WHITHER SADC?
SOUTHERN AFRICA’S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA
A POLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR HOSTED BY
THE CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

SEMINAR REPORT
THE TWELVE APOSTLES HOTEL, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
18 – 19 JUNE 2005
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RAPPORTEURS: NORIA MASHUMBA AND CHUCK SCOTT
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The Centre for Conflict Resolution

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) is affiliated to the University of Cape Town (UCT), in South Africa. The organisation has wide-ranging experience of conflict interventions in the Western Cape and southern Africa, and is working increasingly on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations, as well as on policy research on South Africa’s role in Africa; the UN’s role in Africa; AU/NEPAD relations; and HIV/AIDS and Security.

The Rapporteurs

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 18 and 19 June 2005, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, South Africa, convened a two-day policy advisory group meeting on the theme, "Whither SADC? An Agenda for Southern Africa’s Post-Apartheid Security". This meeting was a follow-up to a CCR policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), in November 2004, focusing on the role and capacity of South Africa as Chair of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). The Cape Town meeting brought together participants comprising senior government officials working closely with SADC, representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), members of the donor community, and a broad range of civil society actors involved in peace, security and governance initiatives in the region.

The policy advisory group meeting provided a platform for policymakers and non-state actors to assess security and governance challenges confronting SADC as the new Executive Secretary, Tomaz Augusto Salomao, took office and as Namibia took over as Chair of the SADC Organ from South Africa in August 2005. More specifically, the policy advisory group evaluated progress to date with the restructuring of SADC’s institutional framework initiated in 2001, and South Africa’s progress in implementing the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) of 2004, within the context of broader initiatives to strengthen southern Africa’s conflict management and peacebuilding roles at sub-regional, continental and international levels.

SADC’s restructuring exercise was embarked on with the objective of harmonising national and regional structures to enhance efficiency in the implementation of the organisation’s programmes and policies. The institutional reforms sought to centralise planning and implementation by replacing 21 nationally-based sectors and commissions with four directorates based at the SADC secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana. The secretariat has been given the role of policy formulation, resource mobilisation and monitoring implementation. A small administrative directorate of the SADC Organ has been established at the secretariat to co-ordinate the activities of the Organ with those of the secretariat. At the national level, SADC established national committees to oversee implementation of the institution’s policies and to co-ordinate linkages with other stakeholders such as civil society.

While SADC has made some progress on the restructuring process, practical difficulties and constraints have also been encountered:

- First, harmonisation has not been achieved, as exemplified by the lack of co-ordination between the office of the Executive Secretary and the four newly-created directorates, in particular the directorate for the SADC Organ. Formally, the SADC Organ’s directorate is viewed as part of the secretariat but, in practice, it tends to operate as a separate entity;

- Second, shortage of relevant expertise, as well as human and financial resources, at the SADC secretariat has slowed down implementation of SIPO and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). These two plans, adopted to provide a broad strategy for implementation of SADC’s policies and programmes, need to be further developed into coherent, practical and complementary strategies for implementation; and

- Finally, the Chair of the SADC Organ has experienced a number of challenges, which include the lack of capacity effectively to implement its mandate.
In attempting to address some of these shortcomings, the Cape Town policy advisory group meeting called on SADC to consider making special provision for supporting the incumbent Chair of the Organ. Currently, the burden for providing technical and operational support, including the responsibility for implementation of SADC’s programmes, rests squarely with the member state hosting the Chair. Some SADC countries struggle with the human and financial resource requirements that accompany the chairing of the Organ.

However, the policy advisory group noted that the problem is not just the shortage of institutional structures, but also a lack of resources to enhance the operational capacity of the existing structures. The Cape Town meeting also referred to the critical issue of political will and reiterated the need for SADC governments to honour their commitments by adequately resourcing institutions that are key to driving regional integration and promoting security and democratic governance in southern Africa. A proposal was made for the mandate of the secretariat to be broadened to allow for flexibility in taking initiatives. It was felt that the current state of affairs has reduced the secretariat to a bureaucratic administrator with little political decision-making powers.

The policy advisory group identified another possible source of support for the SADC secretariat based on strategic alliances with civil society organisations in southern Africa. The experiences of the Botswana-based Formative Process Research on Integration in SADC (FOPRISA) and the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) network were discussed. FOPRISA has established strategic alliances with regional and international research institutes focusing on enhancing SADC’s research and analytical skills. SADSEM interacts closely with the security and defence sectors at national level and has established a solid reputation in its training and capacity-building programmes.
SADC policymakers have acknowledged the role of civil society in southern Africa’s security and governance architecture and have spelt out the scope for such participation in the SIPO document. The objectives of SIPO call for civil society collaboration in areas such as research, public debates and seminars, and conflict prevention, management and resolution. There is a strong civil society network in southern Africa that has contributed immensely to strengthening democratic governance and peacebuilding processes in the sub-region. SIPO’s objectives have, however, largely remained ideals that are practically impossible to implement as they lack clarity on modalities for civil society participation in SADC’s activities. Consequently, the majority of civil society actors in southern Africa have raised concerns that SIPO has done little to improve their channels of engagement with the secretariat.

Despite these challenges, commitment is required from civil society and SADC to continue exploring possibilities to maximise opportunities for collaboration. SADC and civil society could also benefit from the experiences and ‘best practices’ from other parts of Africa. For example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) have demonstrated greater willingness to collaborate with civil society by granting them observer status at their official meetings.

In addition, there is a need for a concerted effort by SADC to improve co-ordination with other external stakeholders, such as its development partners. Many donors have expressed interest in supporting SADC, but the organisation must first address two important issues: streamlining SADC’s procedures for external support, and clarifying its priority areas for assistance. In the same vein, other key structures of SADC such as the newly-created national committees, which are responsible for co-ordinating SADC’s activities with civil society at the national level, must be sufficiently resourced to enhance their role and visibility.

While the debate to enhance collaboration between civil society and SADC continues, civil society in southern Africa needs to continue self-evaluation to maximise its strengths and address its weaknesses. The diversity of civil society has been one of its major strengths, but has, paradoxically, also been one of its major weaknesses. Some of these organisations have found themselves duplicating activities, competing for space and resources and sometimes
compromising their autonomy. Networks such as the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO) may, however, help to address some of these concerns, and could potentially strengthen civil society’s ability to engage with the SADC secretariat.

The AU’s evolving security architecture views regional organisations such as SADC as building blocks and pillars for future co-operation, particularly in the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) scheduled to become operational by 2010. SADC has made progress in positioning itself to assume this new role. Arrangements for establishing the SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) are proceeding steadily. The structures and framework for the establishment of an early-warning centre based at the SADC secretariat are also progressing. In all these initiatives, SADC can derive enormous benefit from closer collaboration with the AU and other sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which have also developed early-warning systems. Developing close ties with the AU would also align SADC’s peace and security initiatives with the UN’s security framework. SADC can then utilise these opportunities to maximise access to UN resources. The UNDP Programme for Strengthening Africa’s Regional Capacities for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Recovery was a pilot project, which provided support to the secretariats of ECOWAS and SADC between November 2003 and December 2004.

Sub-regional organisations such as SADC and ECOWAS are increasingly assuming an active role in peacekeeping operations on the continent. In analysing this new role, ECOWAS’s peacekeeping experiences in the 1990s were used to assess possible lessons for SADC. ECOWAS’s difficulties in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s highlighted some of the critical challenges facing sub-regional organisations in their conflict management efforts. While ECOWAS and SADC have demonstrated a willingness to participate in peacekeeping operations on the continent, there is still an urgent need for closer collaboration with the UN to strengthen the capabilities of sub-regional bodies and to access financial resources from the UN.

The policy advisory group also explored the role and legitimacy of regional hegemons such as South Africa and Nigeria in the context of regional peacekeeping. While acknowledging the military and political capabilities of South Africa and Nigeria in relation to their counterparts in SADC and ECOWAS respectively, the two countries face a number of constraints. These include a lack of both legitimacy and resources to play an effective hegemonic role that is accepted by other states.

The policy advisory group further noted that Africa’s emerging security and governance architecture recognises the inextricable link between the traditional notion of security which emphasises state security and the concept of human security focusing primarily on people. States have an obligation to create the enabling environment for their citizens active participation in development. The enabling environment envisaged is outlined in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) principles of governance which challenge states to uphold democracy and to promote and strengthen democratic governance. These include the creation of effective and accountable public and private institutions and structures, and mechanisms to empower citizens to be able to participate in the economic and political affairs of their countries.

Southern Africa faces enormous human security challenges, which include but are not confined to HIV/AIDS, poverty, socio-economic inequalities, gender and governance. SADC also has some of the highest HIV/AIDS statistics in the world, with an average prevalence rate of 25 percent. Poverty is widespread, and currently 60 percent of people in the 14 SADC countries live below the poverty line. The two cross-cutting issues of HIV/AIDS and poverty are impacting negatively on the stability and development of the sub-region. SADC’s security
framework acknowledges the need to address human security challenges, and the organisation has developed an impressive list of protocols and declarations to address some of these human security challenges, which must be followed by effective implementation mechanisms.

The SIPO document, which is primarily concerned with operationalising the “hard” security provisions of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, also makes reference to human security threats such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, gender-based violence and governance issues. The objective of SIPO is to provide a broad framework on which more specific strategies to address SADC’s human security challenges can be further developed. Civil society actors have criticised the provisions of SIPO for stressing “hard” security issues while lacking clearly defined mechanisms to address human security challenges effectively.

In addition to SIPO, SADC has adopted a number of other documents: the Maseru Declaration on HIV/AIDS of 2003 to address the political, social and economic impacts of HIV/AIDS; the Declaration on Gender and Development of 1997, which seeks to establish a policy framework for mainstreaming gender into all of SADC’s activities; and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections of 2004, to govern election processes in southern Africa. Though some successes have been recorded in a number of these specific areas, practical experience points to poor implementation and a disappointing monitoring record by SADC members.

The land issue in southern Africa, its historical context, current land policies, and their impact on the security of the region were also explored during the discussions. Comparisons were made between Zimbabwe and the land invasions precipitated partly by the slow progress in land redistribution, and the current land policies in South Africa and Namibia. Land reform policies in the latter two countries have been based on the “willing seller-willing buyer” principle. While market-driven policies are implemented within the rule of law, the disadvantage of this approach is that implementation is often slow, expensive and has a potential for stirring conflict.

The land reform experiences of the three countries have provided a number of lessons for the region:

- Since the land question in southern Africa is linked to an historical injustice of dispossession, land reform - if carefully implemented - must be a political tool for redressing these injustices;
- While the political aspect of land can never be ignored, the experience of Zimbabwe, particularly the negative impact of the land reform programme on the economy and the livelihoods of many, provides a compelling argument for a better-planned and less politically-driven approach to land reform;
- Land reform policies have often failed to address the access of women to land. This critical issue will require further articulation in southern Africa. South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe are historically patriarchal societies and this has influenced land-ownership and use, with women generally depending on their male kin for access to land. Though current land policies have attempted to address this anomaly, the emerging pattern, especially in the case of Zimbabwe, indicates that these policies have not been adequately addressed;
- The HIV/AIDS pandemic has introduced a new dimension to land ownership and land use, which exacerbates the plight of groups such as women and the poor who are already vulnerable.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic is increasingly recognised as more than a health crisis. The socio-economic impact of the pandemic in southern Africa has enormous consequences for the security of many countries. Militaries as well as civilian populations are at risk in unique ways. The Cape Town meeting explored the implications of HIV/AIDS for national defence forces who comprise the population most at risk and who constitute the foundation for building an effective SADC Standby Brigade as part of the AU’s stand by arrangements.
INTRODUCTION

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy advisory group meeting at the Twelve Apostles Hotel, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005. This was a follow-up meeting to the seminar, "Supporting South Africa’s Role as Chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS)", held in Tshwane (Pretoria), in November 2004. In September 2005, a new SADC Executive Secretary, Tomaz Augusto Salomao, took office and the OPDS Chair passed from South Africa to Namibia. The June 2005 policy seminar focused primarily on the progress to date with the restructuring of the SADC secretariat, and South Africa’s progress in implementing the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) of the OPDS within the context of broader initiatives to strengthen conflict management and peacebuilding in southern Africa. The seminar also supported the SIPO objective, which calls for “civil society engagement in conflict resolution, public awareness-raising on security issues and establishment of a forum of academic and research institutions to deliberate on peace and security matters”.¹

The objective of the June 2005 Cape Town meeting was to track progress and generate policy proposals in the following eight areas:

- Strengthening the role of the SADC secretariat and the Executive Secretary;
- Implementing key elements of SIPO and strengthening the OPDS;
- Examining the role of key SADC partners;
- SADC’s collaboration with the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN);
- Learning lessons from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);
- Tackling the land reform and HIV/AIDS challenges in southern Africa;
- Assessing SADC’s governance challenges, including democratisation and elections; and
- Analysing the role of civil society in strengthening SADC.

1. Strengthening the SADC Secretariat and Executive Secretary

The SADC summit in 2001 approved the restructuring of the secretariat with a two-year time-frame for completion. The restructuring of the SADC secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana, aimed to boost its institutional capacity and efficiency through establishing a leaner and more focused organisation. However, SADC’s broad shift from project management to policy formulation and harmonisation through a more centralised structure has not yet adequately addressed the organisation’s leadership and resource limitations and have stalled regional integration efforts in southern Africa. To date, SADC has managed to close down its 21 country-based sector units and transfer planning, policy formulation and administrative functions to four centralised directorates within its secretariat. However, the directorates are still developing their operational capacity, with minimum staff complements and limited administrative resources. This has restricted the secretariat’s ability to facilitate, monitor and support project implementation by member states. The secretariat has proposed the establishment of a dedicated project management office to support this function. The SADC Organ also has a small administrative office in the secretariat, with plans to expand the unit into a fifth political directorate, by 2006. At present, there is limited collaboration between the Organ unit, the other directorates, and the Executive Secretary. The mandate of the SADC secretariat is limited to administration, and the restructuring exercise has not increased the powers of the Executive Secretary, although it does provide for a deputy Executive Secretary.

FROM LEFT: DR KAIRED MBIENDE, FORMER SADC EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, WINDHOEK; AMBASSADOR TORBEN BRYLLE, EMBASSY OF DENMARK, TSHWANE (PRETORIA); DR SAM AMOO, UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, ADDIS ABABA

2 SADC currently comprises 14 member states, namely Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The SADC region has a population of about 125 million.
The Cape Town meeting had the benefit of an insider’s perspective of the real and potential constraints of the SADC secretariat, from its former Executive Secretary, Kaire Mbuende. The Namibian diplomat’s presentation at the meeting provided a useful historical overview of the development of the organisation from one of co-operation and co-ordination to the new agenda of regional integration. Mbuende examined the internal and external factors that drive political, economic and security integration in southern Africa. As SADC moves towards a regional community on the economic and political levels, these initiatives have been influenced by global developments and the need to develop regional strategies to engage with other regional and continental structures.

The Cape Town policy advisory group meeting noted that SADC was good at creating institutional structures but bad at capacitating and empowering them. A common set of challenges and constraints emerged from the discussion on strengthening the SADC secretariat and implementing the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ. Both of these processes have been retarded by a lack of capacity and resource constraints.

In order to address these challenges, it is necessary to mobilise financial and human resources and to build capacity for SADC institutions and personnel. There is also a greater need for co-ordination within SADC structures, specifically between the secretariat and the Organ. There must be greater urgency in the implementation of SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and SIPO. While both strategic plans are comprehensive and far-reaching, there are a number of areas that overlap, particularly those on political and governance issues. Concerns were therefore expressed that the critical area of human security was being given less priority than that of military security.

SADC also needs to improve co-ordination with external stakeholders, including development partners and civil society actors. Many donors have indicated their willingness to support SADC, but have requested clarity on its priority areas. Concerns were also expressed that the SADC secretariat has been reluctant to work with civil society groups. Continental links need to be strengthened with other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and, through the African Union, an alignment must be sought with the UN in order to access resources and other support.

SADC has made much progress at the formal level of agreements and policy declarations, but has been less successful at implementing its decisions. Since its reincarnation from the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to SADC in 1992, the organisation has adopted a total of 30 protocols and declarations to harmonise policies and legislation in a number of key areas. Most of these protocols are now in force. However, more needs to be done to ensure implementation and synthesis with national policies. SADC must develop clear legislative procedures with well-defined outputs of its regulations, directives and decisions.
Regulations that are binding on all member states would serve the purpose of unifying common decisions that cannot be altered by national parliaments. Directives could be issued for the purpose of aligning laws, whereby decisions taken in any particular field would then be binding on all member states.

The SADC secretariat and its directorates have a central role to play in the process of integration, but have little power and limited resources to drive implementation of its decisions. The Executive Secretary, currently Mozambican Tomaz Augusto Salomao, should take more initiative to be pro-active with policy proposals and projects rather than purely assuming functional responsibility for implementation, since there are sufficient provisions in the SADC treaty for the Executive Secretary to be pro-active. The secretariat needs to build capacity to prepare position papers to be tabled before SADC’s decision-making structures. SADC does not have sufficient technical staff to deal with the various areas of co-operation. The Executive Secretary therefore needs to develop strategic alliances with other stakeholders and draw on expertise within the region: for example, research institutions that can contribute to policy development and analysis. Stakeholders in civil society and the private sector can also assist SADC by identifying and providing solutions to obstacles slowing down regional integration.

It was noted that member states are willing to commit resources and to drive implementation when they are able to derive immediate benefits from such initiatives. An example is the development of infrastructure such as roads and ports. The same level of commitment and political will is required to tackle human security issues such as HIV/AIDS regionally.

The SADC secretariat also faces serious structural challenges in the management of its programme of integration. These challenges emanate, among other things, from the fact that the driving forces for integration are often external to SADC institutions. Furthermore, some SADC institutions are dynamic and have an institutional culture that the secretariat finds difficult to engage with. For instance, co-operation in the area of politics, defence and security stands on two pillars: politics and diplomacy; and defence and security.

SADC’s committee of ministers of defence and security is active in taking initiatives and promoting projects in its area of competence. Ministers of defence and security identify areas of concern, reach agreement, and develop projects to address these challenges. Regional ministers of defence and security still operate under the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which was established in 1995 as a successor to the defence portfolio of the Front-Line States (FLS). The ISDSC has thus continued with the institutional culture of the FLS. Because of the dynamic nature of co-operation among security forces, it is difficult for the SADC secretariat to play a pro-active role in this area. The leadership of security co-operation is therefore likely to remain with member states, with the secretariat continuing to play a largely servicing role.

There is also a structural and unintended exclusion of the SADC secretariat from the day-to-day activities of SADC’s Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC). Regional ministers of foreign affairs meet more often at other multilateral fora than at the SADC level. They meet at least twice a year at the AU, and also meet in the context of the UN, particularly during the General Assembly sessions, as well as at Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summits. At most of these meetings, SADC ministers meet to co-ordinate their positions, but also to exchange

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information on political developments in their respective countries and the region. The SADC secretariat does not attend many of these consultations through which common approaches to various issues are forged. The secretariat must thus focus greater attention on its working relations with the SADC National Committees (SNCs) of member states, the SADC Committee of Ambassadors and High Commissioners, and other regional institutions and associations.

The process of regional integration needs a continental framework. SADC will benefit a great deal from closer integration and association with the AU and other sub-regional organisations. Closer co-operation with the AU will also align SADC activities, especially in the area of peace and security, with the efforts of the UN. This will enable SADC to access resources through the UN system. SADC remains a complex regional organisation, with numerous challenges facing its member states. These include unresolved regional conflicts; minimal intra-regional trade and uneven development; high levels of poverty; and a devastating HIV/AIDS pandemic. However, SADC has the potential to become one of the most vibrant regional organisations on the African continent. Its combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $296.4 billion in 2004 is among the highest in Africa, and there is a strong industrial base, centred on South Africa, from which to build a regional economy. The economic and political inter-dependence of SADC member states provides a sound basis for more mutually beneficial regional growth and development.
2. Implementing SIPO, Strengthening the SADC Security Organ

SADC has crafted mechanisms and a security architecture that provide for both collaborative security (peaceful co-operation to enhance the mutual security of states and peoples); collective security (peaceful co-operation and the use of force with the explicit authorisation of the UN Security Council); and collective self-defence (mutual defence against external aggression). Since SADC’s founding, a comprehensive and ambitious security project has unfolded.

SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was established in 1996, and a protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation was signed in 2001. The protocol seeks to harmonise the foreign policy of southern African states and calls for security initiatives ranging from conflict prevention to peace enforcement. The accord also calls for SADC member states to co-ordinate their security policy through a troika of members under a one-year rotating chair, supported administratively by the SADC secretariat. In 2004, the organisation unveiled SIPO as a five-year programme to implement its security protocol. SIPO outlined plans for work in four broad sectors: politics, defence, state security, and public security.
In September 2004, South Africa took over as Chair of the SADC Organ for a one-year period until August 2005. The troika comprises current, previous and future chairs of the SADC Organ. South Africa was tasked with initiating and consolidating a number of key activities outlined in the SIPO document. At the Cape Town meeting, in June 2005, Tepe Motumi, Chief Director for Policy and Planning in the South African Defence secretariat in Tshwane, highlighted the country’s progress in implementing SIPO’s priority areas during South Africa’s term as chair of the SADC Organ:

- The action plan to operationalise SIPO is being implemented, with an internal review of progress being prepared as part of the handover to the incoming chair, Namibia.

- There has been progress in the consolidation of peace and political stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and in preparations for elections next year. Three SADC ministers of defence, representing the troika, undertook an assessment mission to the DRC in June 2005. The Organ will assist with demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants and the establishment of an integrated defence force.

- Plans are progressing to establish a SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) and its civilian component, as part of the AU African Standby Force (ASF) to be deployed by 2010. All member states have made specific pledges of troop contributions, and the process is on track to meet the AU’s deadline. Command, control and logistics arrangements will be clarified following the staffing of the recently-established interim Planning Centre (PLANELM) at the SADC secretariat in Gaborone. These plans were submitted for approval at the SADC summit in August 2005.

- The framework and structure to establish a regional early-warning centre has been completed, and a Strategic Analysis Unit, responsible for managing a Situation Room, has been set up. The centre will be staffed by secondments from member states.

- Elections in the region are being conducted and monitored with reference to the SADC electoral protocol.

- The Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare has been revived and operational control has been transferred to the SADC secretariat in Gaborone.

- There is ongoing co-operation to address a number of other defence and security issues in the region, including combating terrorist activities; countering trafficking in small arms; protecting strategic infrastructure; combating stock theft; protecting wildlife; harmonising immigration legislation between member states; and addressing refugee issues, law enforcement at sea and joint border control.

The challenge that faces SADC is whether it can actually implement the numerous and ambitious activities outlined in SIPO, given the reality of limited financial and human resources at its disposal. There is still a need for a more integrated plan of action and a streamlined list of priorities.

SADC’s Conference on Defence and Security Co-operation in December 2004 in Maputo, Mozambique, involved senior military officials and examined the constraints facing the Organ and hampering the implementation of SIPO. The conference was motivated by certain realities: the SADC secretariat lacks capacity to deliver on the expectations imposed upon it, the delivery capacities of the Organ need to be strengthened;
mechanisms to co-ordinate and monitor the relationship between the troika, member states and the secretariat must be established; the institutional and human capacities of the Organ and the troika need to be developed; and institutional capacity is urgently required in the Department of Politics, Defence and Security at the SADC secretariat.

Regarding the implementation of the defence and security components of SIPO, the December 2004 SADC conference noted that: there was an urgent need for financial resources and staff recruitment to strengthen the secretariat; business plans were required to prioritise capacity-building activities within a given time-frame; and relevant structures and decision-makers should give due priority to the Organ, considering that its activities are organically linked to SADC’s development agenda as enshrined in the RISDP. The 2004 conference further suggested that SADC should consider creating a special portfolio finance sub-committee to address funding issues related to the Organ.

The 2004 meeting also recommended that SADC should have an effective, responsive and efficient structure of the Organ at its secretariat. In this regard, apart from regular secretariat staff, SADC should consider improving the terms and conditions of service of seconded staff in order to attract and retain suitable personnel. The Cape Town meeting of June 2005 supported the conference findings, particularly the urgent need for the recruitment of qualified personnel, and noted the consistent failure of the secretariat to retain skilled staff and seconded personnel.

Further recommendations presented and discussed in Cape Town examined opportunities for training, resource mobilisation, human resource development and other capacity-building strategies. SIPO and other key policy instruments such as the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact need to be further developed from policy into coherent programmes of implementation and monitoring. This must be done before the Organ can deliver on its demanding mandate. SADC needs to take its
in institutional and capacity-building process further. There is a need for strategic capacity-building in all areas relevant to the mandate of the Organ. More generally, one of the most critical regional challenges remains that of deepening confidence-building as a means of facilitating regional integration.

Intra- and inter-regional training can be better co-ordinated and strengthened in some areas such as defence; budgeting; diplomacy; early-warning; and gender-related issues. Universities, research institutes and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in particular, need to collaborate in the areas of training, curriculum design and joint accreditation. The Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) network, a grouping of research and policy institutions in eight SADC countries, has done some pioneering work in this area, but more needs to be done.

Applied and basic research is also key to quality training, policy development, security governance and other issues. The Organ needs to draw on regional research networks to build its own research capacity in areas relevant to its work. For this purpose, SADC’s security Organ needs to be properly staffed in terms of the provisions of SIPO; and staff must be well-grounded in analytical and planning skills in areas such as project formulation, management and resource mobilisation.

There has been little progress in the complex area of developing a common foreign policy within SADC. The Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee, headed by foreign ministers and with the responsibility to implement this objective, has a low profile within the region and meets less frequently than the better-established Inter-State Defence and Security Committee.
The policy advisory group also noted that early-warning capacity should be developed incrementally within SADC, taking into account budgetary and fiscal limitations. This capacity must be linked to other confidence-building mechanisms in the sub-region. There is also a need to link the fledgling SADC early-warning system with similar AU initiatives, thus strengthening capacity through building synergies. Various options on strengthening the human resource capacity of the Organ were considered, including the active recruitment of appropriate personnel, short-term secondment of officials, military personnel and academics from SADC member states, in-service training for staff of the politics, defence and security department; attachments and internships of SADC staff to other institutions; and awarding of scholarships to develop a cadre of competent officials.

In addition, there is a need to enhance capacity at state level, especially for serving and incoming chairs of the Organ. While the SADC secretariat is, in theory, expected to provide secretarial services to the Organ, the reality is that technical and operational support and responsibility for implementation is largely dependent on the capacity and energy of the country that holds the Chair. SIPO suggests that the office of the chairperson in less well-resourced states should have direct support from the secretariat. In addition, policy and management capacity needs to be built in all relevant departments of SADC countries, not just in defence, but also in foreign affairs, public security and intelligence agencies.

On resource mobilisation, SIPO provides for a framework to guide relations with donors. Such relations need to be strategically managed in the interest of SADC. The best synergy would be for member states to fund the core functions and activities of SADC’s politics, defence and security department, while additional donor funds and partnerships could be mobilised to implement the 28 strategic objectives and 147 strategies and activities provided for in SIPO.

Finally, given the sectors covered in SIPO, regional security (both in terms of state and human security) could be significantly enhanced through effective community policing and reform of the sub-regional justice and intelligence systems. Security sector reform, too, should form an important part of this process.
3. SADC Capacity-building: Case Studies

Three case studies presented at the Cape Town meeting provided practical examples of capacity-building projects to strengthen SADC, and allowed for a comparative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches.

3.1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

The UNDP’s ‘Programme to Strengthen Africa’s Regional Capacities for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Recovery’ collaborated with African regional organisations to develop and implement regional strategies and to build capacity in the security area. The two-and-half-year pilot project was formulated with the SADC and ECOWAS secretariats. However, implementation with SADC proved problematic due to a lengthy approval process for external support in the areas of peace and security. The UNDP programme activities included:

- **A five-day training seminar on “Project Formulation and Management, and Resource Mobilisation” in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 3 to 8 November 2003.** Participants included officials from the ECOWAS and SADC secretariats, the troika of the Organ, the African Union, the Mano River Union, and civil society organisations from West Africa and the Great Lakes region. The training upgraded the skills and knowledge of participants in project design, preparation, monitoring and evaluation; and established an integrated team and network to manage the overall implementation of the UNDP programme and activities. A training manual was developed and published to facilitate future training and dissemination.

- **Conference on SADC Defence and Security Co-operation**
  With the support of the Danish Embassy in South Africa, the UNDP supported SADC’s first conference on defence and security co-operation on 13 and 14 December 2004, in Maputo, Mozambique. Under the theme of ‘Enhancing Peace and Security for Development in Southern Africa’, the conference brought together 150 senior-level participants, comprising heads of defence; security; and foreign affairs; chiefs of defence staff; and principal secretaries of defence.

- **Technical support to SADC**
  A Memorandum of Agreement between SADC and the UNDP, signed on 13 November 2003, provided technical assistance for SADC in the form of one professional staff officer, one support staff member, and a full complement of office equipment, computers and furniture. However, SADC could only make use of these materials from February 2005.

- **Exchange between ECOWAS and SADC on the Early-Warning System**
  Officers from the SADC secretariat and the troika participated in an ECOWAS working group session on the operationalisation of the ECOWAS early-warning system. The UNDP/ECOWAS project document on the operationalisation of the ECOWAS early-warning system was shared with the SADC secretariat and the Organ troika.

- **Training workshop in Conflict Analysis, Mediation and Negotiation**
  A training workshop held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 28 to 30 September 2004 contributed to the empowerment of SADC troika officials and secretariat personnel with enhanced skills and competencies in conflict analysis, mediation and negotiation.
Support to Peacebuilding in the DRC
SADC identified the mobilisation of women and youth as key actors in the peacebuilding process in the DRC. The UNDP programme facilitated consultations between the SADC secretariat and the ministries of gender and family, and of youth, specifically in connection with the provision of a training workshop for Congolese women leaders in conflict analysis, mediation and negotiation, and the holding of a youth peace and development forum for the DRC.

3.2 Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) network

The Southern African Defence and Security Management network comprises tertiary institutions based in South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania, the DRC, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia. SADSEM provides education and training as well as policy development and support through co-operative projects in all SADC member countries. SADSEM’s main focus areas are democratic control and management of defence forces and other security organs; regional security co-operation; and multi-national co-operation in conflict management and peace missions. The network relies on individuals within its member institutions to drive its activities and there is a need to institutionalise its work to reduce such dependence.
SADSEM has trained over 1000 senior officials, military officers and civil society leaders since January 2000, and the network involves one of the closest collaborations between civil society groups and military officers on the continent. With a number of SADC countries emerging from situations of conflict, SADSEM aims to contribute to effective democratic management of defence and security functions in southern Africa and thereby strengthen peace and security in the region. This objective is motivated by the realisation that civilian oversight of defence and security functions can only be effective if military and police personnel understand and support democratic political processes. SADSEM interacts closely with SADC military institutions and has the potential to impact on southern Africa’s long-term military leadership.

The network does not operate through SADC structures but works directly with national defence and security agencies. SADSEM’s success in engaging with the security sector in the region suggests a greater willingness by governments to co-operate with institutional bodies such as universities and research institutes. The network has established a high profile in the region and has been able to impact on policy processes through developing strong relationships with influential actors in the sector. There are also moves to extend the initiative throughout the continent and to link up with other regional networks to establish an African network of security sector practitioners and activists.

3.3 Formative Process Research on Integration in Southern Africa (FOPRISA)

The recently-established Formative Process Research on Integration in Southern Africa (FOPRISA) project, based in Botswana, aims to improve the understanding of integration policy issues and to enhance research skills and analytical capacity within SADC structures in order to assist the organisation to implement its priority policies. FOPRISA is a four-year collaborative partnership project between several southern African policy research institutes and universities, the Christian Michelsen Institute in Norway, and the SADC secretariat in Botswana.

The project will support SADC’s objectives of regional integration and development through research, monitoring, policy advice and capacity-building activities. Research outputs will provide useful data and analysis for SADC’s policy and programme staff, and also seek to improve SADC’s performance, procedures and operational approaches. The main areas of research are democratisation and conflict management, and economic policies and integration in southern Africa, with an emphasis on the impact of SADC policies and actions on poverty reduction. The project will also monitor progress on SADC’s institutional reform, as well as on relations between its member states, stakeholders, SADC institutions and International Co-operating Partners (ICPs). These monitoring and research activities aim to contribute to, and increase, the policy analysis capacity of SADC’s policy and strategic planning department.

This FOPRISA project is currently in the early stages of being implemented, and its contribution to strengthening the capacity of the SADC secretariat remains to be seen. The question of whether the proposed research was “demand-driven” or creating a demand, was discussed. It was argued that while researchers and academics had initiated the project, the SADC secretariat had identified an urgent need for research and policy analysis support. The project was therefore seen as a mutually beneficial partnership in which researchers and the secretariat will jointly determine the specific research areas and outputs.
4. SADC’s Collaboration with the AU, ECOWAS and the UN

SADC’s challenges in the difficult areas of peace and security have taken on a new urgency with the establishment of the African Union in Durban, South Africa, in 2002. The AU’s evolving security architecture regards regional institutions such as SADC as building blocks and pillars for the ASF to be established by 2010. Harmonising SADC’s activities with those of the AU is a new and urgent priority, along with advancing continental capacity in peace and security.

The AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) have given sub-regional organisations new impetus to focus on democracy and governance and to address regional conflicts. The adoption of the African Union Protocol on Peace and Security, and the establishment of the 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) in July 2004 have underscored the need for African sub-regional organisations to play an active role in the AU’s peace and security agenda. These developments provide opportunities and present challenges to sub-regional organisations such as SADC, including making substantive inputs into the structures and work of the AU’s organs, and articulating clear regional positions.

The protocol establishing the PSC is an important development in Africa’s evolving security architecture. The PSC has been mandated to intervene in sovereign states in the event of genocide; gross violations of human rights; instability within a country that threatens broader regional stability; and unconstitutional changes of government. This is a significant shift from the non-interventionist stance of the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The PSC is also responsible for overseeing the establishment of the ASF and the development of a continental conflict early-warning system. The ASF will consist of rapid deployment stand-by brigades with military, police and civilian components in each of Africa’s five regions (southern, East, North, West and Central Africa). The ASF policy framework provides detailed guidelines for the composition of the regional brigades and targets for a two-phase implementation process to build capacity for six possible mission scenarios: military advice to political missions; observer missions co-deployed with UN missions; stand-alone AU/regional observer missions; peacekeeping or preventive deployments; complex multi-dimensional peace operations; and AU interventions.

The broader operational mechanisms for peace and security in Africa are still evolving, and there is an urgent need for a clearly-defined division of labour among the UN, the AU and Africa’s sub-regional organisations such as SADC. While sub-regional organisations have demonstrated their willingness to play a leading role in peacekeeping in their regions, the primary responsibility for global peace and security should remain with the UN. The UN High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change of December 2004, and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s March 2005 report to the General Assembly, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All, called for UN support for Africa’s regional organisations, including UN funding of regional peacekeeping missions. The High-Level Panel report also called for the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission to assist post-conflict reconstruction efforts. These recommendations will be particularly relevant for the DRC and Angola, both SADC members.


ECOWAS has had more experience than SADC in peacekeeping operations and in collaborating with UN missions. ECOWAS is thus able to provide valuable insights into the successes and pitfalls of these joint operations. A comparison of ECOWAS and SADC is particularly appropriate: both have established security mechanisms with political and military institutions and signed mutual defence pacts; both have conducted regional peace support operations; and both have established sub-regional parliaments and legal tribunals for arbitrating disputes. However, both SADC and ECOWAS are constrained by limited resources and are still heavily dependent on external donors.

The ECOWAS protocol calls for a peace and security observation mechanism as well as an early-warning system with information bureaux, collectively known as ECOWATCH. By April 2002, bureaux had been established in four reporting zones. Officials at these four zones are required to assess political (human rights and democracy), economic (food shortages), social (unemployment), security (arms flows and civil-military relations), and environmental (drought and flooding) indicators on a daily basis. One encouraging development of the ECOWAS early-warning system is the involvement of civil society actors in its establishment. The West African Network for Peace (WANEP), an umbrella group of 300 civil society organisations, was prominently involved in establishing ECOWAS’s early-warning systems and has set up a liaison office at the ECOWAS secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria, to develop common early-warning indicators, and to share early-warning information with secretariat officials. This is an area in which SADC currently lags behind ECOWAS.

The ECOWAS protocol of 1999 called for the establishment of a stand-by force of brigade-size comprising specially-trained and equipped units of national armies ready to be deployed at short notice. An operational framework for the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) has been developed by the ECOWAS secretariat, and all 15 of its member states have pledged one battalion each to the ESF. SADC states are also establishing their own standby peacekeeping brigade, SADCBRIG, as part of the African Union stand-by force. The issue of financing is particularly important to the building of ECOWAS and SADC peacekeeping forces. Under the ECOWAS protocol, funds for the security
mechanism were to be raised from the annual budget until the introduction of a community levy in 2004. All three ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s clearly demonstrated the importance of securing financial support before embarking on military interventions. The ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone cost the Nigerian treasury billions of dollars. Such costs can prove a disincentive to future interventions in a sub-region saddled with a crippling external debt. Other ECOWAS states declined to contribute troops to ECOMOG due to a lack of financial resources to maintain the troops. The implementation of the ECOWAS customs levy in 2004 has, however, yielded some positive results in finding an alternative source of funding, provided that member states continue to contribute these funds to the ECOWAS secretariat. SADC could consider adopting the idea of the ECOWAS community levy to bolster its funds.

Several members of the policy advisory group further argued that sub-regional bodies such as ECOWAS and SADC need local hegemons like Nigeria and South Africa to drive their security complexes. During the 1990s, Nigeria was willing but unable to carry out swift and decisive military interventions in West Africa. South Africa was more able but largely unwilling to undertake such military actions in southern Africa due to the destabilising role of its apartheid-era army in the region. It was, however, mooted that regional hegemons like South Africa and Nigeria could play a positive leadership role through resource mobilisation and driving decision-making and development. However, this could also have a negative impact on regional co-operation if both countries are perceived to be seeking to dominate regional agendas and to be advancing their own parochial rather than regional interests. While South Africa and Nigeria are militarily and politically powerful relative to other states, they must still develop the legitimacy and capacity to influence their respective sub-regions and work to strengthen SADC and ECOWAS to take collective, multilateral action. Both South Africa and Nigeria have, however, felt the heavy economic strains of peacekeeping. In future, South African and Nigerian peacekeepers are likely to serve mainly under the UN, as evidenced by the recent cases of Burundi and Liberia, where both countries insisted that the UN take over responsibility from weak regional organisations.
5. Tackling the Land Reform Challenge

The development policies of most African countries have directed the use of land in ways that have not always been beneficial to national development and which have favoured distorted accumulation by a small elite and foreign capital. The consequences of such policies have been land alienation, the loss of local livelihoods and increased conflict. Land reform is thus an inherently conflictual process, since it challenges established economic and political structures and calls for a restructuring of property and power relations. Land reform can, however, deepen the democratisation of the development process if accompanied by progressive land tenure reforms which can defend the poor against potential land losses, as well as accommodate excluded groups. In southern Africa, a number of countries are grappling with land reform, and their experiences highlight the complexities and challenges inherent in these processes. Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe share a common history of settler colonialism in which land policies dispossession and marginalised the majority of the black population in these countries. Consequently, land became a source of tension and conflict and was central to liberation struggles, particularly in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Today, as these countries grapple with democratic consolidation processes, the land reform process to redistribute land to the previously dispossessed remains an emotive issue, with political aspects dominating other pertinent issues such as poverty and related socio-economic inequalities. The HIV/AIDS pandemic, with a prevalence rate of about 25 percent in a number of SADC countries, has introduced another challenge in terms of the ownership of, access to, and use of land, which has aggravated the plight of vulnerable groups such as the poor, women and children. The gender dimensions of land reform do not seem to be a priority within SADC.

The laws governing ownership of land, particularly customary laws, tend to discriminate against women. During the colonial era, women were treated as perpetual minors with no rights to own property. The current global trends calling for gender parity in all aspects of national life have introduced significant changes, though in many rural communities, women still occupy a subordinate position and can only access land through their husbands. In Zimbabwe, the 2000 "fast track" land reform programme allocated a 20 percent quota to women. According to reports, there was no meaningful implementation of this policy, yet women constitute 52 percent of the population, with 86 percent of them being rural-based subsistence farmers who rely on the land for their livelihood. In South Africa, the current land reform policy makes specific provision for women to access land. However, it is still too early to assess the outcome of the South African government’s policies.

Though other countries in the region are also struggling with land reform processes, the Cape Town meeting focused attention on Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe as the three countries with the worst disparities in land ownership and the most contentious land reform programmes in southern Africa. In Zimbabwe, the 1980 Lancaster House Constitution, which protected the private property of the white minority population for the first ten years of independence, included provisions which prevented the government in Harare from adopting policies to facilitate compulsory acquisition of land. Land reform was to take place within the parameters of a “willing seller-willing buyer” principle, with the government having the first option to buy land offered for sale.

Though the process was taking place within the confines of the law, thus protecting property rights, it proved to be a slow and expensive process for the government. By 1997, in the first phase of the programme, the government had resettled only 71,000 families of a target of 162,000. Most of the land acquired during this period was marginal...
and unsuitable for farming. The conflict that subsequently followed in Zimbabwe in 2002, though partly influenced by other factors such as the declining economy, was also precipitated by the growing impatience of those who had expected to receive land. The Zimbabwean government has also been accused of encouraging the ‘fast track’ land reform process for political motives. The slow pace of the redistribution process, which perpetuated the skewed land policies of the colonial era, had created the perception that the government was not committed to the process. The conflict in 2002 resulted in massive human rights violations, which included violent attacks on individuals and communities, internal displacements of people, food insecurity and loss of property and livelihood. The impact of the conflict has not been confined to Zimbabwe, but has also spread to the rest of the region. It has been argued that events in Zimbabwe have raised the expectations of other groups in South Africa and Namibia who are waiting on their governments to deliver on their promises to redistribute land.

South Africa and Namibia have also adopted market-driven policies based on the ‘willing seller - willing buyer’ principle. In South Africa, the process has been deemed to be slow and has given impetus to increasingly impatient social movements and intermittent violent clashes. In Namibia, the market-driven policies adopted in 1995 have also highlighted the complexities and challenges inherent in such processes. This trend is not unlike that of Zimbabwe: piecemeal and, in many instances, releasing the least arable land onto the market. Some reports from Namibia and South Africa indicate mounting pressure from radical groups pushing for Zimbabwe-style ‘fast track’ land reform.

The experiences of the three SADC countries were discussed at length by the policy advisory group. It was agreed that it is difficult to determine the best policy to adopt, as each country is influenced by its own specific circumstances and priorities. While market-driven policies seem to hold general advantages, they also have their disadvantages. On the positive side, these policies can make for an orderly process, and promote respect for the rule of law that protects rights to property, which augur well for foreign investment and economic development. The demerits of the policies are that the process is slow, particularly for marginalised populations, releases marginal land onto the market, and perpetuates the racially-biased historical land distribution patterns of the colonial era. This situation also creates perceptions that regional policymakers are not committed to addressing the land question.

Taking into consideration the complexities highlighted, the policy advisory group made recommendations for SADC to initiate a debate for a common land policy for the region. Land reform is inextricably linked to SADC’s agenda for regional integration and economic development, yet regional policymakers have not sufficiently articulated the issue. It is critical for policymakers urgently to address the land question in order for South Africa and Namibia to avoid the precedent set by Zimbabwe.

An equally important dimension of land reform is environmental degradation linked to land use. SADC’s population of about 125 million people continues to increase and is expected to double in 24 years. Yet the sub-region as a whole has only 6 percent arable land, and already 80 percent of its population are subsistence farmers depending on land for their livelihood. This translates into increased competition for the already diminishing, and in many instances, exhausted land, which may in turn lead to conflict. In Zimbabwe and Namibia, land reform programmes have been criticised for lacking post-resettlement support to facilitate effective land management. Since the newly-resettled farmers have, in many cases, failed to move beyond subsistence farming, they lack basic technical skills and title deeds to access capital. A combination of these and other related factors in the region have contributed to the food insecurity crisis that southern Africa has experienced in the last two decades. When the time comes for SADC to deliberate on appropriate interventions in the land sector, policymakers will need to take into account sustainable land usage to preserve dwindling regional resources.

6. HIV/AIDS and Human Security

The HIV/AIDS pandemic is increasingly recognised as more than a health crisis. The socio-economic impact of the pandemic in southern Africa has consequences for human security. In southern Africa, HIV/AIDS is responsible for the deaths of approximately 500,000 people every year in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Militaries as well as civilian populations are at risk in unique ways. The policy advisory group focused specifically on the implications of this situation for the military. The absence of conclusive statistics presents difficulties in assessing the extent to which HIV/AIDS has impacted on militaries in southern Africa. However, with a prevalence rate of at least 25 percent among the populations of most SADC countries, it follows that the impact of HIV/AIDS on military personnel is high since this group comprises the population most at risk of contracting HIV.

Not only does this present a major challenge to the sub-region's defence and security arrangements, but HIV/AIDS will inevitably impact on SADC's participation in the AU Standby Force to be established by 2010. Consequently, HIV/AIDS has been declared a major security threat in southern Africa. It was noted by the Cape Town meeting that the UN Security Council held a special session on HIV/AIDS as a security issue in January 2000 and adopted Resolution 1308 in July of the same year, which identified HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security. Subsequently, the UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS Declaration of Commitment of June 2001 included recommendations for HIV/AIDS interventions in national governance and security sectors.

Human security and traditional state security are now increasingly viewed as complementary and mutually dependent. A weakened military can potentially compromise the territorial integrity of the state, as well as draw on resources for care, support and treatment of its rank and file. HIV/AIDS can potentially lead to resource competition between civil and military institutions, adversely affecting other sectors such as the economy and social facilities like health and education. Poverty and economic instability in the SADC region have helped to fuel the spread of the pandemic. In turn, HIV/AIDS further exacerbates poverty. SADC policymakers have acknowledged the multi-dimensional effects of the pandemic, particularly its capacity to decimate human resources and the implications of this on the region's development agenda. There is therefore a need to respond to the pandemic at both national and regional levels.

In 2003, SADC adopted the Maseru Declaration on HIV/AIDS, and unveiled an HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework and Plan of Action: 2003 - 2007. The Strategic Framework aims not only to enhance existing efforts to respond to HIV/AIDS, but also to address holistically the various social, economic and political effects of the pandemic. SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan provides further clarity on the organisation's strategy for combating HIV/AIDS. The RISDP highlights acute poverty in southern Africa among child-headed or elder-headed households, which are increasing due to the AIDS pandemic. The plan also reiterates the outcome of the Maseru summit, during which SADC leaders agreed to establish an HIV/AIDS unit in the SADC secretariat's department of strategic planning, gender and policy harmonisation. SADC has acknowledged the need to mainstream HIV/AIDS at both policy and programme levels. Most SADC countries have also adopted policies and frameworks to address specific issues to prevent and combat HIV/AIDS.

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8 The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, 2003, p.9
Though these responses can be considered to be a step in the right direction, some advisory group members felt that these policies have not been adequately incorporated into viable strategies. Participants noted that SIPO approaches HIV/AIDS in very broad and general terms. While the document acknowledges that HIV/AIDS poses a serious challenge to the realisation of SADC’s political, defence, state and public sectors, SIPO fails to articulate what these challenges are. Policy advisory group members further emphasised that SADC had missed a rare opportunity for institutionalising, within its security organ, the link between HIV/AIDS, state security and human security. The Maseru Declaration of 2003 stresses the need for harmonisation of national policies. Several southern African militaries, such as those of South Africa, Botswana, Tanzania, and Zambia, have adopted national policies which address a broad range of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programmes. These various measures could constitute the basis for a common SADC policy on HIV/AIDS management in the defence and security sectors. SADC countries were urged to continue to support and strengthen current initiatives.

The defence sector has remained the domain of states despite SADC’s pronouncements for the participation of civil society in the peace and security arena. By virtue of the fact that the impact of HIV/AIDS is multi-dimensional, a harmonised and integrated response requires a holistic approach involving civil society and governments. Civil society has expertise and capacity in research and policy development, as well as in the areas of humanitarian assistance, conflict management and HIV/AIDS mitigation. Such expertise could benefit the sub-region’s governments as they seek to integrate HIV/AIDS into peace and security issues.
7. Governance and Democracy

Southern Africa has undergone significant changes over the last two decades, with the conclusion of civil wars in Mozambique and Angola, and democratic transitions in Namibia and South Africa. The region now faces the critical challenge of nurturing post-conflict transitions through the promotion of peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction and entrenching inclusive and participatory systems of governance. However, the picture emerging reflects the difficulties inherent in democratic consolidation. This is a process that requires political commitment and vigilance. In southern Africa, some countries such as South Africa, Botswana, and Mauritius have made strides towards democratisation with positive indicators such as transparent and participatory democratic structures, which are the building blocks of democracy. Several other countries have remained weak and unable to establish participatory democracy and constitutionalism. Institutions of governance in these countries have been compromised, fuelling corruption, human rights violations and disregard for the rule of law.

Economic mismanagement and corruption have fostered the impoverishment of citizens and created uncharacteristically high levels of poverty. The inadequate provision of public health services combined with the HIV/AIDS pandemic have further removed economically-active individuals from participating in the development of their countries. This situation further undermines efforts to promote development, and places an even greater burden on badly-managed economies.

Poor governance affects national societies but also undermines regional security and stability. In a number of southern African countries, systems and channels for democratic participation have been largely closed off. Zambia and Swaziland were cited as cases in point. In these countries, the effective participation of civil society was said to have been heavily constrained through restrictive legislation. In Zimbabwe, the Non-Governmental Organisations Bill and a number of other legal instruments directed at the media were said to have deprived civil society of its watchdog role. SADC governments should, however, recognise that civil society has become a critical actor in fostering democratic governance. The AU recognises the role of civil society actors in promoting democratic governance through the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). Southern Africa has a strong civil society network, which shares the concerns of policymakers for the development of the region and has demonstrated expertise on diverse issues impacting on democracy and “good governance”.

Free and fair elections, which have become a common feature in the democratisation process of southern African countries, are a necessary but insufficient requirement for democratic consolidation processes for two key reasons. First, transparent elections enshrine the importance of providing citizens with the legal channels through which they can participate in political processes. This is vital for the creation of the peaceful, democratic environment necessary for development. Second, elections provide the main legal channel for the orderly transfer of power between competing political groupings. The absence of such channels and mechanisms generates the conditions in which people feel that they have to resort to violence in order to effect change. Several election processes in southern Africa have been far from “free and fair”. Elections have become a source of insecurity for citizens and opposition political parties, and these processes have sometimes been characterised by centralised control of the campaign process, including the co-option of the media. This has generated political tensions and even violence before, during and after elections. In such situations, the political playing field is not level, since opposition parties cannot participate freely; the media is monopolised by ruling parties; electoral commissions are not independent; and elections are held in an atmosphere of intimidation and violence.

The Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections in SADC were adopted in August 2004. The Guidelines, inspired by the AU election principles of 2000, fall within the broad mandate of the SADC Organ, and seek to level the playing field during elections. It is worth noting that SADC’s initiative was preceded by two other complementary instruments: the SADC Parliamentary Forum Norms and Standards initiated by SADC parliamentarians in 2001; and the 2003 Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA)/Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) - Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation (PEMMO): a largely civil society initiative. The Guidelines received their first test in Zimbabwe’s March 2005 elections, and even though SADC declared that Zimbabwe had complied with the Guidelines during the elections, many civil society organisations argued that SADC had failed to police one of its members in the implementation of its own Guidelines.

Another key component of democratic governance is the strengthening of public institutions for the effective delivery of services to citizens. These include public sector reform as well as the management of public finance and institutional capacity-building, particularly within the civil service. Furthermore, this is vital for strengthening checks and balances within and outside the state, including empowering parliaments; ensuring the independence of the judiciary; and safeguarding the autonomy of oversight institutions such as anti-corruption commissions, human rights commissions, auditing institutions and ombudsmen. Outside the realm of the state, civil society is playing an increasingly important role in peace and security issues. Even though such organisations are sometimes severely constrained by repressive legislation, there is general acknowledgement that they have a major contribution to make in terms of peace, security and governance issues. Governments - and regional organisations - therefore need to create space for the effective participation of civil society actors in governance issues. In this context, gender parity remains a key goal for SADC countries, particularly in relation to the inclusion of women in national parliaments. The SADC Declaration on Gender and Development of 1997 called on states to ensure that 30 percent of their parliamentarians are women. The deadline for achieving this quota was set for 2005, and only South Africa and Mozambique exceeded this quota. Recent proposals to consider upgrading the Declaration to a Protocol will give it the ‘teeth’ it currently lacks.

SADC has also embarked on a process of enhancing human security through the promotion and protection of human rights. Civil society and governments can play a complementary role in promoting conflict management and resolution, for example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as in supporting efforts to control organised crime, confront anti-corruption activities, and assist in the demobilisation and reintegration of former soldiers.
8. The Role of Civil Society

The legal framework for civil society participation is outlined in the SADC Treaty of 1992, which recognises non-state actors as key stakeholders in the implementation of the sub-region’s democracy, peace and security project. At the operational level, SIPO translates the treaty’s broad principles by providing strategies for civil society participation in governance and security issues. SIPO makes a specific call for “civil society engagement in a number of areas which include conflict resolution, public awareness-raising on security issues and the establishment of a forum of academic and research institutions to deliberate on peace and security matters”.

Within this broad statement, civil society organisations can seize the opportunity to assume a multiplicity of roles in the following areas of expertise:

- Monitoring implementation by governments of their commitments, which can be done at the level of individual governments and at the regional level. SADC’s commitments to democracy, human rights, peace and security are documented in its list of protocols and declarations and, at the national level, countries have made commitments to international agreements. A great number of these commitments are not being implemented for a number of reasons, which include lack of political will and non-availability of resources. Civil society can co-operate with governments to augment capacity and they can pressure governments to implement their commitments. Civil society organisations can also play a watchdog role. They can develop standards, norms and structures of governance to contribute to strengthening democracy in the region. As noted earlier, EISA has, for example, been instrumental in developing electoral guidelines for SADC. There is significant talent and expertise in specialised fields such as research and training. Civil society can harness this strength to contribute to many areas in which SADC is lacking. This includes conflict prevention and the development of governance institutions such as human rights and anti-corruption bodies.

- Community-based and humanitarian organisations working closely with local communities can play an important role in the democratisation of SADC’s agenda and can bridge the information gap between SADC and national governments. With SADC’s plans for establishing an early-warning system, civil society actors are well positioned to contribute substantively to this process since some of them are close to local communities and can detect early signs of conflict.

- Civil society can also play a critical role in providing checks and balances to augment government oversight institutions such as parliaments and judiciaries, particularly in cases in which the independence of such public institutions has been undermined.

Though SIPO outlines specific areas for collaboration between SADC and civil society actors, it does not provide for implementation mechanisms. High on the list of challenges has been the question of the appropriate entry point for civil society to engage the SADC Organ. NGOs are unclear about which SADC departments to engage, and have often met with resistance and political caution in their efforts to assist the SADC secretariat. It is worth noting that, while many of these concerns are valid, the shortcomings of the SADC secretariat should also be understood within the broader context of bureaucratic hurdles, lack of capacity, and the restricted mandate of that office, which has often limited its decision-making capacity.

Notwithstanding these challenges, there has been a number of healthy interactions between civil society and

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SADC, which have led to invaluable contributions in promoting democratic governance; human rights, meeting the humanitarian needs of SADC citizens; election monitoring and management efforts; and conflict management and resolution. Some concrete examples of such collaboration include regional NGOs collaborating with the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) on issues of HIV/AIDS, human rights and violence against women. The Southern Africa Forum Against Corruption (SAFAC) has also been involved in anti-corruption issues. These limited successes are few and perhaps a drop in the ocean, considering the enormous potential and benefits of such partnerships. The Cape Town policy advisory group called on SADC to take advantage of these opportunities, particularly as the sub-region is faced with so many human security challenges, such as HIV/AIDS, poverty, food insecurity and a lack of resources and capacity.

While civil society continues to seek to strengthen SADC, it is imperative for these actors to conduct their own internal evaluations to identify areas of strength and weakness. Civil society is not a homogeneous group, and while this has been its major strength, it has also been one of its major weaknesses. Because NGOs consist of many diverse groups drawn from professional organisations, research institutes, community-based organisations and churches, it has often been able to maximise its comparative advantage. But the diversity of civil society also represents a variety of interests and agendas which often do not allow its members to speak with unanimity. Many NGOs in southern Africa survive on external funding with the limitations inherent in such dependence. Consequently, some organisations have found themselves compromising their autonomy, duplicating activities and competing for scarce resources.

Despite these challenges, civil society and governments should continue seeking ways of maximising their comparative advantage to contribute towards realising peace, security and development in southern Africa. Southern African NGOs can also benefit from forming networks such as the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO) group, the umbrella body of NGOs and civil society organisations in the sub-region. Established in 1998 to co-ordinate civil society collaboration with the SADC secretariat, the SADC-CNGO has
made some positive strides, including the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the SADC secretariat outlining the framework for civil society participation in SADC’s activities. Collaboration with CNCO could enhance civil society engagement with SADC. Finally, civil society in southern Africa should conduct an audit of university programmes to ascertain the level of knowledge of SADC programmes and activities within the curricula of these institutions. The objective of such an exercise would be to enhance democratic participation in SADC through popularising its policies and activities.
POSTSCRIPT

At its Silver Jubilee summit at which a new member, Madagascar, was officially admitted in August 2005, it was encouraging to note that SADC’s priority areas for 2006 will include the critical issue of implementation, which is pivotal to realising southern Africa’s peace, governance and integration agenda. Effective implementation of SADC’s programme of action has become a regional imperative, as the institution positions itself to assume an increasingly significant role as one of the African Union’s building blocks in the continent’s evolving security and governance architecture.

During its tenure in 2004 - 2005, South Africa, the outgoing Chair of the SADC Organ, underscored the urgent need for SADC to develop effective implementation and monitoring mechanisms, and to translate its ideals into practical strategies that would contribute to deepening the integration agenda. In this context, SADC’s new Executive Secretary, Mozambican national Tomaz Augusto Salomao, in his inaugural speech in September 2005, reaffirmed the need for SADC to consolidate the RISDP and SIPO, the two complementary documents providing “regional expression” to the AU/NEPAD principles which were adopted to steer and operationalise SADC’s shared vision into a concrete programme of action. A Consultative SADC Conference is scheduled for April 2006 with the theme, “Partnership for the Implementation of the RISDP and SIPO”. This meeting was announced by SADC’s Council of Ministers at their 2005 summit in Botswana, and will be hosted by Namibia, the current Chair of the SADC Organ. The meeting will focus on the harmonisation of efforts to mobilise resources to strengthen the role of the SADC secretariat in its endeavours to implement the RISDP and SIPO.

As the institutional structures central to implementation and other SADC activities are established, the organisation will focus attention, in 2006, on creating a strong resource base for their effective functioning, including finalising recruitment of staff for the SADC secretariat and its directorates. While reaffirming SADC’s commitment to democratic governance and a culture of democracy embracing the role of civil society in deepening the regional integration agenda at its August 2005 summit, SADC also underscored the need for the institution to mobilise its own resources. Only a handful of national committees have been established. SADC’s new Executive Secretary has called on civil society and other stakeholders to work together to enhance the capacity and visibility of these national structures.

At the same time that SADC was preparing to host its summit, civil society organisations were convening, for the first time, their own parallel process in Gaborone in August 2005 under the auspices of the SADC-CNGO.

The civil society meeting provided a forum for a collective interrogation of the legal framework governing the participation of NGOs in SADC’s evolving peace and security agenda. While the agenda focused on the challenges and constraints experienced by civil society in their efforts to engage the SADC secretariat, a number of critical human security concerns such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, governance challenges, gender inequalities, and insecurity linked to land reform processes, were discussed.

Highlights of the civil society meeting included:

- On HIV/AIDS, the meeting called on governments to elevate the Maseru Declaration of 2003 to Protocol status;
- On food security, civil society expressed concern on the persistent food crisis across SADC, aggravated by poverty and HIV/AIDS. Civil society further called on policymakers urgently to implement the SADC Trade

12 Introductory Media Statement by Tomaz Augusto Salomao, the new Executive Secretary of SADC, 8 September 2005, Gaborone, Botswana.
Protocol and to adopt policies ensuring access to land for vulnerable groups such as the poor, women, and children.

- On the issues of elections and governance, the meeting called for ratification of relevant continental and regional instruments. In this regard, civil society was asked to monitor the African Peer Review Mechanism more closely.

- On gender parity, the meeting noted that SADC has adopted, in principle, the idea to upgrade its Declaration into a Protocol. The battle has also been won on increasing the 30 percent gender representation for women in national parliaments to 50 percent. The next stage is to ensure that this decision is implemented more vigorously than the poor record of the previous 30 percent target.

The adoption of a Civil Society Guide, a document containing broad principles and a strategic framework for engaging interstate institutions, was one of the positive outcomes of the SADC-CNGO meeting. The Guide is intended to provide a framework for developing short- to long-term goals for civil society’s engagement with interstate institutions. The document also urges civil society to go beyond advocacy, lobbying, and workshops to focus more on constructive engagement with interstate institutions, and to strengthen critical areas such as regional research capacity. The goal of the Guide is to empower civil society actors to influence events at all levels, to enhance civil society’s knowledge of policy processes, and to increase the impact of such processes on the work of civil society.

Finally, SADC-CNGO’s constitutional requirements limiting membership to organisations represented in national NGO coalitions effectively exclude organisations which are unable to participate in national umbrella bodies. This constitutes a major weakness within its structures and could explain the apparent marginalisation of community-based organisations in SADC-CNGO activities, including at the recent meeting in Gaborone. While NGOs can enhance SADC’s capacity in areas such as research and training, community-based organisations have the potential to contribute enormously to conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts in southern Africa. The activities of community-based organisations often require close interaction with local communities, giving them an important vantage point from which to identify early signs of potential conflict.

**WHITHER SADC? SOUTHERN AFRICA’S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA**

ANNEX I

AGENDA

Friday 17 June 2005
18h30      Welcome Cocktails/ Dinner
           Venue: Northdeck / Leopard Room

19h30 Dinner
           Venue: The Café

Day One: Saturday 18 June 2005

9h00 – 09h15
Welcome and Introductions
Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Ambassador Torben Brylle, Ambassador of Denmark to South Africa

09h15 – 11h00
Session I
Strengthening the SADC Secretariat and its Executive Secretary
Chair: Ambassador Torben Brylle, Embassy of Denmark, Tshwane
Speakers:
Dr Sam Amoo, UN Development Programme, Addis Ababa
Dr Kaire Mbuende, former SADC Executive Secretary, Windhoek

Coffee Break: 11h00 – 11h15

11h15 – 12h45
Session II
Implementing SIPO, Strengthening the SADC Organ, and Assessing South Africa’s
Chair of the Organ
Chair: Dr Brigalia Bam, Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Tshwane
Speakers:
Dr Andre Du Pisani, Dept of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Namibia
Dr Tandeka Nkowane, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
Mr Tsepe Motumi, South African Defence Ministry, Tshwane

Lunch Break: 12h45 – 13h45
13h45 – 15h15

Session III
The Role of SADSEM and the Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
Chair: Dr Kaire Mbuende, former SADC Executive Secretary, Windhoek
Speakers: Prof Jonathan Mayuyuka Kaunda, Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis, Gaborone

Coffee Break: 15h15 – 15h30

15h30 – 17h00

Session IV
SADC: Integrating with the AU and the UN, Learning Lessons from ECOWAS
Chair: Major-General Solly Mollo, South African Defence Ministry, Tshwane
Speakers: Mr Pal Martins, Safer Africa, Tshwane
Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

19h00: Dinner
Venue: Azure Restaurant

Day Two: Sunday 19 June 2005

09h00 – 10h30

Session V
SADC: Tackling the Land Reform and HIV/AIDS Challenges
Chair: Ms Scholastica Kimanya, UN Development Programme, Tshwane
Speakers: Ms Ruth Hall, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town
Ms Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Coffee Break: 10h30 – 10h45

10h45 – 12h15

Session VI
SADC’s Governance Challenges: Democratisation and Elections
Chair: Mr Denis Kadima, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Johannesburg
Speakers: Dr Garth le Pere, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand
Ms Yaliwe Clark, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Lunch Break: 12h15 – 13h15
13h15 – 14h45

Session VII
The Role of Civil Society in Strengthening SADC
Chair: Mr Tim Hughes, South African Institute of International Affairs, Cape Town
Speakers: Ms Sue Mbaya, Southern African Regional Poverty Network, Tshwane
Dr Sheila Bunwaree, University of Mauritius, Reduit

Coffee Break: 14h45 – 15h00

15h00 – 16h30

Session VIII
Rapporteurs' Report and Way Forward
Chair: Major-General Solly Mollo, South African Ministry of Defence, Tshwane
Rapporteurs: Ms Noria Mashumba, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Mr Chuck Scott, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

PARTICIPANTS AT THE SEMINAR, "WHITHER SADC? SOUTHERN AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA", TWELVE APOSTLES HOTEL, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA, 18 – 19 JUNE 2005
ANNEX II

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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   University of Cape Town
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   United Nations Development Programme
   Addis Ababa
   Ethiopia

4. Dr Brigalia Bam
   Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa
   Tshwane
   South Africa

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   Embassy of Denmark
   Tshwane
   South Africa

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   University of the Witwatersrand
   Johannesburg
   South Africa

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13. Ms Ruth Hall
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14. Ambassador Wilhard Hellao
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    Tshwane
    South Africa

15. Brigadier Gordon Hughes
    UK Department for International Development
    Tshwane
    South Africa

16. Mr Tim Hughes
    South African Institute of International Affairs
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NOTES
WHITHER SADC?
SOUTHERN AFRICA’S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA

A POLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR HOSTED BY
THE CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

SEMINAR REPORT
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