THE AFRICAN UNION: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES

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About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa; region-building and regional integration on the continent; relations between Africa and the European Union (EU); achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa; and South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.

Rapporteurs

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a three-day policy research seminar in Cape Town, from 27 to 29 April 2016, on the theme “The African Union: Regional and Global Challenges”.

The meeting was convened with about 30 prominent African, Asian, and Western policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors to reflect critically on the historical mission, achievements, challenges, and prospects of the African Union (AU) in a changing regional and global environment.

1. Pan-Africanism and the African Diaspora

Pan-Africanism represented a bid to promote the political, socio-economic, and cultural liberation of Africa, and developed as a political movement in the twentieth century through the efforts of Africans in the Diaspora such as Trinidad’s Henry Sylvester-Williams and America’s William E.B. Du Bois. The creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 1963 brought an end to the rival blocs of the Casablanca, Monrovia and Brazzaville groups, and a gradualist approach to continental unity was adopted. However, the OAU proved to be ineffective in actualising the Pan-African ideals of regional integration and continental development amidst the external machinations of the Cold War. A new wave of optimism about Africa’s future swept through the continent, resulting in the creation of the African Union in July 2002. Remittance flows to Africa from its Diaspora were $35 billion in 2015, compared to official development assistance of $24 billion. There is, however, still an urgent need for the AU to build bridges with the African population in the Diaspora – estimated at 169 million – for investment and development on the continent. The contribution of the Diaspora to Africa’s cultural revival should also be tapped in areas such as literature, film, and the arts.

2. The AU’s Governance Challenges

African countries gained their political independence from the 1950s, and embarked on an ambitious programme of nation-building. However, the initial euphoria around democratic and participatory governance proved to be short-lived. Multi-party political systems soon morphed into one-party states, while military coups and civil wars proliferated. These developments occurred in the context of the socio-economic challenges that many African countries faced in the early stages of statehood. After the end of the Cold War by 1990, the changed international environment led to democratic reforms and more regular elections across Africa. Ruling parties have since been voted out of power in Zambia, Lesotho, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya, Malawi, and Mauritius. African civil society has also become more assertive in holding governments accountable. Poor governance led to popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in 2011, and Burkina Faso in 2014.

Against the backdrop of previous commitments to improve the state of governance in Africa, the AU launched the African Governance Architecture (AGA) in 2011. The AGA seeks to strengthen the coherence and relevance of the various governance instruments across the continent. Its main goal is to empower the various AU organs and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to enhance democratic governance at the national level. The architecture’s three pillars are: shared norms and values centred on the promotion of democracy, sovereignty, and human rights; a set of institutions encompassing the AU and Africa’s sub-regional bodies; and a platform comprising agreed processes for interaction adopted by governments and civil society actors. Complementarity between the AGA and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is essential to
addressing the root causes of conflicts associated with poor governance such as the manipulation of elections and the militarisation of politics. The 2003 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) - a non-adversarial, voluntary, and self-monitoring process involving 35 African states - must also be provided greater political and financial support by African leaders. With only 17 states reviewed by July 2016, the mechanism must urgently develop greater capacity to accelerate its work.

3. The AU’s Socio-Economic Challenges

The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL), both of 1980, constituted the most comprehensive and strategic attempt to address Africa’s socio-economic challenges. The plan was conceived - by Nigerian scholar-diplomat Adebayo Adedej’s UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) - around the total mobilisation of Africa’s human resources to promote the continent’s development. However, very little has been achieved in the area of regional integration and development, with intra-African trade estimated at a paltry 12 percent in 2016. As a socio-economic programme of the AU, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) sought to eradicate poverty, and to promote sustainable growth and development in Africa. Despite its lofty goals, however, the programme has become hampered by implementation constraints. Continental development strategies such as the 2007 Minimum Integration Programme (MIP), and initiatives to develop the continent’s agricultural and infrastructure sectors – the 2003 Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the 2010 Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa – have also not been effectively implemented.

4. The AU’s Peace and Security Architecture

Since the creation of the African Union in July 2002, African leaders have expressed their renewed determination to achieve a conflict-free continent. From 1990, Africa experienced a wave of political change, though violent conflicts continued in Somalia and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), while new conflicts have recently emerged in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and South Sudan. The African Peace and Security Architecture was established by the AU in July 2002 and reflects a fundamental shift from the non-intervention principle of the OAU to a collective security approach founded on a human security paradigm. The APSA framework includes an African Standby Force (ASF) to be established by 2010. The delay in creating the ASF led to the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) in May 2013. Concerns have, however, emerged over apparent competition between the two initiatives. Only 13 AU member states had pledged support for ACIRC by June 2016. The AU’s 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) has, however, become a central decision-making body on peace and security issues in Africa, conducting over 600 meetings since 2004.

5. The AU and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities

The 1991 Abuja Treaty aspired for continental unity through the establishment of an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2025. In the context of a gradual approach to continental integration, Africa’s regional economic communities such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) are the building blocks of the AEC. The AU has encouraged Africa’s RECs to join a Continental Free Trade Area that would include trade liberalisation frameworks reflective of open
markets and agreements signed with external partners. The October 2008 COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Agreement is considered to be instrumental in establishing the AEC, and therefore, needs to rationalise its relations in light of its multiple memberships. Trade liberalisation through bilateral trade agreements could also stall efforts at regional integration. It is, therefore, imperative that African governments urgently finalise negotiations on rules of origin (ROOs) within their sub-regional bodies.

In the area of security, RECs have opened liaison offices at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, and the AU has done the same at the headquarters of the different RECs. However, REC liaison officers do not have access to the AU Peace and Security Council. There is also still little consultation and coordination between the AU Peace and Security Council and similar decision-making organs such as SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council.

6. The AU Commission

A December 2007 report from the Audit of the African Union – chaired by Adebayo Adedeji – provided a scathing indictment of the administrative and management failings of the Commission under its first chair, Mali’s Alpha Konaré, between 2004 and 2007. Only 50 percent of approved tasks had been implemented by 2006, while most directorates were under-spending by 70–90 percent. Key parts of the 2013 Olusegun Obasanjo Report on alternative sources of funding for the AU – which proposed such ideas as a $2 hospitality levy and a $10 airfare levy – also need to be urgently implemented, if the AU is to have a sustainable source of funding. In light of the AU Commission’s capacity constraints, with a staff component of only about 1,740, consideration should be given to delegating some of the functions of the Commission back to AU member states and Africa’s RECs. In addition, the AU Commission should engage more strategically with African civil society, think tanks, the private sector, and the philanthropic sector. In July 2012, the incoming Chair of the AU Commission, South Africa’s Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, raised expectations that the body would be radically transformed and become more efficient. Her four-year tenure at the AU Commission has, however, failed to deliver on these promises, amidst a difficult institutional environment.

7. South Africa and the AU

Under the administration of Thabo Mbeki between 1999 and 2008, South Africa’s foreign policy was increasingly shaped by an “African Agenda” which prioritised democratic governance, peace and security, and accelerated economic growth. Mbeki played a key role in transforming the OAU into the African Union between 1999 and 2002, and in enshrining the right for the organisation to intervene against military coups and in cases of egregious human rights abuses. South Africa became the first country to host the newly created African Union in its port city of Durban in 2002. The country further helped to craft the institutions of NEPAD and the APRM, both of whose secretariat it hosts, along with that of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). South Africa further contributed to AU peacekeeping missions in Burundi (2003–2004) and Sudan’s Darfur region (2004–2007).

Amid South Africa’s own continuing domestic socio-economic challenges, critics have noted that mercantilist approaches and parochial concerns have increasingly shaped its foreign policy towards Africa under president Jacob Zuma since 2009. In furtherance of South Africa’s continental ambitions, it controversially put forward the candidacy of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to contest the position of AU Commission Chair in January 2012, effectively breaking – according to critics – with the unwritten rule that no major African power should occupy this position. She vacated the position of AU Chair after serving only one four-year term. Some therefore argued that the AU had been used as a tool of South Africa’s foreign policy.
8. The AU’s Relations with the UN, the EU, and China

The AU’s relations with external actors such as the United Nations (UN), the EU, and China also remain critical. In the 2015–2016 financial year, the nine UN-deployed missions in Africa (out of 16 globally) cost $6 billion (about 82 percent of all missions). In its search for more sustained, predictable, and flexible sources of funding, the AU adopted a decision in January 2015 to enhance ownership of its budget by financing 100 percent of its operating cost, 75 percent of its programmes, and 25 percent of its peace and security budget. Any eventual decision on a proposal to finance the AU’s peacekeeping operations from the UN’s assessed contributions would, however, require the consent of powerful members of the UN Security Council, and the AU Commission would also need to strengthen its administrative and financial management capacity.

Relations between the African Union and the European Union, based on the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), have been the most durable between the AU and an external actor. However, this evolving relationship has resulted in two dominant interpretations. An optimistic view recognises obstacles in AU-EU relations, but perceives the relationship to be a work in progress and a pioneering experience in inter-regional cooperation. The pessimistic view, in contrast, argues that the rhetorical commitments emanating from political dialogue between AU and EU leaders are rarely matched by effective implementation, and that Brussels is little more than the AU’s most prominent paymaster. A trilateral partnership between the AU, the UN, and the EU has recently emerged with the objective of promoting peace and security in Africa. However, this relationship is still characterised by a number of contentious issues such as the failure of the veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council, including the two EU member states – France and Britain – to agree to a meaningful reform of the organisation’s most powerful body.

Finally, the AU’s relationship with China has demonstrated signs of dependence accompanied by a rhetoric of partnership. This solidarity was formalised in the historical relationship between the Group of 77 (G-77) and China at the UN from the 1950s. Beijing established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 as a platform for collective consultation and dialogue. China – which has become Africa’s largest trade partner with $300 billion in 2015 and has invested in, and bought, its raw materials and minerals – has sought to enhance its global status while contributing to Africa’s infrastructural development. However, one of the major challenges facing this partnership is that the AU does not seem to have a long-term strategy for engaging China.

Policy Recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the Cape Town policy seminar:

1. The AU Commission should engage more strategically with African civil society, think tanks, the private sector, and the philanthropic sector in order to implement its mandate more effectively. There is an urgent need to revisit Adebayo Adedeji’s 2007 five-year review of the AU Commission in order to implement its main findings on reforming the AU’s institutions and accelerating regional integration and economic development efforts in Africa. Key parts of the 2013 Olusegun Obasanjo Report on alternative sources of funding for the AU should also be implemented to ensure a sustainable source of future financing.

2. There is an urgent need to sanction non-performing AU staff members and to implement results-based management at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. Recruitment, retention, and training of personnel should be greatly improved. There is also a need for better coordination between the AU’s Department of Political Affairs and its Peace and Security Department. The AU Commission must further strengthen its administrative and financial management capacity to be able to absorb and manage donor funds.
3. The AU’s continental early warning system needs greater coordination with the mechanisms of sub-regional bodies such as IGAD, ECOWAS, and SADC. Furthermore, African leaders must provide greater financial and political support to the APRM, strengthening its capacity and restoring its previous consistent funding.

4. There is an urgent need to create institutionalised mechanisms for regular consultation and coordination between the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the organs of the RECs; this must include the increased participation of civil society and parliaments in decision-making to promote greater synergy and complementarity between the policies and initiatives of the AU and the RECs in this area.

5. Regional integration in Africa should take into account the configuration of interests in member states, and put in place mechanisms to compensate groups that may lose out from integration. There is an urgent need to cultivate a national entrepreneurial class to drive socio-economic development across Africa. The continent also needs more “Afrocrats” – young, highly competent officials with a strong commitment to Pan-Africanism, similar to many of the EU’s “Eurocrats”.

6. The AU needs to rationalise relations between the RECs and the African Economic Community in light of the multiple membership of the former. It might also be necessary to create a smaller grouping of African states in which conditions for entry involve sound economic and political performance, resulting in greater aid and investment for its members.

7. In line with the Common African Position devised by the AU, five key principles should underpin relations between the AU and the UN: promotion of collective security in the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; support for African ownership and priority-setting; fostering a partnership on the basis of consultative decision-making, division of labour, and burden-sharing; mutual respect and adherence to the principle of comparative advantage; and establishment of a division of labour underpinned by the concept of complementarity.

8. By 2016, the EU had contributed over €1.3 billion to support the AU’s peace and security agenda. The EU-UN joint consultative mechanism must, however, be made more effective in order to facilitate cooperation between both organisations in planning, training, communication, and sharing “best practices” in African peace operations, while fostering trilateral cooperation with the AU.

9. The AU and its member states must invest in understanding China’s strategy in Africa and developing the technical capacity to engage effectively with Beijing in order to promote African interests more effectively; the AU should also develop the capacity to coordinate Africa’s interests in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

10. Finally, Africa should learn lessons from how the Israel lobby has influenced policy in the United States (US) Congress. The tens of thousands of highly educated Africans in America must be mobilised to build a viable constituency for Africa. There is also an urgent need for the AU to develop programmes that build new bridges between Africa and its Diaspora, while also devising strategies to tap into the large African population of 169 million in the Diaspora for investment and development. The AU should thus develop a Diaspora strategy that looks beyond remittances to harness the expertise of the Diaspora to address the skills gap in Africa, especially in the area of science and technology.
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, South Africa, held a three-day policy research seminar at the Vineyard Hotel in Cape Town, South Africa, from 27 to 29 April 2016, on the theme “The African Union: Regional and Global Challenges”.

The policy seminar built on previous work undertaken by CCR within the framework of a four-year Africa programme focusing on “Region-building and Regional Integration in Africa”. Since 2004, the Centre has convened a series of seminars and published over 53 reports and 18 books including *The African Union and Its Institutions in 2008*, which remains one of the very few comprehensive assessments of the continental body and its institutions to date. The April 2016 seminar was an effort to update this volume, taking into account developments over the past eight years. In partnership with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), CCR had also hosted an earlier international colloquium in Berlin, Germany, in August 2012 on the theme “The African Union at Ten: Problems, Progress, and Prospects”.

The April 2016 seminar revisited the performance and prospects of the African Union (AU) at a critical juncture when Africa and the world at large are witnessing significant geo-political, socio-economic, demographic, and environmental challenges.

Seminar Objectives and Themes

With these issues in mind, the Cape Town seminar brought together prominent African and non-African policymakers, scholars, and civil society activists to reflect critically on the historical mission, achievements, challenges, and prospects of the AU in a changing regional and global environment. The meeting also provided a platform for generating concrete ideas on developing the capacity of the AU and repositioning the continental organisation as an effective vehicle for promoting sustainable peace, democratic governance, and socio-economic development in Africa. The seminar sought to achieve the following seven key objectives:

1. To review the performance of the AU 14 years after its creation, against the backdrop of its historical mission to achieve continental integration;
2. To identify and elucidate the current regional and global dynamics that impact on the agency of the AU;
3. To assess the effectiveness of the AU’s security and governance architectures;
4. To explore ways in which the Addis Ababa–based AU Commission can be capacitated to drive the agenda of the Union more effectively;
5. To develop concrete ideas for building viable regional organisations and strengthening the relationship between the AU and Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs);

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6. To make proposals on how to encourage South Africa and other regional leaders to become institutional champions in the interest of an effective AU; and
7. To identify the catalysts for more constructive partnerships between the AU and its external partners, including the African Diaspora.

Deliberations at the seminar were focused under eight broad themes: Pan-Africanism and the African Diaspora; the AU’s peace and security architecture; the AU Commission; the AU’s governance challenges; the AU’s socio-economic challenges; the AU and Africa’s regional economic communities; South Africa and the AU; and the AU’s relations with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and China.

From left: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa; Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg, South Africa; and Professor Chris Landsberg, South African Research (SARChI) Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Senior Associate, School of Leadership, University of Johannesburg.
1. Pan-Africanism and the African Diaspora

As a philosophy and ideology, Pan-Africanism affirms the rich cultural heritage of African societies and the importance of achieving freedom through African unity, solidarity, and self-reliance.

The concept of Pan-Africanism represented a bid to promote the political, socio-economic, and cultural liberation of Africa, and developed as a political movement in the twentieth century through the efforts of Africans in the Diaspora such as Trinidad’s Henry Sylvester-Williams and later, American, W.E.B. Du Bois, who convened five Pan-African Congresses in Europe between 1919 and 1945. The fifth Pan-African Congress, held in Manchester in 1945, was attended by a large delegation from continental Africa, and charted the course for post-war liberation struggles in Africa. Attendees such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta would go on to lead their countries to independence and champion the Pan-African cause.

This period also witnessed the emergence of divergent interpretations of Pan-Africanism and alternative strategies to achieve it, as evidenced in the enduring tensions between advocates for an immediate continental political union (the Casablanca group) and the majority who favoured a gradual approach to unity (the Monrovia and Brazzaville groups).

The creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 1963 brought an end to these rival blocs, and reflected the triumph of the gradualist approach to continental unity over its radical counterpart. There were high expectations that independence would be followed by democratic governance and socio-economic development across Africa. However, despite its success in achieving the decolonisation of Africa and ending apartheid in South Africa, the OAU proved to be ineffective in taking forward the Pan-African ideals of regional integration and development, amid the proxy wars waged by the United States (US) and the Soviet Union across the continent, and over 40 French military interventions in Africa to prop up or replace assorted autocrats. Poor governance and military rule also proliferated throughout the continent. Some African leaders in countries like Uganda and Equatorial Guinea hid behind the shield of sovereignty and committed gross human rights abuses against their people. Following the independence of African countries after 1960,

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4 See Adekeye Adebajo, “Prophets of Pan-Africanism: From the OAU to the AU”, Sunday Independent, 26 May 2013 (available at www.iol.co.za).
over six million Africans died in a bid to defend colonial boundaries in Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The OAU was further criticised for its lack of engagement with the African Diaspora, thereby undermining the global unity of Africans in their struggle for liberation.6

A new wave of optimism about Africa’s future swept through the continent, resulting in the creation of the African Union in July 2002, in South Africa’s port city of Durban, under the stewardship of host president Thabo Mbeki. The birth of the AU was expected to mark a new era in the quest for Pan-African unity. Although the African Union has contributed to efforts to transform Africa’s security and governance landscape, and has brought renewed attention to the ideal of Pan-African unity, Pan-Africanism as a political movement appears to have lost its appeal. The existence of the AU over the past decade and a half has been animated by the same debates over the meaning, timing, phasing, and sequencing of the Pan-African project of regional integration and socio-economic development. It is now evident that the creation of the AU was not underpinned by a shared understanding among African leaders of the organisation’s place in the global order, nor is there consensus on the degree of sovereignty that member states are expected to cede to the AU in order for the organisation to achieve its integrationist goals and make it relevant to the aspirations of Africa’s one billion citizens.7 The AU’s integration goals have also been criticised for being too state-centric and geographically narrow. They do not reflect the original idea of Pan-African unity that was championed by Du Bois and his peers, which focused on the unity of all Africans both on the continent and in the Diaspora. Africa and its neglected Diaspora must thus unite to strengthen the AU and promote a new Pan-Africanism that is anchored in African solidarity.

The African Diaspora has been identified as a sixth African sub-region by the AU, and its financial and technical contributions to the socio-economic development of the continent have been encouraged by African leaders. The African Diaspora can be divided into three broad categories: the historical Diaspora that resulted from the trans-Atlantic and trans-Saharan slave trades; the Caribbean community of African Diaspora–derived states; and the African expatriate communities of nationals from existing member states of the AU.8 However, the idea of the Diaspora as a sixth African sub-region is devoid of content, and the Diaspora has played a more symbolic than substantive role in the work of the AU. It is important to interrogate and conceptualise better the understanding of Diaspora in the context of the discourse on Pan-Africanism. The AU’s Diaspora policy should therefore take into account the composition, dynamics, and tensions within the African Diaspora. Moreover, there is an urgent need for the AU to develop programmes that build bridges between Africa and its Diaspora, while also devising strategies to tap into the African population in the Diaspora – estimated at 169 million9 – for investment and development on the continent.

In recent years, remittances from the African Diaspora have overtaken the amount of foreign aid being provided to Africa. Remittance flows to Africa were $35 billion in 2015, while official development assistance was $24 billion.10 African countries such as Nigeria and Ethiopia have also sought to tap into their respective Diasporas

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to harness resources for their economic development. Nigeria received $21 billion from remittances in 2015,\textsuperscript{8} the sixth largest amount in the world, while Ethiopia used Diaspora bonds to help finance the building of its Renaissance Dam. Some African countries such as Morocco have also established foundations and dedicated government ministries to manage relations with their respective Diaspora communities. The AU should learn from these successful national examples and experiences to design effective programmes that can harness the financial resources of the African Diaspora to finance national projects that can also benefit the continent. The African Union must also develop a Diaspora strategy that looks beyond remittances to tap into the expertise of the Diaspora in order to address the “skills gap” in Africa, particularly in the area of science and technology. Until now, the efforts of the Diaspora to reconnect with the continent and contribute to its development have not been reciprocated in kind by the AU, whose engagement with the former has been characterised largely by symbolic and cosmetic declarations. However, discourses on the African Diaspora should not overlook the negative aspects of this constituency, especially as they relate to the Diaspora’s contribution to capital flight and “brain drain”, which pose a dual challenge to socio-economic development efforts in Africa. African governments invest considerable resources in educating and training their citizens, many of whom are emigrating from the continent to enrich the economies of countries in other parts of the world.

The African Diaspora should further be mobilised to champion the continent’s interests abroad. Between 1980 and 2009, the number of the African-born population in the United States increased from 200,000 to 15 million.\textsuperscript{12} This group could be a significant part of an effective Africa lobby. The coalition that fought the anti-apartheid struggle, including the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and groups like TransAfrica have, however, lost their former political clout. Africa should learn lessons from how the Israel lobby has influenced policy in the US Congress. The tens of thousands of highly educated Africans in America must further be mobilised to build a viable constituency for Africa. Influential African-Americans have more recently not been particularly proactive and assertive in promoting Africa’s interests in the US, despite the presence in the White House of the first black president, Barack Obama, between 2009 and 2016.

The contribution of the Diaspora to Africa’s cultural revival should also be recognised. Africa and its Diaspora have made great strides over the past six decades in efforts to achieve cultural equality in the areas of literature, music, and film. African writers and artists both on the continent and in the Diaspora have been active in promoting Pan-African solidarity and identity. In the post-independence period, Africa and its Diaspora have produced six Nobel literature laureates: Nigeria’s Wole Soyinka, Egypt’s Naguib Mahfouz, South Africa’s Nadine Gordimer and J.M. Coetzee, St. Lucia’s Derek Walcott, and America’s Toni Morrison, whose literary contributions should be included in the Pan-African curriculum that is taught at schools and universities across the continent and in the Diaspora. An emerging African film industry exemplified by Nigeria’s “Nollywood” has also taken up the responsibility of narrating authentic and contemporary African stories. The industry is worth $5 billion, produces over 2,000 films a year, and contributes 1.4 percent to Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP).\textsuperscript{13} Collaboration between actors and directors in Africa and its Diaspora has further contributed to bringing the history and struggles of the continent to global audiences. For example, Chiwetel Ejiofor, a Nigerian-Briton,
partnered with Lupita Nyong’o, an Oscar-winning Kenyan, and Grenadian-Trinidadian British director Steve McQueen, to produce the globally acclaimed film 12 Years a Slave in 2013. Another important contribution in this area is that of Haitian-American director Raoul Peck, who produced two movies, Lumumba (2000), and Sometimes in April (2005), which portray the tragic tales of Patrice Lumumba and the 1994 Rwandan genocide respectively. Diaspora directors should produce more films about Africa with genuine human characters to help change negative global media stereotypes of the continent.
2. The AU’s Governance Challenges

Many African countries gained their political independence beginning in 1960 and embarked on an ambitious programme of nation-building. However, the initial euphoria around democratic and participatory governance was short-lived.

Multi-party political systems soon became one-party states, while military coups and civil wars proliferated on the continent. These weaknesses in democratic governance in Africa occurred in the context of the challenges that many African countries faced in the early stages of statehood and nation-building. Following the crises experienced by African states, and compounded by the failures of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) from the 1980s, there was a strong need for a new framework for development and democracy. The SAPs involved a set of socio-economic policies, including the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, reduction of budget deficits, deregulation of markets, retrenchment of public servants, and large cuts in health and education. These measures were imposed on African governments by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as conditions for receiving loans from these institutions. They contributed to a developmental crisis in Africa.

Governance

Respect for national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, coupled with the often negative role of external actors such as the US, the Soviet Union, and France, gave rise to autocracy in Africa in the decades following independence. This undermined the development of democratic governance on the continent. Some of Africa’s governance challenges include: constitutional amendments, mismanagement of diversity, weak civil societies, fragile institutions, and failure to institutionalise effective policies. Where governments refuse to give up or share power, there has been a tendency for civil conflict and insurgency, as in Somalia, Liberia, and the DRC. Poor governance practices in Africa have also given rise to the phenomenon of popular uprisings, as in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in 2011, and Burkina Faso in 2014. Against the backdrop of these governance challenges, there is a strong argument for a limit of two terms for African presidents in order to avoid “imperial presidencies” and ensure fresh governance ideas and new leadership. Others have argued against presidential term limits, citing cases such as Germany and Britain that do not have such limits.

It is important to acknowledge African electoral success stories such as that of Nigeria in 2015, which, against all expectations, held a credible election that led to the peaceful transition from one civilian government to

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14 This section is partly based on a presentation made by Jerome Adeikhena, “The African Peer Review Mechanism: Problems, Progress, and Prospects”, at the CCR policy research seminar “The African Union”.

another for the first time in its 55-year history. Twenty-three elections were scheduled to be held in Africa in 2016. Sixteen polls were held in 2015. Elections should not, however, be confused with processes of ensuring genuine democracy. Africa needs to avoid the “fallacy of electoralism” and uncritical embrace of “liberal democracy”. Consideration should be given to exploring the notion of “developmental democracy” and its appropriateness in the African context. Other recommendations for governance reforms in Africa include: building resilient institutions, visionary leadership, active citizens, empowered civil societies, innovative political systems suited to African contexts, and sustainable domestic funding for elections.

The African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance was adopted by African leaders in January 2007 and came into force five years later. The adoption of this charter was an effort to move from autocratic systems of government towards the acceptance of shared values such as the promotion of democracy, the protection of human rights, and respect for diversity. Other shared-value instruments include the 2000 AU Constitutive Act; the 2000 Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA); the 2002 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council; the 2009 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy Framework; and the more recent Agenda 2063 of 2015.

Against the backdrop of previous commitments to improve the state of governance in Africa, the AU launched the African Governance Architecture (AGA) in 2011. The main rationale for the AGA is that while there are several governance frameworks, as well as numerous institutions at the national, regional, and continental levels with a mandate to promote democratic governance, there is little effective synergy among these institutions and frameworks. The AGA therefore seeks to strengthen the coherence and relevance of the various instruments for continental governance. Its main goal is to empower the various AU organs and the RECs to enhance democratic governance at the national level. Its three pillars are: shared norms and values centred on the promotion of democracy, sovereignty, and human rights; a set of institutions encompassing the AU and the RECs; and a platform comprising agreed processes for interaction adopted by institutions, states, and civil society actors. The AGA is still in its infancy – the platform was only officially launched in June 2012 – but builds on some positive changes in African governance, including a strengthening norm against unconstitutional changes of government, and an increasing number of democratic transitions. Between 1960 and 1990, only in Sierra Leone did a ruling party lose power in Africa and only seven heads of state (Somalia’s Aden Abdullah Daar, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, Senegal’s Léopold Senghor, Cameroon’s Ahmadou Ahidjo, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, Sierra Leone’s Siaka Stevens, and Sudan’s Abdel Rahman al-Dahab) willingly stepped down from power. Since 1990, African countries have held regular elections and ruling parties have been voted out of power in Zambia, Lesotho, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya, Malawi, and Mauritius. Civil society in Africa has also become more assertive in holding governments to account.

16 In a liberal democracy, the exercise of political power by elected representatives is subject to checks and balances. Liberal democracy also emphasises the protection of civil liberties, restraints on the ability of the majority to impose its will on the minority, and the promotion of a free market economy.
17 Developmental democracy denotes a political system in which the main task of the government is to catalyse the agency of its citizens to enable them to assume full responsibility for their socio-economic and political development.
Notwithstanding these positive developments, the continent continues to face significant governance challenges. While the AU and Africa’s RECs have developed norms and principles that provide a platform for more participatory and improved governance, African states have consistently struggled to translate declaratory commitments into practice. National sovereignty remains jealously guarded, while the continent’s institutions continue to lack resources, collective authority, and popular legitimacy. What is more, new and worrying trends are taking root in different parts of the continent that raise serious questions about the commitment of African leaders to democratic shared values. The phenomenon of “constitutional coups” – or “third-termism” – has seen some African leaders manipulate their national constitutions in a bid to bypass presidential term limits. Since 2000, nine African heads of state have tried to remain in power by changing their country’s constitutions to prolong their term in office or remove presidential term limits altogether.¹⁹ Many of these attempts have succeeded in countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda. While constitutional amendments to increase term limits or to scrap them are not necessarily inimical to democratic governance, the manipulative tactics that sometimes characterise these processes do not augur well for the trust and consensus required to build democratic polities in Africa.²⁰ In Rwanda, for example, President Paul Kagame’s successful bid to change the constitution to allow himself to run for a third term in December 2015 occurred against the backdrop of accusations that the government was stifling free speech, dissent, and political opposition.²¹ In neighbouring Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni extended his 30-year rule in February 2016 after winning elections that, according to EU and Commonwealth observers, lacked transparency and were marred by government intimidation.²² Another significant trend is the use of security measures to stifle genuine dissent and civil liberties, in the context of a growing threat of terrorism on the continent.

While the African Governance Architecture seeks to strengthen the commitment of AU member states to upholding the norms and values of democratic governance, it cannot be implemented successfully without strong institutional synergies with the African Peace and Security Architecture – the continent’s primary framework for addressing conflicts and instability. Complementarity between the AGA and the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture is essential to addressing the root causes of conflicts associated with poor governance, such as the manipulation of elections and the militarisation of politics. Efforts to strengthen the synergy between both architectures have largely taken the form of promoting greater institutional collaboration between the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the AGA Platform. At a more technical level, an Inter-Departmental Taskforce on Conflict Prevention has been established within the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, co-chaired by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) – which is responsible for implementing the AGA – and the Peace and Security Department (PSD). An annual High-Level Dialogue on Democracy,

¹⁹ These leaders include Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré, Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza, Cameroon’s Paul Biya, Chad’s Idriss Deby, Congo-Brazzaville’s Denis Sassou Ngeusu, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) Joseph Kabila, Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni.
Human Rights, and Governance, convened under the aegis of the AGA, also provides a forum for the exchange of ideas among key stakeholders in Africa’s security and governance architectures. In recent times, the Department of Political Affairs and the AU Peace and Security Department have found further common ground through collaboration in implementing post-conflict reconstruction and development interventions in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR). Notwithstanding these different processes and initiatives, the relationship between the AGA and the APSA remains tenuous, and more effort is required to help build synergy between them.

The African Peer Review Mechanism

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was introduced by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2003 as a mechanism to provide Africans the opportunity to evaluate their own progress towards sound governance and democratic principles. The APRM is a non-adversarial, voluntary, and self-monitoring process involving 35 African states by July 2016. For the first time, African leaders expressed a willingness to subject their governance performance to review by their peers. The mechanism operates through a panel of eight eminent persons, a secretariat, and accountability structures at the national, regional, and continental levels. The appointment of eminent persons is based on the principle of regional balance. However, the decision-making authority of the APRM is invested in participating heads of state and government. The APRM review process for any given country takes 12 to 18 months to complete. Of the 35 states that have signed up to the programme, only 17 had been reviewed by 2016, when four review missions were scheduled – for Chad, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sudan – along with a second review of Kenya.23

As an Africa-owned framework, the APRM was designed to support African countries to entrench the values of democratic governance into their political systems. The mechanism is therefore critical for the effective implementation of the AU’s Agenda 2063. The APRM aims to help African countries address democratic deficits and create the economic transparency required to attract investment and nurture growth.24 In particular, the mechanism has initiated dialogue between private and government stakeholders and civil society actors on areas for improvement and tackling challenges such as corruption, capital flight, and tax avoidance. It has further promoted progress on governance and electoral reform, and focused political attention on important challenges – for example, the violence that accompanied national elections in Kenya in 2007–2008, and xenophobic violence in South Africa in 2008.25 However, owing to the changes that took place in NEPAD, the APRM has been neglected and the quality of the panel of eminent persons has declined. After Presidents

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25 For more on this, see CCR, “The African Union at Ten”.
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa left office in 2007 and 2008 respectively, the APRM struggled to operate effectively. These two presidents were viewed as the main champions of the mechanism. The position of APRM Chief Executive Officer (CEO) remained vacant for a decade between 2004 and 2015, and a new CEO, South Africa’s Eddy Maloka, was appointed only in January 2016. However, the APRM requires more than new leadership at its South Africa-based secretariat to become a key instrument for promoting democratic governance in Africa. The mechanism needs leaders with credibility and authority who can champion its objectives and deal with the low performance of states that have been reviewed. Furthermore, the mechanism is confronted with severe financial difficulties and is currently facing huge budget deficits. At a February 2016 APRM heads of state meeting, its newly appointed CEO expressed his concern over the non-payment of annual subscription fees of $100,000 by member states. The APRM has been mainly relying on funding from South Africa and Nigeria. The previous consistent funding of the mechanism by African governments must therefore be urgently restored.
3. The AU’s Socio-Economic Challenges

The global commodity boom in the first decade of the 2000s, attributed mainly to rising demand from emerging markets such as China, placed many African countries on a steady trajectory of economic growth.

However, the “Africa Rising” narrative – popular in mainstream Western media – that has been associated with this economic trend, masks enduring negative socio-economic dynamics on the continent. For the most part, the gains of economic growth have not been inclusively shared, leaving the continent with high levels of poverty and unemployment especially among the youth. Most African economies are also highly unequal, with an average Gini co-efficient measure of 43.6 percent inequality, with 46.8 percent of sub-Saharan Africans still living in poverty in June 2016. Africa is also often at the receiving end of the negative effects of climate change such as rising temperatures and increased risks of drought and floods.

The continent’s socio-economic development has long been on the agenda of African organisations as well as donor governments. However, finding a durable and effective development model has so far eluded the continent. The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL), both of 1980, constituted the most comprehensive and strategic attempt to address Africa’s socio-economic challenges. The LPA was an inward-looking strategy that emphasised the virtues of collective self-reliance and regional integration in Africa’s socio-economic development, with a view to liberating the continent from continued external dependence. The plan was conceived – by Adebayo Adedeji’s UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) – around the total mobilisation of Africa’s human resources to promote the continent’s development. In addition to its emphasis on promoting industrialisation in Africa, the LPA also prioritised measures to scale up science and technology research in the agricultural sector and to promote food security. This was essentially a pact between African citizens and their leadership, as opposed to the 2001 New Partnership for Africa’s Development, which was widely seen as a neo-liberal plan that was more of a partnership between African leaders and foreign partners, with a heavy reliance on foreign direct investment and external aid. The LPA was not implemented mainly due to a lack of resources, and it was adopted at a time when African economies were under severe strain not least because of the effects of the Bretton Woods-led structural adjustment programmes. Africa must therefore revisit the Lagos Plan of Action since many of its ideas are as relevant today as they were in the 1980s. The LPA was conscious of many of the socio-economic challenges with which the continent still grapples. For example, the argument for regional integration as a path to socio-economic development in Africa remains strong. However, current efforts to revive the ideas articulated in the LPA run a similar risk of non-implementation, considering that they come at a time when the economic boom enjoyed by many African countries since 2000 has ended, with Africa’s terms of trade having declined by 12 percent by April 2016.

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6 This section is partly based on presentations made by Thandika Mkandawire, “On the Politics of Regional Integration”, and Said Adejumobi, “The AU’s Socio-Economic Challenges”, at the CCR policy research seminar “The African Union”.
27 Most recent World Bank data in June 2016 (available at http://data.worldbank.org). These figures exclude several conflict-affected countries for which no data was available.
A decade ago, when optimism was high, South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki spoke of an “African Renaissance” as a vision for a prosperous future for the continent. NEPAD was to be the vehicle through which the Renaissance would be fulfilled. Both were based on the idea that Africa’s socio-economic and political challenges could be addressed through continental initiatives supported by external assistance. As a socio-economic programme of the AU, NEPAD sought – among other objectives – to eradicate poverty, promote sustainable growth and development in Africa, and end the marginalisation of the continent in the globalisation process while fully integrating Africa into the global economy.

Despite NEPAD’s lofty goals, the programme has become hampered by implementation constraints. Early commitments in terms of donor and private sector funding did not materialise. The annual funding gap for NEPAD’s infrastructure projects stood at $40–45 billion in June 2014. Thus, despite developing important continental development strategies such as the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), NEPAD runs the risk of being seen as yet another failed attempt at Africa’s socio-economic development. Civil society was also not properly consulted in the crafting of the programme, which was seen by some critics as a top-down process and a self-imposed neo-liberal structural adjustment programme. NEPAD is still used as the blueprint for Africa’s development in discussions with new donors like China in making decisions on how development assistance can best be employed. However, critics continue to argue that the discourse on Africa’s socio-economic development must move away from the neo-liberal mind-set embodied by NEPAD, and towards a more developmental approach based on effective regional integration. Africa cannot develop by relying disproportionately on external actors. African development must be a nationalist project. There is thus an urgent need to cultivate a national entrepreneurial class to drive socio-economic development across the continent. This elite should be sensitive to Africa’s historical and contemporary challenges, and play a positive role in the socio-economic transformation of the continent. More generally, development planners in Africa must devise development strategies that allow the continent to engage more strategically and independently with the outside world. For example, in order for African countries to reduce the use of fossil fuels for rapid economic development, Western countries must grant them access to clean energy technologies. African governments should also revive national development banks that were established in the 1960s to drive development efforts across the continent. These were abandoned by many African countries in the 1970s and 1980s following opposition to these institutions from the World Bank.

More than three decades after the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action, very little has been achieved in the area of regional integration and development, with intra-African trade estimated at a paltry 12 percent. Various initiatives and mechanisms have emerged under the aegis of the AU to foster socio-economic development and integration in Africa. These include the Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) of 2007, aimed at strengthening cooperation and convergence among Africa’s RECs; action plans to accelerate trade, industrialisation, and the establishment of a continental free trade area; and programmes to develop the continent’s infrastructure and agricultural sector – the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa of 2010 and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) of 2003 respectively. The CAADP, in particular, has sought to prioritise the agri-business sector, which generates between 35 and 40

percent of the continent’s gross domestic product and provides employment for about 70 percent of its population. The programme seeks to promote an African-owned and led farming sector and has an agreed target of 10 percent of national budgets to be spent on agriculture. It also outlines a range of measures to strengthen food production and distribution and to alleviate poverty. A country and sub-regional implementation process forms the backbone of the CAADP, providing a set of tools for analysis, design, implementation, and evaluation of agricultural investment programmes.35

Public spending on agriculture across Africa has increased by an average of seven percent since the Maputo Declaration was adopted among AU member states in 2003, with seven countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Niger, and Senegal) exceeding the target of spending 10 percent of their budgets on agriculture, and seven (Burundi, the DRC, Ghana, Madagascar, Rwanda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) managing to achieve the 10 percent threshold by February 2015.36 Development and implementation of policies in line with the CAADP framework remain uneven at sub-regional and national levels, and the programme needs to promote greater ownership by, and more partnerships among, its signatories. In addition, CAADP has failed to address adequately the challenges that climate change poses to rain-fed agriculture, and participating farmers have been less than forthcoming about the environmental issues they continue to encounter.37

The most recent pan-continental initiative, Agenda 2063 of 2015, is a 50-year framework that outlines grand aspirations for Africa’s socio-economic development. This new framework builds on previous initiatives such as the LPA and NEPAD to aspire for, among other goals, a prosperous Africa based on ideals of collective self-reliance and self-sustainability. Agenda 2063 has seven key aspirations: a prosperous Africa promoting inclusive growth and sustainable development; an economically integrated and politically united continent based on Pan-African ideals and the vision of an African Renaissance; an Africa of democratic governance, respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law; a peaceful and secure continent; an Africa with a strong cultural identity and common values, ethics, and heritage; a people-driven continent that can unleash the potential of its women and youth; and an Africa that can be an influential global player and partner. These goals are to be achieved through greater emphasis on infrastructure development, regional integration, and rapid industrialisation. Agenda 2063 is expected to be operationalised through five 10-year implementation plans, the first of which was adopted by the AU in June 2015.38

While having such a long-term aspirational plan forces Africa to craft a strategic vision and to set its ambitions high, current dynamics suggest that the chances of the success of Agenda 2063 are far from guaranteed. Beside the fact that the framework is overly ambitious and contains many unrealistic goals and targets, Agenda 2063 will have to contend with a poor record of implementing continental plans and programmes. Although Africa recorded an annual economic growth rate of 4.6 percent between 2007 and 2015, this cannot be attributed mainly to the successful implementation of any of the initiatives and frameworks that have been adopted to

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35 CCR, “The African Union at Ten”.
37 CCR, “The African Union at Ten”.
promote socio-economic development and integration on the continent. The recent economic growth in Africa has largely been a function of external factors such as the rise in global commodity prices due largely to demand in China, which had weakened by 2016.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by world leaders at the UN in New York in September 2015 to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), offer another important framework that can potentially contribute to Africa’s socio-economic development. The 17 SDGs seek to tackle pressing development challenges such as extreme poverty and hunger, rising global inequality, climate change, unemployment, and rapid urbanisation. Through the Common African Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, adopted in January 2014, the AU played an important role in having African priorities such as industrialisation and job creation incorporated into the SDGs. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda, adopted at the third International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Addis Ababa in July 2015, also includes provisions that can contribute significantly to Africa’s development efforts, including the establishment of a mechanism to promote science, technology, and innovation. The challenge now is for the AU to align the opportunities inherent in these global frameworks with Africa’s development initiatives, notably Agenda 2063.

Assessments of progress in regional integration in Africa need to take into consideration the enormity of the integration project in relation to the continent’s limited capacity and resources, as well as its colonial legacy. While the European integration experience is often presented as the model that Africa should emulate, it is worth noting that the challenges that the EU had to overcome on its path to integration are insignificant when compared to what Africa is confronted with. Europe’s integration also took much longer than is often acknowledged. The success of regional integration schemes in Africa depends to a large extent on effective strategies for industrialisation and not necessarily on increasing the size of the African market of one billion people. Regional integration initiatives should also take into account the configuration of interests in the AU’s 54 member states, and put in place mechanisms to compensate groups that may lose out from integration efforts. This would go a long way to win the support of countries with small economies that are often wary of the domination of much larger economies. Considering that the slow pace of regional integration in Africa has often been attributed to lack of political will, it is also imperative to interrogate this concept and analyse its impact on regional integration efforts in Africa within specific contexts and policy areas. Furthermore, the centrality of effective leadership for successful regional integration in Africa cannot be overemphasised. Africa needs quality leaders similar to those who led the continent in the 1960s, and who were instrumental in its liberation from colonialism and apartheid. However, the vision required for successful regional integration and development in Africa cannot be provided solely by the political elite. It is the collective responsibility of all Africans to champion the continent’s economic development efforts. In particular, the role of the African intelligentsia and bureaucratic class in promoting processes of regional integration and socio-economic development.

43 Nagar, “COMESA and SADC”, p. 203.
development on the continent is critical. Post-independence African governments have struggled to engage effectively with the continent’s intellectuals. Many African bureaucrats employed in regional organisations are also often not ideologically and technically committed to the African integration project. They sometimes work in these organisations to serve parochial or national interests rather than regional interests. There is thus an urgent need to foster a class of “Afrocrats” – young, highly competent officials with a strong commitment to Pan-Africanism, similar to the EU’s “Eurocrats”.

From left: Professor Thandika Mkandawire, Professor of African Development, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), London, Britain; and Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice, University of Cape Town (UCT), South Africa; Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Member of the Friends of the African Union Panel of the Wise; and Professor Said Adejumobi, Director, Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Lusaka, Zambia.
4. The AU’s Peace and Security Architecture

Since 1990, Africa has experienced a wave of political change moving from protracted civil wars and autocratic rule towards peace and more democratic governance. However, violent conflicts in Somalia and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo continue, while new conflicts have emerged in the Central African Republic, Mali, and South Sudan. These conflicts are embedded in complexes of insecurity that encompass poverty, inequality, crime, state violence, social violence, and environmental degradation.

At the 50th anniversary celebration of the creation of the Organisation of African Unity in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 2013, African heads of state and government reiterated their determination to achieve a conflict-free continent. They also pledged to strengthen the continent’s mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution at both the continental and sub-regional levels. Additionally, African leaders committed themselves to promoting greater collaboration between the AU and regional economic communities such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). These objectives are to be achieved through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which was established by the AU in July 2002. The normative underpinnings of the APSA reflect a fundamental shift from the non-intervention principle of the OAU to a collective security approach that is founded on a human security paradigm.

The APSA framework includes a 15-member Peace and Security Council, a continental early warning system (CEWS), a five-member Panel of the Wise, an African Standby Force (ASF), and a Peace Fund. Each pillar of the architecture is intended to be replicated at the sub-regional level. Except for the ASF, all the other pillars of the APSA have been established, though their performance has been mixed. The Peace and Security Council, in particular, has become a major decision-making body on peace and security in Africa. The Council has held over 600 meetings to address peace and security challenges on the continent, and dealt with 26 active conflicts since 2004. Within a decade, these conflicts had decreased to only seven. This decrease is partly due to the AU, actively supported by the UN, the EU, and Africa’s RECs. In collaboration with these global and regional actors, the PSC has contributed to the resolution of conflicts in countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. However, these relative successes mask serious weaknesses in Africa’s institutional capacity to address conflicts, exemplified by the difficulties of operationalising the African Standby Force.

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44 See Adekeye Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts (Boulder and London: Rienner; and Johannesburg: Jacana, 2011).

The AU has been developing the African Standby Force since 2004 to provide the Union with the capacity to respond to conflicts in a decisive and timely manner. Though the ASF was initially scheduled to be launched in 2010, the AU was not able to hold the force’s first major training exercise, in South Africa, until 2015. With the delay in the ASF becoming fully operational, in May 2013 the AU Assembly established the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC).\(^{46}\) ACIRC is premised on three key principles. First, it is based on the willingness and ability of individual African states to deploy troops voluntarily within 15 days. Second, the initiative is expected to be self-sustaining, with member states paying for their own deployment. Third, ACIRC adopts a continental rather than a sub-regional collective security approach. The operationalisation of the force has, however, also been marred by significant challenges. Only 13 AU member states had pledged support for the initiative by 2016, despite the fact that it had been endorsed by the AU Assembly three years earlier. Key players such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Kenya expressed reservations about ACIRC, while South Africa strongly championed the force.\(^{47}\) Moreover, while ACIRC was originally conceived as a temporary measure to address the need for rapid deployment until the ASF could be fully developed, concerns have emerged over apparent competition between the two initiatives. Some observers have argued that ACIRC is diverting resources and political energy away from finalisation of the ASF.\(^{48}\)

With a view to improving the AU’s peace and security architecture, an independent assessment of the implementation of the APSA was commissioned by the AU Peace and Security Department in 2010. The outcomes of this review are documented in the 2010 report Moving Africa Forward,\(^{49}\) which identified several weaknesses with regard to implementation of the APSA framework. These included insufficient vertical coordination between the APSA and the peace and security mechanisms of the RECs, which were noted to be developing at different paces. The report also identified weak horizontal coordination among the various components of the APSA, and between the AU’s Department of Political Affairs and its Peace and Security Department. The second roadmap of the APSA (2016–2020) builds on the 2011–2013 roadmap, and was developed to address many of these weaknesses. The roadmap is underpinned by the principles of self-reliance, collective security, and greater synergy between the AU and Africa’s RECs. The document essentially advocates a rethinking of Africa’s peace and security architecture. The new APSA roadmap also stresses the need for improved data collection for early warning in order to pre-empt conflicts on the continent.\(^{50}\) The AU’s early warning system currently lacks intelligence-gathering capability, and relies heavily on open-source information. The continental early warning system therefore needs greater coordination with the mechanisms of RECs such as IGAD, ECOWAS, and SADC. The Panel of the Wise has been operational since 2007 and is composed of five members for the four-year period 2014–2017: Albina Faria de Assis Pereira Africano (Angola), Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe (Uganda), Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), Luisa Diogo (Mozambique), and Edem Kodjo (Togo). The Panel works with similar organs of the RECs through the Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise), which was established in May 2013. In addition to promoting debate on, and drawing attention to, key peace and security issues in Africa, the Panel has also been involved in preventive diplomacy and other forms of peacemaking in countries such as the Central African Republic. It further seeks to prevent and defuse election-related violence in Africa.

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With regard to the Peace Fund, the AU still relies heavily on external funding, and has not been effective in mobilising resources from within the continent. AU member states contributed only 2.69 percent to their organisation’s programme budget for the 2015 financial year. Africa thus needs to reduce this dependence and find ways of generating its own funding. The proposal for the AU to fund 25 percent of AU-mandated peacekeeping missions by 2020, and for the UN to pay for 75 percent of such missions from assessed contributions, may be a potential solution. The UN’s Peacebuilding Fund had mobilised a total of $540 million by December 2013, since its establishment in October 2006. However, the contribution of the Fund is dwarfed by the $5 billion a year that the UN spends on peacekeeping, over 80 percent of which is spent on the operation of missions rather than on post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.

The AU’s total budget for 2016 is $416.8 million, of which $150.5 million is for operating costs, while $266.3 million has been allocated to implement AU programmes. Member states are expected to make an annual contribution of $69.8 million, while $247 million is sourced annually from external donors. The AU Commission is allocated the lion’s share of the AU budget ($318.8 million), followed by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development Agency ($33.8 million), while the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) receives the third highest budget allocation ($32.4 million). The Peace and Security Council was allocated $797,216 of the AU’s 2016 budget. At the AU summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in June 2015 the organisation endorsed a report on the scale of assessment and alternative sources of financing the AU, proposing that its member states make equitable contributions to the organisation’s budget based on a tier system to be phased in over five years, starting from January 2016.

Further afield, the divisions in the 54-member Africa Group in New York over the issue of Western Sahara are hampering Africa’s ability to engage effectively at the UN. The Africa Group is the largest bloc at the UN and has been an important platform through which African states have coordinated their positions and influenced the decisions of the world body, including resolutions of the UN Security Council. However, the issue of Western Sahara’s independence has become a major source of contention among African states at the UN, threatening to split the Africa Group. This has forced the group to meet at the UN secretariat instead of its own office, without representation by the Polisario Front.

The UN-AU Joint Task Force on Peace and Security held its 12th consultative forum in New York in March 2016 to discuss the issue of collaboration between the two bodies. The meeting made recommendations to the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), established by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in October 2014, to undertake a review of UN peace operations and determine the needs of future missions. The report of the panel, UN Peace Operations, stressed the need for the AU and the UN to strengthen and combine their efforts on conflict prevention, particularly in the context of elections in Africa.
such as those in the DRC scheduled for December 2016. Meanwhile, the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council held their 10th annual consultative meeting in New York in May 2016 to assess cooperation between the two councils in the areas of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding in Africa. The consultative meeting also explored ways in which the partnership between the AU and the UN could be strengthened. Thus, in addition to reviewing the conflicts in Burundi and Somalia, the two councils discussed the need to transform their partnership in order to make it more effective in addressing issues of peace and security in Africa.
5. The AU and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities

Legal Framework

The 1991 Abuja Treaty aspired for continental unity through the establishment of an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2025. This was to be achieved through six defined stages of progression. The underlying principles of the AEC are clearly articulated in the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, both adopted in 1980. These documents serve as the principal instruments that inform the relationship between the AU and the RECs. In the context of the preferred gradual approach to continental integration, the Abuja Treaty of 1991 identified RECs as the building blocks of the AEC. The importance of the RECs to Africa’s region-building and regional integration efforts cannot be overstated. Even though the key framework driving the continental integration project is the African Economic Community, all the functional institutions, programmes, and initiatives of the AU are dependent on the efforts of Africa’s eight recognised sub-regional organisations: ECOWAS, COMESA, the EAC, ECCAS, SADC, IGAD, the AMU, and the Economic Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). Although the AU took a decision in December 2006 to recognise only eight sub-regional organisations and imposed a moratorium on the creation of new ones, there are 19 RECs across the continent with substantial duplication of duties and differences in their objectives, capacities, and levels of functionality.

Historically, RECs have been created and evolved independently of the OAU/AU. However, by virtue of their centrality to the African regional integration project, there have been continued efforts at the continental level to strengthen their performance, while harmonising and coordinating their policies and activities with the agenda of the OAU/AU. A Protocol on Relations between the AEC and the RECs was signed in February 1998, providing for horizontal and vertical cooperation and harmonisation of programmes. The July 2001 OAU Summit in the Zambian capital of Lusaka reaffirmed the status of RECs as building blocks of the newly established AU, and initiated a review process of the existing protocol between the RECs and the AEC, resulting in the adoption of a new instrument to structure the relationship between the AU and the RECs. The relationship between the AU and the RECs has historically been guided by a 2008 Protocol on Relations between these entities.

Notwithstanding the existence of these legal and institutional mechanisms, the AU’s mandate to coordinate the RECs has generally proved difficult to implement in practice. While there have been improvements in the flow of information between the RECs and the AU, coordination of policy and decision-making has been difficult. First, the development of RECs as vehicles for sub-regional integration has been uneven, in the context of considerable differences in regional political dynamics. Together with long-standing rivalries among Africa’s

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57 This section is partly based on presentations made by Martin Uhomoibi, “The AU and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities”, and Dawn Nagar and Fritz Nganje, “Relations Between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities: Progress, Challenges, and Prospects”, at the CCR policy research seminar “The African Union”.
61 South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), “The Role of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as the Building Blocks of the African Union”, 21 July 2004 (available at www.dfa.gov.za).
regional hegemons such as South Africa and Nigeria, this uneven development has often created tensions between the RECs and undermined effective coordination between the RECs and the AU, particularly in the area of peace and security. Second, because RECs are legal entities in their own right and are not bound by the Abuja Treaty in the same way that AU member states are, their commitment to continental integration has sometimes been compromised by the dominant national interests that drive Africa’s sub-regional organisations.  

**Economic Challenges**

The attempts by African governments to deepen economic integration through the creation of free trade areas, as well as customs and monetary unions, have achieved comparatively little success. Africa remains the only continent in which a mere 12 percent of total trade is conducted among regional states. In comparison, intra-regional trade in North America, the EU, and Asia stands at 49, 61, and 62 percent respectively. Most African countries continue to export raw materials and cash crops, thus creating a continental market that is more competitive than complementary. In addition, a number of African countries belong to more than one regional economic community, which has hindered the coordination of sub-regional trade liberalisation timetables.

The AU needs to rationalise its relations with Africa’s RECs in light of its multiple memberships. It might also be necessary to create a smaller grouping of African states in which conditions for entry involve sound economic and political performance, resulting in greater aid and investment. This would be similar to the EU’s approach of starting with six members in 1957 and growing to 28 by 2016, based on setting stringent conditions for entry and attracting members through its success.

The AU has encouraged Africa’s RECs to join a Continental Free Trade Area that would include trade liberalisation frameworks reflective of open markets and agreements signed with external partners. However, trade liberalisation through bilateral trade agreements appears to contradict efforts at regional integration. It is imperative, therefore, that member states finalise negotiation on rules of origin (ROOs), which are used to determine the national source of particular products in order to facilitate effective implementation of preferential trade agreements.

The anticipated merger of the RECs to create an African Economic Community by the revised date of 2028 also raises a number of concerns. The October 2008 COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Agreement is considered to be instrumental in establishing the AEC. With a combined GDP of $1.2 trillion in 2015, the bloc is also viewed by the AU as representing a potentially important step in concluding a Continental Free Trade Area. The 19-member COMESA, the six-member EAC, and the 15-member SADC make up a 26-member COMESA-EAC-SADC grouping. However, African states have struggled to spearhead intra-African trade due to poor continental infrastructure. The Lamu Port Southern Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor Project is

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expected to contribute to addressing this deficit, but more still needs to be done to achieve real economic growth at country level through intra-African trade. Regional economic integration over the past three decades has also been too heavily concentrated on tariff settings as a priority. Issues concerning industrialisation, technology, and research-driven integration must also be given more attention. These areas should be made more attractive for member states to have the drive to grow their economies, so that regional industries become more involved in industrialisation and manufacturing.67

Strengthening Continental Security

The African Union only established a continental peace and security architecture in 2002. However, despite their limited capacities, RECs such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC have been instrumental in peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in their respective sub-regions even before the AU was created. This dynamic has introduced tensions in the relationship between the AU and the RECs about which actor has primary authority to intervene in African conflicts. A memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security was signed in January 2008 between the AU, COMESA, ECCAS, the EAC, CEN-SAD, ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC. The memorandum called for the AU and the RECs to work together towards the full operationalisation of the APSA and the maintenance of peace and stability in Africa, on the basis of the principles of subsidiarity, comparative advantage, and complementarity. The document also emphasised the imperative for information-sharing, regular consultation, institutional presence, and operational cooperation between the AU and the RECs. A number of initiatives have been taken to strengthen the interface between these entities on peace and security. For example, RECs have opened liaison offices at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, and the AU has done the same at the headquarters of the different RECs. However, REC liaison officers do not have access to the 15-member AU Peace and Security Council. There has also been cooperation and coordination between some components of the APSA such as the continental early warning system, and the Panel of the Wise, with similar structures in the RECs. Despite these initiatives, there is still little consultation and coordination between the AU Peace and Security Council and similar decision-making organs in the RECs such as the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council. This has sometimes resulted in the AU and the RECs adopting divergent positions and responding differently to conflict situations, as in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011 and Mali in 2013, where the AU and ECOWAS initially failed to agree on a proper division of responsibilities.

Tensions and competition between the AU and the RECs in the area of peace and security cannot be completely avoided. However, the frequency of this competition and its impact on the effectiveness of the APSA can be mitigated. First, there is a need to create institutionalised mechanisms for regular consultation and coordination between the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the organs of the RECs that are charged with making decisions on matters of peace and security. Second, an increased role for civil society and parliaments in defining the foreign policies and national security interests of African states would also promote greater synergy and complementarity between the policies and initiatives of the AU and the RECs on peace and security. In many African countries, the making of foreign and security policies is dominated by a few elites whose narrow

67 See Levine and Nagar (eds.), Region-Building in Africa.
conception of the national interest is often the cause of rivalry with other states, resulting in regional organisations being paralysed or pitted against one another. For example, the competing interests of the ruling elite in Uganda and Ethiopia reportedly contributed to undermining the effectiveness of IGAD’s response to the civil war that broke out in South Sudan in December 2013. The rivalry between these two states also reportedly made it difficult for IGAD to coordinate its response to the South Sudanese crisis with the AU.68

6. The AU Commission

The African Union Commission was established in 2002 to serve as the permanent secretariat of the organisation, with a mandate to implement the decisions of different AU organs, and provide strategic guidance in efforts towards promoting greater political and socio-economic integration in Africa.

Since its creation, the Commission has come under much criticism for its organisational inefficiencies and failure to provide strategic direction to the AU. A December 2007 report from the Audit of the African Union – chaired by Nigeria’s Adebayo Adedeji – provided a scathing indictment of the administrative and management failings of the Commission under its first chair, Mali’s Alpha Konaré. Between 2004 and 2007, implementation of programmes was lacking, with only 50 percent of approved tasks implemented in 2006, and most directorates under-spending by 70–90 percent.

The AU Commission oversaw the transformation of the OAU into the AU, and successfully drafted several important policy documents that have fleshed out the progressive principles contained in the AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000. However, over the past decade and a half, the Commission has struggled to establish its independence. AU bureaucrats have sometimes been accused of demonstrating loyalty to the priorities of their national governments at the expense of the agenda of the organisation. The Commission also continues to rely heavily on external donors for financing its activities. More than half of its $416.8 million annual budget in 2016 is still funded by external donors. In this context, the effectiveness of the Commission continues to be hampered by the absence of effective coordination and low staffing levels. As of August 2015 the Commission had only 1,743 staff, including those at its headquarters and regional offices. The European Union Commission, in stark contrast, had a staff component of 33,000 as of 2016.

Any assessment of the performance and effectiveness of the AU Commission should take into account the Commission’s mandate, structure, capacity, as well as its institutional authority in relation to other organs. The AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000 ambitiously set out 14 objectives for the continental organisation’s 17 institutions. These objectives and institutions have turned out to be too many, and there is an urgent need to rationalise them. The AU Commission’s functions include: implementing the decisions taken by other organs of the AU; organising and managing the meetings of the Union; assisting member states in implementing the AU’s programmes and policies; and coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the decisions of the other AU organs. However, the Commission has not been able to fulfil these functions effectively, mainly due to its inadequate human, financial, institutional, and technical capacities. Decisions at the AU Commission are often left unimplemented. The capacity challenges at the Commission are also compounded by the fact that member states, through their embassies in Addis Ababa, sometimes intervene directly with the Commission if their nationals are facing disciplinary measures. This practice prevents the emergence of a culture of performance monitoring and...
evaluation, as well as accountability, at the AU Commission. Its structure is also a source of inefficiency, inhibiting effective coordination and synergy between departments. For example, the effectiveness of the AU Commission in delivering on its peace and security mandate has sometimes been undermined by weak coordination between the AU's Department of Political Affairs and its Peace and Security Department. The lack of synergy between these two departments is not unique to the AU, though, as the same challenges exist at the United Nations.

Three measures can be adopted to address the capacity deficits within the AU Commission. First, there is an urgent need to improve recruitment, retention, and training at the Commission. These processes should be based on merit and not on political considerations. Second, there is a need to sanction non-performing staff members and to implement a results-based management system at the AU Commission. Third, concerted efforts are required to provide the AU with a sustainable source of funding. Given the fact that many AU member states have been unable to meet their financial obligations to the Union in a predictable manner, the recommendations contained in the 2013 report of the High-Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Funding for the African Union, led by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, should be urgently implemented. Among other recommendations, the Obasanjo report proposed that all AU member states impose a $2 hospitality levy for each hotel stay and a $10 airfare levy for each international flight entering or leaving Africa. However, it was noted that countries such as Mauritius and Seychelles, whose economies depend heavily on tourism, objected to the use of hotel and airfare levies as sources of funding for the AU, arguing that such taxes are meant to develop the infrastructure of the local tourism industries in individual African countries.

In light of the AU Commission’s capacity constraints, consideration should also be given to delegating some of the functions of the Commission back to Africa’s regional economic communities and AU member states. This would, however, require greater vertical synergy and coordination between the AU and the RECs. In addition, the AU Commission should engage more strategically with African civil society, think tanks, the private sector, and the philanthropic sector. This would enable it to tap into the human, financial, and technical resources of these non-state actors in order to implement its mandate more effectively. In this regard, it is important for the Citizens and Diaspora Organisations Directorate (CIDO) within the AU Commission to be restructured to enable it to play an effective role in facilitating the participation of civil society and the private and philanthropic sectors in the work of the AU.

In addition to its capacity constraints, the performance of the AU Commission has also been adversely affected by the Commission’s lack of independence in relation to its member states and donors. The AU Commission has little room to manoeuvre and to be innovative because member states and heads of state remain the primary decision-makers in the Union. The Commission can only function to the extent that it is allowed to do so by AU member states. This lack of independence is partly demonstrated in the actions of some AU Commission staff who sometimes perform their duties on the basis of advice and instructions from member states and external donors. Expectations that, upon assuming office in July 2012, the Chair of the AU Commission, South Africa’s Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, would radically transform the Commission and make it more efficient, were not fulfilled. The experience and leadership style of the AU Commission Chair does indeed matter. For example, during his tenure as Chair of the AU Commission between 2003 and 2008, former Malian president Alpha Konaré did not attend meetings of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) and had strained relations with its ambassadors. These tensions affected the performance of the Commission in a negative manner.

Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure at the AU Commission has had both critics and supporters. She has been credited with giving greater visibility to gender issues, while also widely considered to have advocated for the AU to be financially self-sufficient by increasing the annual dues of its member states and raising funds from the private sector. Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure at the AU Commission also saw the adoption of Agenda 2063, a new human resource strategy to
professionalise the Commission; and a 2014–2017 Strategic Plan. However, critics have noted that, in addition to poor governance and conflicts in Burundi, South Sudan, and the CAR, the Commission remained plagued by issues of bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of implementation capacity under Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure.74

The institutional challenges facing the AU Commission are deep-rooted and therefore not amenable to quick fixes or the isolated interventions of the Commission’s Chair. Its agenda is also often tied to its Chair. Each new Chair comes in with his or her own priorities and develops a strategic plan for the duration of their tenure at the Commission, which have so far not exceeded a single four-year term. Ultimately, strengthening the effectiveness of the AU Commission would require far-reaching transformations in the structure and operation of the AU. In this regard, there is an urgent need to revisit Adebayo Adedeji’s 2007 five-year review of the African Union in order to implement the main findings of the report on reforming the AU’s institutions and accelerating regional integration and economic development efforts in Africa. Among other assessments, the Assembly of the AU had failed to provide adequate leadership in the acceleration of the integration process in Africa.75 In this regard, the Adedeji report called for a review of the working methods of the Assembly, while also recommending that the Chair of the Assembly (at the level of head of state) should hold office for two years, instead of the current one year, to allow for more effective leadership and policy continuity. The Adedeji report further called for the transformation of the AU’s Executive Council into a Council of Ministers to enable sectoral ministers to play an active role in processes of continental integration. With regard to the AU Commission, the report observed that the absence of clear lines of authority between the Chair, the Deputy Chair, and the Commissioners undermined the ability of the Chair of the Commission to exercise his or her full authority as the organisation’s Chief Executive and Accounting Officer. Among other remedial measures, the Adedeji report recommended that the election of Commissioners should be separated from the portfolios that they occupy, and that the responsibility for assigning portfolios and monitoring and managing the performance of Commissioners should be assumed by the Chair in his or her capacity as the Commission’s Chief Executive. The Adedeji report further found that the absence of effective leadership and management systems at the AU Commission had resulted in poor supervision and low morale among staff, while inefficiencies in recruitment processes had left the Commission heavily under-staffed.76

76 See Audit of the African Union.
South Africa is the dominant economic force in the Southern African Development Community (accounting for 60 percent of its economy), is the third largest economy in Africa in 2016 after Nigeria and Egypt, and plays an important role on both the continental and global stages.  

The country has twice served as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, in 2007–2008 and 2011–2012. Tshwane (Pretoria) is also the only African member of both the Group of 20 (G-20) major economies and the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), and is the only African country that has a strategic partnership with the EU in Africa. South Africa has generally sought rhetorically to use these platforms to promote Africa’s voice while pursuing its own more parochial interests.

Tshwane has adopted a multilateral approach that places Africa at the centre of its foreign policy agenda. South Africa has pursued the establishment of appropriate continental mechanisms in order to foster a common public good in Africa and in pursuit of its own national interests. In 1992, the African National Congress (ANC) crafted a foreign policy that sought to reintegrate South Africa into the international community and rebuild the country’s diplomatic capacity. The policy also sought to promote the pursuit of peace and regional cooperation. In 1994, the ANC emphasised the need to “reflect the interests of the continent of Africa”. South Africa joined the OAU in May 1994. Building on the ruling ANC’s solidarity with other liberation movements on the continent, Tshwane sought to create a new platform from which it could engage the industrialised North more effectively.

Under the administration of Thabo Mbeki from 1999, foreign policy was increasingly shaped by the “African Agenda”, which prioritised democratic governance, peace and security, and accelerated economic growth as the building blocks of continental development. A stand-alone multilateral departmental branch was established in the then Department of Foreign Affairs – now the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). Mbeki helped to foster South Africa’s strong commitment to multilateralism. During this period, Tshwane played a key role in transforming the OAU into the African Union between 1999 and 2002, and in enshrining a right for the organisation to intervene against military coups and in cases of egregious human rights abuses in its 2000 Constitutive Act. South Africa also became the first country to host the newly created African Union in its port city of Durban in 2002. The country further crafted the African Peer Review Mechanism and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. Tshwane’s support for the AU has also involved contributions of troops to its peacekeeping missions in Burundi (2003–2004) and Sudan’s Darfur region (2004–2007), in addition to hosting the AU Pan-African Parliament and the NEPAD and APRM secretariats.
South Africa’s then foreign minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, similarly adopted an activist role on the AU’s Executive Council during Mbeki’s presidency (1999–2008) in support of more effective multilateral mechanisms. At the same time, in a bid to strengthen the AU’s new institutions, Tshwane led the drive for African governments to pay their dues to the continental body. South Africa also took the lead in the AU’s promotion of Diaspora initiatives, hosting an African Diaspora summit in May 2012. South Africa subsequently played a key role in strengthening relations between the AU and the United Nations during its two two-year terms on the UN Security Council, in 2007–2008 and 2011–2012. Tshwane further sought to promote Africa’s political and developmental interests in its engagements with other multilateral fora including the Group of Eight (G-8), the G-20, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), the European Union, the Group of 77 (G-77) at the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Commonwealth, and more recently, the BRICS.

In recent years, South Africa has demonstrated its continental leadership aspirations by, among other things, successfully seeking re-election to the 15-member AU Peace and Security Council in January 2016. In addition, Tshwane championed the creation of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises from May 2013. However, under President Jacob Zuma, several South Africa-based AU institutions such as NEPAD, the APRM, and the Pan-African Parliament, closely associated with the Mbeki era, were neglected. Other perspectives, however, blame South Africa’s subsequent lack of interest in the Pan-African institutions and initiatives that it helped to create on the emergence of strong voices within the ruling ANC party who have questioned the wisdom of expending the country’s limited resources in pursuit of an Africa-focused foreign policy amid South Africa’s own continuing domestic socio-economic challenges. Thus, as the country has sought to address its domestic challenges of underdevelopment, poverty, and insecurity, fears have also increased that mercantilist approaches and parochial concerns have increasingly shaped its foreign policy towards Africa. Moreover, South Africa has been accused of stoking divisions within the continent through its involvement in conflict situations such as Côte d’Ivoire and the CAR in 2011 and 2013 respectively. In February 2016, Tshwane announced the withdrawal of its 850 peacekeepers from the African Union–United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and appears to be tiring of the dangerous SADC-led intervention brigade in eastern DRC, launched with Tanzania and Malawi in July 2013.

In furtherance of South Africa’s continental ambitions, Tshwane has increasingly sought to “deploy” its own officials within the AU in order to ensure better representation of its national interests and to promote its foreign policy goals. It controversially put forward the candidacy of its former foreign affairs minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, to contest the position of AU Commission Chair in January 2012, effectively breaking – according to critics – with the unwritten rule that no major African power should occupy this position. The election of Dlamini-Zuma

as Chair of the AU Commission in July 2012 was eventually supported by a majority of African countries. However, her nomination had been strongly opposed by Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Uganda, which interpreted the move as breaking with a tradition of solidarity that has historically promoted representation of African interests by the continent’s less powerful countries. Tshwane, on its part, argued that it was SADC’s turn. It recognised no unwritten rule against large states occupying the post, and noted that Dlamini-Zuma’s election formed part of a series of practical measures designed to boost the AU’s capacity and overcome a lack of political will among African governments in implementing important continental decisions. Some of these measures include: the North-South transport corridor linking Durban to Dar es Salaam, which has been promoted by president, Jacob Zuma; a drive to enhance the effectiveness of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) in Arusha, as well as the African Human Rights Commission in Banjul; rationalisation of the continental body’s administrative and human resources structures; and concrete support for regional economic communities like SADC and the EAC in realising their integration agendas. Other priorities identified by Dlamini-Zuma included increased emphasis on the priorities of women and vulnerable groups; a search for greater African funding to reduce dependence on external donors; and a strategy to coordinate with external actors such as China and the EU at the continental rather than bilateral level.

However, Dlamini-Zuma was not able to implement many of her programmes or initiatives because of her limited powers at the AU. She vacated the position of AU Chair in 2016 after serving only one four-year term. There were reports that Dlamini-Zuma’s exit from the AU was decided without proper consultations with leaders of SADC who had been instrumental in her election in July 2012. Some therefore believe that the AU had been used as a tool of South Africa’s foreign policy. Tshwane has also become increasingly uncomfortable with the idea of promoting democracy in Africa. There is a widespread perception that the country’s human rights–driven approach to foreign policy is no longer as prevalent as it was during the era of Nelson Mandela. South Africa has signed up to various human rights agreements, such as the July 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was ratified in November 2000 and incorporated into the country’s constitution in 2002. However, South Africa failed to arrest ICC-indictee, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir when he attended the AU Summit in Johannesburg in April 2015, though several AU members such as Kenya, Uganda, and Chad have also adopted an anti-ICC stance, arguing that the Court unfairly targets Africans.

A 2009 document published by South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation – a conceptual framework to identify anchor states in the five geographical regions recognised by the African Union – underscored the continued importance of the African continent to the country. The document outlined the efforts and commitment of the South African government to strengthen the continent’s capacity to address the challenges of conflict, poverty, and underdevelopment. South Africa remains the most

85 CCR, “Post-Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Policy After Two Decades”, pp. 28–29.
industrialised economy in Africa. With a GDP of $358 billion in 2015, South Africa, is, however still grappling with massive unemployment, unofficially estimated at 40 percent. Tshwane is also trying to remedy its poor migration policies inherited from the apartheid regime, which discriminated against migrants from other African countries. The country cannot lead an African Renaissance without a large domestic African constituency supporting it, a point that is underscored by recurrent xenophobic attacks against African migrants in South Africa that have killed more than 350 people since 2008.

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8. The AU’s Relations with the United Nations, the European Union, and China

One of the key objectives of the African Union is to create conditions for Africa to engage collectively with the outside world from a position of strength. The ambition and ideal at the founding of the AU in 2002 was that, given time, the organisation would speak on behalf of Africans on the global stage.

A decade and a half later, the AU has not been able to develop an influential voice in international affairs, let alone serve as a platform for a common African foreign policy and diplomacy. The AU’s relations with external actors have also been largely defined by its dependence on their financial and material largesse, and the marginalisation that comes with such dependence.

AU-UN Cooperation

Relations between the AU and the UN, in particular, have over the years reflected the weak international agency of the former. The AU and the UN, however, have a shared interest in mutual cooperation. About 60 percent of the peace and security issues with which the UN Security Council deals are in Africa, and although the Council has primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, it has also increasingly recognised the comparative advantage that the AU and Africa’s RECs bring to peacemaking efforts on the continent. For its part, the AU needs the financial and material backing, and sometimes the global legitimacy, of the UN to deal effectively with African conflicts. This has given rise to a partnership of necessity between the AU and the UN that has sometimes been criticised as “burden-shedding” by the UN rather than genuine “burden-sharing”.

The world body has played a role in the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture, including the creation of a 10-year capacity-building programme to benefit AU-linked institutions, though the latter never received a budget and was implemented on an ad hoc basis. UN peacekeeping interventions have taken place on the African continent since the end of the Cold War. In the 2015–2016 financial year, the nine UN-deployed missions in Africa (out of 16 globally) cost $6 billion (about 82 percent of all missions). There were 101,270 UN peacekeepers deployed in these nine missions in Africa in April 2016 (about 86 percent of all UN peacekeepers deployed globally). In addition to efforts aimed at strengthening cooperation between the 15-member UN Security Council and the 15-member AU Peace and Security Council, three important mechanisms have since been developed to enhance the partnership between the AU and the UN at the working level: the establishment of a UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in Addis Ababa in July 2010; a commitment to undertake “collaborative field missions” to enhance synergy in monitoring, assessing, and

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responding to peace and security issues in Africa; and the creation of a UN-AU Joint Task Force on Peace and Security. Moreover, since 2007, the UN Security Council has held annual meetings with the PSC, although the United States, in a bid to prevent a dilution of the UN Security Council’s authority, has emphasised that these meetings should not be construed as strategic engagements between two equal councils.92

Notwithstanding these mechanisms, relations between the AU and the UN have for the most part been characterised by deep tensions. Many African leaders complain that the Security Council sometimes treats AU initiatives with contempt, while the three Western veto-wielding permanent members of the Council – the US, Britain, and France – continue to draft about 80 percent of resolutions on Africa and have often decried the AU’s lack of unity and decisiveness on the UN’s most powerful body. Other factors that have bedevilled AU-UN relations include: the absence of a strong unified AU voice in New York; the difficult relationship between AU Commission Chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon; divergent views held by the AU and UN on peace operations; and the thorny issue of the International Criminal Court.93

Since 2007, there have been various initiatives to strengthen cooperation and coordination between the AU and the UN in the area of peace and security, including the establishment of a joint UN-AU framework for an enhanced peace and security partnership. However, the AU and the UN have struggled to find common ground on sharing the burden for maintaining peace and security in Africa. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations in October 2014 to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the state of UN operations in light of emerging challenges and needs. The AU contributed to this process through a Common African Position on the review of UN peace operations adopted by the AU Peace and Security Council in April 2015. The Common African Position identified five key principles that should underpin relations between the AU and the UN in efforts to maintain peace and security on the continent: promotion of collective security in the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; support for African ownership and priority-setting; fostering a partnership on the basis of consultative decision-making, division of labour, and burden-sharing; mutual respect and adherence to the principle of comparative advantage; and establishment of a division of labour underpinned by the concept of complementarity.94 In addition to calling for improved strategic and operational partnership between the AU and the UN in efforts to promote peace and security, the document also called for greater UN support to AU-led peace operations, including the use of UN-assessed contributions to support peacekeeping missions deployed by the AU. The June 2015 report of the high-level panel incorporated a number of the recommendations contained in the Common African Position, including the need for stronger UN-AU strategic partnership guided by a division of labour based on consultative decision-making, comparative advantages, accountability, transparency, and respect for international standards. The document further recommended the use of UN-assessed contributions to support AU peace operations on a case-by-case basis.95

94 UN report, “Uniting Our Strengths For Peace: Politics, Partnership and People”.
95 UN report, “Uniting Our Strengths For Peace: Politics, Partnership and People”.

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In its search for more sustained, predictable, and flexible sources of funding, the AU adopted a decision in January 2015 to enhance ownership of its budget by financing 100 percent of its operating cost, 75 percent of its programmes, and 25 percent of its peace and security budget. The implementation of this decision, which is also aimed at reducing the AU’s financial dependence on external actors, is expected to be phased in incrementally over a five-year period. Under this proposal, 75 percent of the AU’s peacekeeping budget would be paid from the UN’s assessed contributions. In January 2016, the AU appointed the former president of the African Development Bank (AfDB), Rwanda’s Donald Kaberuka, as the High Representative for the African Union Peace Fund, with a mandate to mobilise additional resources for the continental organisation’s peace and security activities. Kaberuka’s mandate also included lobbying the UN to agree to contribute 75 percent of the cost for peacekeeping missions deployed by the AU. Convincing the UN Security Council to acquiesce to the AU’s request may, however, prove to be difficult. The Security Council may consider contributing 75 percent of the AU’s peace operations on a case-by-case basis as recommended by the High-Level Panel on the Review of Peace Operations, and on the condition that AU member states are able to contribute their 25 percent of the budget before making any request to the UN. Any eventual decision to finance the African Union’s peacekeeping operations from the UN’s assessed contributions would also require the AU Commission to strengthen its administrative and financial management capacity.

AU-EU Cooperation

Relations between the African Union and the European Union, based on the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), have been the most durable between the AU and an external actor. The JAES aims not only to streamline Brussels’s engagement with the continent, but also to move it beyond development aid and Africa-focused issues to include political dialogue and cooperation in areas of mutual interest and concern, as well as on global challenges. Beside other political, economic, and geo-strategic interests, the EU needs a strong continental organisation to deal with African issues. On the African side, partnership with Brussels not only raises the AU’s profile, but also provides resources for advancing its security and development goals.

The evolving relationship between the AU and the EU has over the years lent itself to two dominant interpretations. On the one hand is the optimistic view that recognises obstacles in AU-EU relations but views the relationship as a work in progress and a pioneering experience in inter-regional cooperation. This perspective is largely informed by the EU’s financial and technical support to Africa through programmes such as the African Peace Facility (APF), the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF), and the African Union Support Programme (AUSP). Through the African Peace Facility established in December 2003, the EU has provided a total of €865.5 million to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Brussels had also contributed, by 2016, a total of more than €13 billion to support the AU’s peace and security agenda through

99 Conrad Rein, “EU-AU Interregional Relations and the Role of the UN”, Itiṣṣiyi I, no. 4, June 2015, pp. 1-5.
the APF. The EU has further provided peacekeepers to African conflicts, having deployed troops to the DRC (2003 and 2006), Chad (2008–2009), and the Central African Republic (2014–2015). Moreover, the European Union has spent €55 million on supporting the institutional reform process of the AU Commission, in addition to awarding over 80 grants for infrastructure projects in Africa worth over €6.5 billion. On the other hand, a fairly pessimistic view argues that the rhetorical commitments emanating from political dialogue between AU and EU leaders are rarely matched by effective implementation, and that Brussels is little more than the AU’s most prominent paymaster. The EU’s perceived imposition of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) on African countries also poisoned AU-EU relations.

A trilateral partnership among the AU, the UN, and the EU has emerged with the objective of promoting peace and security in Africa. Based on a September 2003 joint declaration on UN-EU cooperation in crisis management, New York and Brussels agreed to set up a joint consultative mechanism to facilitate cooperation in planning, training, communication, and sharing of “best practices” on peacekeeping operations in Africa. Both organisations have cooperated in the CAR, Chad, the DRC, and Mali, though the results have been mixed. The AU’s trilateral partnership with the UN and the EU is still characterised by a number of contentious issues. There have been tensions between the AU and the UN due to the reluctance of the veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council, including two EU member states – France and Britain – to agree to a meaningful reform of the body.

The AU-China Partnership

Finally, the AU’s relationship with China has also demonstrated signs of dependence, accompanied by a rhetoric of partnership. However, unlike the relationship between Africa and the EU, the relationship between China and Africa has been built around a historical solidarity. This solidarity was formalised in the relationship between the Group of 77 and China at the UN, which has evolved since the 1960s from an ideologically driven friendship into a more practical partnership. There is a convergence of interests between China and Africa. Beijing – which has become Africa’s largest trade partner worth $300 billion in 2015 and has invested in, and bought, its raw materials and minerals – seeks to enhance its global status. This has also coincided with Africa’s need for infrastructure, industrialisation, and regional integration. In addition to financing the construction of a new AU headquarters inaugurated in January 2012, China has become an important player in peace and security efforts in Africa due in part to the need to protect its growing investments on the continent. Beijing has increasingly supported AU peace operations, financially and materially. Almost 90 percent of Chinese peacekeepers in UN missions are deployed in Africa: Beijing had 2,622 peacekeepers in seven UN missions on the continent in June 2016, in the DRC, Sudan’s Darfur region, Mali, South Sudan, Liberia, Western Sahara, and Côte d’Ivoire.

100 European Commission, “Key Facts”.
101 Rein, “EU-AU Interregional Relations”, p. 2.
Bilateral trade between Africa and China rose from $10.6 billion in 2000 to $91.2 billion in 2009, and more recently in 2015 to nearly $300 billion. Beijing accounts for about 20 percent of imports to sub-Saharan Africa and about 15 percent of the region’s exports. However, with the contraction of China’s economy by 2016, the share of Africa’s exports to the Asian giant has started to decline, while the growth of Chinese exports into the continent continues to increase.\textsuperscript{104} China has also expressed its support for Africa’s development and integration aspirations, as embodied in the AU’s Agenda 2063. In 2006, Beijing provided $625 million in support of NEPAD’s Pan-African Infrastructural Development Fund (PAIDF), and eight years later, established a $2 billion multilateral fund, which will be co-financed by the People’s Bank of China and the African Development Bank, to support development projects on the continent.\textsuperscript{105} The Chinese government also signed a memorandum of understanding with the AU Commission in January 2015 that commits Beijing to supporting the AU’s infrastructure development and industrialisation efforts.\textsuperscript{106}

China’s expanding support for the AU is not merely an act of benevolence. Successful integration in Africa is good for growing Chinese investments on the continent. As the example of Sudan and South Sudan illustrates, Beijing also has an economic interest in a peaceful and stable Africa. Significantly, China’s cooperation with the AU has evolved alongside its bilateral relations with individual African countries, which have sometimes been criticised for destroying textile industries and using over 70,000 Chinese workers on projects rather than employing Africa labour. Furthermore, China’s partnership with Africa has been affected by issues such as the environmental degradation caused by its companies and the fact that Beijing prefers to engage with individual African governments rather than the AU as a whole.\textsuperscript{107} Given that many African governments lack the capacity to negotiate with China from a position of strength, Beijing’s predisposition for bilateral cooperation in Africa could negatively impact the continent’s long-term development. The establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000 could potentially provide an opportunity for Africa to engage with Beijing on a multilateral basis.

China established FOCAC as a platform for collective consultation and dialogue. The AU’s improved relationship with Beijing is reflected in the increased role that the continental organisation has assumed in FOCAC, having moved from an observer to a full participating member in October 2011.\textsuperscript{108} At the December 2015 FOCAC summit held in Johannesburg, the Chinese government pledged $60 billion to assist the development of African countries in 10 priority areas, including infrastructure development, upgrading of health-care facilities, supporting drought-stricken countries, and providing scholarships for African students. The summit further adopted the Johannesburg Action Plan, which is expected to be implemented between 2016 and 2018 and will seek to deepen political, economic, social, security, and diplomatic relations between Beijing and Africa. China’s evolving partnership with Africa should also be seen in the wider context of the BRICS grouping. Closer


\textsuperscript{106} “AU, China Agree Big Infrastructure Deal”, News 24, 27 January 2015 (available at www.news24.com).


diplomatic ties between Africa and China, which is the dominant player in the BRICS, could benefit the continent’s development efforts. For example, the New Development Bank, launched by the BRICS in July 2015, could become a potential source of much-needed investment for Africa’s infrastructure development needs.109

However, the inability of African states, under the auspices of the AU, to forge a consensus on, and develop a common strategy for, engaging with China continues to undermine the emergence of a strong multilateral framework for Sino-African cooperation. The AU and its member states have not invested as much as China has done on its part, in understanding Beijing’s strategy in Africa and developing the technical capacity to engage effectively with China to promote African interests. As such, one of the challenges facing this partnership is that the AU does not seem to have a long-term strategic plan to engage with China, a problem compounded by the fact that the continental body’s coordination mechanisms remain weak.

109 CCR, “South Africa and the BRICS".
Policy Recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the Cape Town policy seminar:

1. The AU Commission should engage more strategically with African civil society, think tanks, the private sector, and the philanthropic sector in order to implement its mandate more effectively. There is an urgent need to revisit Adebayo Adedeji’s 2007 five-year review of the AU Commission in order to implement its main findings on reforming the AU’s institutions and accelerating regional integration and economic development efforts in Africa. Key parts of the 2013 Olusegun Obasanjo Report on alternative sources of funding for the AU should also be implemented to ensure a sustainable source of future financing.

2. There is an urgent need to sanction non-performing AU staff members and to implement results-based management at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. Recruitment, retention, and training of personnel should be greatly improved. There is also a need for better coordination between the AU’s Department of Political Affairs and its Peace and Security Department. The AU Commission must further strengthen its administrative and financial management capacity to be able to absorb and manage donor funds.

3. The AU’s continental early warning system needs greater coordination with the mechanisms of sub-regional bodies such as IGAD, ECOWAS, and SADC. Furthermore, African leaders must provide greater financial and political support to the APRM, strengthening its capacity and restoring its previous consistent funding.

4. There is an urgent need to create institutionalised mechanisms for regular consultation and coordination between the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the organs of the RECs; this must include the increased participation of civil society and parliaments in decision-making to promote greater synergy and complementarity between the policies and initiatives of the AU and the RECs in this area.

5. Regional integration in Africa should take into account the configuration of interests in member states, and put in place mechanisms to compensate groups that may lose out from integration. There is an urgent need to cultivate a national entrepreneurial class to drive socio-economic development across Africa. The continent also needs more “Afrocrats” – young, highly competent officials with a strong commitment to Pan-Africanism, similar to many of the EU’s “Eurocrats”.

6. The AU needs to rationalise relations between the RECs and the African Economic Community in light of the multiple membership of the former. It might also be necessary to create a smaller grouping of African states in which conditions for entry involve sound economic and political performance, resulting in greater aid and investment for its members.

7. In line with the Common African Position devised by the AU, five key principles should underpin relations between the AU and the UN: promotion of collective security in the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; support for African ownership and priority-setting; fostering a partnership on the basis of consultative decision-making, division of labour, and burden-sharing; mutual respect and adherence to the principle of comparative advantage; and establishment of a division of labour underpinned by the concept of complementarity.
8. By 2016, the EU had contributed over €1.3 billion to support the AU’s peace and security agenda. The EU-UN joint consultative mechanism must, however, be made more effective in order to facilitate cooperation between both organisations in planning, training, communication, and sharing “best practices” in African peace operations, while fostering trilateral cooperation with the AU.

9. The AU and its member states must invest in understanding China’s strategy in Africa and developing the technical capacity to engage effectively with Beijing in order to promote African interests more effectively; the AU should also develop the capacity to coordinate Africa’s interests in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

10. Finally, Africa should learn lessons from how the Israel lobby has influenced policy in the United States Congress. The tens of thousands of highly educated Africans in America must be mobilised to build a viable constituency for Africa. There is also an urgent need for the AU to develop programmes that build new bridges between Africa and its Diaspora, while also devising strategies to tap into the large African population of 169 million in the Diaspora for investment and development. The AU should thus develop a Diaspora strategy that looks beyond remittances to harness the expertise of the Diaspora to address the skills gap in Africa, especially in the area of science and technology.
Annex I

Agenda

Day One:  Wednesday, 27 April 2016

15:00 – 15:45 Welcome Cocktail and Registration

15:45 – 17:00 Book Launch: *Thabo Mbeki: The Rise and Fall of Africa’s Philosopher-King*, by Adekeye Adebajo
Venue: Summerhouse 3, Conference Centre, Vineyard Hotel

Chair: Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg, South Africa

Speaker: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town

Discussant: Professor Chris Landsberg, South African Research (SARChI) Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Senior Associate, School of Leadership, University of Johannesburg (UJ), South Africa

17:00 – 17:30 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

17:30 – 19:00 Session I: South Africa and the African Union

Chair: Ms Felleng Sekha, Managing Partner, IQS Strategic Public Affairs Consulting, Cape Town

Professor Chris Landsberg, South African Research Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Senior Associate, School of Leadership, University of Johannesburg

Dr David Monyae, Co-Director, University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute (UJCI)

19:30 Welcome Dinner
Day Two: Thursday, 28 April 2016

09:00 – 10:30 Session II: Pan-Africanism and the African Diaspora: From the OAU to the AU

Chair: Ambassador Adonia Ayebare, Senior Adviser, Peacebuilding and Development, Permanent Observer Mission of the AU to the United Nations (UN), New York, United States (US)

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Professor Pearl Robinson, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Tufts University, Massachusetts, United States

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee Break

10:45 – 12:15 Session III: The AU’s Peace and Security Architecture

Chair: Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg

Ambassador Rodney Kiwa, Head of the AU Liaison Office to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Gaborone, Botswana

Ambassador Adonia Ayebare, Senior Adviser, Peacebuilding and Development, Permanent Observer Mission of the AU to the United Nations, New York

12:15 – 13:30 Group Photo followed by Lunch

13:30 – 15:00 Session IV: The AU Commission

Chair: Dr Wolff-Christian Peters, Programme Manager, SADC Peace, Security, and Good Governance Programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Gaborone

Dr Hespahina Rukato, Director, Centre for African Development Solutions (CADS), Johannesburg; and Former Deputy Chief of Staff at the Bureau of the AU Commission Chair

Ambassador Olusegun Akinsanya, Former Ambassador of Nigeria to the African Union
15:00 – 15:15 Coffee Break

15:15 – 16:45 Session V: The AU’S Governance Challenges

Chair: Mr Pierre Frühling, Counsellor and Senior Programme Manager, Anti-Corruption and Democratic Governance, Regional Development Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden, Addis Ababa


Dr Khabele Matlosa, Director, Department of Political Affairs, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa

17:00 Participants were transported from the hotel to the Centre for the Book, Cape Town


Venue: Centre for the Book, 62 Queen Victoria Street, Cape Town

Chair: Professor Said Adejumobi, Director, Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Lusaka, Zambia

Speaker: Mr Charles Mutasa, Independent Development Policy Consultant, Harare, Zimbabwe

Discussant: Professor Thandika Mkandawire, Professor of African Development, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), England; and Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice, University of Cape Town (UCT)

19:00 Participants were transported back from the Centre for the Book to the hotel for dinner
Day Three: Friday, 29 April 2016

09:30 – 11:00  Session VI: The AU’s Socio-Economic Challenges

Chair:  Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Member of the Friends of the African Union Panel of the Wise

Professor Said Adejumobi, Director, Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Lusaka

Professor Thandika Mkandawire, Professor of African Development, London School of Economics and Political Science; and Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice, University of Cape Town

11:00 – 11:15  Coffee Break

11:15 – 12:45 Session VII: The AU And Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

Chair:  Ambassador Adonia Ayebare, Senior Adviser, Peacebuilding and Development, Permanent Observer Mission of the AU to the United Nations, New York

Ambassador Martin Uhomoibhi, Head of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID); and Former Deputy Ambassador of Nigeria to the African Union

Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town;

Dr Fritz Nganje, Research Consultant, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; and Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, South African Research Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg

12:45 – 13:45 Lunch

13:45 – 15:15  Session VIII: The AU, the United Nations, the European Union (EU); and China

Chair:  Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Professor Ulf Engel, Professor for Global Studies, Institute for African Studies, University of Leipzig, Germany

Dr David Monyae, Co-Director, University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute (UJCI)
15:15 – 15:45  Coffee Break and Completing Evaluation Forms

15:45 – 16:45  Session IX: Rapporteurs’ Report and the Way Forward

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Fritz Nganje, Research Consultant, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; and Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, South African Research Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg
Annex II

List of Participants

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2. Professor Said Adejumobi  
   Director  
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3. Ambassador Olusegun Akinsanya  
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4. Ambassador Adonia Ayebare  
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   African Union Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations (UN)  
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   United States

5. Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse  
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   Ghana

6. Professor Ulf Engel  
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   Counsellor  
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   Team Leader  
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Founder of Africa Women’s Forum  
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15. Professor Chris Landsberg  
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   Gaborone

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   Medford
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   Harare

29. Ms Felleng Sekha
   Managing Partner
   IQS Strategic Public Affairs Consulting
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   Cape Town

30. Ambassador Martin Uhomoibhi
    Head of the African Union/United Nations
    Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
    El Fasher
    Sudan

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3. Ms Akhona Njanya
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Annex III

List of Acronyms

ACIRC African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
ACJHR African Court of Justice and Human Rights
AEC African Economic Community
AIDB African Development Bank
AGA African Governance Architecture
AGRF African Green Revolution Forum
AITF EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU Arab Maghreb Union
ANC African National Congress
APF African Peace Facility
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF African Standby Force
AU African Union
AUSP African Union Support Programme
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa bloc
CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CAR Central African Republic
CBC Congressional Black Caucus
CCR Centre for Conflict Resolution
CEN-SAD Sahelo-Saharian States
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CEWS continental early warning system
CIDO Citizens and Diaspora Organisations Directorate
CODESRIA Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSSDCA Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (AU)
DIRCO Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)
DPA Department of Political Affairs (AU)
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC East African Community
ECA UN Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EPAs economic partnership agreements (EU)
EU European Union
FAL Final Act of Lagos
FES Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>G-20</td>
<td>Group of 20 major economies</td>
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<td>G-77</td>
<td>Group of 77</td>
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<td>G-8</td>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
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<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint Africa-EU Strategy</td>
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<td>LAPSSET</td>
<td>Lamu Port Southern Sudan–Ethiopia Transport</td>
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<td>Lagos Plan of Action</td>
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<td>Millennium Development Goals (UN)</td>
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<td>MIP</td>
<td>Minimum Integration Programme (AU)</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (SADC)</td>
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<td>PAIDF</td>
<td>Pan-African Infrastructural Development Fund (NEPAD)</td>
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<td>PanWise</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan-African Parliament</td>
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<td>PIDA</td>
<td>Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (AU)</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>Permanent Representatives Committee (AU)</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
<td>regional economic communities</td>
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<td>Tokyo International Conference on African Development</td>
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<td>UN Office to the African Union</td>
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VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA
This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA
BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE
This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.

VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN A NEW SUDAN
This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION
This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AFRICA
This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS MEDIATION EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA
This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of “prosecution versus amnesty” for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.

The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.

The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.

The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.

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This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military cooperation, and migration.

**Volume 26**

**Eurafricque?**

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military cooperation, and migration.

**Volume 27**

**Security and Development in Southern Africa**

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

**Volume 28**

**HIV/AIDS and Militaries in Africa**

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006), Cairo, Egypt (September 2007), and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

**Volume 29**

**Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in Southern Africa**

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.
This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition - the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help to ‘reset’ the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa’s region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012, considered Africa and South Africa’s performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council; the politics and reform of the Security Council; the impact of the African Group at the UN; and the performance of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013, considered the progress being made by the African Union (AU) and African regional economic communities (RECs) in managing conflicts and operationalising the continent’s peace and security architecture; and the roles of key external actors in these efforts.

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 July 2013, reviewed post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy after two decades, and explored the potential leadership role that the country can play in promoting peace and security, as well as regional integration and development in Africa.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 17 to 18 February 2014 assessed the principles underpinning international investment agreements, including bilateral investment treaties (BITS), and the implications of these instruments for socio-economic development efforts in South Africa and the rest of the continent.
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 April 2014, considered the challenges and potential of Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) in promoting region-building and regional integration on the continent, including through a comparative assessment of experiences in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region

This policy advisory group seminar held in Franschhoek, Western Cape, from 9 to 10 May 2015, assessed the obstacles to peace, security, and governance in the Great Lakes region. The report discusses the ongoing political crises in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and provides policy recommendations crafted at the seminar.

South Africa and the BRICS: Progress, Problems, and Prospects

This policy advisory group seminar held in Tshwane, South Africa, from 30 to 31 August 2014, assessed the potential for increasing the impact of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) Grouping on global politics, and to develop concrete recommendations in support of South Africa’s continuing engagement with the bloc.

Region-Building and Peacebuilding in Southern Africa

This policy advisory group seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana, from 19 to 20 September 2015, assessed key issues on region-building and peacebuilding in Southern Africa, while analysing South Africa’s leadership role in the sub-region.
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This policy research seminar was held in Cape Town, from 27 to 29 April 2016 and convened about 30 prominent African, Asian, and Western policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors to reflect critically on the historical mission, progress, problems, and prospects of the African Union (AU) in a changing regional and global environment. The seminar considered seven key objectives: first, to review the performance of the AU 14 years after its creation, against the backdrop of its historical mission to achieve continental integration; second, to identify and elucidate the current regional and global dynamics that impact on the agency of the AU; third, to assess the effectiveness of the AU’s security and governance architectures; fourth, to explore ways in which the Addis Ababa-based AU Commission can be capacitated to drive the agenda of the Union more effectively; fifth, to develop concrete ideas for building viable regional organisations and strengthening the relationship between the AU and Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs); sixth, to make proposals on how to encourage South Africa and other regional leaders such as Nigeria and Algeria to become institutional champions in the interest of an effective AU; and finally, to identify the catalysts for more constructive partnerships between the AU and its external partners, including the African Diaspora.