THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH SUDAN

POLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR REPORT
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About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa; region-building and regional integration on the continent; relations between Africa and the European Union (EU); achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa; and South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy advisory group seminar at Burgers Park Hotel in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa, from 11 to 12 December 2015 on the theme “The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan”.

The meeting brought together about 30 key – mainly South Sudanese – civil society activists and scholars, as well as senior officials from South Africa and major external organisations, including the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), to reflect critically on the record of, and prospects for, civil society in peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan.

1. The Role of Civil Society in South Sudan: Challenges and Opportunities

The nature and role of civil society in South Sudan has been largely shaped by a Western narrative that equates civil society with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), while tending to ignore existing institutions such as local chiefs and traditional authorities. There are over 5,000 registered NGOs in South Sudan today, including some so-called “briefcase NGOs”, which have been formed mainly to access donor funding. Furthermore, most external funding has gone to Juba-based NGOs, with the result that South Sudanese community-based organisations often operate without adequate financial or technical support. Western NGOs such as Oxfam and World Vision, in particular, have faced criticism for diverting peacebuilding resources from local organisations.

This heavy reliance on, and competition for, scarce donor resources has contributed to the inability of many South Sudanese NGOs to define an independent agenda, while undermining the prospects for collaboration among them. Many local civil society organisations are over-stretched and lack clear objectives, while the sector as a whole suffers from a dearth of subject-specific expertise, knowledge, and skills. The civil war that erupted in December 2013 has further damaged relations within and between South Sudanese NGOs, by sharpening divisions based on political and ethnic affiliations.

Both the South Sudanese government and the rebels have also sought to co-opt, and at times infiltrate, national NGOs. This was made evident during the political negotiations of the August 2015 Addis Ababa peace accord. Since December 2013, pre-existing tensions between the media and government too have worsened, with several journalists killed in targeted attacks. South Sudanese civil society organisations thus operate in a climate of fear, intimidation, and harassment, which poses a significant challenge to their peacebuilding role.

2. Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Local and National Processes

Initially a struggle for power and ethnic dominance within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the December 2013 civil war sparked an array of local intra-ethnic conflicts fuelled by political motives. To a significant extent, this represented the failure of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and authorities in South Sudanese local communities, which have been undermined by the proliferation of ethnic-based NGOs and the empowerment of elites within formal civil society. For example, high-level peace conferences and initiatives have, by and large, failed to include adequate grassroots participation. Lack of resources and physical infrastructure, as well as weak advocacy capacities, have further constrained local peacebuilding efforts.
After December 2013, South Sudanese civil society played an important role in the delivery of humanitarian aid and basic services, as well as in bringing security concerns to national and international attention, though these multiple roles over-stretched the sector’s capacity. Church groups, in particular, have been an influential peacebuilding actor. For example, in November 2015, church leaders mediated three agreements between the government and local communities: two in Western Equatoria state, and one in Central Equatoria state. However, the church has limited capacity and its peacebuilding efforts, too, have been constrained by the ethnic nature of the South Sudanese conflict.

The economic context is an important influence on both national and local peacebuilding processes. Oil wealth distribution, in particular, is a crucial issue, having been a cause of conflict and insecurity even before December 2013. However, the space for local civil society activism on tackling oil exploitation and promoting greater government accountability has been significantly curtailed by the conflict, even as the need for it was highlighted by the escalation of violence centred on South Sudan’s oil fields from December 2013 onwards. A key challenge thus relates to how civil society can best be supported in developing an independent critical function in the militarised and polarised context of South Sudan.

3. Gender, Peace, and Security

South Sudanese society has historically been characterised by severe gender disparities in terms of access to services including education, justice, and healthcare; as well as employment opportunities. An estimated 84 percent of South Sudanese women, for example, are illiterate. Furthermore, the scale and severity of sexual and gender-based violence has only increased since December 2013, with the UN documenting countless incidents of such violence, particularly against women and children.

Government and civil society interventions to improve the plight of women in South Sudan have been inadequate. Although women make up 27 percent of the South Sudanese National Parliament, they are under-represented in the cabinet, judiciary, governorships, as well as the leadership of national commissions, businesses, universities, and NGOs. Furthermore, South Sudanese women in senior political positions have not only shied away from their responsibility towards marginalised women, but have also, at times, played a major role in instigating violent conflict. Targeted interventions in priority areas such as psycho-social support, entrepreneurial development, gender-based violence, and participation in electoral politics, thus need to be undertaken to promote the meaningful empowerment of South Sudanese women.

Greater efforts are similarly needed to address the disconnect between the experiences of rural and urban women in the country. The South Sudan Women’s Lawyers Association (SSWLA), for example, provides pro bono services to rural women. UN Women has also established a leadership institute for women at the University of Juba, and sponsored the creation of a parliamentary caucus that encourages female politicians and policymakers in Juba to identify and engage with their rural counterparts.

4. Accountability, Reconciliation, and Justice

For five decades (1956–2005), South Sudan was engaged in a violent struggle for independence, with trauma transferring from one generation to another and reinforcing ethnic identities. By one estimate, 68 percent of South Sudanese have witnessed or experienced conditions that have caused trauma, with the figure as high as 92 percent for Western Bahr El Ghazal state.
The proliferation of small arms has further abetted a reliance on violence as an instrument for the acquisition of wealth, power, and food security, as much as for the achievement of revenge-based justice. Many traditional mechanisms for reconciliation and justice have collapsed in South Sudan, while new institutions such as the Dinka Council of Elders, the Equatoria Elders Forum, and the Nuer Peace Council are state-designed, and thus, heavily politicised structures. The August 2015 peace accord provides for the creation of a Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS); a Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA); and a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing (CTRH). Civil society has a critical role to play in ensuring that legislative processes for the creation of these new institutions are not hijacked by political motives.

The pursuit of reconciliation and justice, though, needs to be a multi-layered process that addresses the national and local community levels differently. The Hybrid Court, for example, is based on criminal retributive justice and focuses on individual accountability. It cannot fully address all the root causes of conflict or provide community justice. Reconciling the often competing imperatives of justice and peace is another major challenge. Also, reconciliation cannot be assumed, but is a deliberative process that requires planning and engagement with all levels of South Sudanese society.

5. The Role of Civil Society in Implementing the 2015 Addis Ababa Peace Accord

The August 2015 Addis Ababa peace accord calls for extensive restructuring of South Sudan’s governance architecture and for the establishment of a new Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU). This reform process, however, faces a number of challenges, including the influence of “spoilers” such as South Sudan’s many warlords and the so-called Jieng Council of Elders. Decades of violent conflict and inter-ethnic tensions have also undermined the trust and social cohesion required to implement the August 2015 agreement. An additional challenge relates to President Salva Kiir’s unilateral decision in October 2015 to establish 28 states out of South Sudan’s existing 10, seen by many as a violation of the implementation of the peace accord.

South Sudanese civil society could have an important role to play in advancing the political reforms that the August 2015 agreement codifies and in ensuring local ownership of its implementation. Several NGOs have instituted educational exchange programmes to allow South Sudanese to interact with their counterparts in African countries such as Kenya and Rwanda who have gone through similar experiences. Civil society organisations have also been vocal in raising concerns about delays in implementing key aspects of the peace accord, while drawing the attention of external actors – including the Troika comprised of the United States (US), Britain, and Norway – to political posturing that could jeopardise the peace process.

In order to continue to contribute in positive ways to local and national peacebuilding processes, South Sudanese civil society actors need to forge constructive partnerships with their counterparts, as well as other influential actors, in the region. These partnerships could be a vital source of support for their domestic peacebuilding endeavours, though the generally under-developed culture of cross-border linkages in Africa’s civil society sector poses a major obstacle in this regard.

6. The Peacebuilding Role of External Actors

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has led external efforts to end the current conflict in South Sudan, including the mediation of the August 2015 peace agreement. This IGAD-led peace process
has been supported by regional and international organisations such as the AU, the East African Community (EAC), the UN, and the European Union (EU); as well as national actors such as Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa, China, Japan, and the Troika countries. Yet, these external actors also have disparate national interests, ranging from the protection of economic interests – as in the case of China – to the pursuit of security interests in the region, as in the case of the US. The role of Uganda, in particular, is disputed, with many questioning its unilateral military intervention in support of President Salva Kiir’s government.

South Africa’s position on the political crisis in South Sudan has primarily been informed by its commitment to the principle to peaceful resolution of conflicts. In addition to diplomatic support for the August 2015 agreement, Tshwane has supported a parallel peace initiative in the form of an intra-party dialogue known as the Arusha Process. Alongside Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) ruling party, South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC) is a co-guarantor of this process, which is aimed at reconciling the various factions of South Sudan’s ruling party.

External actors have a critical role in building an enabling environment for sustainable peace in South Sudan through supporting the establishment of credible state institutions. External donors need, though, to provide political, financial, and technical assistance, not only for the implementation of the August 2015 accord, but also for social and economic development projects in South Sudan. Drawing on the experience of African countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, South Sudan should, furthermore, consider seeking expertise from among its large Diaspora to bridge capacity gaps.

On the ground, the 16,147-strong United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is the main organised framework for external engagement in South Sudan. Its capacity to respond effectively to the humanitarian crisis since December 2013, though, has been stretched, with 2.78 million South Sudanese displaced and tens of thousands killed in the fighting. Since August 2016, the mission’s mandate also provides for a 4,000-strong Regional Protection Force, but progress towards its deployment has been slow, with the South Sudanese government only accepting the participation of neighbouring countries in the force in November 2016.

Policy Recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the Tshwane policy seminar:

1. The root causes of South Sudan’s multiple conflicts need to be better understood by key domestic, regional, and external actors through greater engagement with local communities, as well as more robust and rigorous conflict analysis in order for conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts to have greater impact and sustainability.

2. National NGOs in South Sudan need to focus on specialisation in key areas (for example, human rights, women’s empowerment, youth development, and HIV/AIDS programmes); on strengthening their technical capacities in these areas; and on becoming more professional rather than on pursuing donor agendas to obtain funding.

3. It is vital for South Sudanese women’s groups not only to strengthen the linkages among themselves, but also to collaborate and form partnerships with other civil society organisations and international NGOs working on issues such as health and education that affect women in order to maximise their impact.
4. External donors need to reconsider funding strategies that are overly focused on supporting Juba-based NGOs, and provide greater resources for strengthening community-based grassroots organisations which are accountable to their local communities. They must also focus more on the aspirations of South Sudanese civil society itself.

5. South Sudanese civil society organisations should forge and strengthen relationships with NGOs and other forms of civil society in Eastern Africa and the wider continent, which could serve as an alternative source of technical support as well as provide experiential learning, while helping them to engage more actively with key regional bodies such as IGAD, the EAC, and the AU. In addition, greater collaboration among civil society groups within South Sudan could help maximise the influence of the sector as a whole on national peacebuilding processes.

6. The pursuit of transitional justice and reconciliation in South Sudan needs to be a two-fold process, with the reconciliation of elites driven by renowned African leaders, while community reconciliation is prioritised by community-based and civil society organisations who also need to be empowered to find innovative ways to promote accountability within their local communities.

7. It is vital for trauma-healing, trauma-counselling, and mental health support to be included, and treated as a priority, in programme interventions aimed at promoting accountability, reconciliation, and justice in South Sudan.

8. South Sudanese civil society has a crucial role to play in providing evidence-based guidance on the implementation of the August 2015 peace accord by drawing on its local knowledge and on-the-ground presence; and in serving as a watchdog to ensure that the agreement’s prospects of success are not harmed by the vested interests of powerful political actors, warlords, and other spoilers.

9. International as well as local actors involved in peacebuilding processes in South Sudan need to make greater efforts to increase the participation of representatives from smaller, rural communities in their interventions, including policy dialogues and capacity-building workshops. In this context, the vital role played by local chiefs, and traditional and religious leaders in grassroots conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts also needs to be better understood and supported.

10. External political, financial, and technical support for peacebuilding processes in South Sudan must be long term, and go beyond isolated interventions to focus on the systematic provision of sustained support for the building of durable state institutions.
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy advisory group seminar at Burgers Park Hotel in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa, from 11 to 12 December 2015 on the theme “The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan”.

The Centre has, for 48 years, worked to promote a just and sustainable peace in Africa, with an emphasis on strengthening the capacity of African institutions and civil society actors to resolve conflicts and to build peace in their own communities. This report builds on CCR’s policy development and research on issues pertaining to South Sudan since 2006, as well as its sustained capacity-building work in the country since 2012. In April 2006, the Centre organised a policy advisory group seminar in Cape Town on the theme “South Sudan within a New Sudan”, which devised concrete recommendations on how the emerging country could use the opportunity of the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to establish strong governance institutions.1 CCR held a further policy meeting in Cape Town in August 2010 that focused on the domestic, sub-regional, and external challenges facing Sudan, as South Sudan prepared for its landmark referendum in January 2011.2 Based on this experience, since 2012, the Centre has been working on a sustained basis in South Sudan to build the capacity of diverse local actors in the areas of human rights, gender, security sector reform, conflict resolution, and HIV/AIDS. Nine capacity-building workshops have been held in Juba, South Sudan, with the most recent workshops focusing on building the conflict management capacities of local human rights and peacebuilding non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in South Sudan.

CCR’s December 2015 Tshwane seminar took place at a particularly politicised, uncertain, and critical juncture in South Sudan’s nearly five-year history as an independent state. The high expectations accompanying the country’s independence in July 2011 have been destroyed by the ongoing civil conflict that began in December 2013, precipitated by a leadership crisis, but with roots in deeper political tensions within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).3 Failure to resolve the political differences between the SPLM’s top leaders – in particular, South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir Mayardit, and his former vice-president, Riek Machar – rapidly resulted in a violent, inter-ethnic conflict, drawing key regional actors into the crisis. These have included the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU), as well as individual countries such as Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa. Notably, in December 2013, Uganda deployed troops in South Sudan to support Salva Kiir, while peace negotiations have been held since the start of the crisis under the auspices of IGAD.4

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1 Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), South Sudan within a New Sudan, seminar report, Franschhoek, South Africa, 20–21 April 2006 (available at http://www.ccr.org.za).
The conflict has displaced 1.73 million people within the country, while making 1.05 million South Sudanese refugees in Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya; and killed tens of thousands of people. The IGAD-led peace talks, meanwhile, have been fraught with difficulties. The eventual signing of a peace accord in August 2015 between Salva Kiir’s government and the main rebel opposition – Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) – was met with cautious optimism, but its implementation has, from the outset, been beset with difficulties. An important milestone was reached with the establishment of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) in April 2016, but the eruption of fresh violence in Juba in July 2016 has since resulted in a deteriorating humanitarian and security situation. In August 2016, the United Nations Security Council authorised the creation of a 4,000-strong Regional Protection Force, operating under the aegis of UNMISS, with a mandate to provide security in and around Juba including through the use of force, where necessary. This force was yet to deploy as of November 2016, and the political situation remained uncertain, following the flight from Juba of Riek Machar and his replacement by Taban Deng Gai – a former SPLM-IO negotiator – as vice-president in the transitional government by Salva Kiir. The prospects for a genuine and sustainable peace remain in the balance, rendering essential a deeper understanding of the root causes of South Sudan’s multiple conflicts and a more inclusive peacebuilding process.

CCR’s December 2015 Tshwane seminar took place two years after the outbreak of violence in Juba in December 2013, with the still fragile August 2015 Addis Ababa peace accord providing the backdrop to the meeting. Building on the Centre’s well-established academic and policy networks and ground engagement in South Sudan, the meeting brought together about 30 key – mainly South Sudanese – civil society activists and scholars, as well as senior officials from South Africa and major external partner organisations, including the AU and the UN, to reflect critically on the record of, and prospects for, civil society in peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan. The seminar also provided a platform for developing concrete, actionable recommendations for strengthening the capacity of local civil society organisations to play a more effective role in ongoing and future peacebuilding processes in South Sudan. This report is based on discussions at the meeting, as well as on the seminar concept note and further research.

The Tshwane policy advisory group seminar sought to achieve six key objectives:

1. To understand the challenges facing South Sudanese civil society in the context of the country’s conflict, and the uncertain political prospects for implementation of the August 2015 peace accord;
2. To identify lessons from past experiences of civil society involvement in South Sudanese peace processes that can assist local NGOs in the country to contribute more effectively to peacebuilding efforts;

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7 The concept paper drew mainly from research undertaken by Daniel Large, Assistant Professor at the School of Public Policy at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary.
3. To reflect critically on the role of, and prospects for, civil society in the dissemination and implementation of the August 2015 peace accord, as well as in the resolution of local conflicts in South Sudan;
4. To assist South Sudanese civil society in developing effective peacebuilding strategies that can accommodate the disparate needs of local communities across the country;
5. To explore ways of strengthening civil society engagement with issues of accountability, reconciliation, justice, gender equality, and women’s empowerment as important aspects of peacebuilding in South Sudan; and
6. To identify concrete ways in which key external actors – such as South Africa, IGAD, the AU, and the UN – can support South Sudanese civil society’s peacebuilding roles more effectively.

From left: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa; and Mr Paul Mulindwa, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.
1. The Role of Civil Society in South Sudan: Challenges and Opportunities

The evolving nature and role of civil society in South Sudan — a country with a population of 12.3 million — is intertwined with the history of internal conflict and international engagement in the country. In this regard, the period from 1989 to 2005 is particularly significant for understanding the context of the challenges facing contemporary civil society in South Sudan, although independence in 2011 and the current conflict have, in many ways, changed these circumstances significantly.

During this period, international humanitarian engagement in the then Southern Sudan was mostly organised under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)-Southern Sector. A more prominent role for “civil society” came into being as a result of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army’s efforts to be seen to be undertaking reform. In 1993, SPLA Commander-in-Chief, John Garang, permitted the creation of the first so-called indigenous non-governmental organisation, the Cush Relief and Rehabilitation Society. However, civil society was generally seen as “weak.” While notionally representing a more pluralist system, in reality, the indigenous NGOs “[reinforced] centralised power” within the SPLM/A.

Moreover, Operation Lifeline Sudan took civil society to be the realm of formal and informal organisations outside of state control. In Southern Sudan, this meant outside SPLA control. Barring the church, however, there was no network of autonomous NGOs in the territory. In addition to faith-based organisations such as the Sudan Council of Churches and the Islamic Council, civil society was mainly comprised of grievance-based and advocacy groups; with the latter category including both those groups operating within Sudan and those active in the Diaspora. International understanding of civil society further tended to ignore existing institutions such as local chiefs and forms of traditional authority. “Civil society” was consequently approached as a lacuna to be filled through the creation and strengthening of Southern Sudanese NGOs. The NGO Forum was created in 1996 to coordinate non-governmental organisations working in Southern Sudan, and has since played a pivotal role in the development of the NGO sector in South Sudan. By 2016, the South Sudan NGO Forum comprised 104 national and 129 international NGOs operating in the country. This underscores the importance of external NGO engagement in South Sudan, as well as the extent to which external aid can build the capacity of civil society.

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 between the government of Sudan – led by Omar al-Bashir – and the SPLM/A – led by John Garang – significantly transformed the civil society sector within Southern Sudan. National NGOs emerged to dominate the space, effectively overshadowing other forms of civil society. There are over 5,000 registered NGOs in South Sudan today. Many key figures in civil society were also absorbed into the autonomous government of Southern Sudan, thus depriving the sector of much of its leadership. Since 2005, the nature of South Sudanese civil society has continued to be shaped, to a
large extent, by Western donors, three of which – the United States (US), Britain, and Norway – were guarantors of the CPA. The dominant Western narrative not only equates civil society with NGOs, but also views these organisations primarily as a tool for influencing government policies and decisions. This understanding of civil society has, on the one hand, encouraged the development of the NGO sector in South Sudan. On the other hand, it has given rise to a situation in which most of the external funding for the sector has gone to Juba-based NGOs, causing resentment among other civil society actors (for example, farmers’ associations). As a result, South Sudanese community-based organisations with strong grassroots constituencies often operate without adequate financial or technical support.

In addition, the heavy reliance of South Sudanese civil society on foreign donors, along with the problem of under-capacity, has contributed to the inability of many NGOs to define an independent agenda based on the interests of South Sudanese citizens. Given this patron-client relationship, according to local actors, the tendency of external actors such as the Troika – the US, Britain, and Norway – to impose their governance and development templates on South Sudan has, at times, constrained the implementation of local peacebuilding models and priorities, and contributed to narrowing the space for South Sudanese civil society to effect change in their country through their own indigenous solutions. Meanwhile, competition for donor resources and the attendant imperative to remain relevant has tended to undermine collaboration among civil society organisations, while encouraging a hostile relationship between civil society and the state. Furthermore, as more well-established entities, foreign NGOs are more easily able to secure access to financial support from donors. These resources are used by international NGOs, by and large, to implement their own programmes in South Sudan, with only occasional sub-contracting of operations to national NGOs. In this context, Western NGOs such as Oxfam and World Vision have faced criticism for diverting peacebuilding resources to themselves that should go toward strengthening the capacity of local organisations.

The effectiveness of South Sudanese civil society has also been hindered by the highly polarised and militarised nature of the country’s politics. Following the country’s independence in 2011, the SPLM/A’s “process of transforming the institutions of the liberation struggle” has faced numerous challenges. Governance in South Sudan has been underpinned by the army and national security system, with militarism rendered more severe by the current conflict and the further proliferation of small arms since December 2013. Both the government and the opposition have sought to co-opt, and sometimes to infiltrate, NGOs. This was evident during the political negotiations of the August 2015 peace accord. This situation has given civil society in South Sudan a rather partisan character, which has sometimes contributed to undermining its legitimacy and credibility in the country. Of equal concern is the top-down militaristic culture that pervades politics in South Sudan, with former military officers and rebel leaders frequently appointed to positions of responsibility in the government and bringing with them values that are often averse to political accountability. The governing authorities have also sought to regulate tightly the work of civil society organisations, including through legislation. This has reduced the space for genuine dialogue between the state and civil society. Civil society activists have thus often become victims of government harassment. Pre-existing tensions between the media and government too have worsened in the context of the conflict since December 2013. Journalists have been particularly vulnerable,
and some have been killed in targeted attacks during the current civil war. Amid shifting patterns of fighting, it is also important to consider relations between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition and civil society organisations. This includes international NGOs, given the efforts of the SPLM-IO’s relief wing – the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA) – to seek to manage, and garner legitimacy from, the United Nations and other international agencies.

The challenges facing South Sudanese civil society are considerable, given the complexities and impact of the country’s conflicts at multiple levels across South Sudan. This includes the mammoth scale of human displacement and the 4.8 million people deemed by the UN to be food insecure as of July 2016.15 Below the level of elite politics, the impact of the current conflict on South Sudanese society has been devastating and further damaged social ties between and within diverse communities, including but not confined to the Nuer and the Dinka. In this respect, the civil war has significantly altered not only the context in which civil society organisations work at the grassroots level in South Sudan, but also damaged relations within and between these organisations by sharpening divisions based on a combination of political and ethnic affiliations. Many civil society organisations are founded and staffed along ethnic lines, making it difficult for them to have influence beyond their narrowly defined communities and to undertake, or participate in, efforts to forge a sense of unified national purpose. Several South Sudanese activists have noted internal mistrust as a major obstacle for local civil society to overcome in order to play a more effective peacemaking and peacebuilding role in South Sudan.

Furthermore, in a context defined by limited economic opportunities, the tendency to see the civil society sector primarily as a source of livelihoods is ever present in South Sudan. It is therefore not uncommon in the country to find so-called “briefcase NGOs”, which have been formed mainly to access donor funding; are characterised by nepotism; conduct perfunctory activities; and lack the commitment to drive transformative change. More generally, South Sudanese civil society has a dearth of subject-specific expertise, knowledge, and skills, with some of those purporting to be “gender specialists”, for example, often lacking awareness of the broader context provided by initiatives such as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 on women, peace, and security. Many local NGOs are also over-stretched and lack clear objectives, which further impedes their effectiveness in a context of limited capacities and resources. Altogether, these weaknesses have raised serious questions about the credibility and accountability of civil society in South Sudan.

Notwithstanding these challenges, the August 2015 peace accord has provided a window of opportunity for civil society in South Sudan to reinvent itself and to play a more concerted role in peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts in the country. To this end, South Sudanese NGOs will have to engage in new forms of relationships with the government and citizens of South Sudan. This new engagement should seek to transcend the dominant donor narrative on what is beneficial for South Sudan, and instead be rooted in original thinking and dialogue with diverse local stakeholders. Furthermore, South Sudanese civil society can learn valuable lessons from the experiences of civil society organisations in other African countries, given the similarities in contexts and

challenges encountered. For example, in Kenya, partnerships between national and international NGOs – in particular grant-making organisations – have often been crucial for withstanding government crackdowns and creating a strong architecture for peace. In Tunisia, Nobel Peace Prize-winning civil society organised a national dialogue that forced political parties to agree a secular constitution and organise democratic elections in 2014.
2. Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Local and National Processes

Conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan have been largely unsuccessful thus far, due mainly to a widespread failure to understand the root causes of the country’s multiple conflicts, in particular those below the level of elite politics.

Initially a struggle for power and ethnic dominance within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, the December 2013 civil war sparked an array of local intra-ethnic conflicts that have persisted. To some extent, this represents the failure of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and authorities such as chiefs and elders in local communities across South Sudan. For example, disputes over cattle raids, grazing, farming land, and access to water and other resources, have historically been prevented and resolved at the local level through dialogue, with traditional leaders typically convening meetings to persuade conflicting or adversarial parties to settle their differences with each other and to maintain peace. Indeed, the 2011 Transitional Constitution provides for the inclusion of traditional authority as a key institution of local government. The role of traditional mechanisms and leaders, however, has been undermined by several factors including the proliferation of ethnic-based non-governmental organisations, many with unclear roles and responsibilities; and the empowerment of elites within formal civil society.

New challenges to established traditional authority have emerged in many parts of South Sudan, not only as a result of generational change and the violent fracturing of social relations wrought by the current conflict, but also due to a broader set of crises related to legitimate authority, control, and conflict resolution mechanisms. The prospects for engaging traditional authority in peace processes are thus related to the emergence of new forms of authority deriving legitimacy from the “rule of the gun” and to the changing role of chiefs in responding to local conflicts. The striking diversity of responses to violence by chiefs and religious authorities in Unity, Upper Nile, and Western Equatoria states, for example, suggests the need for an array of inter-connected solutions. This situation also highlights the imperative of securing a better understanding of micro-dynamics, including the impact of conflicts across many different parts of South Sudan and its adjacent regions. Grassroots peacebuilding and civil society initiatives have a key role to play in making peace processes less elite-driven. However, this requires a deeper understanding of the myriad ways in which the role of local chiefs and traditional leaders has been affected by the ongoing conflict.

Peacebuilding models have often been imported into South Sudan without taking into account its own specific domestic circumstances. High-level peace conferences, consultative meetings, and other such initiatives have, by and large, failed to include adequate grassroots participation, and consequently, to take effective measures to address local conflicts, as well as the breakdown of traditional authority in South Sudanese communities. The outcomes of these meetings, furthermore, have tended to neglect the importance of trust-building processes and community-level structures to repair South Sudan’s fragile social fabric. The lack of physical infrastructure

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16 This section is partly based on presentations made by David De-Dau and Batali Geoffrey at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, “The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan”.
is also a major constraint that has hindered greater engagement by national and international NGOs with civil society at the grassroots level. Much of South Sudan is inaccessible by road, with the problem exacerbated during the rainy season as well as by insecurity due to a lack of the rule of law. This situation has been made even worse by the outbreak of the December 2013 civil war. Unlike Juba-based NGOs, community-based organisations and grassroots groups typically do not have, and are unable to access, the necessary funding to overcome transport constraints. Under-capacity is an additional and critical weakness, particularly in the case of women. The problem is worse in rural areas, but local as well as national civil society actors often lack the communication (including language), advocacy, and negotiation skills that are essential for their peacebuilding efforts. Community-based organisations are further constrained by limited access to information about the technical and financial resources that are available for their work.

Ethnicity has also sharpened divisions within South Sudanese civil society and compromised local, as well as national, peacebuilding processes, with participation often determined by political and ethnic affiliations. Civil society has sometimes fuelled the crisis through ethnic-based messages, and the ethnic nature of the conflict has further damaged the ability of civil society organisations to be impartial, with NGOs in different states divided along ethnic lines. During the negotiations for the August 2015 Addis Ababa peace agreement, for example, South Sudanese civil society comprised a divided force, and as such, was unable to exert a positive influence on the peace process. This was despite the fact that civil society representatives had not been initially included in the IGAD-led initiative, but had been forced to lobby for their participation in the process. This has contributed to a deep mistrust of civil society, as well as to the lack of ownership of peacebuilding processes by stakeholders in local communities, many of whom continue to be uninformed about the IGAD-mediated peace process and its outcomes. In this regard, the maintenance of its impartiality is one of the most formidable challenges facing the civil society sector in South Sudan.

On the ground though, South Sudanese civil society actors – both formal and informal – have had a more positive impact on achieving some improvements in human security. In the three months from the start of the current conflict which erupted in December 2013, the violence internally displaced 706,000 South Sudanese and created over 173,000 refugees in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya.19 South Sudanese civil society played an important role in the delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as in bringing security concerns to the attention of the government in Juba and the international community. This process involved support from international NGOs, with the South Sudan NGO Forum convening several meetings on issues related to the provision of humanitarian assistance during this period. In a context of weak governance, particularly since December 2013, civil society organisations have also carried out service delivery in parts of the country. The full extent of South Sudanese civil society’s peacebuilding efforts, including in rural areas, needs to be documented. However, the multiple roles that national and local civil society has played during the current crisis have stretched its capacity. There is an urgent need for national and local organisations, formal and informal civil society groups, and international NGOs in South Sudan to build more concrete and strategic alliances to exploit their full potential for tackling the challenges posed by persistent conflict, corruption, poor governance, poverty, and injustice.

19 David De-Dau, “South Sudan: Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Local and National Processes”, presentation at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, “The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan”.
Church groups, in particular, have been an influential peacebuilding actor at the local and national levels in South Sudan. They were instrumental in mediating the conflict between the South Sudanese government and David Yau Yau’s Cobra Forces in Jonglei state after the 2010 elections, which led to the establishment of the Greater Pibor Administrative Area. More recently, in November 2015, church leaders were able to mediate three agreements between the government and local communities: two in Western Equatoria state, and one in Central Equatoria state. However, the church has limited capacity and its peacebuilding efforts, too, have been constrained by the ethnic nature of the conflict. The church must further take responsibility for its role, before the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in framing the conflict with Sudan as a Christian minority fighting jihadists in Khartoum. Nonetheless, South Sudanese civil society should interface more with the church, as well as traditional leaders and grassroots stakeholders. These groups also need to understand peacebuilding as a long-term process that must connect local to national conflict resolution efforts. Local conflict resolution is a key area in which South Sudanese civil society has the potential to make a tangible difference, as demonstrated by the people-to-people peace process that helped produce the 1999 Wunlit Peace Agreement between the Nuer and Dinka in the West Bank of the Nile.

Furthermore, the economic context is an important influence on both national and local peacebuilding processes in South Sudan. Oil is crucial for any consideration of current and future conflicts, as well as possibilities for peace and the efficacy of peacebuilding strategies in South Sudan. Prior to 2013, the country’s political economy had been concentrating wealth in Juba and the various state capitals, while leaving the hinterlands of Jonglei and Upper Nile states out of economic development. This is not to say that economic issues were the sole, or primary, cause of previous conflicts such as the Yau Yau rebellions in Jonglei between 2010 and 2012. Rather, the broader point is that oil wealth distribution, alongside other issues such as ethnic conflicts, cattle raids, and border and land disputes, had contributed to insecurities even before the start of the current civil war in December 2013. Oil is central to current arguments by anti-government opposition groups that Juba has become the “new Khartoum”, and that the new South Sudan is characterised by corruption, oil-based patronage, and the squandering of public resources. As international agencies struggle to deal with “economic stress” – food insecurity, austerity economics, livelihoods, and local economies – civil society engagement with governance and economic issues in South Sudan is vital for improving transparency and accountability, and for effectively tackling the nexus between conflict and corruption.

Another key challenge relates to how civil society can best be supported in developing an independent critical function that provides checks and balances to the work of the government. The European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS), for example, was involved in efforts to build the capacity of affected local groups in the oil-producing areas of South Sudan to tackle oil exploitation and to promote greater government accountability. While the space for local civil society activism on the issue has been significantly curtailed since December 2013, and the oil fields either shut down completely (such as in Unity state) or operate at much reduced production capacity (for example, in Upper Nile state), the need for such work has been enhanced by the ongoing conflict. However, whether – and if so, how – civil society can engage in this area, is open to debate.

22 For a more recent working paper, see David Deng, “Oil and Sustainable Peace in South Sudan”, South Sudan Law Society, Juba, February 2015.
Prior to December 2013, civil society groups had been undertaking work on the social and environmental impacts of oil in South Sudan. Local communities in the oil-producing regions of Upper Nile and Unity were active stakeholders in terms of asserting themselves more forcefully through the 2012 Petroleum Act on questions such as compensation for oil-induced displacement, losses, and environmental impact. The escalation of violence centred on the oil fields from December 2013 onwards has set these efforts back considerably.
3. Gender, Peace, and Security

Decades of conflict and underdevelopment have had serious effects on the status and well-being of women in South Sudan. Accurate data on sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence is difficult to find, but such violence is widespread in South Sudan.

Its scale and severity have further increased since the outbreak of civil conflict in December 2013, with the UN describing women and children “being deliberately targeted, with countless incidents of sexual violence, including gang rapes, abductions, killings, arson and displacement”. South Sudanese society has historically been characterised by severe gender disparities in terms of access to services including education, justice, and maternal and child healthcare; as well as employment opportunities. As of January 2012, for example, only 37 percent of girls between the ages of six and 13 were attending school. Unsurprisingly, although women make up about 49 percent of the total population of South Sudan, an estimated 84 percent are illiterate. Given that the majority of women also live in rural areas, the high incidence of illiteracy has undermined efforts to alleviate the effects of violent conflict on South Sudanese women. Furthermore, women have limited rights to land and are often discriminated against by customary law and traditional authorities.

Government and civil society interventions to improve the plight of women in South Sudan have been generally inadequate, particularly in the context of recurrent power struggles and violent conflict. This has been most noticeable in the struggle to translate the constitutional principle of greater gender equity into an effective “affirmative action” programme. South Sudan’s 2011 Transitional Constitution accords women full and equal dignity, and the right to equal pay for equal work. It also provides for the promotion of the participation of women in public life through a quota of at least 25 percent in the country’s legislative and executive organs. The 2005 Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan contained similar provisions. However, progress towards achieving genuine gender equity has, in practice, been limited over the past decade. Although women made up 27 percent of the South Sudanese National Parliament in 2015, they remained under-represented in the cabinet, judiciary, governorships, as well as the leadership of national commissions, businesses, universities, and NGOs. Furthermore, the appointment of women to leadership roles in government has become a political tool in the service of South Sudan’s ruling elite. There has been a recycling of women in positions of authority rather than the empowerment of a more diverse group of women and the introduction of new faces. This practice not only highlights the adverse effects of South Sudanese politics on efforts to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment, but also calls into question the role of women in leadership positions, and more generally, the efficacy of affirmative action policies in addressing the historical marginalisation of women.

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23 This section is partly based on presentations made by Nyuon Susan Sebit William and Ruth Lugor at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, “The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan”.
24 UN Security Council “Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan”, S/2015/655, 21 August 2015, p. 15.
In South Sudan, as in many other African countries, there seems to be a tendency for women to become beholden to their male counterparts once they have been appointed to senior leadership positions in the ruling party and the government. In the particular case of South Sudan, women in senior political positions have not only shied away from their responsibility towards marginalised women, but have also, at times, played a major role in instigating violent conflicts that subject women to even greater suffering. In this context, it is imperative not only to review and strengthen the implementation of the 25 percent quota for women’s representation in government decision-making structures, but also to move the discourse and practice of gender equality and women’s empowerment beyond the issue of representation. This, in turn, requires urgent and targeted interventions that support rural women, in particular, in priority areas such as psycho-social support, entrepreneurial development, gender-based violence, and participation in electoral politics. Just as importantly, there is an urgent need to address the challenges that women face with regard to access to justice and land ownership, against the backdrop of regressive customary laws. While the 2011 Transitional Constitution provides for the rights of women, it also includes “customs and traditions of the people” as a source of legislation. Customary laws and courts are the primary means through which the vast majority of South Sudanese access justice. In a deeply patriarchal society, these have the “potential to reinforce practices that perpetuate gender inequality”.

Women’s organisations have further been hamstrung in their efforts to promote the empowerment of South Sudanese women by several factors including, in particular, the disconnect between the experiences of rural and urban women in the country. Many women’s organisations, as well as other NGOs working on women’s issues, have a mostly elitist character and primarily focus on the concerns of women in the main urban areas of the country (for example, Juba and its surrounding areas). This means that the experiences and interests of women in rural areas are not adequately reflected in the dominant discourses on gender equality and women’s empowerment. This is not to suggest that civil society in South Sudan has been completely insensitive to the conditions of women in the country’s rural areas. In addition to their advocacy work at the national and regional levels, several prominent NGOs and women’s organisations have been working to bridge this rural-urban divide through interventions that specifically target rural women. The South Sudan Women’s Lawyers Association (SSWLA), for example, provides pro bono services to rural women. A group of civil society organisations has also been lobbying the government to pass a Sexual Offences Act that would benefit mostly women in the rural areas. UN Women, meanwhile, has sought to promote a comprehensive approach to the empowerment of women in South Sudan, working with women’s organisations and male-led NGOs, and establishing a leadership institute for women at the University of Juba. Women empowerment centres have also been set up at the grassroots level nation-wide. In addition, UN Women has sponsored the creation of a parliamentary caucus that encourages female politicians and policymakers in Juba to identify and engage with their rural counterparts.

The potential roles of civil society organisations in ensuring the inclusion of gender justice in community, state, and national reconciliation; promoting the empowerment of women through greater engagement, dialogue, and advocacy; and ensuring a gendered approach to peacebuilding, all need to be explored further. Upon attaining independence in 2011, South Sudan agreed to the AU’s 2006 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and

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31 Friederike Bubenzer and Elizabeth Lacey, Opportunities for Gender Justice and Reconciliation in South Sudan, Policy Brief no. 12, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), Cape Town, South Africa, July 2013, p. 6.
Development Strategy,\(^{32}\) which calls for gender mainstreaming to inform nation- and state-building; and ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in September 2014. In addition, the South Sudanese government and the UN signed a joint communiqué to address conflict-related sexual violence in October 2014. Notably, the August 2015 peace accord not only provides for the active involvement of women in its implementation, but is also designed to deliver tangible peace dividends to women across South Sudan. The adoption by the South Sudanese government of an Action Plan to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 on women, peace, and security also provides an opportunity for women’s organisations, NGOs, and other stakeholders to strengthen their struggle against gender inequality and the marginalisation of women in the country. In this regard, the onus very much rests on civil society organisations to use such official frameworks and commitments as entry points to bring about greater and more sustainable change in the lives of women in South Sudan. For example, women’s organisations and NGOs should seek to ensure that the outcomes of the ongoing constitutional review process subject customary laws and other traditional practices to constitutional principles that protect women’s rights. Civil society organisations also have a critical role to play in ensuring that atrocities committed against women are prioritised, and effectively dealt with, in the different transitional justice mechanisms envisaged under the August 2015 peace accord.

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4. Accountability, Reconciliation, and Justice

For five decades (1956–2005), South Sudan was engaged in a violent struggle for independence, which it finally attained from Khartoum in July 2011. Partly as a result of this sustained experience of violence, fear, and emotional distress; trauma has transferred from one generation to another — both among national elites and local communities — while reinforcing ethnic identities.

Violence in present-day South Sudan is, furthermore, a complex phenomenon, with political violence such as that perpetrated by government and opposition forces in Unity and Upper Nile states, occurring alongside structural violence around issues of poverty and resource-sharing, for example, in Western Bahr El Ghazal state. By one estimate, 68 percent of South Sudanese have witnessed or experienced conditions that have caused trauma, with the figure as high as 92 percent for Western Bahr El Ghazal. In the same national survey, conducted between April and June 2015, the most traumatising situations or events identified by participants were the killing of community members during conflicts and the escalation of disputes into armed violence, closely followed by the destruction of property (including livestock) and displacement. With entire communities thus affected across South Sudan by near-continual exposure to violence and armed conflict, trauma-healing and trauma-counselling are a prerequisite for transitional justice and reconciliation processes to have any success on the ground. South Sudanese stakeholders in various capacities similarly need to be empowered to focus on truth-telling and accountability, though the ethnic character of many of the crimes that have been perpetrated and the continued importance of ethnic loyalties pose a significant challenge in this regard.

In the absence of the rule of law and in the context of a heavily militarised state and society, accountability and justice have taken the form of a culture of revenge in South Sudan, with reconciliation coming to be viewed as a sign of weakness and capitulation. This has, in turn, contributed to perpetuating cycles of violence, with women and children among the most vulnerable to the suffering. The proliferation of small arms, after five decades of conflict and state neglect, has further abetted a reliance on violence as an instrument for the acquisition of wealth, power, and food security, as much as for the achievement of revenge-based community justice. Yet, discussions on accountability, reconciliation, and justice in South Sudan have, for the most part, been elite-driven, with community acceptance of peace and reconciliation processes being a secondary concern. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army included a call to begin a process of national reconciliation as part of a broader peacebuilding effort, but did not specify any mechanisms, and was ignored by Khartoum, with little done to achieve any form of healing or justice for victims of human rights abuses. Similarly, the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission – established in 2011 by the newly formed government of President Salva Kiir – was perceived, for the most part, to be toothless. Meanwhile, many of the traditional mechanisms for reconciliation and justice have collapsed in South Sudan, particularly after December 2013. While new institutions such as the Dinka Council of Elders, the Equatoria Elders Forum, and the Nuer Peace Council have emerged, these are state-designed and thus heavily politicised structures.

The thorny issue of whether accountability, reconciliation, and justice can and will be properly addressed in South Sudan is prominent in the efforts of South Sudanese civil society groups to address the causes, nature, and
aftermath of violence. These take into account past conflict, and are currently framed around the applicable provisions of the August 2015 Addis Ababa peace accord. Many argue that the avoidance of pursuing accountability in past reconciliation processes has been an obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding in South Sudan.35 After December 2013, South Sudanese civil society groups called for the creation of a commission of inquiry into atrocities committed during the eruption of violence.36 The August 2015 peace accord provides for the creation of three transitional justice institutions: an independent Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS); a Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA); and a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing (CTRH).37 However, these mechanisms are vulnerable to political manipulation, with continued disagreement between the government and opposition on various aspects of the agreement. The August 2015 accord, for example, does not identify the seat of the Hybrid Court, leaving it to be determined by the chair of the African Union Commission (AUC). While the South Sudanese government has asserted that the court should be based in Juba, the SPLM-in-Opposition has called for it to be located outside South Sudan. The extent to which there is political will, as well as commitment among individuals and communities, to engage in a process of national reconciliation remains open to question. Yet, any such process needs to be South Sudanese-led. The country’s civil society groups, in particular, must continue to explore ways in which they can support the Hybrid Court; and how they can be involved in, and contribute towards, transitional justice, while drawing lessons from other African cases such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and South Africa,38 and utilising appropriate international expertise.

As the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS) – chaired by Nigeria’s former president Olusegun Obasanjo – confirmed, atrocities were committed in a systematic manner by both parties to the conflict that began in December 2013, and included several cases of extreme brutality and cruelty, as well as sexual and gender-based violence against women.39 The Commission’s final report, which was not made public until a year after it had been completed, was submitted to the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) in October 2014. The document includes recommendations on accountability and institutional reform that will require mature South Sudanese political leadership to heal wounds and to reconcile the nation. The Obasanjo Commission was, however, criticised for focusing on crimes committed by the state, while neglecting non-state actors such as militias.

Past and present conflicts in South Sudan are furthermore inter-related. A key challenge in the pursuit of accountability, reconciliation, and justice relates to identifying which crimes were committed by whom, and when they should be addressed. South Sudan lacks a history of accountability, and has a culture of impunity and revenge that cuts across all levels of society. Its multiplicity of conflicts, furthermore, have complex drivers, some of which differ from one part of the country to another. This means that the pursuit of reconciliation and justice also needs to be a multi-layered process that addresses the national and local community levels differently but without neglecting the connections between them. The Hybrid Court, for example, is based on criminal retributive justice and focuses on individual accountability. It cannot fully address all the root causes of conflicts (such as the sharing of resources), deal with political violence, or provide community justice. Reconciling the often competing imperatives of justice and peace is another major challenge.

36 “Civil Society Statement on the Establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into Atrocities Committed During the Conflict in South Sudan”, signed by 16 South Sudanese NGOs, 25 January 2014.
37 See “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan”, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 17 August 2015, Chapter V, pp. 40–45.
In the final analysis, reconciliation cannot be assumed, but is a deliberative process that requires planning and engagement with all levels of South Sudanese society. The restorative potential of traditional reconciliation mechanisms should be identified and re-instituted, without a return to reconciliation as revenge. Civil society also has a critical role to play in ensuring that legislative processes for the creation of the new transitional justice institutions envisaged under the August 2015 peace agreement, are not hijacked by political motives. In this context, the establishment of an independent national judiciary that enjoys public trust and confidence is key.

At present, about 80 percent of South Sudanese citizens use customary, as opposed to formal, justice mechanisms. Within the context of customary justice and legal pluralism, the role of the church, in particular, in reconciliation and peacebuilding is of vital importance. In many rural areas, pastors and church leaders are the only local civil society with a permanent presence and established networks. The church further has a track record of important work on questions of peace and reconciliation. For example, it played a leadership role in the process of inter-communal dialogue for reconciliation in the wake of violence between the Lou Nuer and Murle communities in Jonglei in 2011. The South Sudan Council of Churches has also been involved in various initiatives to address the most recent conflict, and launched a peace plan in April 2015 that seeks to build reconciliation and be independent of formal peacemaking, while connecting local grassroots communities with national political leaders. Many South Sudanese civil society organisations clearly expect the church to assume a leadership position in peacebuilding processes.

40 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in South Sudan, “About South Sudan” (available at http://www.ss.undp.org/content/south_sudan/en/home/countryinfo/).
41 Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Andreas Øien Stensland, “The UN Mission and Local Churches in South Sudan: Opportunities for Partnerships in Local Peacebuilding”, Conflict Trends no. 3 (2011), p. 34
42 In April 2014, the Committee for National Healing, Peace, and Reconciliation in South Sudan joined the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission, and the National Assembly’s Specialised Committee on Peace and Reconciliation, in forming a joint National Reconciliation Platform to engage South Sudanese and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led political process.
5. The Role of Civil Society in Implementing the 2015 Addis Ababa Peace Accord

As South Sudanese sought to respond to the rapid, exceedingly violent escalation of conflict after December 2013, the critique of elite-based peacemaking was well-established, notably in relation to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Partly as a result of this criticism of previous experience, there was concerted pressure by the Troika and the European Union (EU) for the IGAD-led peace talks, aimed at resolving South Sudan’s current conflict, to broaden participation beyond the narrow group of belligerents comprised of protagonists before and after the 2005 CPA. This led to the so-called “stakeholder phase” involving some civil society participation in the peace talks between May and September 2014. During this period, it became evident that South Sudanese civil society held a multiplicity of views about the conflict and options for ending it. This rendered the challenge for the mediation process even greater. Once this attempt at a more inclusive approach broke down, the negotiations returned to being a narrow, elite-driven process. This experience underlines the importance of learning from previous Southern and South Sudanese peace processes in considering the options for, and prospects of, South Sudanese civil society engagement in peacebuilding efforts.

The August 2015 Addis Ababa peace accord aims to lay the foundations for long-term state- and nation-building in South Sudan. As such, it calls for extensive restructuring of the country’s governance architecture, including a review of South Sudan’s 2011 Transitional Constitution and its different state constitutions; and advocates the establishment of a new Transitional Government of National Unity. This reform process, however, faces a number of challenges, not least of which is the influence of “spoilers” who have a vested interest in the status quo. They include South Sudan’s many warlords, who now control the country’s army, and the so-called Jieng Council of Elders, an informal assemblage of ethnic-based leaders which is believed, by some, to be the de facto parliament of South Sudan. Decades of violent conflict and inter-ethnic tensions have also destroyed the social fabric of South Sudan and undermined the trust required to implement the August 2015 peace accord. The worsening state of the country’s economy poses an additional challenge to the successful implementation of the agreement, given the resources required to carry out some of the activities envisioned in the accord. Reduced oil production and lower international oil prices, combined with the ongoing conflict, have had a significant negative impact on the South Sudanese economy, which has contracted from $13.3 billion in 2013 to $9 billion in 2015. Government finances have been further badly affected by the devaluation of the South Sudanese pound (SSP), which had depreciated from SSP 18.5 per dollar in December 2015 to about SSP 80 per dollar by September 2016. The country is experiencing hyperinflation, with the South Sudan Bureau of Statistics recording an annual increase in the consumer price index (CPI) of 682.1 percent between September 2015 and September 2016.

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43 This section is partly based on presentations made by Peter Lofane and Sebit Emmanuel Charles at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, “The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan.”
mongering rhetoric and actions of senior officials in the South Sudanese government is also a matter of concern, as it reveals a lack of political will on the part of the ruling elite to abide by the letter and spirit of the peace accord. For example, the unilateral decision by President Salva Kiir in October 2015 to establish 28 states out of South Sudan’s existing 10 states is seen by many as a violation of, and an obstacle to, the smooth and full implementation of the IGAD-mediated agreement.

Given that the process leading up to the August 2015 peace accord was disconnected from ordinary South Sudanese citizens, the role of civil society will be all the more critical in moving the peace process forward – particularly in terms of the dissemination and implementation of the agreement. The peace accord features certain provisions for limited civil society inclusion in its implementation. This includes minor representation in some of the entities that the agreement is supposed to establish, such as the Boards of the Special Reconstruction Fund, and of the Economic and Financial Management Authority. The agreement also provides for consultation with “other stakeholders and the civil society” concerning the establishment of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing. Even if the views of civil society are not ultimately decisive in shaping political reforms, it could have an important role to play in advancing the political reforms that the agreement codifies and in ensuring local ownership of its implementation. In the context of malicious attempts by some to spread misinformation about the agreement, it is further incumbent upon civil society organisations not only to disseminate accurate facts about the peace agreement to ordinary South Sudanese, but also to provide encouragement to local communities to engage critically with the letter and underlying spirit of the accord. This would help to ensure that the implementation of the agreement does not become a project of the political elite, but is connected to a grassroots process.

Civil society in South Sudan is clearly committed to playing a meaningful role in the implementation of the August 2015 peace agreement. Based on the lessons learned from the incomplete implementation of the 2005 CPA, many civil society organisations have been working to lay the groundwork, and to garner support, for the full implementation of the IGAD-mediated accord. For example, several civil society organisations have instituted educational exchange programmes to allow South Sudanese to interact with, and draw inspiration from, their counterparts in African countries such as Kenya and Rwanda who have gone through similar experiences. This is in addition to organising public lectures to encourage critical reflection and constructive debates on issues relating to the peace agreement. Civil society organisations have also been vocal in raising concerns about delays in implementing key aspects of the peace accord such as the demilitarisation of Juba, while drawing the attention of external actors, including the Troika, to the political posturing of different stakeholders that could jeopardise the peace process. However, some of these activities undertaken by the NGO sector have been interpreted by the South Sudanese government as hostile towards it. Against the backdrop of a virtual absence of the rule of law in South Sudan, civil society organisations operate in a climate of fear, intimidation, and harassment. This poses a significant challenge to the critical role that NGOs have to play in ensuring a sustainable peacebuilding process in South Sudan.

In order to mitigate the effects of the adverse political environment in which they operate and to continue to contribute in positive ways to local and national peacebuilding processes, civil society organisations in South Sudan need to forge constructive partnerships with their counterparts, as well as other influential actors, in the region. These partnerships could be a vital source of support for their domestic peacebuilding endeavours. For example,

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50 See “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan”. 

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partnerships between South Sudanese civil society organisations and NGOs in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) could be useful in gaining access to Botswana’s former president, Festus Mogae, who serves as the chairperson of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission of the August 2015 peace agreement. However, South Sudanese civil society organisations face a number of challenges in attempting to establish useful ties with like-minded entities in the region, given the generally under-developed culture of cross-border linkages in Africa’s civil society sector. Although civil society organisations in other African countries have been active in keeping the peace process in South Sudan on the agenda of regional organisations, and continue to show solidarity with their South Sudanese counterparts, there is a growing tendency within African civil society towards operating in silos. Another regional constituency whose influence civil society in South Sudan could usefully leverage in the implementation of the August 2015 peace agreement is influential African leaders and former heads of state. However, this would require sustained and intense advocacy work, given that this important constituency has so far been conspicuously silent on the implementation of the peace agreement in South Sudan.

Finally, in a politically charged and deeply polarised society such as South Sudan’s, it is vital for local South Sudanese civil society groups to conduct their activities with the utmost professionalism and impartiality. This would enable them to regain their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the diverse stakeholders that they need to engage with in order to have an impactful role in the implementation of the August 2015 peace agreement. Should the peace accord endure, the return and reintegration of South Sudanese refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) is a key area in which civil society could contribute meaningfully. The existence of a massive and dispersed population of uprooted South Sudanese presents a major challenge for any future peacebuilding strategy. According to the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), there were 1.73 million IDPs and 1.05 million South Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries – including over 934,000 who fled the outbreak of violence in December 2013 – as of November 2016.51 The nature of civil society in UNMISS civilian camps in South Sudan and the ways in which the South Sudanese IDP and refugee populations have self-mobilised – including South Sudanese and international responses to their needs – are vital to consider in debates on the reintegration of these populations as part of future peacebuilding initiatives in South Sudan.

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6. The Peacebuilding Role of External Actors

The Djibouti-based Intergovernmental Authority on Development has led external efforts to end the current conflict in South Sudan, appointing three special envoys in December 2013 to lead the mediation process: Ethiopia’s Seyoum Mesfin, Kenya’s Lazaro Sumbeiwo, and Sudan’s Mohammed Ahmed Moustafa El Dabi.

The IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) was subsequently established to monitor compliance with the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, signed by the two main warring South Sudanese parties in January 2014, and to inform the work of the IGAD special envoys. In August 2015, an IGAD-mediated peace accord was signed in Addis Ababa by rebel leader Riek Machar, on behalf of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition, and Pagan Amum Okiech, representing the Former Detainees group. After initially refusing, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir – under regional and international pressure – signed the agreement a few days later in Juba, but expressed reservations on several issues including the proposed demilitarisation of the capital. The IGAD-led peace process has been supported by the “IGAD Plus” (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda); the African Union High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa); the East African Community (EAC); the Troika; China; the European Union; the United Nations; and the IGAD Partners Forum. Notably, during his visit to Addis Ababa – the seat of the AU – in July 2015, US President Barack Obama underlined the importance of the peace deal and of establishing a Transitional Government of National Unity in South Sudan.

On the ground, the 16,147-strong United Nations Mission in South Sudan is the main organised framework for external engagement in South Sudan. Established in 2011, the UN operation has since changed in scope and size, and currently has a mandate that includes protecting civilians; monitoring and investigating human rights abuses; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and supporting the IGAD peace process. Furthermore, in October 2015, when extending the mandate of the mission, the UN Security Council urged an open and fully inclusive national dialogue involving the full participation of youth, women, faith groups, and civil society organisations, among others, while encouraging key external partners such as IGAD and the AU to support implementation of the August 2015 agreement. Since August 2016, the mission’s mandate also provides for a 4,000-strong Regional Protection Force, but progress towards its deployment has been slow, with the South Sudanese government only accepting the participation of neighbouring countries in the force in November 2016. Alongside the peacekeeping mission, there are various UN development agencies that work in South Sudan. These include the World Food Programme (WFP), UN Women, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

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52 This section is partly based on presentations made by Harris Majeke and Lansana Wonneh at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, “The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan”.

Although South Sudan applied to join the EAC shortly after gaining independence in 2011, its admission was not immediate due to concerns about weak governance and under-developed legal and institutional frameworks.\(^{54}\) Even though these issues remain an ongoing challenge amidst persistent conflict, South Sudan acceded to the EAC in April 2016, joining Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda in the regional grouping. Juba’s membership of the regional bloc is expected to have major economic benefits for the land-locked country. The EU, for its part, has mainly focused on providing humanitarian and development assistance, and supporting South Sudanese civil society. In addition to regional and international organisations, several individual countries – including Ethiopia, Sudan, South Africa, China, and Japan, among others – have been involved in various ways in supporting conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan.

Yet, these external actors also have disparate national interests, ranging from the protection of economic interests – as in the case of China – to the pursuit of security interests in the region, as in the case of the US. Juba has, in turn, tended to view most external actors with deep distrust, including the UN which it has accused of bias. Similarly, Washington is seen by several members of the South Sudanese government to have influenced IGAD in promoting a negotiated settlement that involved power-sharing, and in so doing, imposed a compromise on it. Uganda’s role in the South Sudanese conflict is also disputed, with many questioning its unilateral military intervention in support of President Salva Kiir’s government. The proxy war between Kampala and Khartoum, in particular, through support for armed militias and auxiliaries in South Sudan has complicated the search for a durable peace in the country.

South Africa’s position on the political crisis in South Sudan, meanwhile, has primarily been informed by its commitment to the principle of the peaceful resolution of conflicts. After the signing of the August 2015 peace agreement, Tshwane focused its diplomatic efforts on two key obstacles to the accord’s implementation: the demilitarisation of Juba, and Salva Kiir’s unilateral decision to re-divide South Sudan into 28 states. Based on its view that the disintegration of relations within the SPLM/A lies at the heart of South Sudan’s political crisis, the South African government has also supported a parallel peace initiative in the form of an intra-party dialogue known as the Arusha Process. Alongside Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) ruling party, South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC) is a co-guarantor of this process, which is aimed at reconciling the various factions of South Sudan’s ruling party and former liberation movement under the framework provided by the 2015 Agreement on the Reunification of the SPLM. ANC officials – including, in particular, deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, in his role as President Jacob Zuma’s Special Envoy to South Sudan – have undertaken several visits to Juba, while engaging with other political parties in the region, to support the intra-party dialogue. Furthermore, since 2005, South Africa has supported capacity-building efforts in South Sudan through the provision of training for key South Sudanese diplomats and civil servants.

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In the absence of internal capacity and of internal actors with broad-based legitimacy in an ethnically fractured society, external actors have a critical role in building an enabling environment for sustainable peace in South Sudan through supporting the establishment of credible state institutions, including those envisaged under the August 2015 peace agreement. However, external donors need to provide political, financial, and technical assistance, not only for the implementation of the peace accord, but also for social and economic development projects in South Sudan. The generation of economic opportunities, in particular, is vital for peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan. Despite resources such as oil, the local economy remains weak, and cannot on its own meet the demands of post-conflict reconstruction, state-building, and development. In a context of weak productive activity and limited economic opportunities, the competition for government resources as a source of livelihoods is likely to remain intense, while promoting the vulnerability of the state as an object of patronage. Given the weaknesses of the South Sudanese economy, the presence of foreign businesses in sectors such as banking, transport, and telecommunications, could stimulate local entrepreneurship. Drawing on the experience of African countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, South Sudan should also consider seeking expertise from among its large Diaspora in order to bridge capacity gaps.

Working relations between South Sudanese and international NGOs are another important factor when considering how to enhance the peacebuilding role of external actors. In 2011, a major evaluation of donor support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Southern Sudan between 2005 and 2010 recommended that norms be developed and applied to ensure that international NGOs provide more effective support to local government and civil society organisations in these areas. While recognising the need for inclusive state-building during this period, international civil society groups such as Saferworld, Save the Children, and World Vision had tended to assign minor roles to Sudanese NGOs. The lessons of relations between international and national NGOs in South Sudan from different phases of the past thus need to be identified and incorporated into current and future peacebuilding efforts. On the whole, international support for South Sudanese civil society needs to be reformed with a view to addressing the challenges of peacebuilding more effectively and to assisting the development of a strong civil society in South Sudan.

The foundation of sustainable peacebuilding is local ownership, which requires inclusive processes within South Sudan, but also a partnership of equals between the country’s civil society (including grassroots groups) and external actors. Towards this end, South Sudanese civil society organisations – in particular, national NGOs – must be able to mobilise the aspirations of all segments of society. The pursuit of ethnic dominance, largely between Dinkas and Nuers, must be abandoned if South Sudan is not to be trapped in an endless cycle of violence. External actors, for their part, can play a vital role in supporting the inclusion of marginalised groups, including women, in peace processes, as demonstrated by the example of UN Women’s work with the South Sudan Women’s Network for Peace. Before the signing of the August 2015 peace accord, UN Women supported the network in crafting a “Women’s Agenda” which was reflected in the final agreement, and has continued to provide support to South Sudanese women to be part of the AU’s efforts to monitor the country’s ceasefire agreement. In November 2015, UN Women also convened a National Women’s Dialogue for Peace, bringing together about 500 South Sudanese women from across the country, as well as policymakers, foreign diplomats, and UN officials, to discuss the role of women in the implementation of the IGAD-mediated peace agreement.

Much remains contingent on the uncertain prospects of the August 2015 accord. Yet, the dominant international response to the situation in South Sudan has remained in emergency humanitarian mode. While there is concern that “development” in states not directly affected by conflict has been neglected, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan for 2015 – focused on humanitarian concerns – included little by way of long-term peacebuilding. Implementation of the August 2015 accord will involve an important support role for international actors. However, in the face of ongoing political challenges at the leadership level, as well as sporadic fighting in November 2016, the prospects for South Sudan going beyond a formal peace remain uncertain.
Policy Recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the Tshwane policy seminar:

1. The root causes of South Sudan’s multiple conflicts need to be better understood by key domestic, regional, and external actors through greater engagement with local communities, as well as more robust and rigorous conflict analysis in order for conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts to have greater impact and sustainability.

2. National NGOs in South Sudan need to focus on specialisation in key areas (for example, human rights, women’s empowerment, youth development, and HIV/AIDS programmes); on strengthening their technical capacities in these areas; and on becoming more professional rather than on pursuing donor agendas to obtain funding.

3. It is vital for South Sudanese women’s groups not only to strengthen the linkages among themselves, but also to collaborate and form partnerships with other civil society organisations and international NGOs working on issues such as health and education that affect women in order to maximise their impact.

4. External donors need to reconsider funding strategies that are overly focused on supporting Juba-based NGOs, and provide greater resources for strengthening community-based grassroots organisations which are accountable to their local communities. They must also focus more on the aspirations of South Sudanese civil society itself.

5. South Sudanese civil society organisations should forge and strengthen relationships with NGOs and other forms of civil society in Eastern Africa and the wider continent, which could serve as an alternative source of technical support as well as provide experiential learning, while helping them to engage more actively with key regional bodies such as IGAD, the EAC, and the AU. In addition, greater collaboration among different civil society groups within South Sudan could help maximise the influence of the sector as a whole on national peacebuilding processes.

6. The pursuit of transitional justice and reconciliation in South Sudan needs to be a two-fold process, with the reconciliation of elites driven by renowned African leaders, while community reconciliation is prioritised by community-based and civil society organisations who also need to be empowered to find innovative ways to promote accountability within their local communities.

7. It is vital for trauma-healing, trauma-counselling, and mental health support to be included, and treated as a priority, in programme interventions aimed at promoting accountability, reconciliation, and justice in South Sudan.

8. South Sudanese civil society has a crucial role to play in providing evidence-based guidance on the implementation of the August 2015 peace accord by drawing on its local knowledge and on-the-ground presence; and in serving as a watchdog to ensure that the agreement’s prospects of success are not harmed by the vested interests of powerful political actors, warlords, and other spoilers.
9. International as well as local actors involved in peacebuilding processes in South Sudan need to make greater efforts to increase the participation of representatives from smaller, rural communities in their interventions, including policy dialogues and capacity-building workshops. In this context, the vital role played by local chiefs, and traditional and religious leaders in grassroots conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts also needs to be better understood and supported.

10. External political, financial, and technical support for peacebuilding processes in South Sudan must be long term, and go beyond isolated interventions to focus on the systematic provision of sustained support for the building of durable state institutions.

Participants of the policy advisory group seminar, “The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan”, Burgers Park Hotel, Tshwane.
Annex I

Agenda

Thursday, 10 December 2015

17:30 – 19:00 Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) Public Dialogue and Report Launch: “Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region”

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

Speakers: Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, Former Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region; and Former National Security Advisor to the South African President

Mr Paul Mulindwa, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

19:00 Welcome Dinner

Day One: Friday, 11 December 2015

09:00 – 09:45 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Mr Paul Mulindwa, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

09:45 – 11:15 Session I: The Role of Civil Society in South Sudan: Challenges and Opportunities

Chair: Ambassador Graham Maitland, Chief Director of Central and North Africa, South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Tshwane

Speakers: Mr Hafeez Wani, National Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Focal Point, South Sudan NGO Forum, Juba, South Sudan

Ms Rita Martin Lopidia Abraham, Executive Director, Eve Organisation for Women Development, Juba
11:15 – 11:30  Coffee Break

11:30 – 13:00  Session II:  Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Local and National Processes

Chair:  Mr Edmund Yakani, Executive Director, Community Empowerment for Progress Organisation (CEPO), Juba

Speakers:  Mr David De-Dau, Executive Director, Agency for Independent Media (AIM), Juba

Mr Batali Geoffrey, Programme Associate, South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), Juba

13:00 – 14:15  Group Photo followed by Lunch

14:15 – 15:45  Session III:  The Role of External Actors in Peacebuilding

Chair:  Professor Chris Landsberg, South African Research (SARChI) Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Senior Associate, School of Leadership, University of Johannesburg (UJ), South Africa

Speakers:  Ambassador Harris Majeke, Director for the Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean Islands, South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Tshwane

Mr Lansana Wonneh, Deputy Country Representative for South Sudan, United Nations (UN) Women, Juba

19:00  Dinner
Day Two: Saturday, 12 December 2015

09:30 – 11:00  Session IV: Gender, Peace, and Security

Chair: Mr Lansana Wonneh, Deputy Country Representative for South Sudan, UN Women, Juba

Speakers: Ms Nyuon Susan Sebit William, Executive Director, South Sudan Women’s Lawyers Association (SSWLA), Juba

Ms Ruth Lugor, Deputy Director, The Roots Project, Juba

11:00 – 11:15  Coffee Break

11:15 – 12:45  Session V: Accountability, Reconciliation, and Justice

Chair: Mr Paul Mulindwa, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Speakers: Mr Edmund Yakani, Executive Director, Community Empowerment for Progress Organisation, Juba

Mr Frank Emmanuel Muhereza, PhD Graduate Fellow, Makerere Institute for Social Research (MISR), Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda

12:45 – 13:45  Lunch

13:45 – 15:15  Session VI: The Role of Civil Society in Implementing the 2015 Peace Accord

Chair: Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Member of the Friends of the African Union (AU) Panel of the Wise

Speakers: Mr Peter Lofane, Executive Director, Manna Development Agency (MADA), Torit, South Sudan

Mr Sebit Emmanuel Charles, Programme Manager, Governance and Peacebuilding, Institute for Promotion of Civil Society (IPCS), Yei, South Sudan

15:15 – 15:45  Coffee Break and Completing Evaluation Forms
15:45 – 16:30  Session VII: Rapporteurs’ Recommendations and the Way Forward

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Rapporteurs: Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Fritz Nganje, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, South African Research Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg
Annex II

List of Participants

1. Ms Rita Martin Lopidia Abraham
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4. Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse
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5. Mr David De-Dau
   Executive Director
   Agency for Independent Media (AIM)
   Juba

6. Mr Ephrem Tadesse Gebre
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   Tshwane, South Africa

7. Mr Batali Geoffrey
   Programme Associate
   South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA)
   Juba

8. Ambassador James Jonah
   Former United Nations (UN) Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs
   New York, United States (US)

9. Professor Chris Landsberg
   South African Research (SARChI) Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and
   Senior Associate, School of Leadership
   University of Johannesburg (UJ)
   Johannesburg, South Africa

10. Mr Peter Lofane
    Executive Director
    Manna Development Agency (MADA)
    Torit, South Sudan

11. Ms Ruth Lugor
    Deputy Director
    The Roots Project
    Juba

12. Ambassador Graham Maitland
    Chief Director: Central and North Africa
    Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)
    Tshwane

13. Ambassador Harris Majek
    Director: Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean Islands
    Department of International Relations and Cooperation
    Tshwane

14. Ms Elizabeth Atong Malual
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    South Sudan Law Society
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Conference Team

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3. Ms Lauren October  
   Intern  
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Annex III

List of Acronyms

ANC        African National Congress
AU         African Union
AUC        African Union Commission
AUCISS     African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan
CBS        Central Bureau of Statistics (Sudan)
CCM        Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CCR        Centre for Conflict Resolution (Cape Town, South Africa)
CEDAW      Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN)
CPA        Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPI        consumer price index
CRA        Compensation and Reparation Authority
CTRH       Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing
EAC        East African Community
ECOS       European Coalition on Oil in Sudan
EU         European Union
HCSS       Hybrid Court for South Sudan
HRW        Human Rights Watch
ICG        International Crisis Group
IDPs       internally displaced persons
IGAD       Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IJR        Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (Cape Town, South Africa)
ITAD       Information Training and Development
MVM        Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (IGAD)
NBS        National Bureau of Statistics (South Sudan)
NGOs       non-governmental organisations
OCHA       Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OLS        Operation Lifeline Sudan
PSC        Peace and Security Council (AU)
SADC       Southern African Development Community
SPLM/A     Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM-IO    Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
SSCCSE     Southern Sudan Commission for Census, Statistics, and Evaluation
SSP        South Sudanese pound
SSRA       Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
SSWLA      South Sudan Women’s Lawyers Association
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TGoNU</td>
<td>Transitional Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
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The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

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The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

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The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

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African perspectives on the United Nations’ (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA’S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA
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AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA
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This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.
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This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006), Cairo, Egypt (September 2007), and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

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This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.
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PEACEBUILDING IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS
This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.

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BUILDING PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.

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POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)
This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community in building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

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This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.

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SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

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This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help ‘reset’ the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.

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SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa’s region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH SUDAN

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THE AFRICAN UNION AT TEN
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS
This international colloquium held in Berlin, Germany, from 30 to 31 August 2012, reviewed the first ten years of the African Union (AU), assessed its peace and security efforts; compared it with the European Union (EU); examined the AU’s strategies to achieve socioeconomic development; and analysed its global role.

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This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012, considered Africa and South Africa’s performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council; the politics and reform of the Security Council; the impact of the African Group at the UN; and the performance of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

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This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 13 and 14 May 2013, considered the progress that Africa has made towards achieving the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); and sought to support African actors and institutions in shaping the post-2015 development agenda.

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THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC (ACP) GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 29 to 30 October 2012, considered the nature of the relationship between the ACP Group and the EU, and the potential for their further strategic engagement, as the final five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the two sides approached in 2015.

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TOWARDS A NEW PAX AFRICANA
MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING PEACE IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA
This policy research seminar held in Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013, considered the progress being made by the African Union (AU) and Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) in managing conflicts and operationalising the continent’s peace and security architecture; and the roles of key external actors in these efforts.

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POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER TWO DECADES
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 July 2013, reviewed post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy after two decades, and explored the potential leadership role that the country can play in promoting peace and security, as well as regional integration and development in Africa.

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SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (IIAs)
This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 17 to 18 February 2014 assessed the principles underpinning international investment agreements, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and the implications of these instruments for socio-economic development efforts in South Africa and the rest of the continent.
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 April 2014, considered the challenges and potential of Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) in promoting region building and regional integration on the continent, including through a comparative assessment of experiences in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 27 to 29 April 2016, revisited the performance and prospects of the African Union (AU) in the areas of governance, security, socio-economic challenges, as well as assessing the AU Commission and its relations with African sub-regional organisations and external actors.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana, from 19 to 20 September 2015, assessed key issues relating to region-building and peacebuilding in Southern Africa, while analysing South Africa’s leadership role in the sub-region.

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 March 2016, assessed the major obstacles to peace and security in the Great Lakes, and considered seven broad issues: security and governance; the cases of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda; as well as the roles of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) in the region.
Notes
In December 2015, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted about 30 key — mainly South Sudanese — civil society activists and scholars, as well as senior officials from South Africa and major external partners, including the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), to reflect on the record of, and prospects for, civil society in peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan. The seminar had six key objectives: first, to understand the challenges facing South Sudanese civil society in the context of the country’s conflict; second, to identify lessons from past experiences of South Sudanese peace processes that can assist local civil society organisations to contribute more effectively to peacebuilding efforts; third, to reflect on the role of, and prospects for, civil society in the dissemination and implementation of the August 2015 Addis Ababa peace agreement, as well as in the resolution of local conflicts; fourth, to assist South Sudanese civil society in developing peacebuilding strategies that can accommodate the disparate needs of local communities across South Sudan; fifth, to explore ways of strengthening civil society engagement with transitional justice, reconciliation, and gender equality as key aspects of peacebuilding efforts in the country; and sixth, to identify ways in which external actors can support South Sudanese civil society more effectively.