REGION-BUILDING AND PEACEBUILDING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements, About the Organisers, and Rapporteurs  

Executive Summary  

Introduction  

1. Strengthening Southern Africa’s Security Architecture  

2. SADC: Obstacles to Regional Integration  

3. Governance, the Role of Civil Society, and the SADC Parliamentary Forum  

4. Strengthening the SADC Secretariat  

5. Trade and Development  

6. South Africa’s Leadership Role in Southern Africa  

7. The Role of External Actors: UNECA and the EU  

Policy Recommendations  

Annexes  

I. Agenda  

II. List of Participants  

III. List of Acronyms

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About the Organisers

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa; region-building and regional integration on the continent; relations between Africa and the European Union (EU); achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa; and South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is a German private non-profit organisation committed to the principles and values of social democracy. Today, FES supports education, research, and international cooperation from its head offices in Bonn and Berlin, as well as through its offices in more than 90 countries. The foundation has a Regional Project in Southern Africa that prioritises regional security policy cooperation within the framework of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Once a year, FES organises the Maputo Dialogue, a regional forum on regional security policies. In addition, other regional projects deal with press freedom in Southern Africa, as well as social justice, trade union cooperation, and the promotion of democracy, elections, and cooperation among ruling political parties in Southern Africa.

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) office in Gaborone, Botswana, hosted a two-day policy advisory group seminar in Gaborone, from 19 to 20 September 2015, on “Region-Building and Peacebuilding in Southern Africa”.

The Botswana seminar assessed key issues on region-building and peacebuilding in Southern Africa, while analysing South Africa’s leadership role in the sub-region. The seminar was convened with about 30 mostly African policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors. Senior officials participated from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and from the SADC region and donor governments.

1. Strengthening Southern Africa’s Security Architecture

In November 2012, SADC’s Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) launched its new peace and security structure – a five-year plan to implement its Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) II. The plan was expanded from four sectors in SIPO I (politics, defence, state security, and public security) to five in SIPO II with the separation of the police sector from the public sector, in which it had previously been incorporated. In order to strengthen Southern Africa’s peacekeeping capacity, training for the SADC brigade is being organised through its Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO), both based in Zimbabwe. This support has led to some progress in the operations of the RPTC and its future expansion plans will require that it increases its human resources and curriculum development.

Although SADC states – South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi – led a 3,000-strong intervention into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in March 2013, the organisation still lacks the necessary resources and technical expertise to undertake comprehensive peacebuilding on its own. SADC will have to devise effective, locally-driven strategies with key international actors such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank to ensure that the root causes of conflicts are tackled timeously, and that fragile countries do not slide back into conflict in the future as a result of ineffective peacebuilding.

2. SADC: Obstacles to Regional Integration

The change from the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) in 1980 to SADC in 1992 was influenced by both regional and international forces. Although SADC has since made progress in formulating a regional industrial development strategy, the organisation is still confronted with the task of implementing it and achieving coherence in the industrial policies of its individual member states. The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), adopted in 2003, is SADC’s blueprint for deepening regional integration in Southern Africa. The plan provides a broad strategy for implementing the organisation’s policies over a 15-year timeframe (2005-2020). Two RISDP reviews have been undertaken to date. The first was a desk assessment conducted by the Botswana-based SADC secretariat reviewing implementation from 2005 to 2010. This was followed by an external mid-term review between 2012 and 2013, culminating in a proposed revised RISDP from 2015 to 2020.
The RISDP reviews between 2005 and 2013 noted that the link between member states and the SADC secretariat was weak. Not all member states had established national committees, and those that had, had not equipped them with the capacity to fulfil their mandate. As of 2013, of the 15 SADC member states, functional SNCs existed in only four countries – Angola, Mauritius, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

Implementation of regional integration decisions often takes place at the national level through key ministries. Issues of industrialisation, beneficiation, and value addition have not been effectively addressed by SADC. Limited regional integration has thus occurred in Southern Africa, with intra-regional trade being less than 20 percent. SADC also needs greater community outreach projects to ensure that its work reaches the grassroots and is not just elite-driven.

3. Governance, the Role of Civil Society, and the SADC Parliamentary Forum

In the past two and a half decades, Southern Africa has experienced a wave of political change, moving from protracted civil war and colonial or authoritarian rule towards peace and more democratic modes of governance characterised by political pluralism, openness, and the holding of regular elections. This growth of more democratic rule has formed part of the “third wave” of democratisation, which accelerated in Africa with the end of the Cold War by 1990.

Though often weak and poorly organised, civil society in Southern Africa has grown increasingly vocal, and a critical media has emerged in many parts of the sub-region. Democratic institutions such as parliaments, electoral bodies, and judiciaries, too, have become more assertive in challenging domestic abuses of power. Local communities can be empowered through decentralisation to respond to the immediate needs of voters. Created in 1997, the SADC Parliamentary Forum has long played only an advisory role in the sub-region. There is some support for transforming the forum into a full-fledged regional parliament. However, this idea has not yet been embraced by all SADC members.

4. Strengthening the SADC Secretariat

SADC’s Executive Secretary, Tanzania’s Stergomena Lawrence Tax, oversees the secretariat and also directly manages the directorate of the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, as well as four units: gender, internal audit, macroeconomic convergence surveillance, and public relations. There are two deputy executive secretaries, South African, Thembinkosi Mhlongo, focuses on regional integration; while Congolese, Emilie Mushobekwa, oversees finance and administration. As currently constituted, SADC’s secretariat is detached from its 15 member states, and has a difficult relationship with the organisation’s external donors. The secretariat also suffers from human and financial resource constraints; weak internal controls and management systems; ineffective monitoring and evaluation systems; as well as a lack of strong oversight structures. Over the past two and a half decades, SADC has adopted over 40 protocols and declarations to harmonise policies and legislation.
5. Trade and Development

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference, created in 1980, was built on the basis of a decolonisation-driven regionalist project against apartheid South Africa. In 1992, SADCC reconstituted itself into SADC. At both national and regional levels, regional integration requires synergy to succeed, and therefore the organisation should consider how to align its integrationist aims with those of SACU, whose five members—South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland—all belong to SADC.

Several SACU members have complained that South Africa has obstructed their industrialisation ambitions, and dumped cheaper goods on their markets. In contrast, some South African officials have argued that the other four SACU member states continue to benefit disproportionately from the agreement. In 2014, SACU’s exports were 18.6 percent of total trade. A revised 2002 SACU agreement has encountered further challenges, with parallel processes of the organisation’s trade-in-services agreement competing with SADC’s free trade area. SADC has basically failed to diversify its manufacturing base, with 98 percent of trade in the sub-region concentrated in four broad sectors: unprocessed agricultural goods; food manufactures; textiles; and clothing.

6. South Africa’s Leadership Role in Southern Africa

South Africa, which accounts for about 60 percent of Southern Africa’s economy, was invited to join SADC in 1994. It has since contributed to peacemaking efforts in Lesotho, the DRC, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar. There were regional perceptions and fears that gains from regional integration would be uneven, with a powerful South Africa likely to benefit more from the integration process than other countries. Convergence among the economies of Southern Africa has remained slow, with South Africa seen by other SADC countries as a major threat to regional development given the oligopolistic behaviour of some of its multinational corporations (MNCs). South Africa has a corporate sector running parallel with its foreign policy, which has sometimes complicated regional integration efforts. The country can be characterised by three Ms. First, South Africa is seen as mercantilist in the economic arena, having reportedly obstructed the building of a cement factory in Namibia, and a vehicle assembly plant in Botswana. South Africa is also seen as a messiah that can potentially drive development and peacemaking in the sub-region. The country is finally viewed as a model for the sub-region, given its “soft power” attributes of educating Southern Africa’s elite at its universities and “exporting” South African popular culture abroad (such as through satellite television service DStv). South Africa has further provided sub-regional support for spatial development initiatives (SDIs) in the areas of energy, water, transport, and gas production.

6. The Role of External Actors: UNECA and the EU

The UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) has sought to promote more effective regional integration policies in Southern Africa. UNECA established a separate Sub-regional Development Centre for Southern Africa in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1997, which now serves SADC governments. The three key objectives of the office are: first, to generate ideas that can catalyse regional integration and cooperation through technical support that promotes collective approaches working with SADC, SACU, and COMESA; second, to facilitate networking and information exchange among the sub-region’s development partners; and third, to serve as a link between UNECA and its development partners by organising discussion fora and disseminating policy recommendations and technical publications produced by UNECA and other collaborators.
Another multilateral actor, the European Union (EU), is the world’s only supranational entity in which sovereignty is pooled. Brussels has had a long-standing relationship with SADC since 1980, and has been a major funder of regional integration efforts in Southern Africa over the past three and a half decades, contributing €206 million to regional integration and infrastructure. The EU has further identified South Africa as one of its 10 strategic partners globally. EU funding to SADC offers support to the SADC secretariat’s integration efforts. The partnership has also focused on poverty eradication. With up to 90 percent of regional trade volumes being transmitted by maritime transport, security is increasingly important to the facilitation of Europe’s trade in goods by sea. Brussels has thus provided €37.5 million to both SADC and COMESA to fight piracy in the Indian Ocean.

Policy Recommendations

The following 13 key policy recommendations emerged from the Gaborone policy advisory group seminar:

1. SADC needs to promote balanced and equitable development that has relevance to its 281 million citizens. The organisation must also return to implementation of community outreach projects. Member states must offer critical staff to improve the overall performance of implementation; monitoring and evaluation; and oversight; within the SADC secretariat. Such staff must be elite staff and not junior staff, and should educate their governments on the needs of regional integration on their return home.

2. SADC states need to develop a viable regional strategy for beneficiation, value addition, and industrialisation. The organisation should consider regional integration as a socio-economic priority, and incorporate factors of complementarity, inclusivity, and equality into its integration model. Creating conditions for the free exchange of goods is critical, rather than just declaring a free trade area into existence, as SADC did in 2008. Trade liberalisation and developmental regionalism also need to be more closely sequenced across Southern Africa.

3. A knowledge reference group should be established to integrate the main elements of SADC’s RISDP and SIPO. A National Security Policy framework is also needed across SADC countries to promote security sector governance and to integrate security sectors to ensure accountability and enhance confidence-building. A regional School of Diplomacy – such as Tanzania’s Centre for Foreign Relations – should be established to train SADC diplomats and other policymakers in order to pursue mutually beneficial sub-regional foreign policy goals.

4. SADC member states must fund their own peace and security programmes, and rely less on external donors who may have different priorities. A more equitable division of responsibility is required in regional peacekeeping to reduce dependence on South Africa. An effective division of labour must also be fostered between SADC, the AU, and the UN.

5. The research unit within the SADC secretariat needs to be strengthened to ensure effective policy planning, while the organisation should establish partnerships with centres of excellence and think tanks across the sub-region.
6. Coordination between the five directorates in the SADC secretariat needs urgent improvement, with the workload shared proportionately within the organisation. SADC should consider increasing its permanent staffing within the secretariat, aligning staffing more effectively with programming, and establishing proper reporting systems.

7. The SADC secretariat should participate actively in the activities of the SADC Parliamentary Forum which its members must be encouraged to transform into a sub-regional parliament. SADC should also devise a monitoring mechanism to measure progress in the implementation of its regional integration schemes. Sanctions must be imposed for non-compliance of SADC decisions.

8. SADC National Committees need to be reformulated to capacitate them in order to make them more relevant and effective. Political parties in SADC are in urgent need of internal democratisation, and also require accountability mechanisms in the areas of governance and funding.

9. Deepening of a democratic culture is required within SADC. Civil society activists should not adopt an instinctively confrontational approach towards national governments, and must find ways to cooperate with them, where appropriate. Decentralisation and strengthening of local governance is also essential to ensuring popular participation in governance and empowering local communities. SADC should develop a sense of regional identity and prioritise common values.

10. SACU members need to be capacitated to devise alternative domestic revenue streams, given their over-reliance on the organisation’s customs-generated income. SACU should create a regional development fund rather than just transferring money through a revenue distribution process. There is also an urgent need to bridge the disparity of development and production capacities among SACU’s members. Furthermore, a mechanism should be created for monitoring the implementation of agreements signed by sub-regional governments.

11. The South African government must develop a clear vision for regional integration, regulate the role of its corporate sector, and build domestic constituencies that promote regional integration in the sub-region. South Africa should use its strategic partnership with Angola to ensure a more effective SADC. Tshwane (Pretoria) must also be more active within SADC structures.

12. UNECA should share lessons from its monitoring system on regional integration with the SADC secretariat. It should help to harmonise the industrialisation plans of SADC and COMESA, which it is currently supporting separately. Southern Africa must also learn lessons from West African civil society engagement with ECOWAS in areas of early warning and governance.

13. The issue of migration – both within SADC and to Europe – needs urgent prioritisation. An evolving AU migration policy, which has adopted a developmental approach, could provide useful lessons. Obstacles to the free movement of people must also be removed if regional integration is to succeed. South Africa should subordiante its national interests to broader interests in areas such as immigration and industrialisation. South Africa and Lesotho should also consider establishing a future confederation, with South Africa removing border controls between the two countries.
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) office in Gaborone, Botswana, held a two-day policy advisory group seminar in Gaborone, from 19 to 20 September 2015, on “Region-Building and Peacebuilding in Southern Africa”. The potential and actual leadership role of South Africa in the sub-region was a major focus of the seminar.

CCR and FES co-organised six seminars on the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and state reconstruction in Zimbabwe, between 2005 and 2012. The Botswana meeting also built on the decade-long work of the Centre and the Foundation related to strengthening Southern Africa’s security and governance architecture, and promoting regional integration. The meeting was informed by CCR’s 2012 book Region-Building in Southern Africa, as well as by 11 policy seminars on governance and security issues in Southern Africa organised by the Centre in South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zambia between 2004 and 2014.

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung has a Regional Project in Southern Africa that places a special focus on regional security policy cooperation within the framework of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Once a year, FES organises the Maputo Dialogue, a regional forum on regional security policies. In addition, other regional projects deal with press freedom in Southern Africa, as well as social justice, trade union cooperation, and the promotion of democracy, elections, and cooperation among ruling political parties in Southern Africa.

The September 2015 Botswana seminar assessed key issues on region-building and peacebuilding in Southern Africa and provided an opportunity to examine the contemporary challenges of region-building and peacebuilding in Southern Africa, while analysing South Africa’s potential and actual leadership role in the sub-region. The meeting developed 13 concrete policy recommendations that can further contribute to these efforts. The Botswana policy advisory group seminar was convened with about 30 mostly African policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors. Senior officials attended from SADC, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), as well as key policymakers from the SADC region and donor governments. Over the two days, discussions centred on the following seven broad themes:

1. Strengthening Southern Africa’s Security Architecture
2. SADC: Obstacles to Regional Integration
3. Governance, the Role of Civil Society, and the SADC Parliamentary Forum
4. Strengthening the SADC secretariat

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Five key objectives of the September 2015 policy advisory group seminar informed the meeting’s debates and discussions:

1. To strengthen Southern Africa’s evolving security and governance architecture, as well as the important role of civil society in the sub-region;
2. To contribute to the policy development efforts of the South African and SADC governments, as well as to those of the SADC secretariat;
3. To assess critically efforts to promote region-building and peacebuilding in Southern Africa, and the specific roles of SADC, SACU, and the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Agreement;
4. To strengthen dialogue between South Africa and its neighbours in order to foster dialogue among SADC members about critical governance and security challenges in Southern Africa; and,
5. To explore strategies that can encourage SADC members to promote foreign policy goals consistent with human rights, peace and security, and democratic governance.

From left, Dr Thembinkosi Mthlongo, Deputy Executive Secretary for Regional Integration, Southern African Development Community (SADC) secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana; and Honourable Peter Katjavivi, Speaker of the National Assembly, Parliament of Namibia, Windhoek.
1. Strengthening Southern Africa’s Security Architecture

The basic structure of the Southern African Development Community’s security organ comprises the Chair, the Troika (three rotational heads of state on an annual basis), the Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO), the Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), and the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC).

SADC leaders mandated the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) to formulate a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) of 2001, which was to guide the implementation of its 2004 Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, as well as the 2003 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ also developed additional policy documents such as the Mutual Defence Pact, which was signed at the August 2003 SADC Summit. Crucially, however, SIPO did not have an implementation mechanism. It was signed in March 2004 with a life span of five years. A number of evaluation and review exercises were held between 2007 and 2009, and in August 2009 the Ministerial Committee of the Organ directed the SADC secretariat to finalise the second edition of SIPO by 2010. The revised SIPO was signed by SADC leaders in August 2010 in Maputo, Mozambique, and launched in Arusha, Tanzania, in November 2012. SIPO’s OPDSC launched its new peace and security structure – a five-year plan to implement SIPO II. The plan was expanded from four sectors in SIPO I (politics, defence, state security, and public security) to five in SIPO II with the separation of the police sector from the public sector, in which it had previously been incorporated.

In order to strengthen Southern Africa’s peacekeeping capacity, training for the SADC brigade is being organised through its Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO), both based in Harare, Zimbabwe. The SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, established in 1995 by the Zimbabwean government, was transformed into a key entity of the SADC Organ in 2005. The RPTC, in its infancy, was mainly funded by the British and Danish governments. Since being handed over to SADC in 2005, its member states have funded most of its operational costs. The German government has been the RPTC’s main International Cooperating Partner (ICP) since 2011, providing capacity-building and material support. While this support has led to some progress in the operations of the RPTC, its future expansion plans will require that it increases its human resources and curriculum development.

The RPTC falls under the Directorate of the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation. It provides training for peacekeeping practitioners on military, police, and civilian components; assists in implementing SADC peace support missions; plays a key role in the implementation of the SADC brigade; and builds capacity in conflict prevention and conflict management. The RPTC has trained over 3,000 military officers from SADC countries and has taken the lead on joint SADC peace support exercises such as Blue Hungwe, Blue Crane.
Tanzanite, and Airborne Africa. SADC has also reported some progress in developing an early warning system, though this system lags behind the security mechanisms developed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Southern Africa’s security architecture is confronted by three key obstacles. First is the failure of its member states to fulfil their responsibilities under the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation. SADC still lacks the necessary resources and technical expertise to undertake comprehensive peacebuilding on its own. The organisation will have to devise effective, locally-driven strategies with key international actors such as the UN and the World Bank to ensure that the root causes of conflicts are tackled timeously, and that fragile countries do not slide back into conflict in the future as a result of ineffective peacebuilding and state-building. Second, SADC members - South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi - deployed a 3,000-strong intervention force in March 2013 that was able, with the Congolese army, to rout the March 23 (M23) rebel group in November 2013. However, the intervention force was set up outside of the formal SADC brigade structure. There is an urgent need for a more equitable division of responsibility in regional peacekeeping efforts, with less dependence on South Africa. SADC, the AU, and the UN must also develop an effective division of labour. Finally, funding and coordination issues remain a priority for future peacekeeping interventions and should be urgently addressed.

SADC’s peacemaking interventions in Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Madagascar between 2002 and 2013, while demonstrating the sub-regional body’s commitment to stable constitutional governance, have also exposed the ad hoc nature of its peacemaking efforts and its lack of capacity to undertake effective and sustained post-conflict peacebuilding. The two cases of Zimbabwe and the DRC particularly underline the enormous challenges of reconstructing and rebuilding fragile states in which peace and stability remain under threat in the absence of sufficient financial support and political will.

Although the revised 2001 SADC Treaty provides for non-military powers of enforcement, such as sanctions, these have rarely been employed. Madagascar’s suspension from the organisation in 2009, following its unconstitutional change of government, was not accompanied by concrete sanctions to isolate the new regime other than its exclusion from the sub-regional body’s meetings. South Africa was instrumental in leading mediation efforts in the former French colony. However, the continuity of SADC’s peacemaking initiatives have sometimes been disrupted - as in the case of Madagascar - by the annual changes of membership in the Troika of its Organ and its associated committees. The South African–led SADC mediation team in Zimbabwe also encountered challenges to its authority in implementing a transitional roadmap. However, SADC leaders eventually supported South African mediation efforts, culminating in a new constitution and elections in July 2013 that saw President Robert Mugabe’s 23-year rule extended.

Further afield, Lesotho’s fractious political system continued to experience recurring incidences of post-election conflicts and tensions which have marred its transition to democracy. Under an agreement brokered by South Africa’s deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, the SADC facilitator, Lesotho’s election date was brought forward from May 2017 to February 2015, and the quarrelling security chiefs General Maaparankoe Mahao, Tlali Kamoli,
and Khothatso Tsooana relieved of their posts. After Pakalitha Mosisili was elected prime minister of Lesotho in March 2015,9 there were accusations of a vendetta against loyalists of ousted premier, Tom Thabane.10 A Double SADC Troika Extraordinary Summit meeting involving South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho, and Namibia was held in Tshwane (Pretoria) in July 2015 to deal with the increasing political violence in Lesotho following the brutal killing of General Mahao, the former commander of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) during the previous month.11 In August 2015, SADC called for an investigation of the killing and announced the creation of a political, security, and police oversight committee to monitor political instability in Lesotho.

Many details about the effective functioning of the SADC brigade remain unclear. SADC’s security architecture is part of the AU-led African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and is one of five regional economic communities (RECs) under the APSA. To date, ECOWAS appears to have surpassed SADC’s capabilities and preparedness levels, as evidenced by the ECOWAS missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau between 1990 and 2015. SADC’s mediation and early warning units are still in their infancy, with their effectiveness being impeded by a lack of trust and political will from member states.

Other challenges for SADC’s security architecture include a lack of capacity within its institutions; a failure to implement its own plans, activities, and strategies; poor coordination between its institutions; and slow progress on gender mainstreaming. Environmental issues should also be prioritised, given the threats to livelihoods that will ensue from climate change. Although a number of member states have reviewed their national security policies, Namibia remains the only country in the sub-region with a fully integrated national security policy. The other 14 SADC member states should thus be urged to draw up national security policies to enhance regional security cooperation. They could emulate the Namibian model in order to link the national security landscape across all member states and, like Namibia, include a monitoring and evaluation component to guide resource allocation. To further enhance regional security, diplomacy should be harnessed as a confidence-building tool. A sub-regional diplomatic school should also be developed in which diplomats from SADC member states are trained together, at the same time and place, with a common curriculum. This would enhance collective understanding and a shared normative outlook on sub-regional matters and priorities. The Tanzania-based Centre for Foreign Relations could provide a possible model in this regard.

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2. SADC: Obstacles to Regional Integration

Article 5 of the SADC Treaty of 1992 notes that complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes is key to achieving the regional integration objectives that SADC has set for its 15 member states and the sub-region’s 281 million citizens. These objectives include: sustainable development, economic growth, and poverty alleviation. The treaty further states that complementarity can be accomplished through harmonised planning, broad-based participation, appropriate institutional mechanisms, and requisite resources.

The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, adopted in 2003, is SADC’s blueprint for deepening regional integration in Southern Africa. The plan provides a broad strategy for implementing the organisation’s policies over a 15-year timeframe, from 2005 to 2020. It thus sets out priorities, policies, and strategies for achieving SADC’s long-term goals. The RISDP further seeks to ensure effective linkages and to enhance synergy among the following sectors in which the organisation works: trade, economic liberalisation, infrastructure development, sustainable food security, and human and social development. Furthermore, the RISDP prioritises cross-sectoral intervention areas including: poverty eradication; combating HIV/AIDS; gender mainstreaming; private sector development; science and technology; and the environment and sustainable development. In terms of the institutional framework for operationalising the RISDP, the SADC secretariat is responsible for the management and coordination of the plan, while at the political level the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) provides policy guidance and oversight. Among the main implementing structures of the strategic roadmap are the Botswana-based secretariat, technical committees, and SADC national committees (SNCs). The national committees and the secretariat are also responsible for monitoring implementation and coordination between SADC and its 15 member states. The RISDP requires these committees to provide regular status reports to the SADC secretariat in Gaborone.

Article 16A of the SADC Treaty of 1992 – amended in 2001 – established the national committees with the mandate to “provide input at national level in the formulation, coordination, and implementation of SADC policies, strategies and programmes of action; initiate projects and issue papers as an input to the preparation of the RISDP, in accordance with the priority areas set out in the SADC common agenda; and create a national steering committee, sub-committees and technical committees”.

The SNCs are therefore the main link between member states and the SADC secretariat, playing a critical role in mobilising national consensus around regional initiatives, facilitating stakeholder participation at the national level, and channelling their inputs to the inter-governmental body. For this reason, the RISDP has underscored the need for member states to provide the national committees with the necessary resources and capacity to function effectively.

Two RISDP reviews have been undertaken to date. The first was a desk assessment conducted by the SADC secretariat reviewing implementation from 2005 to 2010. This was followed by an external mid-term review between 2012 and 2013, culminating in a proposed revised RISDP from 2015 to 2020. The reviews highlighted
progress, challenges, and lessons learned. Progress in implementation was most successful in the following sectoral areas: trade, industry, finance, and investment (TIFI), with 65 percent of targeted outcomes achieved; food, agriculture, and natural resources (FANR), with 64 percent of targeted outcomes achieved; and infrastructure and services (IS), with 60 percent of targeted outcomes achieved. However, it was noted that overall implementation was far behind schedule, and that several important targets had been missed.

Most SADC national committees are not functioning effectively and are superficial structures. Implementation of regional integration decisions often takes place at the national level through key ministries. The RISDP reviews between 2005 and 2013 noted that the link between member states and the SADC secretariat was weak. Not all member states had actually established national committees, and those that had, had not equipped them with the capacity to fulfill their mandate. As a result, consultation at the national level, which was to be spearheaded by the SNCs and mandated to include the private sector and civil society, was reported to be virtually non-existent. Annual SNC meetings to review their own performance were no longer being convened by the SADC secretariat. Inadequate human, financial, and technical resources across all areas of the secretariat were yet another major constraint.

The trajectory of SNCs has varied since the first committees were established in 2001. Eight years later, all SADC countries except South Africa had set up a national committee. However, these committees have all fallen short of the basic requirements in the founding SADC Treaty of 1992. Their structures and functions have differed across countries; SNCs have met irregularly; their capacity has been limited; and they have been poorly integrated into their national government frameworks. As of 2013, of the 15 SADC member states, functional SNCs existed in only four countries – Angola, Mauritius, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Therefore, it seems that although SNCs are among the most important structures within SADC’s institutional architecture, they are among the least effective.

The state of SNCs reveals a lack of political will in many SADC member states; low prioritisation of these committees; and disconnected national and regional planning and implementation processes. These factors underscore the need for greater commitment to building and nurturing institutions of regional cooperation. This is an important issue, given that Southern African governments have been reluctant to cede any significant power to the SADC secretariat in Botswana, which lacks autonomous operational capacity and instead relies primarily on the political will, resources, and actions of its member states and donors for the implementation of its objectives and activities. SADC itself has been faced with continuing challenges of building operational capacity and a strong human resource base despite having previously undergone several restructuring processes, and it has experimented with different organisational structures. Moreover, SADC continues not only to be government-led, but also to act in a top-down manner. Broadening of ownership of the regional integration project beyond governments in Southern Africa to civil society and the private sector through more inclusive approaches for engagement, as well as sensitisation and awareness efforts, are therefore critical.

16 SADC, Desk Assessment, pp. 95–96.
The change from the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) in 1980 to SADC in 1992 was influenced by both regional and international forces. Although SADC has since made strides in formulating a regional industrial development strategy, the organisation is still confronted with the task of implementing it and achieving coherence in the industrial policies of its individual member states. Another impediment to the attainment of a regional integration policy is the lack of a regional value chain for mineral-producing member states, since regional value chains are controlled by global value chain systems. Issues of industrialisation, beneficiation, and value addition have not been effectively addressed by SADC. Little regional integration has occurred in Southern Africa. Instead, what has largely transpired is “regional cooperation”. SADC therefore needs greater community outreach projects to ensure that its work reaches the grassroots and is not just elite-driven. Common values are also absent in SADC’s integration efforts. The issue of free trade is another that deserves attention, as reflected by Southern Africa’s failure to produce international goods. SADC should thus treat regional integration as a socio-economic development issue and incorporate complementarity, inclusivity, and equality into its integration model. Two other major problems in the sub-region are the absence of a compliance and enforcement mechanism for regional protocols, and multiple memberships of SADC member states in other regional economic communities such as SACU, the EAC, and COMESA.
3. Governance, the Role of Civil Society, and the SADC Parliamentary Forum

Poor governance has often resulted in conflicts and crises in SADC countries such as the DRC, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Free and fair elections, which are critical to democratisation efforts in Southern Africa, are a necessary but sometimes unrealised requirement for democratic consolidation processes. Furthermore, the holding of credible elections is not a panacea.

A key component of democratic governance is the strengthening of public institutions for the effective delivery of services to Southern Africa’s 281 million citizens. In the SADC sub-region, such services include public sector reform, the sound management of public finances, and institutional capacity-building, particularly within national civil services. These efforts will be vital for strengthening checks and balances within and outside the state through empowering parliaments; ensuring the independence of judiciaries; and safeguarding the autonomy of oversight institutions. SADC should therefore consider refining the mandate of its Panel of Elders to complement the work of the AU Panel of the Wise, and avoid duplicating efforts.

In the past two and a half decades, Southern Africa has experienced a wave of political change, moving from protracted civil war and colonial or authoritarian rule towards peace and more democratic modes of governance characterised by political pluralism, openness, and the holding of regular elections. This growth of more democratic rule has formed part of the “third wave” of democratisation, which accelerated in Africa with the end of the Cold War by 1990. Several countries in the sub-region have progressed from de facto one-party rule to multi-party regimes, with Botswana and Mauritius having the longest records as constitutional democracies: regular elections have taken place in both countries since independence in 1966 and 1968 respectively. Lesotho, after 23 years of one-party rule (1970–1986) and military dictatorship (1986–1993), made the transition to multi-party democracy with elections in 1993. Angola introduced parliamentary rule following its emergence from a protracted 27-year civil war in 2002, while Namibia and South Africa have made much progress towards consolidating constitutional democracy since 1990 and 1994 respectively.

Four Guiding Principles of Democracy

In placing democracy at the centre of regional integration efforts within SADC, four guiding principles are therefore instructive. The first is the electoral processes in member states, which are the starting point for the attainment of democratic governance. There is a need to ensure that elections are free and fair. Democracy, however, should not be equated with periodic polls. Elections should instead be understood not as an event, but rather as a process. The democratic culture in each SADC country must be deepened and transcend four-yearly elections, in order to hold governments accountable.

The second guiding principle for the attainment of democracy is the presence of strong and internally democratic political parties. Despite being the major stakeholders in elections and the governance of a country, political parties in Southern Africa are a neglected component of the democratisation process. Their internal governance mechanisms, conduct, funding sources, and the way they interact with each other all need to be more closely scrutinised. Activities and policy frameworks, such as primary elections and manifestos, are also key components of the democratic fabric of any country, and thus need to operate within the confines of democratic processes.
The third guiding principle for the attainment of democracy is the need for effective legislatures. Parliaments are important for opening up space for civic participation and engagement – for the will of the people to be realised. Legislatures provide a platform to deliberate on the views of the citizens and civil society. Parliamentarians therefore need to maintain close contact with their constituents at all times in order to represent their interests effectively. The relationship between the legislature and the executive also needs careful attention. The executive tends to dominate the other two arms of state, which is often detrimental to democratic governance. Parliaments must not become rubber-stamps of overbearing executives. The Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation, developed jointly by the Johannesburg-based Electoral Commissions Forum and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) – now the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa – are a prime example of the positive and instructive contributions that civil society can make to SADC’s work in this area. EISA was also instrumental in the creation of panels with grassroots involvement for the mediation of election-related conflicts in South Africa, Zambia, and Lesotho.19

Similarly, the Electoral Platform of Civil Society for Elections, a forum of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Angola created in 2005, has been active in election observation and civic education, while the Oasis Forum – alongside other civil society organisations – was a vocal participant in Zambia’s constitution-making process between 2012 and 2015.20 Other examples abound, and include the work done by the Southern Africa Forum Against Corruption (SAFAC). In terms of the role of civil society in the SADC sub-region, the work of women’s groups is of particular note. Gender parity in politics is a key goal, and the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development of 1997 called on member states to ensure that 30 percent of their parliamentarians are women. Persistent lobbying by women’s groups led Southern African policymakers to increase the quota for women representatives in political office from 30 to 50 percent in August 2005. Only South Africa has so far met this quota.

Though often weak and poorly organised, civil society in Southern Africa has grown increasingly vocal, and a critical media has emerged in many parts of the sub-region. Democratic institutions such as parliaments, electoral bodies, and judiciaries, too, have become more assertive in challenging domestic abuses of power. Indeed, only Swaziland, with its absolutist monarchy, has openly bucked the sub-regional trend towards more participatory democracy.21 Therefore, the fourth guiding principle for the attainment of democracy is decentralisation, with local governance being of critical importance. This is the most effective way of allowing citizens to participate actively in day-to-day governance activities without limiting this participation to four-yearly elections. Local communities can be empowered through decentralisation to respond to the immediate needs of voters. For this reason, across Southern Africa, local government elections need as much attention as central government polls if effective devolution of power, as well as both vertical and horizontal accountability are to be achieved. Civil society has been playing an increasingly important role in governance issues across Southern Africa.22 The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ of 2004 spells out this importance in the scope provided for civil society participation in a number of areas such as research, public debates, seminars, and conflict management efforts. The revised SIPO II seeks further to enhance this interaction, recognising NGOs as key stakeholders in the sub-regional project of promoting democracy, peace, and security.

At the country level, the SADC national committees are responsible for building cooperation and collaboration between state and non-state actors. At the civil society level, the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO) is the body that attempts to represent the views of citizens and NGOs in SADC member states. The SADC-CNGO continues to lobby SADC members to accede to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process for purposes of self-assessment and to enhance accountability. The coalition also engages with the SADC secretariat to find ways of enhancing cooperation and collaboration between the two, though it has recently struggled to gain access to the secretariat. Civil society across Southern Africa has often adopted a confrontational approach towards their governments. However, a less belligerent approach should be adopted, where possible.

The SADC Parliamentary Forum

The SADC Parliamentary Forum was established in Windhoek, Namibia, in 1997 as part of efforts to enhance regional integration in Southern Africa. It was tasked with giving citizens a voice and helping parliamentarians to promote regional integration through their involvement in these efforts. The SADC Parliamentary Forum comprises 3,500 parliamentarians representing 13 parliaments across the sub-region and was created in 1997. It seeks to bring regional experience to bear at the national level, and its role as the link between SADC and civil society organisations is potentially important. This role also extends to citizens and the business community in Southern Africa.

The SADC Parliamentary Forum has long played only an advisory role in the sub-region, but it has become clear that its role needs to be expanded. There is some support for transforming the forum into a full-fledged regional parliament. However, this idea has not yet been embraced by all SADC leaders. Continued insistence on sovereignty by SADC member states will remain an obstacle to the transformation of the forum into a regional parliament. Most countries in Southern Africa are not willing to cede sovereignty to a sub-regional body with full legislative powers. Only two countries – South Africa and Namibia – have spoken out clearly in support of the creation of a full-fledged SADC parliament at the ministerial level. Many questions also still remain about how a SADC parliament would be elected and what its specific competencies would be.

Despite this lack of progress, the government of Namibia has pledged to fund certain operational costs of the parliament, including the donation to the proposed regional parliament of the current building housing the SADC Parliamentary Forum in Windhoek. The structure of the proposed regional parliament is modelled on the AU’s Pan African Parliament (PAP), with every SADC member state allowed to seat five MPs – elected from their national parliaments – in the proposed regional parliament.

From left, Ms Alice Mogwe, Executive Director, Ditshwanelo: The Botswana Centre for Human Rights, Gaborone; Honourable Peter Katjavivi, Speaker of the National Assembly, Parliament of Namibia; Ms Joanmariae Fubbs, Chair of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, Parliament of South Africa; and Dr Khabele Matlosa, Director for Political Affairs, African Union Commission.
4. Strengthening the SADC Secretariat

Though the SADC secretariat in Gaborone should essentially act as the engine of the organisation, the sub-regional body is still grappling with transparency and accountability challenges in its regional integration efforts.

A number of bodies have been established to guide efforts at strengthening the capacity of the SADC secretariat. These include: an institutional audit report; an internal audit report; a strategic planning, monitoring, and evaluation policy; a board of auditors; an audit committee; and a task force on strengthening internal controls. These reforms were introduced by the SADC Council of Ministers in Mauritius in April 2008, with a board of auditors established to review compliance with financial, regulatory, corporate governance, accountability, and transparency frameworks. Also conducted were a number of key studies and surveys meant to help solidify efforts to capacitate the SADC secretariat, including an organisational health assessment, an organisational culture assessment, and a risk management policy.

The SADC secretariat is operationally responsible for the organisation’s regional integration initiatives. It should serve as a coordinating institution that proposes priorities to its 15 member states. However, there is an urgent need to identify alternative structures such as national parliaments and think tanks in member states that can domesticate and help enforce regional agreements. The sub-regional body should improve its performance monitoring and measurement mechanisms, as well as its capacity to absorb funds. The secretariat still has serious staffing and capacity constraints. The SADC Treaty of 1992 did not increase the powers of its Executive Secretary. The fact that Namibian technocrat Kaire Mbuende left the post in 1999 (having been elected in 1994), due to what some regarded as an independent streak, reinforced the impression that sub-regional leaders do not want too strong a secretariat. Prega Ramsamy, a low-key economist from Mauritius, held the post between 2001 and 2005. Ramsamy was widely viewed as cautious and unwilling to offend member states with politically sensitive activities. During his tenure, the SADC secretariat kept something of a distance from civil society groups, with the ironic result that a sub-region with world-class NGOs did not reap the full benefits of this knowledge. Mozambican technocrat Tomãz Salomão, took over the position until 2013 and, though more dynamic than his predecessors, struggled to win over the support of his senior officials. Salomão’s successor, Japanese-trained Tanzanian technocrat, Stergomena Lawrence Tax, became the first female SADC Executive Secretary in August 2013.

SADC’s Executive Secretary directly manages the directorate of the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, as well as four units: gender, internal audit, macroeconomic convergence surveillance, and public relations. There are two deputy executive secretaries, one focusing on regional integration, the other on finance and administration. The deputy executive secretary for regional integration, South Africa’s Thembinkosi Mhlongo, oversees five directorates: trade, industry, finance, and investment; infrastructure and...
services; food, agriculture, and natural resources; social and economic development; and policy planning and resource mobilisation. The deputy executive secretary for finance and administration, Congolese national Emilie Mushobekwa, is responsible for two directorates – budget and finance, and human resources and administration – in addition to overseeing the four units of conference services, procurement, legal affairs, and information communication technologies.

As currently constituted, SADC’s secretariat is detached from its member states, and has a difficult relationship with the organisation’s external donors. The secretariat also suffers from human and financial resource constraints; weak internal controls and management systems; ineffective monitoring and evaluation systems; as well as a lack of strong oversight structures. Coordination between its directorates is often poor, while donors still remain unclear on priority areas. Since the financing of regional integration efforts is critical, SADC needs to mobilise its own resources to fund these efforts. This could take the form of mobilising the capacities of think tanks within its member states to implement its integration plans. Learning from the European Union, SADC might also consider creating a structural development fund to finance its regional integration projects. A lead country such as South Africa (which accounts for 60 percent of SADC’s economy) could further ensure consistent funding of the organisation’s integration schemes.

Over the past two decades, SADC has adopted over 40 protocols and declarations to harmonise policies and legislation. Most have been ratified by member states, but implementation and incorporation into national policies remains patchy. The organisation thus still requires clear legislative procedures of its regulations, directives, and divisions. SADC appears to be good at creating institutions, but not at capacitating and empowering them. If capacitated, civil society groups could help increase the secretariat’s capacity and hold their national governments accountable on issues of regional integration.

The SADC secretariat must thus be strengthened by its leaders to play a central role in promoting regional integration. SADC member states, as direct beneficiaries of the sub-region’s goals, ought to contribute to the secretariat by offering critical skills. In this regard, the capacity of the secretariat has received a major boost from South Africa’s continued secondment of experts in the areas of health; security; environmental affairs; immigration; communications; science and technology; and fisheries. Tshwane is committed to strengthening the capacity of SADC, and has identified the organisation as a foreign policy priority towards the attainment of its regional development and integration goals in Southern Africa.

Strengthening of the sub-regional body in two particular areas is necessary - technical and administrative capacity, and political will and commitment. The issue of the exact role that the founding leaders of SADC wanted the secretariat to perform requires further interrogation. It appears that, on the one hand, sub-regional heads of state sought to create a powerful secretariat that could respond effectively to Southern Africa’s development challenges, while at the same time fearing the creation of an overly powerful secretariat that could challenge the authority of the political leadership. However, the SADC secretariat should be the principal institution vested with the technical capacity to drive regional integration projects. Therefore, its Executive Secretary needs to be empowered to take initiatives on behalf of the body – to make policy proposals and push useful projects rather than just playing a functional, bureaucratic role.

In order further to strengthen the SADC secretariat, it is critical to adopt a long-term approach over a short-term one. The Harare-based African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) is in the process of engaging SADC to draw up a 10-year implementation strategy that is consistent with the AU’s Agenda 2063. Under this initiative, the
ACBF will provide advisory and technical advice on programme management to the SADC secretariat. In a further bid to strengthen the secretariat, the foundation is also seeking to harmonise the values of the sub-region’s member states. The secretariat still lacks the technical capacity to prepare position papers for SADC decision-makers, and needs to be capacitated in the area of research and development. A well-run and well-functioning research unit would allow a coordinated response to a number of issues in the sub-region. The organisation should therefore draw on expertise within the sub-region, as well as work more closely with the private sector.

The SADC secretariat ought to be involved in the day-to-day activities of its Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee. Civil society and NGOs also have a critical watchdog role to play in strengthening the SADC secretariat, and can ensure that the secretariat conforms to a code of ethics and accountability, as well as help to bring the secretariat closer to its 281 million citizens. Furthermore, sub-regional foreign ministers meet more often outside SADC structures than within to take decisions on the organisation, without any representation of SADC secretariat officials. These ministers meet twice a year at AU Summits and also during the annual UN General Assembly in New York to coordinate SADC positions on important international issues. The secretariat thus needs to work more closely with SADC’s national committees, the SADC Committee of Ambassadors, and other similar bodies. Key SADC structures, such as the national committees, should be strengthened and better resourced to enhance their role, functions, and visibility to non-state stakeholders. In most of its 15 member states, SADC falls under the aegis of the ministry of foreign affairs. However, member states should be encouraged to establish departments dealing specifically with regional integration.
5. Trade and Development

For regional integration to be effective, SADC’s current leaders need to aspire to the activist role played by the Front Line States (FLS), established in 1975. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference, created in 1980, was built on the basis of a decolonisation-driven regionalist project against apartheid South Africa.

In 1992, SADCC reconstituted itself into the Southern African Development Community which adopted a number of regional integration protocols aimed at expediting region-building efforts in Southern Africa. This included the Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) model in 1995, and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan in 2003. A SADC free trade agreement was announced in 2008, but has not yet been implemented. A SADC customs union was to be established in 2010, but has been delayed, while the proposed adoption of a common market by 2015 and a monetary union by 2016 have also been postponed. SADC has basically failed to diversify its manufacturing base, and 98 percent of trade in the sub-region is in four sectors: unprocessed agricultural goods; food manufactures; textiles; and clothing.

At its August 2015 summit, SADC leaders discussed the implementation of the regional industrialisation strategy agreed at its extraordinary summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, four months earlier. Questions have been raised as to whether the linear model of integration – a gradualist approach that defines stages of integration – is truly conducive to Southern Africa’s integration efforts. While the “new regionalism” agenda emphasises a need to increase intra-regional trade in order for Southern Africa to compete in the global marketplace, unilateral actions by member states have often worked against this agenda.

Since SADC has adopted a free trade approach, it must also be aware of what each member trades. An awareness among member states regarding their imports and exports is imperative for the effective functioning of a free trade area. A linear process also requires free exchange, as well as equitable and balanced integration. SADC should assess whether it has the appropriate capacity and implementation instruments to conduct open trade. For example, the EU adopted a framework that could assess how to address imbalances in trade between France and Germany. In the case of SADC, there is no such model to compare the trade imbalances between Zimbabwe and Lesotho, nor are sufficient funds available to design an appropriate integration model. Previously, sector-coordinating units were a manifestation of the old integration model of SADCC, which was implemented in accord with the sectoral specialisation of member states and in line with their comparative advantages.25

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25 The sectoral activities and responsibilities of SADCC during the 1980s as overseen by its member states comprised the following: Angola – energy; Botswana – agriculture research, livestock production, and animal disease control; Lesotho – environment and land management, and water; Malawi – inland fisheries, forestry, and wildlife; Mauritius – tourism; Mozambique – culture, information, sports, transport, and communications; Namibia – marine fisheries and resources, and the legal sector; Swaziland – human resources development; Tanzania – industry and trade; Zambia – employment, labour, and mining; Zimbabwe – crop sector, food, agriculture, and natural resources; and later, South Africa (which joined SADC in 1994) – finance, investment, and health. See also the typology provided in Margaret Lee, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2002), p. 51.
At both national and regional levels, integration requires synergy to succeed, and therefore SADC should consider how to align its regional integration aims with those of SACU, whose five members all belong to SADC. Established in 1910, SACU is a functioning customs union and one of the oldest in the world, comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.\(^{26}\) The union has a common external tariff (CET) and a common revenue pool as derived from its constitutive act and current agreement, signed by its heads of state in October 2002. Post-apartheid South Africa agreed to restructure the organisation to render greater benefits to its four other members, whose share of revenues increased from 2.6 percent in 1969–1970 to 31.8 percent in 1991–1992. In October 2002, a new SACU agreement was signed that sought to democratise the institution and introduced decision-making by consensus. Its secretariat was moved from South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry (the dti) in Tshwane to the Namibian capital of Windhoek.

In 2014, SACU’s exports increased to 18.6 percent of total trade, up slightly from 18.4 percent in 2013. Since the October 2002 agreement, emphasis has been shifting to consideration and incorporation of deeper levels of integration. Such efforts include establishing a tariff board and tribunal, developing and implementing policies for SACU’s revenue-sharing arrangement, and consolidating a single market while integrating it into the global economy. Creating conditions for free exchange of goods – rather than just seeking to establish a free trade area – is critical. SACU is thus working on establishing a common negotiating mechanism. Its revenue-generating model consists of three components: customs, excise, and development. However, this revenue pool has allowed SACU member states to use the generated amount as a lump sum to boost their national fiscal budgets, instead of using some of the funds for the allocated developmental component of trade. This inevitably creates a gap in the critical aspect of developing trade within the bloc.

Moreover, the generated pool consumes 50 to 60 percent of members’ revenues, with 30 to 40 percent of Botswana’s national revenue typically coming from SACU. Thus, better coordinating mechanisms and policies will be essential to improving the organisation’s effectiveness. The 2002 agreement has met with further challenges such as divergent interests among the five member states, with parallel processes of SACU’s trade-in-services agreement competing with SADC’s free trade area. Amidst these challenges, SACU members have also been involved in negotiating a SADC economic partnership agreement (EPA) with the EU that includes Mozambique (a SADC member state). In moving forward, SACU could create a framework for developing and monitoring the intended objectives of the 2002 agreement. Competition for investment among its members should also be underpinned by a regional approach linked to a regional tourism plan.

Several SACU members have argued that South Africa’s regulations have prevented them from protecting their infant industries from South African firms. There continues to be widespread grumbling about the dumping of cheaper South African goods, to the detriment of local producers. In stark contrast, some South African officials have argued that the other four SACU member states – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland – continue to benefit disproportionately from the agreement. Namibia and Swaziland, in a bid to protect their trade interests, joined the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement in June 2015. In 2008, SADC, the East African Community, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa had established the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Cooperation Area. Covering a regional market of 26 countries,

the first Tripartite summit of regional leaders was held in October 2008 with the aim of harmonising trade and investment regimes; establishing a free trade area among the three blocs; enhancing inter-REC economic cooperation; strengthening cooperation with multilateral and bilateral partners; coordinating negotiations on multilateral issues; promoting industrialisation; and encouraging intra-regional investment. The three regional blocs include 26 of Africa’s 55 countries, with a combined population of 530 million people and a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $630 billion as of 2013 ($1,180 per capita).

The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area was signed in June 2015 by half of the bloc’s 26 member countries. The initiative aims to boost intra-regional trade, attract foreign investment, promote cross-regional infrastructure projects, and remove the costs of multiple regional memberships by harmonising integration programmes. With poor infrastructure viewed as generally retarding trade, inter-regional commerce between COMESA and SADC was a paltry 6.5 percent in 2011. These low levels of continental and regional trade are directly linked to the transport costs associated with conducting trade in the region. In 2014, the cost of shipping a standard 20-foot container from the South African port of Durban to Lusaka, Zambia, was $5,000, compared to $1,500 for shipping the same size of container from Japan to Durban.

The creation of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African can be traced back to the ideals of Pan-African solidarity and collective self-reliance from the 1960s. At the 1978 meeting of ministers of trade, finance, and planning in Lusaka, Zambia, the Declaration of Intent and Commitment to the Establishment of a Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa was adopted. The preferential trade area was later transformed into the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa in 1993, whose establishment was ratified in December 1994. South Africa declined to join COMESA after its political independence in 1994. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the sub-regional body suffered from two key challenges that contributed to its poor economic performance: a rise in the external debt of its 19 member states, and sluggish growth as a result of poor industrial and manufacturing outputs. Problems that remain with COMESA include: protectionist trade policies; bureaucratic red-tape that slows the free movement of goods; the weak harmonisation of principles and protocols around democratic governance and human security; and overlapping membership of states with other RECs such as SADC.

The third part of the Tripartite Free Trade Area - the East African Community - was established in 1967. Ten years later, the organisation collapsed due to ideological differences, leadership contests, and divergent views about the benefits of regional integration. In November 1999, the Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (with Rwanda and Burundi joining in 2007), and implemented from July 2000. Intra-regional trade, which has increased by 16 percent

from 2005 to 2010, and was 19.5 percent in 2014, is higher in the East African Community, with 140 million people, than in any of Africa’s other four sub-regions. Much of the intra-regional trade in Eastern Africa, however, largely benefits Kenya, and is driven by manufactured products. In 2013, the EAC signed a protocol outlining plans to establish a monetary union by 2023.

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6. South Africa’s Leadership Role in Southern Africa

South Africa was invited to join SADC in 1994. There were regional perceptions and fears that gains from regional integration would be uneven, with a powerful economy like South Africa, accounting for about 60 percent of Southern Africa’s economy, likely to benefit more from the integration process than other countries in Southern Africa.

Convergence among the economies of Southern Africa has remained slow, with South Africa seen by other SADC states as a major threat to regional development given the oligopolistic behaviour of some of its multinational corporations (MNCs), and its Trade Development Corporation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU in 1999 negatively affecting the prospects for establishing a SADC free trade area.

SADC’s developmental strategy of spatial development initiatives in sectors such as energy and transport has been used to try to advance regional integration. Its revised RISDP for 2015-2020 should expand to include projects such as the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) and the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), both created in 1995. South Africa was tasked by SADC leaders to boost regional infrastructure and facilitate greater foreign direct investment (FDI). It has the second largest economy on the continent after Nigeria, with a GDP of $349 billion and 54 million people in 2015. The legacy of apartheid and South Africa’s destabilisation of the sub-region – including $60 billion in damages and one million deaths in the 1980s – continue to complicate its current relations with its neighbours. For four decades, apartheid South Africa completely dominated the sub-region – militarily, economically, and politically – casting a dark shadow over Southern Africa. The xenophobic attacks that have occurred in post-apartheid South Africa, particularly since 2008, have further damaged the country’s regional reputation. In August 2008, 62 mostly SADC citizens were killed in horrific attacks and 100,000 people were displaced. Between 2008 and 2015, a further 350 foreigners were killed in xenophobic attacks (most recently between March and May 2015) in South Africa.

As the sub-regional hegemon in Southern Africa, South Africa occupies the leading role in SACU and is also the dominant economic force within SADC. South Africa completed a second two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2012, having served a previous term in 2007-2008. South Africa is also the only African member of the Group of 20 (G-20) major economies and a member of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) bloc. It is the only African strategic partner of the EU. The extent of South Africa’s engagement in international fora provides clear evidence of a foreign policy that has been shaped by its commitment to multilateralism and global governance over the past two decades. However, as South Africa has sought increasingly to address its domestic challenges of underdevelopment, poverty, and insecurity, fears have also mounted that parochial concerns – particularly in the economic sphere – may increasingly shape its foreign policy.

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Under President Jacob Zuma’s leadership since 2009, South Africa’s most important strategic relationship in Southern Africa has been with oil-producing Angola, which has replaced Zimbabwe as the sub-region’s second largest economy. Bilateral trade between Tshwane and Luanda decreased from 28 billion rand in 2013 to 23.4 billion rand in 2015. The diplomatic thaw between the two sub-regional powers marks an important shift in Southern Africa’s post-apartheid security dynamics, and was reflected in South Africa’s diplomatic support for Angola’s defence of Laurent Gbagbo’s attempt to cling to presidential office in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011. In turn, Luanda strongly supported Tshwane’s successful campaign to make its candidate, and the country’s minister of home affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, chair of the AU Commission in July 2014, which received strong SADC support. If the Angola–South Africa bilateral relationship can be institutionalised, it could strengthen SADC and provide a powerful ally for South Africa on the continent.

Zimbabwe, formerly South Africa’s largest commercial trading partner on the continent, still enjoyed bilateral trade with Tshwane of 26 billion rand in 2013 and 26.8 billion rand in 2015. The two countries’ importance to each other has been magnified by their parallel historical struggles against white settler regimes. Tshwane spearheaded SADC’s mediation efforts in neighbouring Zimbabwe, which led to the signing of the Global Political Agreement in September 2008 and the subsequent appointment of Jacob Zuma as SADC facilitator to oversee the implementation of this deal. At times, this facilitation was greeted by fierce opposition from Robert Mugabe’s regime. However, claims in the international media of naive cuddling of Mugabe by Tshwane would appear to be contradicted by reports of South African intelligence officers working with high-level officials of the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) to understand the internal workings of the ruling party. In addition, Tshwane mostly provided assistance to Harare within the context of implementing the 2008 Global Political Agreement. Meanwhile, South African companies increased their share in Zimbabwe’s tourism, services, and mining sectors, obtaining bargains during the economic crisis there.

South Africa’s relationship with Mozambique was among the first to be forged after 1994. In 2013, Mozambique’s bilateral trade with South Africa was worth more than 39 billion rand and 38.8 billion rand in 2015. Maputo supported the tougher line adopted by SADC’s South African–led mediation efforts in Zimbabwe, while Tshwane backed the bloc’s peacemaking initiative in Madagascar led by former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano. South Africa’s Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) has also played a key role in supporting the project of parastatal Eskom to transform the Congo’s Grand Inga Dam into a source of electricity for much of sub-Saharan Africa. However, other South African companies have been accused of using dubious means to pursue business interests in the DRC, such as the “blue-chip” companies De Beers, Anglo American, Anglovaal Mining, and Iscor, which were all cited in a 2002 UN report on the illicit looting of the Congo’s mineral resources. As a result, some have even questioned Tshwane’s motives in playing such an active mediation role in the country.

Regionally, South Africa adopted an integration approach that sought to be both market-driven and developmental. Tshwane soon had a corporate sector running in parallel with its foreign policy, which made

38 See SARS, “Cumulative Bilateral Trade by Country 2013”.
39 See SARS, “Cumulative Bilateral Trade by Country 2015”.
40 See SARS, “Cumulative Bilateral Trade by Country 2013”.
41 See SARS, “Cumulative Bilateral Trade by Country 2015”.
regional integration efforts more difficult to manage. South Africa can be characterised by three Ms. First, the country is seen as mercantilist in the economic arena, having reportedly obstructed the building of a cement factory in Namibia, and a vehicle assembly plant in Botswana. South Africa is also seen as a messiah that can potentially drive development and peacemaking in the sub-region. The country is further viewed as a model for the sub-region, given its “soft power” attributes of educating Southern Africa’s elite at its universities and “exporting” South African popular culture abroad (such as through satellite television service DStv). The military intervention into Lesotho in 1998 to protect the Lesotho Water Highlands Project, however, raised suspicions about South Africa’s domineering hegemony. More positively, South Africa largely funded Lesotho’s elections in 2006 and 2011. SADC as a sub-region matters to the South African government, which has further provided support for spatial development initiatives in the areas of energy, water, transport, and gas production.

Southern Africa must facilitate the free movement of both goods and people if region-building is to be effective. Ever since South Africa joined SADC in 1994, it has prioritised protectionist migration policies over semi-skilled and skilled labour, which has worked against SADC’s migration efforts. South Africa’s weak public services could, however, benefit from progressive migration policies that import skilled workers from Southern Africa. In particular, South Africa should be encouraged to open its borders with Lesotho to allow for the free movement of both goods and people between both countries. Regional leadership should revolve more among other states including countries such as Angola, rather than being relegated to just South Africa alone. SADC members must share responsibilities and coordinate their interests on key issues such as sub-regional industrialisation projects. Tshwane, however, does not appear to support regional integration, but rather regional cooperation. It also projects a contradictory leadership role in the sub-region, embracing a quasi-developmental integration approach that encourages neighbouring states to adopt open markets, knowing that it has a huge trade monopoly over its neighbours. This role is characterised by South Africa’s “rand diplomacy” and “parastatal diplomacy”.

From left, Professor Lloyd Sachikonye, Associate Professor, Institute of Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe; Dr Adekeye Adeboj, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution; and Professor Chris Landsberg, South African Research (SARChI) Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Senior Associate, School of Leadership, University of Johannesburg

This paragraph is expanded based on Nagar, The Politics of Regional Integration in Africa.
7. The Role of External Actors: UNECA and the EU

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

Moving from the sub-regional level to external actors, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa was created in 1958 to promote socio-economic development in Africa by offering technical support and advisory services to help member states formulate and implement policies for advancing the socio-economic transformation of the continent. UNECA has thus focused on capacity-building and formulated macroeconomic and sectoral policies and programmes. The organisation opened a Subregional Office for Eastern and Southern Africa in the Zambian capital of Lusaka in 1966. Its key goals included: liaising between UNECA headquarters in Addis Ababa and governments in the region; gathering information on the needs and challenges of countries to enable effective formulation of assistance programmes; conducting studies on socio-economic development; documenting key aspects of socio-economic life; providing advisory services to sub-regional governments; and helping to organise seminars, workshops, and study tours to build the development capacity of the region.

In 1981, under Nigeria’s Adebayo Adedeji, UNECA created the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African, which became the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa in 1993. Over the years, UNECA has collaborated with a number of continental bodies such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), regarding the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, and the African Union, regarding the Agenda 2063 framework. UNECA also established a separate Subregional Development Centre for Southern Africa in Lusaka in 1997, which now serves SADC governments. The three key objectives of the current sub-regional office are, first, to generate ideas to catalyse regional integration and cooperation through technical support that promotes collective approaches in collaboration with SADC, SACU, and COMESA; second, to facilitate networking and information exchange among development partners; and third, to serve as a link between UNECA and development partners by organising discussion fora and through disseminating policy recommendations and technical publications produced by UNECA and other partners.

In Southern Africa, politics has trumped economics, with the role of the state becoming increasingly more important than that of the market. With this realisation, UNECA has sought to promote more effective regional integration policies in Southern Africa. The organisation has also created specialised knowledge centres, for example in mining production, politics, gender, and climate change, in support of sub-regional states. The performance of African governments in keeping accurate records is extremely poor. Without an accurate data collection system, monitoring and evaluation frameworks are flawed, resulting in inaccurate economic growth indicators. Africa’s regional integration policies are often developed and implemented in silos. COMESA and SADC are developing their own industrial policies in isolation from those of other RECs, which has resulted in duplication and weakened regional implementation efforts. Opportunities for value addition and beneficiation have therefore been lost. These are some of the challenges that UNECA is seeking to address in Southern Africa.

The European Union

Finally, another multilateral partner of SADC - the EU - is the world’s only supranational entity in which sovereignty is pooled. Brussels has had a long-standing relationship with SADC ever since the inception of SADCC in 1980, and has been a major funder of regional integration efforts in Southern Africa over the past three and a half decades. The SADC-EU cooperation fund has come under the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) of the 10th and 11th iterations
of the European Development Fund (EDF), with two focal points - economic integration and political cooperation - under an all-encompassing umbrella: the EU’s Trade Related Facility (TRF), which has total funds of €316 million in 2014-2019. South Africa receives a contribution fund from the EU separately from that of SADC.

The EU’s 11th Development Fund entails support across regional priorities with an overall amount of €1.322 billion funded within regional envelopes from January 2015. Regional infrastructure priority areas of €600 million will be used to support “hard” and “soft” regional infrastructure projects, with €450 million to be split among Africa’s RECs to implement regional initiatives. SADC receives €90 million of this fund, while COMESA and the EAC each receive €85 million.

Brussels has identified South Africa as one of its 10 strategic partners globally. However, the 28-member EU has limited Tshwane’s access to the trade and aid benefits offered to other members of the 79-member African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group. SADC’s Regional Indicative Programme for 2018-2013 is supported by the EU in the amount of €166 million. This funding offers regional economic and political integration support implemented by the SADC secretariat. The partnership also focuses on poverty eradication, centred on the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which aimed to halve poverty globally by December 2015 and
have been replaced by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The framework for the EU-SADC partnership is based on the three pillars of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP Group: political dialogue, trade for development, and development cooperation.

The consequent duality of market access arrangements in Southern Africa has complicated region-building efforts, and sometimes led to friction in South Africa’s relations with Brussels, as well as with some of its smaller sub-regional neighbours. With the conclusion of negotiations for an economic partnership agreement between the EU and Southern Africa by 2016 and with up to 90 percent of regional trade volumes being transmitted by maritime transport, security is increasingly important to the facilitation of Europe’s trade in goods by sea. The EU has thus provided €37.5 million to both SADC and COMESA to fight piracy in the Indian Ocean.

47 Nagar, The Politics of Regional Integration in Africa.
Policy Recommendations

The following 13 key policy recommendations emerged from the Gaborone policy advisory group seminar:

1. SADC needs to promote balanced and equitable development that has relevance to its 281 million citizens. The organisation must also return to implementation of community outreach projects. Member states must offer critical staff to improve the overall performance of implementation; monitoring and evaluation; and oversight, within the SADC secretariat. Such staff must be elite staff and not junior staff, and should educate their governments on the needs of regional integration on their return home.

2. SADC states need to develop a viable regional strategy for beneficiation, value addition, and industrialisation. The organisation should consider regional integration as a socio-economic priority, and incorporate factors of complementarity, inclusivity, and equality into its integration model. Creating conditions for the free exchange of goods is critical, rather than just declaring a free trade area into existence, as SADC did in 2008. Trade liberalisation and developmental regionalism also need to be more closely sequenced across Southern Africa.

3. A knowledge reference group should be established to integrate the main elements of SADC’s RISDP and SIPO. A National Security Policy framework is also needed across SADC countries to promote security sector governance and to integrate security sectors to ensure accountability and enhance confidence-building. A regional School of Diplomacy – such as Tanzania’s Centre for Foreign Relations – should be established to train SADC diplomats and other policymakers in order to pursue mutually beneficial sub-regional foreign policy goals.

4. SADC member states must fund their own peace and security programmes, and rely less on external donors who may have different priorities. A more equitable division of responsibility is required in regional peacekeeping to reduce dependence on South Africa. An effective division of labour must also be fostered between SADC, the AU, and the UN.

5. The research unit within the SADC secretariat needs to be strengthened to ensure effective policy planning, while the organisation should establish partnerships with centres of excellence and think tanks across the sub-region.

6. Coordination between the five directorates in the SADC secretariat needs urgent improvement, with the work-load shared proportionately within the organisation. SADC should consider increasing its permanent staffing within the secretariat, aligning staffing more effectively with programming, and establishing proper reporting systems.

7. The SADC secretariat should participate actively in the activities of the SADC Parliamentary Forum which its members must be encouraged to transform into a sub-regional parliament. SADC should also devise a monitoring mechanism to measure progress in the implementation of its regional integration schemes. Sanctions must be imposed for non-compliance of SADC decisions.

8. SADC National Committees need to be reformulated to capacitate them in order to make them more relevant and effective. Political parties in SADC are in urgent need of internal democratisation, and also require accountability mechanisms in the areas of governance and funding.
9. Deepening of a democratic culture is required within SADC. Civil society activists should not adopt an instinctively confrontational approach towards national governments, and must find ways to cooperate with them, where appropriate. Decentralisation and strengthening of local governance is also essential to ensuring popular participation in governance and empowering local communities. SADC should develop a sense of regional identity and prioritise common values.

10. SACU members need to be capacitated to devise alternative domestic revenue streams, given their over-reliance on the organisation’s customs-generated income. SACU should create a regional development fund rather than just transferring money through a revenue distribution process. There is also an urgent need to bridge the disparity of development and production capacities among SACU’s members. Furthermore, a mechanism should be created for monitoring the implementation of agreements signed by sub-regional governments.

11. The South African government must develop a clear vision for regional integration, regulate the role of its corporate sector, and build domestic constituencies that promote regional integration in the sub-region. South Africa should use its strategic partnership with Angola to ensure a more effective SADC. Tshwane (Pretoria) must also be more active within SADC structures.

12. UNECA should share lessons from its monitoring system on regional integration with the SADC secretariat. It should help to harmonise the industrialisation plans of SADC and COMESA, which it is currently supporting separately. Southern Africa must also learn lessons from West African civil society engagement with ECOWAS in areas of early warning and governance.

13. The issue of migration – both within SADC and to Europe – needs urgent prioritisation. An evolving AU migration policy, which has adopted a developmental approach, could provide useful lessons. Obstacles to the free movement of people must also be removed if regional integration is to succeed. South Africa should subordinate its national interests to broader interests in areas such as immigration and industrialisation. South Africa and Lesotho should also consider establishing a future confederation, with South Africa removing border controls between the two countries.
Annex I

Agenda

Friday, 18 September 2015

17:30 – 19:00 Public dialogue launching the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) book Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects

Chair and Discussant: Dr Simba Makoni, Former Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg, South Africa

19:00 Welcome Dinner

Day One: Saturday, 19 September 2015

09:15 – 09:30 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Dr Ulrich Golaszinski, Resident Representative Botswana and Regional Project Coordinator Southern Africa, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Gaborone

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

09:30 – 10:30 Session I: Opening Address: SADC’S Role in Promoting Regional Integration

Chair: Honourable Peter Katjavivi, Speaker of the National Assembly, Parliament of Namibia, Windhoek

Dr Thembinkosi Mhlongo, Deputy Executive Secretary for Regional Integration, Southern African Development Community secretariat, Gaborone

10:30 – 11:00 Group Photo followed by Coffee Break
11:00 – 12:30  Session II:  Trade and Development: SADC and SACU

Chair:  Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

Dr Simba Makoni, Former Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community

Ms Motselisi Matsela, Economist, Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Windhoek

12:30 – 13:30  Lunch

13:30 – 15:15  Session III:  Governance, the Role of Civil Society, and the SADC Parliamentary Forum

Chair:  Ms Joanmariae Fubbs, Chair of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, Parliament of South Africa, Cape Town

Dr Khabele Matlosa, Director for Political Affairs, African Union (AU) Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Ms Alice Mogwe, Executive Director, Ditshwanelo: The Botswana Centre for Human Rights, Gaborone

Honourable Peter Katjavivi, Speaker of the National Assembly, Parliament of Namibia, Windhoek

15:15 – 15:30  Coffee Break

15:30 – 17:00  Session IV:  Strengthening Southern Africa’s Security Architecture

Chair:  Dr Lucy Shule, Lecturer, Centre for Foreign Relations, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Ret. Lt Col Tanki Mothae, Former Director, Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), SADC secretariat

Professor André du Pisani, Professor of Political Science, University of Namibia (UNAM), Windhoek

19:00  Dinner
Day Two: Sunday, 20 September 2015

09:30 – 11:00  Session V: Strengthening the SADC Secretariat

Chair: Dr Ulrich Golaszinski, Resident Representative Botswana and Regional Project Coordinator Southern Africa, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Gaborone

Ambassador Mdu Lembede, High Commissioner of South Africa to Botswana

Dr Folasade Ayonrinde, Senior Programme Officer, African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), Harare

11:00 – 11:15  Coffee Break

11:15 – 12:45  Session VI: South Africa’s Leadership Role in Southern Africa

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Professor Chris Landsberg, South African Research (SARChI) Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Senior Associate, School of Leadership, University of Johannesburg, South Africa

Professor Lloyd Sachikonye, Associate Professor, Institute of Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Harare

12:45 – 13:45  Lunch

13:45 – 15:15  Session VII: The Role of External Actors: UNECA and the EU

Chair: Ambassador Petri Salo, Ambassador of Finland to South Africa

Dr Said Adejumobi, Director, Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Lusaka

Ambassador Alexander Baum, Head of the European Union (EU) Delegation to Botswana and to the Southern African Development Community

15:15 – 15:45  Coffee Break and Completion of Evaluation Forms
15:45 – 16:45  Session VIII:   Rapporteurs’ Recommendations and The Way Forward

Chair:           Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Simba Makoni, Former Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community

Rapporteurs:    Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Gabriel Malebang, Lecturer, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone
Annex II

List of Participants

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   Director
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5. Mr Boichoko Ditlhake
   Executive Director
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6. Professor André du Pisani
   Professor of Political Science
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7. Ms Joanmariae Fubbs
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8. Ms Sophia Gallina
   Team Leader
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9. Dr Ulrich Golaszinski
   Resident Representative FES Botswana and Regional Project Coordinator for Southern Africa
   Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)
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10. Honourable Professor Peter Katjavivi
    Speaker of the National Assembly
    Parliament of Namibia
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11. Professor Gilbert Khadiagala
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12. Professor Chris Landsberg
    South African Research (SARChI) Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Senior Associate, School of Leadership
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13. Ambassador Mdu Lembede  
High Commissioner of South Africa to  
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14. Mr Rangarirai Machemedze  
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17. Dr Khabele Matlosa  
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19. Mr Calson Mbegabolawe  
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20. Dr Themba Mhlongo  
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21. Ms Alice Mogwe  
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22. Dr David Monyae  
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23. Ret. Lt Col Tanki Mothae  
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30. Professor Lloyd Sachikonye
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31. H.E. Ambassador Petri Salo
    Ambassador of Finland to South Africa
    Tshwane

32. Dr Lucy Shule
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33. H.E. Ambassador Rolf Ulrich
    Ambassador of Germany to Botswana
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34. Ms Elizabeth van Renen
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3. Mr Bakang Ntshingane
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   Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
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Annex III

List of Acronyms

ACBF  African Capacity Building Foundation
ACP  African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group
AGF-VIII Eighth African Governance Forum
APRM  African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA  African Peace and Security Architecture
AU  African Union
BRICS  Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
CCR  Centre for Conflict Resolution
CET  Common external tariff
COMESA  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPS  Centre for Policy Studies
DBSA  Development Bank of Southern Africa
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC  East African Community
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EDF  European Development Fund (EU)
EISA  Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
EPA  Economic Partnership Agreement (EU)
EU  European Union
FDI  Foreign direct investment
FES  Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FLS  Front Line States
FTA  Free Trade Area
G-20  Group of 20 states
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
ICM  Integrated Committee of Ministers
ICP  International Co-operating Partner
ICTs  Information communication technologies
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISDSC  Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (SADC)
ISPDC  Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (SADC)
LDF  Lesotho Defence Force
M23  March 23 Movement (rebel group)
MCO  Ministerial Committee of the Organ (SADC)
MDC  Maputo Development Corridor
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals (UN)
MNCs  Multinational corporations
MONUSCO  UN mission in the DRC
NGOs  Non-governmental organisations
OTHER PUBLICATIONS IN THIS SERIES (AVAILABLE AT WWW.CCR.ORG.ZA)

VOLUME 1
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S SECURITY
THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA

The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

VOLUME 2
SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA
THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE

The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

VOLUME 3
THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA'S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

VOLUME 4
A MORE SECURE CONTINENT
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

African perspectives on the United Nations’ (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 21 and 24 April 2005.

VOLUME 5
WHITHER SADC?
SOUTHERN AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

VOLUME 6
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY
AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

VOLUME 7
BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY

This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.

VOLUME 8
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.
This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of ‘prosecution versus amnesty’ for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.

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This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military cooperation, and migration.

**VOLUME 30**

**FROM EURAFRIQUE TO AFRO-EUROPA**

**AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY**

This policy seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.

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**VOLUME 32**

**TAMING THE DRAGON?**

**DEFINING AFRICA’S INTERESTS AT THE FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA CO-OPERATION (FOCAC)**

This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.
VOLUME 33
PEACEBUILDING IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS
This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.

VOLUME 34
STABILISING SUDAN
DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES
This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

VOLUME 35
BUILDING PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.

VOLUME 36
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)
This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN) and the international community in building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

VOLUME 37
STATE RECONSTRUCTION IN ZIMBABWE
This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.

VOLUME 38
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

VOLUME 39
THE EAGLE AND THE SPRINGBOK
STRENGTHENING THE NIGERIA/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONSHIP
This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help “reset” the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.

VOLUME 40
SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa’s region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.
VOLUME 41
THE AFRICAN UNION AT TEN
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS
This international colloquium held in Berlin, Germany, from 30 to 31 August 2012, reviewed the first ten years of the African Union (AU), assessed its peace and security efforts; compared it with the European Union (EU); examined the AU’s strategies to achieve socioeconomic development; and analysed its global role.

VOLUME 42
AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE UNITED NATIONS’ SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012, considered Africa and South Africa’s performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council; the politics and reform of the Security Council; the impact of the African Group at the UN; and the performance of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

VOLUME 43
GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTHERN AFRICA
This report considers the key governance and security challenges facing Southern Africa, with a focus on the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-regions progress towards democracy, and its peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts.

VOLUME 44
ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGs) IN AFRICA
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 13 and 14 May 2013, considered the progress that Africa has made towards achieving the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and sought to support African actors and institutions in shaping the post-2015 development agenda.

VOLUME 45
THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC (ACP) GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 29 to 30 October 2012, considered the nature of the relationship between the ACP Group and the EU, and the potential for their further strategic engagement, as the final five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the two sides approached in 2015.

VOLUME 46
TOWARDS A NEW PAX AFRICANA
MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING PEACE IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA
This policy research seminar held in Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013, considered the progress being made by the African Union (AU) and Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) in managing conflicts and operationalising the continent’s peace and security architecture; and the roles of key external actors in these efforts.

VOLUME 47
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER TWO DECADES
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 July 2013, reviewed post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy after two decades, and explored the potential leadership role that the country can play in promoting peace and security, as well as regional integration and development in Africa.

VOLUME 48
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (IIAs)
This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 17 to 18 February 2014 assessed the principles underpinning international investment agreements, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and the implications of these instruments for socio-economic development efforts in South Africa and the rest of the continent.
VOLUME 49
REGION-BUILDING AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 April 2014, considered the challenges and potential of Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) in promoting region building and regional integration on the continent, including through a comparative assessment of experiences in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

VOLUME 50
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE BRICS: PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS
This policy advisory group seminar held in Tshwane, South Africa, from 30 to 31 August 2014, assessed the potential for increasing the impact of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) Grouping on global politics, and to develop concrete recommendations in support of South Africa’s continuing engagement with the bloc.

VOLUME 51
SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION
This policy advisory group seminar held in Franschhoek, Western Cape, from 9 to 10 May 2015, assessed the obstacles to peace, security, and governance in the Great Lakes region. The report discusses the ongoing political crises in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and provides policy recommendations crafted at the seminar.
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This policy advisory group seminar was held in Botswana from 19 to 20 September 2015 and convened about 30 mostly African policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors. Senior officials attended from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), as well as key policymakers from the SADC region and donor governments. The seminar considered five key objectives: first, strengthening Southern Africa’s evolving security and governance architecture, as well as the important role of civil society in the sub-region; second, contributing to the policy development efforts of the South African and SADC governments, as well as to those of the SADC secretariat; third, assessing critically efforts to promote region-building and peacebuilding in Southern Africa, and the specific roles of SADC, SACU, and the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Agreement; fourth, strengthening dialogue between South Africa and its neighbours in order to foster dialogue among SADC members about critical governance and security challenges in Southern Africa; and finally, exploring strategies that can encourage SADC members to promote foreign policy goals consistent with human rights, peace and security, and democratic governance.