an even lower level of coverage.\(^\text{17}\)
During the Cotonou negotiations, it was agreed that none of the ACP countries should be worse off under an EPA than they were under the provisions of the Lomé Convention. The ACP countries were therefore offered improved market access to the EU, and it was generally understood that this would mean duty-free and quota-free access for all ACP countries. For more than half of the ACP states in the category of "Least Developed Countries" (LDCs) – as defined by the United Nations – this was, in fact, already granted in the 2001 provision for free access for “everything but arms” (EBA) from least developed countries.

However, these new arrangements might result in some significant adjustment costs for some of the ACP countries if their preferences are eroded vis-à-vis their competing fellow members. The negotiations have continued and will therefore have to keep focusing on either how to compensate the countries in question or how to maintain their preferences without falling foul of WTO rules. There must be close correlation with the "trade for aid" agenda, and the Paris Declaration and Donor Co-ordination of 2005 is key to mitigate successfully against the negative impact of free trade. In the interim, it has become clear that only free trade agreements will be the outcome of these negotiations, and 2008 will thus have to focus on how to minimise adjustment costs of such an arrangement for the ACP. To maximise the gains of market access, the negotiations will have to focus on how to simplify and optimise the rules of origin and to pay attention to the difficulties in meeting the EU’s very stringent sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules. Suggestions have been made for a simple 25 per cent value-added requirement for rules of origin with full cumulation with all developing countries, including South Africa. Regarding SPS measures, the ACP should be closely involved in the setting of these standards, and a significant amount of EU support should go towards establishing regional centres of excellence that can effectively verify these standards. In return, Europe expects the liberalisation of ACP markets to EU products.

Controversially, trade-related areas like investment, competition, procurement and trade facilitation, as well as trade in services, were included in the ACP/EU talks. This has led many to note that the negotiating agenda under the EPA talks is more ambitious than that under the WTO. It is also feared that the ACP will make concessions that they would otherwise not have made within the WTO context. Problems have further arisen on the definition of the four regional groups in Africa, covering, in principle, West, East, Central and Southern Africa. The EPA talks became more complex and fragmented with the approach of the deadline of 31 December 2007. The ACP was warned by the EU that a failure to sign would render parts of Cotonou illegal under the WTO. Many feel that a delay in implementation would help to resolve some of their difficulties, although Brussels became increasingly impatient with what it perceived to be the procrastination tactics of its ACP partners.

As the deadline approached, it became increasingly obvious that in the ACP regions, only the Caribbean was going to be ready to sign up to an EPA by December 2007. The EU was therefore placed in a position where it had to back-track on earlier firm opposition to interim agreements, since these would be the only vehicle that could reach WTO-compatible regimes by the deadline, yet still keep the door open to further negotiations on areas other than goods. In the run-up to the deadline, a flurry of last-minute interim agreements were signed by the EU on the one hand, and some ACP regions, sub-regions and individual states, on the other. All the interim agreements contain “rendezvous clauses” to continue negotiations in 2008.

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20 If agreement cannot be reached between EU and third parties, they often agree to return to the subject later. Their decision is made official by putting it in writing and including it as a clause in the legal text. This type of clause is known as a “rendezvous clause.”
Despite strong pressure from Brussels, a large number of ACP states still opted out of signing any agreement by December 2007. Most of these countries would maintain their market access to the EU through the EBA deal. The remaining non-LDC ACP countries that did not initial any agreement would be left to export under the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme, which results in the untenable situation in which tariffs would be increased on their exports.21

Which Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states have signed Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)?

Overview of EPA signatory states

a) Countries in italics are classified as Least Developed Countries. In the table compiled by the EU Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/gsp/eba4_sum.htm), Somalia and Timor-Leste (East Timor) are listed as LDC non-signatories (in the Eastern and Southern Africa, ESA; and Pacific ACP States, PACP; groupings respectively). Since neither country has played any part in the negotiation of EPAs, they are omitted here. The same applies to Cuba and South Africa, which are ACP members but not signatories of the Cotonou Agreement.

b) Cape Verde, where indicated in the EBA/GSP column, has been classified as non-LDC since January 2008, but will be able to export to the EU under the EBA initiative for a transitional period of three years.

21 The non-LDC countries that have not initialled an EPA include: Nigeria; Congo Brazzaville; Gabon; the Cook Islands; the Federated States of Micronesia; Nauru; Niue; Palau; Marshall Islands and Tonga.
### ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS - SIGNATORY STATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Signatory states in December 2007</th>
<th>Countries in Everything But Arms (EBA)/Standard Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) Category</th>
<th>Proportion of signatory countries</th>
<th>Number of liberalisation schedules</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) EPA</td>
<td>Comoros Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Seychelles Sudan Zambia Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Comoros Madagascar Mauritius Seychelles Zimbabwe Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Malawi Sudan Zambia</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>East African Community (EAC) EPA</td>
<td>Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda</td>
<td>Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA</td>
<td>Angola Botswana Lesotho Mozambique Namibia South Africa Swaziland</td>
<td>Botswana Lesotho Mozambique Namibia Swaziland Angola</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) EPA</td>
<td>Cameroon Chad Central African Republic Congo-Brazzaville Democratic Republic of the Congo Equatorial Guinea Gabon São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>Cameroon Chad Central African Republic Congo-Brazzaville Democratic Republic of the Congo Equatorial Guinea Gabon São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
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Although interim agreements were the only outcome possible under the circumstances, the further disintegration of the ACP group into even smaller sub-regions and individual states going it alone will have a detrimental impact on regional integration agendas in the ACP.\footnote{European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), 11 January 2008, “EPA Negotiations: Where do we stand?” (available at www.ecdpm.org/epa: accessed 15 January 2008).}

This was a key area raised by participants at the Cape Town seminar: the ACP group needs to remain a coherent and functioning entity. This is especially key to the African continent. It has not gone unnoticed that the well-intentioned EBA scheme (giving almost complete access to the EU for all least-developed countries) introduced in 2001, when Frenchman, Pascal Lamy, now head of the WTO, was still EU Commissioner for Trade, had the unintended effect of further introducing divisions among Africa’s struggling regional groupings.

A good example is the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which aims to establish a customs union by 2010. At the start of the EPA negotiations, SADC members were torn between joining either the SADC EPA group or the Eastern and Southern African (ESA) EPA group. The SADC group eventually consisted of eight states, which included South Africa, Angola and Tanzania but excluded Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, DRC, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Since a customs union, by definition, has a common external tariff to third

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**ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS - SIGNATORY STATES**

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) EPA</td>
<td>Antigua/Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts/Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent, Suriname, Trinidad/Tobago</td>
<td>Antigua/Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts/Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent, Suriname, Trinidad/Tobago</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1</td>
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Source: Christopher Stevens, Paper titled “Did the Sky Fall in on January 1?” January 2008, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London.
countries, it made no sense for SADC member states to be split into two groups to negotiate with the EU. The interim agreements have now further jeopardised progress towards a SADC customs union, as South Africa opted out of the EPA; Tanzania joined the new East African Community EPA; and Angola has only indicated that it might be willing to sign an EPA sometime in the future. Within the ESA grouping, Malawi, DRC and Zambia failed to initial the interim agreement, which leaves their future trading arrangement within Southern Africa unclear.

The reality of the interim agreements damages hopes for regional integration, especially in Africa, for both the EU and the ACP. From the outset, the EU stressed that the EPAs should be regional free trade agreements that would promote regional integration. However, by forcing the EPAs to be comprehensive agreements that include both services and investment rules, the EU lost the opportunity to use trade to further the cause of integration. Had Brussels focused on goods alone, the time available for negotiation might have been sufficient. For the ACP, an opportunity was thus lost to manage internally overlapping memberships of regional organisations and to consolidate the road towards the African Union’s goal of continental integration. Thus, far from promoting regional integration, the EU was perceived to be sowing divisions within ACP members. Cotonou’s trade provisions undermined ACP solidarity.

The negotiations had not been completed by August 2008 but, apart from the large number of countries that have failed to sign up to any agreement, those that have signed are committed to continuing negotiations in 2008 (and possibly beyond). Each of the initialled agreements has a ‘rendezvous clause’. Namibia, for instance, insisted that it would only “provisionally initial” an interim deal if it meant negotiations of the contentious issues would be solved before it has to sign the deal. And for many other ACP countries the important issue of development has not been adequately addressed. For the EU, the inclusion of non-goods-related aspects of trade agreements, like services and competition rules, are far from being satisfactorily addressed. The road to full agreement is still a long one.

Much has been said about the EPAs and their development component and numerous questions were asked at the Cape Town seminar around this topic. As in other trade negotiations – like the South Africa-EU Trade, Development and Co-operation (or the ‘SA-EU Free Trade’) Agreement (TDCA) and at the WTO – it is unclear what form that development component should take. Within the EPA context, the matter is further complicated by the fact that the Cotonou Agreement “already provides for measures to improve the poverty reducing impact of trade – to contribute to poverty reduction EPAs must result in things happening that would not otherwise occur”.

Although the Cotonou Agreement forms the direct basis for development co-operation between the EU and the ACP, the underpinning European Union treaty is the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. According to the treaty, development co-operation is officially a shared competence between the European Commission and EU member states, and has three key aims: promoting social and sustainable development; poverty alleviation; and integrating developing and least-developed countries into the global economy. The beneficiaries of this policy are predominantly ACP states.

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Cotonou also explicitly states that its focus is on poverty reduction. It further aims to base its strategies on international development targets as concluded within the UN and in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The accord shares responsibility for success between the European Commission, EU member states and the ACP, encouraging partners to co-operate towards finding effective strategies to promote development. While encouraging differentiation between the ACP, the agreement also supports an integrated approach, focusing on economic development, as well as social and human development. Regional co-operation and integration also accords high importance to the Non-State Actor (NSA) sector.

The ninth European Development Fund (EDF) expired on 31 December 2007. This date coincided with the deadline for the negotiation of EPAs between ACP countries and the EU. However, discussions of the tenth EDF are already well underway, and the result of these talks will determine the entire framework for development funding until 2013. The level of resources available for the tenth EDF has already been determined as part of the budgetary processes of the EU that was finalised in December 2005. It was agreed to provide 0.02821 per cent of EU Gross National Income (GNI) for the tenth EDF. This amounts to approximately €22.6 billion.

The European Investment Bank will also contribute €2 billion to the EDF, bringing the total budget to approximately €24 billion over six years. In the ninth EDF period, the basic amount available was €13.5 billion, but this was topped up by an extra €9.8 billion surplus from the sixth to the eighth EDF. The Maastricht-based European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) points out that the tenth EDF is even less than the ninth EDF with the ‘reliquats’ (i.e. unspent funding from the previous EDFs) in nominal terms as well as in relative terms as a percentage of the EU’s GNI. The allocation of the unspent surplus from the ninth EDF is yet to be approved for transfer to the tenth EDF and may be returned to member states rather than allocated to the tenth EDF. A large amount of resources (albeit a small percentage of Europe’s GNI) has thus already been committed to the ACP’s development. Continued calls from ACP states that the EPAs should include a development chapter with firm commitments from Europe on funding appears to have fallen on deaf ears, resulting in a continuation of this “dialogue of the deaf” between the rich North and the poor South.

However, as a result of the EPAs, ACP countries are likely to lose public revenue because of reduced tariff revenues: a key concern to ACP states. Furthermore, while liberalising trade with the EC (European Commission) and regional partners, ACP countries will face adjustment costs due to restructuring of their economies. This will require support for their productive capacities in order to take full advantage of new export opportunities. Adjustment costs will differ from one ACP country to another. Many of these states have already liberalised extensively under International Monetary Fund conditions (they also have only a small margin of products to liberalise) in order to bring the agreements in line with WTO rules and the stipulations of their interim EPA agreements. For others, adjustment to

27 See several publications by the ECDPM at www.ecdpm.org.
reach set targets could be significantly higher. It has thus proved difficult to negotiate regional agreements, as the economies of neighbouring states and their international trade policies can differ significantly.

Although it has been acknowledged that “the EC will continue to provide development assistance under the EDF as well as under special assistance programs in the area of sensitive products such as bananas, sugar and rice funded from the EU budget, [the] ACP countries stress the need to ensure additional funding for EPA support complementary to the EDF, in order to avoid diverting funds from other development areas to trade related projects.”

However, additional funding mechanisms are not the only way in which a trade agreement can be structured to be developmental in nature. The EU has argued strongly that the development aspect of the EPAs is about more than funding – that it is, to a large extent, also about the design of the agreements. In its promotional publication on the EU-SADC EPA, the Commission states: “Pro-development trade arrangements with Europe can help those [SADC] businesses develop and compete internationally. That is the vision at the heart of the Economic Partnership Agreements that will define future EU-SADC trade relations.” It says further that “EPAs are designed as a response to globalisation and the need for development. They are about creating an economic area where goods, services and finance can be more freely traded. They will also provide a clear set of transparent, predictable rules, offering stability to traders and investors alike.”

Analysis of market access issues for the entire ACP region has shown that, in order for the grouping to reach WTO-compliant free trade agreements with the EU, most of the ACP states would have to liberalise on only a small percentage of their current imports from the EU. This means that liberalisation in the trade of goods alone will not do much to strengthen the ACP’s role in international trade. The EU believes that, for the ACP to be drawn into the global economy and to kick-start economic development based on the EPAs, they need to be about more than just the liberalisation of trade in goods. Some Europeans also believe that investment agreements, in particular, can have a positive impact on foreign direct investment (FDI) in ACP countries.

Rules of Origin (RoO) are a neglected area of discussion on the development aspect of EPAs, yet they could determine their further impact on development. As Chris Stevens at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London writes: “They are the ‘small print’ of trade preference and regional trade agreements – any favourable treatment that they promise applies only to goods that meet the rules. Changing the rules will change the benefits.” Or, as Mark Pearson, of the Regional Trade Facilitation Programme (RTFP) in Tshwane, South Africa, points out: “while strict rules of origin can effectively act as barriers to trade, more liberal allowances can serve to stimulate exports. In the context of the EPAs, if these rules are difficult to fulfil, cause significant delays or involve high costs for exporters, many of the potential advantages of the trade agreements will be cancelled out.”

EU RoOs have, in the past, come under severe criticism for their complexity and for acting as barriers to trade, rather than tools for development. In Southern Africa, Lesotho’s textile industry is an example of the dramatic impact that RoOs can have. Lesotho enjoys the same kind of duty-free and quota-free access to the US market under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000 as it does to the EU under its own EBA

scheme. However, Lesotho’s exports to the US by far outstrip its exports to the EU. Furthermore, the composition of 97 per cent of the country’s exports to the EU consists of mineral exports, whereas exports to the US mainly consist of textiles and clothing – a high employment-creating industry in Lesotho.

In sum, the EPAs are still a long way from being finalised and even further from delivering on promises of regional and global economic integration for the ACP. A long road of evaluation and negotiation still lies ahead. Many in Africa remain sceptical about the EPAs, but it remains to be seen whether a positive outcome can still be achieved from what has largely turned into a disappointing and frustrating process that has impacted negatively on the relationship between once-strong allies: the ACP and the EU.

2.2 Peacekeeping and Security Co-operation

Turning from economic to security issues, in recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the strong links between development and security, and that there can be no sustainable development without stability and security. This is true in Africa, Europe and the rest of the world. This idea also acknowledges the importance of human security within the broader context of peacekeeping and security, which was the subject of discussions at the Cape Town seminar. It was strongly felt that Africa’s human security needs – including tackling HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, which are all major obstacles to development – must be urgently addressed, health systems strengthened, and resources increased.
EU Initiatives

Traditionally, the European Union as a bloc has been unable and/or unwilling to get involved in African conflict situations, though individual countries such as France intervened militarily over 30 times in post-colonial Africa. There are also concerns in Africa that, after policy debacles in Rwanda (1994) and Zaire (1997), Paris is seeking to use the EU to legitimise future military interventions in strategically important parts of the continent. With the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) from 1992 (the Maastricht Treaty) to 1997 (the Amsterdam Treaty) with its major component being a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Europe as a bloc has been more active in international crisis situations. Still, the EU’s participation in African cases is often limited, and Brussels often prefers to work through Africa’s regional organisations. One central goal of the new EU Strategy for Africa is to increase Europe’s efforts at all stages of the conflict cycle and to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), with the African Union and its 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) established in 2004, at its core. This is an effort to support the growing African political will to find African solutions to African conflicts. An African Standby Force (ASF) is also to be established by 2010, based on five sub-regional brigades.32

In 2004, the EU established a €250 million development instrument in support of African peace support operations and capacity-building in the area of peace and security. This African Peace Facility (APF) is funded from the resources of the European Development Fund. The funds from the APF can be used to finance some of the costs incurred by African peacekeeping forces, such as the cost of transporting troops, soldiers’ living expenses, and the development of other capabilities. This money can, however, not be used to cover direct military and arms expenditure. In April 2006, the EU agreed to provide an extra €300 million under the tenth EDF to continue support for the African Peace Facility for 2008-2010. This support needs to be sustained.

The Context of Europe’s involvement in African Peacekeeping and Security

The European Commission, as well as its Council and Parliament have all sought to provide assistance in building the AU’s peacekeeping capacity. This goes back at least to the EU-Africa summit in Cairo in 2000, and received a boost when the EU adopted an African strategy in 2005, which was accepted by the AU. Consultations were initiated to outline a draft joint strategy, which was adopted at the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon in December 2007. Central among the cluster topics that this joint strategy seeks to address is peace and security, and there was a pledge to increase co-operation between Africa and the EU in this key sector. Regular dialogue is also envisaged, including consultation between the Peace and Security Councils of both Unions, as well as mechanisms for regular consultations at ambassadorial level in Addis Ababa, Brussels and at the United Nations in New York.

The EU’s peacekeeping and security strategy also makes a commitment to capacity-building and co-operation in the fight against global terrorism, as well as networking and information exchange on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), and Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL). The strategy provides for awareness-raising on peace and security issues involving civil society, and for joint assessment missions in conflict and post-conflict areas. The short Lisbon Declaration that accompanied the Strategy in 2007 committed both continents to a “robust peace and security architecture in Africa.”33

32 Akokpari, Ndinga-Muvumba and Murithi (eds), The African Union and its Institutions
33 For the text of the Strategy and Action Plan and other Lisbon documents see the websites http://europafrique.org/lisbon-summit/ and www.europafrica.org
Military interventions often require sustained and durable funding, and without UN, EU, and other Western funding, the AU and Africa’s sub-regional organisations would often not be able to undertake peacekeeping missions. Apart from funding for the African Peace Facility mentioned earlier, the EU partly assisted in funding the $200 million shortfall for the AU operation in Sudan’s Darfur region (AMIS), an ongoing commitment into 2008 under the UN/AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Brussels has also been assisting with the building of capacity in the AU’s Peace and Security Department. The European Commission’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), established by the EU Council in 2001 to address political and/or emergency-related situations, has further provided specific support to AU-led peacekeeping efforts in Burundi between 2003 and 2004. A French-led force, Operation Artemis, was sent to Ituri in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003, and 700 EU peacekeepers were deployed to assist the UN force in DRC at the time of elections in the Congo in 2006. This was a significant shift in EU policy in its involvement in African conflicts. There were divergent views expressed at the Cape Town seminar on whether the French call for EU security involvement in francophone countries was a coincidence. Views were also expressed on aspects of US ‘cowboy diplomacy’ in Africa, and some African states were said to view EU involvement as a ‘lesser evil’ that brought with it certain advantages to Africa in its present situation.

Apart from the existing Code of Conduct on arms exports to stem the illicit flow of weapons, particularly to Africa, the EU is also encouraging its members to ratify the UN Convention on Corruption of December 2005, to ensure the proper management of natural resources in war-affected parts of Africa. The European Development Fund has supported democratic governance programmes in Africa at the country level, and is assisting with developing the AU’s capacity to monitor and address governance issues. Through political dialogue and consultations with its African partners, the EU supports ongoing efforts to monitor and improve governance initiatives. In particular, the EU has endorsed the work of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of 2004, which also figures prominently in the Joint Strategy approved in Lisbon.

African citizens are engaging with the work of the AU through its Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). Through ECOSOCC, African civil society has sought to influence the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of AU policies and programmes. Currently, there is an ongoing ECOSOCC initiative to strengthen the AU/EU partnership through greater civil society participation. The EU, through the Maastricht-based European Centre for Development Policy Management, has produced a number of issue-papers dealing with priority areas and to serve as a framework for collaboration between the two continents.

These four areas include: peace and security; governance, democracy and human rights; trade and regional integration; and development. This initiative aims to provide guidelines for collecting ideas from civil society organisations, parliamentarians, and other relevant stakeholders in order to feed them into official EU and AU deliberations. Specifically, these public consultations have been designed to encourage debate among the wider public, so that African and European civil society actors can feed their views into the working of the Joint Strategy. In order to promote focused debate and to ensure that concrete proposals emerge, the AU established an Interim Steering Committee for Civil Society Consultation on the EU-AU Joint Strategy for Africa in 2007, which led to a formal meeting with civil society in Lisbon in December 2007 that produced its own joint strategy.
Two Case Studies

How do these efforts from Africa and Europe to develop a joint strategy translate into assistance in conflict situations on the African continent? The Cape Town meeting examined two conflict areas in which the AU and the EU have been involved: Sudan’s Darfur province and Africa’s Great Lakes region.

a) Darfur

More than 200,000 people are estimated to have died in Darfur since 2003. This massive military and humanitarian crisis is too large a problem for the African Union to deal with without the assistance of the international community. The 7,000 ill-equipped and poorly resourced AU peacekeepers, who were deployed in Darfur by 2004 with a restricted ceasefire monitoring mandate, have scarcely been able to protect themselves, let alone Darfuris. In July 2007, the UN Security Council mandated a 26,000-strong UNAMID hybrid force under the leadership of Nigerian Force Commander, General Martin Agwai – who was present at the Cape Town seminar – to bolster the AU mission in Darfur. With UNAMID coming officially into existence on 1 January 2008, there were still only 9,000 troops committed to the force. There had already been urgent appeals to UN member states from General Agwai to face their responsibilities and provide the pledged troops. He has also publicly drawn attention to the need for heavy-duty helicopters, the absence of which was particularly telling after the attack by a rebel faction on the AU base at Haskanita in the Darfur region in October 2007. Eleven AU peacekeepers were killed in this attack and many more injured, but the critically wounded could not be immediately evacuated for lack of means to do so.
Under a plan devised in July 2006, the UN was to provide financial and logistical support to the AU force that would eventually be subsumed under a UN mission. The Omar al-Bashir government in Khartoum, however, resisted a strong UN presence in Darfur (despite the existence of a 10,000-member UN force in South Sudan to oversee the peace accord there), branding it an effort by the West to extend its influence in the area. This foot-dragging continued for an extended period, and still continues. It remains a continuing challenge for those in the AU who see the Darfur exercise as an important test of the new organisation’s credibility. Indictment for war crimes in Darfur against al-Bashir which the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) announced in July 2008 could further complicate peacemaking efforts.

Though many UN processes have pledged support to strengthening the peacekeeping capacity of Africa’s regional organisations, this has often been more rhetoric than reality. Former African UN Secretaries-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, both commissioned and wrote four reports urging such actual support between 1992 and 2005. Annan recommended a ten-year capacity-building programme for AU peacekeeping by the UN, but more powerful members have been reluctant to fund regional peacekeepers from assessed UN contributions.

The EU’s response to the Darfur crisis has included a number of mutually enforcing and complementary strategies, but these still focus on Brussels’ traditional “hands-off” approach. The EU – led by France – has deployed more troops on African soil, albeit in neighbouring Chad, as well as in the Central African Republic (CAR). In both cases, reverberations from Darfur have been seriously destabilising for countries where the regimes of presidents Idriss Deby (Chad) and Francois Bozizé (CAR) are already extremely fragile. French concerns at the spreading of the Darfur conflict to their own African clients, and the perceived wider threat to regional stability, placed Paris at the forefront of lobbying efforts for the creation of the largest EU force deployed thus far (see details below).

In sum, the EU has enacted the following strategies in Darfur and its environs:

- The EU has mobilised funds of around €1 billion. Most resources have been provided for humanitarian assistance, including food and other aid to Darfuri refugees in neighbouring Chad. The European Commission has allocated €282 million in humanitarian support to Darfur. EU member states have also provided around €12 million in support of the political process. Contributions to the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the AMIS force amounted to approximately €325 million, including funding from the African Peace Facility of €212 million;

- Brussels actively supported the Abuja peace talks leading to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in 2006, including providing funding of €850,000;

- The EU is continuing its support for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A);

- The EU appointed Danish diplomat Torben Brylle as its Special Envoy to Darfur in 2007, who worked with the AU Special Envoy for Darfur, former OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim appointed in 2005;

- In July 2007, the deployment of an EU Force (EUFOR) in Chad and CAR was approved in Brussels, with the endorsement of the UN Security Council. The mandate of the force was officially to guarantee the
security of the 400,000 refugees from Darfur and displaced persons in camps along the border in both
countries. However, there was some concern in some EU member states about the high visibility and
vulnerability of the force, which contributed to delays in assembling both personnel and materials. By
January 2008, with extra commitments from Ireland, Poland and, especially, France, the EU Council of
Ministers confirmed that it would be sending a force of around 3,700 troops, of which France would provide
2,100, and the remainder would be drawn from 13 other EU member states. The common financing by the
EU of the operation was put at €100-120 million for the first year, but this would only amount to 15 per cent
of the total estimated cost. Even in the week that EUFOR was agreed by the EU Council of Ministers on 24
January 2008, the deployment of the force was delayed by a new invasion of Chad by Chadian rebels from
across the Sudan border, which was only foiled at great cost after three days of combat in the Chadian
capital (in May 2008, Chadian-based Sudanese rebel forces launched an attack on the outskirts of
Khartoum which was repelled by the government); and

- The EU has also supported AMIS in Darfur through the provision of equipment and assets, planning and
technical assistance, military observers, training of African troops and civilian police officers; and
strategic transportation (EU civilian-military supporting action). This support was also extended to the
new hybrid UN/AU force. There is, however, still much nervousness within the international community
at the unenthusiastic, and at times openly uncooperative, attitude of the Sudanese government when
faced with any outside intervention, be it the AU, the EU or the UN.

b) The Great Lakes Region

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, four decades of bad governance under the Western-backed Mobutu
Sese Seko dictatorship eventually resulted in a devastating civil war by 1997. During peace negotiations, various
factions often failed to demonstrate genuine commitment to implementing peace agreements, and plundered
the country’s rich economic resources. Laurent Kabila launched a rebellion in 1997 that toppled Mobutu with
help from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola. Despite expectations that the Congolese would finally be liberated
from tyranny, Kabila’s rule continued in the autocratic traditions of Mobutu. In August 1998, Kabila’s former
allies, Uganda and Rwanda, invaded the Congo in support of anti-government rebels. In response, a pro-Kabila
alliance of Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Chad sent troops to the DRC.

From left: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo, South Africa’s Special
Envoys to the Great Lakes Region; and Ambassador Aldo Ajello, former EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region

Kabila was assassinated in 2001 by one of his presidential bodyguards. His son, Joseph, assumed power in Kinshasa. Sporadic fighting continued, particularly in Orientale province and the Kivu region. The Inter-Congolese dialogue took place in South Africa in 2002 and a power-sharing agreement was eventually negotiated between the key parties. In July 2002, South African President Thabo Mbeki brokered the Pretoria accord between the DRC and Rwanda, in which Kagali agreed to withdraw from the Congo in exchange for Kabila’s promise to track down and disarm militias that had launched attacks on Rwanda from the Congo.

A month later, Angola brokered the Luanda accord between the DRC and Uganda, in which Kampala agreed to withdraw from the Congo. In December 2002, Congolese parties meeting in Tshwane (Pretoria) signed an accord that called for a two-year transition during which Kabila would remain president, running the country with four vice-presidents, including representatives of: the Rally for a Democratic Congo (RCD); the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC); and the unarmed opposition. Many Congolese expressed concern at the lack of support for this warlords’ government of self-serving political office-holders from Mobutu’s discredited dictatorship.

In July 2003, the UN Security Council mandated its 17,000 peacekeepers to use force to implement its mandate in Ituri and Kivu provinces, and imposed an ineffectual arms embargo. A month later, William Swing, a veteran American diplomat, was appointed as the UN Special Representative in Kinshasa, raising hopes that the presence of a high-profile American in the post would encourage Washington to lend greater support to the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). From 2003, Senegalese diplomat Ibrahima Fall also supervised the Great Lakes Conference involving regional governments and civil society. Italian diplomat Aldo Ajello contributed to peacebuilding efforts as the EU Special Envoy to the Great Lakes. The Transitional Government struggled, amidst widespread allegations of corruption against its members and the military top brass, to implement a disarmament programme.35

Between June and September 2003, the EU’s French-led Operation Artemis was deployed to Bunia in eastern DRC to help support the UN’s efforts in the volatile Ituri province. The mission was deemed a success because it was able to contain the problem, before handing over to UN peacekeepers. The EU also sent a small, 1,400-strong EUFOR force to the DRC in 2006 to monitor the elections and to contribute to a peaceful environment in support of the 17,000 troops already there under UN control. Twenty-five million potential Congolese voters took part in the elections, which cost an estimated $422 million, with the EU providing much of these funds. With such a small force, the EU could not have been expected to make much of a difference to the situation on the ground. The deployment of the EU force was, however, important in defining the approach and potential future security role of the EU in Africa. Mary Martin argued strongly in 2007 that the EU-DRC mission "has been the most striking example so far of the EU using human security as a methodology for its external engagement", and this experience is expected to establish a framework for future military and civilian assistance to Africa.36

At the same time, a European human security doctrine implies a normative emphasis intended to focus the attention of actors on the means and methods by which external intervention seeks to achieve peace and

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security. This approach is about “combining military force and civilian measures in such a way that it produces not merely short-term stabilisation, but the foundations of sustainable peace.” The resurgence of rebellion in eastern Congo in 2007 led to new concerns within the international community at the new threat of humanitarian disaster in the DRC. The mobilisation of mediators from many quarters, including the EU, helped to bring about yet another peace deal signed in Goma, eastern Congo, in January 2008. This involved over 20 groups, including the army of the ethnic Tutsi “General”, Laurent Nkunda, and the pro-government Mai Mai militia group. The success of the accord, however, still depends heavily on whether the Rwandan government is satisfied that the accord has addressed the problem of surviving members of the Interahamwe, the Hutu militia that was largely responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide that resulted in 800,000 deaths.

While the EU is still grappling with the nature of its global military interventions, Brussels has singled out the Congo (alongside Sudan) as a key area of priority on the African continent. The EU is currently involved in a joint action to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC within the framework of the ESDP. The mission will provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the Congolese army. The question of military interventions also engaged considerable and sometimes heated debate in the Cape Town seminar, in view of many reservations over the actions of some EU member states, notably France, in the past. Perceptions have been widespread in Africa that France – having been discredited by unilateral interventions in Rwanda (1994) and Zaire (1997) – may be seeking multilateral EU cover for future military interventions in Africa. These suspicions have been reinforced by the French-led EU intervention in DRC in 2003; the current EU force in Chad and Central African Republic to support the UN/AU mission in Darfur; and French interventions to protect regimes in Chad (2006 and 2008) and CAR (2006), all interventions staged in francophone Africa. Most participants felt that, in view of the developing common European defence and security policy, EU member states should not only seek to intervene in future under the EU umbrella, but also seek UN authority and African support. Future missions would be well advised to avoid such suspicions of a Gallic pursuit of parochial interests, and to ensure that the primacy of the world body in maintaining international peace and security is not eroded through EU actions.

37 Ibid. p.67.
2.3 Migration

The third and final area of focus of Africa/Europe relations – international migration – is increasingly viewed as an important contributor to development. Migration is a phenomenon that persists and is being discussed in many international fora. A major issue is how to maximise the benefits of migration to both the home and host countries, and the role that migration can play in the distribution of income, wealth and resources and contribute to human development. The challenge remains to develop a human rights approach in dealing with migrants.

At the Lisbon Summit in December 2007, the AU and the EU declared: “On a global scale, we have today an increased understanding of our vital interdependence and are determined to work together in the global arena on the key political challenges of our time, such as energy and climate change, migration or gender issues.” Although the issue has been hotly debated, Africa and Europe are still far from a clear and jointly owned strategy on migration. These issues must be addressed intelligently through long-term strategies using mechanisms such as the AU/EU troika meetings and the EU/Mediterranean process that focuses on the countries of North Africa. There should be a growing recognition that migrants are not economic entities, but human beings, and migration should be seen as an additional tool to reduce poverty. There is an urgent need for an integrated approach and the need for better data and information. Migration was also discussed within the context of the trade and development aspects of the Africa-Europe relationship. The free movement of people is being discussed at the World Trade Organisation, although little progress has been made thus far. It would seem as if greater progress is being made at the UN through its Global Commission on International Migration, although its impact would arguably be less than a breakthrough at the WTO. The Cape Town seminar debated how Europe could contribute to a positive debate on migration, as three broad approaches to migration essentially still exist within Europe: one that focuses on containing migration, on physically intercepting and halting would-be immigrants to Europe; a second approach sees migration as a fact and a potentially positive contributor to development in Europe as well as Africa; and the third approach examines the root causes of migration and tries to address them in developing countries, thereby encouraging nationals to remain in their home countries.


From left: Professor Dietrich Thränhardt, University of Münster, Germany; Ms Njeri Karuru, Information Development Research Centre, Nairobi; Mr Vincent Williams, Programme Manager, Southern African Migration Programme, Cape Town.

36 EURAFRIQUE? AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY
Containing migration is the first knee-jerk response to a phenomenon generally perceived to be a problem in Europe. Increasing numbers of foreigners are seen as a burden on European social budgets and a threat to local cultures and norms. That this reaction is misguided, and stems from ignorance of the economic need for migration in order for the European economy to grow, is clear. Europe’s future growth depends on the movement of skilled and semi-skilled labour to Europe. Even workers with no or limited skills should be welcomed to ensure that current growth can be sustained.

Migration to Europe is a necessary component of the continent’s growth strategy. In order to ensure that immigrants contribute to the economy as well as their new society, host countries should aim to integrate immigrants into societies quicker and in a more coherent way. This was also recommended by a 2007 OECD report, which argued that Europe should provide fair and immediate access to labour markets for immigrants since economic integration can pave the way for social integration. It is crucial to encourage language courses at the outset, and to ensure that immigrant children gain early access to education in order to form a firm basis for learning new languages and cultural nuances. Immigrants from Africa to Europe should also be encouraged to form part of the social fabric of their adoptive homes.

Fears have been expressed in Europe that immigrants are diluting cultural norms and traditions. However, viewed from the other side, migration can lead to ‘a transfer of cultural and social values and capabilities in the home countries of immigrants. In Bangalore in India you can see very clearly that migrants have also brought home modern attitudes. For example, corruption is in decline, the number of children per family is decreasing (whether we regard this as positive or not), and people who have worked in the US try to introduce modern business practices. Finally, migration may have an influence on political development, particularly in countries where opposition groups are not tolerated at home but can influence the situation from abroad.”

A more liberal approach to migration as a whole would regard the process as a catalyst for development. Proponents of this view argue that an African Diaspora could contribute to the building of lobby groups for Africa in Europe as well as a knowledge base in Africa, as migrants return home. Migration contributes to economic wealth in Africa through remittances from family members abroad. Where and how these remittances are spent is still not well understood, and this remains an area that could benefit from additional research. The amount of remittances sent back to Africa far outweighs the development aid the continent currently receives, as Dietrich Thränhardt has noted: ‘The World Bank has calculated that globally these transfers are about two-and-a-half times greater than official development aid. They are also more stable and reliable than private foreign investment. We may argue over what kind of transfers are more important for development. But we do know that a lot of overhead costs are associated with development aid, whereas remittances actually reach part of the population of poor countries and create demand which stimulates the economy.”

There are discrepancies between policies among EU states, even among states that belong to the Schengen agreement, the main purpose of which is to abolish internal physical borders. The 2007 OECD report also encouraged policy co-ordination between the EU’s development policy towards African countries and

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41 Ibid. p. 60.
understanding the positive effects of migration in the home countries of migrants. These initiatives could contribute to the positive experience of migration. At the same time, African countries would do well to incorporate aspects of migration and the impact of remittances into their national development strategies.42

A third approach to migration examines how to encourage migrants in general to remain in their home countries and to apply skills learnt where it is most needed. How does one mitigate the ‘push-factor’ of migration – those factors, like crop failure, poor living standards and unemployment – that drive people from a country? Approaches to dealing with this challenge would include: improving governance at home and increasing peace and stability; increasing the standard of living; and creating economic opportunities, thus discouraging citizens from migration. However, research has shown that, as countries start to develop and improve their governance, education and economic growth, migration occurs as a natural phenomenon. As Dietrich Thränhardt observed: “Attempts have often been made to use development aid to prevent migration. This simply cannot work because development does not lead to less migration; on the contrary, it will at least initially lead to more migration. If you introduce modern technologies, for example tractors, into agrarian societies, you reduce the need for rural labour, and this will cause surplus labourers to migrate.”43

In addition, it has been noted that a large percentage of migrants do return home after a stint of a few years abroad. The OECD confirms this point in its 2007 report by arguing that “the quest for successful migration management is hindered by the lack of knowledge and ill-defined concepts and policy thinking that lead to poor outcomes. For instance, temporary and permanent migration are distinctions that are losing their ability to describe how people behave today – resulting in policies that lock people in (or out). Many permanent immigrants return to their countries or move on to other countries. That process is likely to accelerate as information regarding far-flung job opportunities improve and the cost of migration fall. Similarly, many temporary migrants stay on (legally or illegally) in their countries of employment.”44

Policy development over the years has often failed to recognise that differentiating between highly skilled and low-skilled migrants does not help either in managing the number of immigrants or in successfully addressing the needs of Western economies and the gaps in their labour forces. There is, however, an elite-migration process that is welcomed in Europe. For instance, there are more Malawian doctors in Manchester, England, than in Malawi. But the exclusively welcoming of high-skilled migrants and the benefits they can bring ignores the big gaps at the lower end of the labour market that could easily be filled by other immigrants. Secondly, allowing high-skilled immigrants to be accompanied by their families also results in a number of non-high-skilled labourers crossing borders.

But how would an AU-EU migration policy be implemented? Torsten Moritz, of the Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME), has argued that “cooperation between the EU and Africa on migration issues is not at all new. The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the EU and 78 ACP states includes the famous Article

42 OECD, Gaining from Migration: Towards a New Mobility System, OECD Development Centre, 2007 (available at http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,en_2649_33935_39207646_1_1_1_1,00.html).
43 Thränhardt, “A Gradual Opening of Borders can lead to Win-Win Situations”.
44 OECD, Gaining from Migration: Towards a New Mobility System.
13 on political cooperation and dialogue on migration. It goes to great lengths in describing the modalities of the readmission of people who have come to Europe through ACP countries or who are nationals of ACP countries. For the last four to five years, almost every European Council has discussed the connection between migration and development – very often with the connotation of saying: we penalise countries who do not cooperate with us in migration questions by cutting development aid to them.” However, people are increasingly calling for new approaches to the perceived problem of migration and a more humane response to the attraction for Africans of the lures of “fortress Europe”. New initiatives and ideas can change the way in which migration is perceived. During the EPA negotiations, the Caribbean countries tried to include a certain number of visa requirement liberalisations in their agreement, although the EU did not want to set a precedent for other developing countries. South Africa, in turn, is in discussions with the EU on how Europe can contribute to the training of its doctors, since many of them end up working in Europe.

Though migration is a contested area, this is clearly a sensitive topic in both Africa and Europe, and the EU-Africa Strategy does not provide much guidance on how to address this important topic. However, given the attention that the issue continues to receive, migration is bound to remain on the international agenda, and policy must start to move towards harnessing the positive impact that migration can bring to both Europe and Africa. The current “brain-drain” from Africa to Europe should become a “brain-gain” for both Europe and Africa.

45 Torsten Moritz, “Limiting Migration by Border Controls, or Enhancing the Development Effects of Migration – Two Contradictory Approaches in European Migration Policy”, in Global Structure Policy for Africa’s Development: Taking a Hard Look at EU-Africa Strategy
3. Policy Recommendations

The Cape Town meeting resulted in 14 policy recommendations in the three areas of economics, peacekeeping, and migration. These were presented as a contribution to the shaping of discussions at the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon, Portugal, in December 2007. The recommendations have been revised in light of the Lisbon summit, and the expiry of the EU deadline on Economic Partnership Agreements at the end of 2007.

The Africa-Europe Economic Relationship

- Despite numerous policy documents, summit declarations and strategy papers between Africa and Europe, not enough was done in the past about the implementation and monitoring of these agreements. The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership adopted in Lisbon in December 2007 sought to create a framework by which declarations and decisions can be implemented and monitored. This will still have been in vain in the absence of sufficient attention being paid to capacity and resources, but, above all, political will in both Africa and Europe.

- The adoption of the joint strategy paper and action plan at the Lisbon summit of 2007 should be a step towards deepening trust and confidence in the Africa-Europe relationship. This should apply to the issue of EPAs, and, although these relate to Cotonou and the ACP relationship, they should be consistent with the philosophy of the joint EU-AU strategy. The way EPAs threatened to spoil the atmosphere in Lisbon highlights the importance of such a co-ordinated approach.

- A broad review of problems surrounding EPAs should therefore be undertaken to ensure the building and maintenance of trust between Africa and Europe. This could grant an extended time-frame before ACP countries are expected to sign the EPAs, which, in any case, would be an acceptance of present realities, since less than half the ACP group signed up to EPAs on 1 January 2008. Strategic documents should be jointly developed to maximise ownership by both partners and to enhance real partnership between the two continents.

- The ambition for regional integration, which goes back to the Lomé Convention of 1975, is close to the heart of African states. The EU is to be commended for supporting this aspiration, in both Cotonou and the Lisbon strategy, but there is merit to the concern of the ACP ministers that the Cotonou approach to regional groupings has, in fact, given rise to unfortunate divisions. This needs to be urgently rectified.

- The spirit of the AU's inclusion of the African Diaspora as its sixth region (including Caribbean members of the ACP) should be invoked in efforts to ensure the cohesiveness and unity of the ACP group, as well as to make sure that the EU's new Africa strategy, and that contained in Cotonou, remain in harmony with each other.

- African leaders should call on Europe to implement reforms agreed to in its Common Agricultural Policy, an initiative that is still widely perceived by Africans to be a profligate programme that contradicts the EU's fair trade policies in an area in which Africa has a comparative advantage.

- The impact of climate change in Africa should be investigated, especially on the continent's vulnerable and marginalised communities: mutual policies should be developed to avoid Africa's development being adversely affected.
Peacekeeping and Security

- Relations between the AU and the EU in the field of peace and security have to be based on mutual self-interest. Therefore, through the 15-member African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) and sub-regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); Africa must contribute significantly to defining and supporting its own security agenda.

- Both Africa and Europe should put increased weight and political will behind the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010, currently described as a ‘work in progress’ in need of continuing material and capacity-building support. The €250 million provided for the African Peace Support Facility (APSF) by the EU between 2004 and 2007, and subsequent provision of €300 million, must be sustained. Pledges made by the UN and the Group of Eight (G8) industrialised countries, involving EU countries France, Britain, and Italy, must also be urgently met.

- Peacekeeping missions in Africa must be provided speedily with better resources and equipment, particularly attack and utility helicopters, the lack of which have often impeded operations in difficult circumstances. This has now become more important with the arrival of the hybrid UN/AU mission in Darfur.

- Africa’s human security needs, including tackling HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, which are all major obstacles to development, must be urgently addressed. Health systems must be strengthened and resources increased through bodies like the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.
Given the strong link between security and development, Africa and Europe should work for the conclusion of an international arms treaty. This could build on such initiatives as the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 1998 and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies of 1996 which limit arms exports from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.

### Migration

- Finally, in the area of migration, the EU should finance training in African countries that are home to migrant doctors and nurses in order to replace skills lost to these countries.

- More research financing should also go towards understanding the phenomenon of migration and its impact on both the host countries and the countries of origin. This could help ensure that migration policies are more effective and mutually beneficial. It could also address the rise in xenophobic immigration policies and of racism in Europe.
Annex I

Agenda

Tuesday 30 October 2007

18h30 – 20h00 Welcome Reception and Dinner

Day One Wednesday 31 October 2007

9h00 – 9h15 Welcome and Opening

Chair: Ms Yasmin Sooka, Director, Foundation for Human Rights, Tshwane

Panelists: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Ulrich Golaszinski, Resident Representative, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Mozambique

9h15 – 11h00 Session I: The AU and the EU: Shotgun Wedding, Marriage of Convenience, or Strategic Partnership?

Chair: H.E. Dan Frederiksen, Ambassador of Denmark to South Africa, Tshwane

Panelists: Dr Solomon Gomes, Senior Political Officer, Darfur Integrated Task Force, African Union (AU) Commission, Addis Ababa

H.E. Lodewijk Briët, Head of the European Union (EU) Delegation to South Africa, Tshwane

11h00 – 11h15 Coffee Break

11h15 – 12h45 Session II: Trade, Aid and Development: A Dialogue of The Deaf?

Chair: H.E. Dieter W Haller, Ambassador of Germany to South Africa, Tshwane

Panelists: H.E. Peter Katjavivi, Ambassador of Namibia to Germany, Berlin

H.E. Rob de Vos, Ambassador of the Netherlands to South Africa, Tshwane

The Most Rev. Njongonkulu Ndungane, Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town

12h45 – 13h45 Lunch
13h45 – 15h30  Session III: Mediation and Peacemaking in Sudan

Chair: Ms Yasmin Sooka, Executive Director, Foundation for Human Rights, Tshwane

Panelists: General Martin Agwai, Force Commander of the UN/AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

Professor Holger Hansen, Centre for African Studies, University of Copenhagen

15h30 – 15h45  Coffee Break

15h45 – 17h15  Session IV: Mediation and Peacemaking in the Great Lakes

Chair: Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo, South Africa’s Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region

Panelists: Ambassador Aldo Ajello, former EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

20h00  Dinner

Day Two  Thursday 1 November 2007

9h00 – 11h00  Session V: From Lomé to Lisbon: The History and Practice of a Relationship

Chair: Mr Soumano Sako, African Capacity Building Foundation, Harare

Panelists: Mr Kaye Whiteman, former Editor, West Africa, London

Dr Martin Uhomoibhi, Ambassador of Nigeria to the United Nations, Geneva

Dr Ernst Stetter, Director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Brussels

11h00 – 11h15  Coffee Break
11h15 – 13h00 Session VI: Military Co-operation, Human Security and Peacekeeping: The Invalid and the Gendarme?

Chair: Mr Ibrahim Nawar, Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo

Panelists: Ms Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Catherine Gegout, School of Politics, University of Nottingham

13h00 – 14h00 Lunch

14h00 – 15h30 Session VII: Migration: Africa’s “Boat People” Encounter “Fortress Europe”?

Chair: Ms Njeri Karuru, Information Development Research Centre, Nairobi

Panelists: Mr Vincent Williams, Programme Manager, Southern African Migration Programme, Cape Town

Professor Dietrich Thränhardt, University of Münster

15h30 – 15h45 Coffee Break

15h45 – 16h00 Filling out of Evaluation Forms

16h00 – 16h15 Coffee Break

16h15 – 17h15 Session VIII: Rapporteurs’ Report and the Way Forward

Chair: Ms Joan Thomas, Acting High Commissioner of Jamaica to South Africa, Tshwane

Panelists: Ms Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, Independent Consultant, Leuven

Mr Kaye Whiteman, former Editor, West Africa, London
Annex II
List of Participants

1. Dr Adekeye Adebajo
   Centre for Conflict Resolution
   Cape Town
   South Africa

2. General Martin Agwai
   Force Commander
   African Union Mission in Sudan
   Khartoum

3. Ambassador Aldo Ajello
   Former EU Special Representative
   for the Great Lakes Region

4. Ms Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott
   Independent Consultant
   Cape Town
   South Africa

5. Mr Jean-Luc Bodin
   Consul of France
   Cape Town
   South Africa

6. Paul Bradnum
   Centre for Conflict Resolution
   Cape Town
   South Africa

7. Ambassador Lodewijk A E Briët
   EU Delegation to South Africa
   Tshwane
   South Africa

8. Mr Guillaume Chevalier
   Consul of France
   Cape Town
   South Africa

9. Ms Rosaline Daniel
   Centre for Conflict Resolution
   Cape Town
   South Africa

10. Ambassador Rob de Vos
    Royal Netherlands Embassy
    Tshwane
    South Africa

11. Major Frank Sunday Etim
    African Union Mission in Sudan
    Khartoum

12. Ambassador Dan Frederiksen
    Royal Danish Embassy
    Tshwane
    South Africa

13. Dr Catherine Gegout
    University of Nottingham
    Nottingham
    England

14. Dr Ulrich Golaszinski
    Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
    Maputo
    Mozambique

15. Dr Solomon Gomes
    Darfur Integrated Task Force
    African Union Commission
    Addis Ababa
    Ethiopia

16. Ambassador Dieter W Haller
    German Embassy
    Tshwane
    South Africa
17. Professor Holger Bernt Hansen
   Centre for African Studies
   University of Copenhagen
   Denmark

18. Ms Njeri Karuru
   Senior Programme Officer
   Information Development Research Centre
   Nairobi
   Kenya

19. Ambassador Peter Karjavvi
   Embassy of the Republic of Namibia
   Berlin
   Germany

20. Mr Sam Kona
   Centre for Conflict Resolution
   Cape Town
   South Africa

21. Ms Lorna Levy
   Independent Writer and Researcher
   Cape Town
   South Africa

22. Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo
   Department of Foreign Affairs
   Tshwane
   South Africa

23. Mr Charles Mutasa
   African Forum and Network on Debt and
   Development
   Harare
   Zimbabwe

24. Mr Ibrahim Nawar
   Al Ahram Centre for Political
   and Strategic Studies
   Cairo
   Egypt

25. Most Reverend Njongonkulu Ndungane
   Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town
   Cape Town
   South Africa

26. Ms Cecilia Nedziwe
   School of Political Science
   and International Studies
   University of Queensland
   Brisbane
   Australia

27. Mr Christoph Pohlmann
   Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
   Johannesburg
   South Africa

28. Dr Werner Rechmann
   Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
   Johannesburg
   South Africa

29. Mr Soumam Sako
   African Capacity Building Foundation
   Harare
   Zimbabwe

30. Ms Yasmin Sooka
    Foundation for Human Rights
    Tshwane
    South Africa

31. Dr Ernst Stetter
    Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
    Brussels
    Belgium

32. H E Joan E Thomas
    High Commission of Jamaica
    Tshwane
    South Africa
33. Professor Dietrich Thränhardt  
   University of Münster  
   Münster  
   Germany

34. Professor Ben Turok  
   Member of Parliament  
   Cape Town  
   South Africa

35. Dr Martin Uhomoibhi  
   Ambassador of Nigeria to the UN  
   Geneva  
   Switzerland

36. Mr Kaye Whiteman  
   Former Editor, West Africa  
   London  
   England

37. Mr Richard Wood  
   British Consul-General  
   Cape Town  
   South Africa

38. Mr Daniel Zimbler  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town  
   South Africa

Conference Team:

39. Ms Pippa Segall  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town  
   South Africa

40. Ms Johanna Webb  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town  
   South Africa
Annex III

List of Acronyms

ACP  African, Caribbean and Pacific group
AMIS  AU mission in Darfur
AU  African Union
CAR  Central African Republic
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
EBA  Everything But Arms
ECDPM  European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECOSOCC  Economic, Social and Cultural Council (AU)
EDF  European Development Fund
EEC  European Economic Community
EPA  Economic Partnership Agreement
ESA  Eastern and Southern African EPA group
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy
EU  European Union
EUFOR  European Union Force
FTA  Free Trade Areas
GNI  Gross National Income
CSP  Generalised System of Preferences
HIV/AIDS  Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IMF  International Monetary Fund
LDCs  Least Developed Countries
OAU  Organisation of African Unity
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SADC  Southern African Development Community
UN  United Nations
UNAMID  United Nations/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur
WTO  World Trade Organisation
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VOLUME 1
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S SECURITY
THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA

The interrelated and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of UN reform were the focus of this policy seminar held from 21 - 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

VOLUME 2
SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA
THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE

The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July - 1 August 2004.

VOLUME 3
THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA’S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The state of governance and security in Africa under the AU and NEPAD were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Meny Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

VOLUME 4
A MORE SECURE CONTINENT
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

African perspectives on the United Nations (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.

VOLUME 5
WHITHER SADC?
SOUTHERN AFRICA’S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

VOLUME 6
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY:
AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

VOLUME 7
BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECs), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY

This seminar in Cape Town from 20 - 22 August 2005 made policy recommendations on how the AU’s institutions, including NEPAD, could achieve their aims and objectives.

VOLUME 8
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa’s democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.
VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA
This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations in 2000.

VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006, examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA: BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE
This policy and research seminar held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of democratic practice, sustainable development, and peace and security.

VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN A NEW SUDAN
This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION
This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AFRICA
This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS MEDIATION EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA
This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw our key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations’ newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
The objective of the seminar held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.
VOLUME 23
CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICTS IN AFRICA
This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.

VOLUME 24
SOUTHERN AFRICA:
BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
This report is based on a seminar held in Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007 that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.

VOLUME 25
PREVENTING GENOCIDE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
CHALLENGES FOR THE UN, AFRICA, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13-15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, “ethnic cleansing” or crimes against humanity.
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In the eight years that have passed since the Africa-Europe Summit in Cairo, Egypt, in April 2000, dramatic geopolitical developments have impacted on the relationship between Africa and Europe. This report examines the relationship between the two continents in the 21st Century, exploring three key issues: the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt) between Africa and Europe; peacekeeping and military co-operation; and migration.