REGION-BUILDING AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA

POLICY RESEARCH SEMINAR REPORT
CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
DATE OF PUBLICATION: OCTOBER 2014
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RAPPORTEURS
ROSALINE DANIEL AND DAWN NAGAR
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DESIGNED BY: KULT CREATIVE, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
EDITORS: ADEKEYE ADEBAJO AND MARK PATERSON, CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA, AND JASON COOK
PHOTOGRAPHER: FANIE JASON
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About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa; region-building and regional integration on the continent; Africa and the European Union (EU); the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Africa; and South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.

The Rapporteurs

Rosaline Daniel is a Senior Project Officer, and Dawn Nagar a Researcher, at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa.
Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy research seminar in Cape Town, from 28 to 30 April 2014, on “Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa”.

The meeting convened about 30 leading practitioners, scholars, and civil society actors from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and North America to consider region-building and regional integration processes in Africa; to advance African efforts to promote peace, security, and socio-economic development on the continent; and to strengthen the capacities of institutional frameworks for intra-continental trade, including through improved coordination between the African Union (AU) and the continent’s sub-regional bodies.

1. Themes and Concepts of Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa

Region-building is commonly defined as the effort by states in a common region to cooperate in ways that enhance their political, economic, social, security, and cultural integration. In general, regional integration in Africa requires strengthening the capacity of individual states to fulfil their core functions. However, in the five decades since the emergence of a pan-African ideology that sought the political emancipation of territories under colonial domination through regional integration, the results of region-building efforts on the continent have been disappointing, with only 12 percent of trade being intra-regional. Most African economies remain weak, and historical divisions have worked against effective regional integration, while institutional capacity has been lacking for national, sub-regional, and continental bodies promoting regionalism. For African regional bodies, the high transactional costs of doing business caused by overlapping memberships in regional bodies and the failure to improve the continent’s inadequate infrastructure, as well as its trade and non-trade barriers, have further impeded region-building efforts.

The success of Africa’s region-building and regional integration efforts is linked to the potential leadership role of strategic countries in their respective sub-regions such as South Africa in Southern Africa; Nigeria in West Africa; Kenya in Eastern Africa; the conflict-afflicted Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in Central Africa; and Algeria in North Africa. Such countries could potentially lead future efforts to strengthen regional arrangements and promote stability and development through integration of their respective sub-regions.

2. Cross-Border Interactions, Regionalism, and Developmental States

Cross-border trade to meet the diverse needs of Africa’s fragmented markets evolved from informal interactions across borders, into complex networks that infiltrated state bureaucracies. As a result, formal and informal region-building efforts diverged. The African Union’s approach recognises the importance of African border markets in attracting investments from emerging economic powers. The continent has become the home of burgeoning frontier markets, which promise higher returns, as well as greater risks for investors. Frontier markets have generally supported the expansion of “developmental states”. For example, South Africa’s membership in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) bloc has helped to connect high-risk investors and exchange-traded funds to the continent, as well as supporting Tshwane’s (Pretoria’s) regional leadership aspirations.
The private sector has a crucial role to play in Africa’s regional integration processes. Informal trading networks have promoted an increase in unrecorded regional trade, but have often failed to promote intra-African trade in place of foreign trade. On balance, informal trading networks represent potentially valuable institutional resources for the development of a more grounded and flexible regionalism. However, coherent planning to promote more beneficial regionalism requires the creation of appropriate templates to collect accurate data on the precise nature of trans-border trade and related activities, and on how these shape, and are shaped by, broader economic and political forces on the continent.

3. Region-Building in Southern and Eastern Africa

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was created in 1980 to promote solidarity in efforts to decolonise the sub-region in opposition to apartheid South Africa. In 1992, SADCC reconstituted itself as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which now has 15 member states. However, the sub-regional body has its own constraints, including a lack of resources, a disparate membership with widely varying national interests, and many institutional challenges. South Africa still accounts for 70 percent of SADC’s gross domestic product (GDP). In addition, the bloc is dependent on external donors, which are expected to fund 61 percent – $54.2 million – of a total $88.3 million budget in 2014-2015. SADC, the East African Community (EAC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) concluded a tripartite agreement in 2008 involving a free trade area for the bloc’s 26 member states; a combined population of 530 million people; and a GDP of $1 trillion in 2013. The initiative aims to boost intra-regional trade, attract investment for development, promote cross-regional infrastructure projects, and remove the costs of overlapping regional memberships by harmonising integration programmes. Progress has, however, been slow.

The East African Community, which has a population of 140 million people, was established in 1967, collapsed in 1977, and was revived in 2000. Intra-regional trade in the five-country bloc, which increased by 16 percent from 2005 to 2010, is higher than in any of Africa’s four other sub-regions. Much of this trade, however, largely benefits Kenya and is driven by manufactured products. There have also been divisions between Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda on the one hand, and Tanzania and Burundi on the other. Over the past two decades, the broader Eastern African sub-region – especially the Horn of Africa – has been deeply divided, despite the efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with states either waging war against each other or supporting each other’s rebels. South Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia remain particularly volatile.

4. Region-Building in West and Central Africa

West Africa has been one of Africa’s most conflict-prone sub-regions, which has hindered region-building efforts. Thirty-seven coups took place in the sub-region between 1960 and 1990. Civil wars also occurred in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau from the 1990s. More recently, Mali, Guinea, and parts of Nigeria have experienced instability. Formal and informal intra-regional trade among the 15 member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) constituted a mere 10 and 15 percent respectively of West Africa’s total trade in 2013. However, ECOWAS has promoted substantive intra-regional private sector engagement. Eleven Nigerian firms, with capital markets of over $1 billion, including seven banks, are listed among the 12 largest companies in West Africa.
Central Africa’s sub-regional body, the 10-member Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), was established in 1983. ECCAS was moribund for many years due to non-payment of membership fees and a lack of political commitment among its member states. In 1999, its members created the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) which has been largely ineffective. Central African states have responded to this failure by relying on SADC, the AU, and the United Nations (UN) to manage sub-regional conflicts. The mineral-rich DRC, the potential regional hegemon in Central Africa, has also been unable to play a leadership role, due to a weakened state wracked by conflicts. Meanwhile, the tiny state of Rwanda, is one of the few countries with the capacity to project military force in the sub-region, and has periodically intervened in the DRC, along with Uganda. The failure of region-building efforts in Central Africa can be directly attributed to these difficulties.

5. Region-Building in North Africa

In February 1989, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia met to hold the first summit of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The AMU is based on a trade agreement that seeks to strengthen political and economic cooperation, and unity, among its five member states. AMU member countries, which have a combined GDP of $414 billion, share a cultural, linguistic, and religious heritage, as well as structural links to the dominant former colonial power in the sub-region: France. Substantial trade barriers – both tariff and non-tariff – have, however, blocked trade among Maghrebi countries, hampering economic integration. Algeria’s border with Morocco has remained closed since 1994. Intra-regional trade remained a paltry 5 percent of the Maghreb’s total commerce in 2013, and the AMU has been moribund for two decades.

6. Region-Building in Europe, South-East Asia, and Latin America

The European Union (EU) is an economic and political union of 28 member states established originally as a six-member European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. The EU operates through a system of independent institutions and inter-governmental decisions, and remains the world’s most successful effort at regional integration. Despite its serious financial crisis, Brussels can potentially provide useful lessons for Africa’s region-building efforts. The EU’s ability to attract new members among its neighbours has enabled Europe’s integration process to continue, although the “widening” of the body may have occurred at the expense of its “deepening”. The history of the European Union teaches the lesson that favourable circumstances and political will are the key prerequisites for successful region-building.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Five new members joined between 1984 and 1999: Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia. ASEAN’s main aims include: accelerating economic growth and social progress; promoting regional peace, stability, and development; and providing opportunities for its member states to discuss their differences peacefully. In 2003, ASEAN moved from region-building language to a community approach, establishing three pillars for its economic, political, and socio-cultural activities. The principal exports of ASEAN countries, like those of African countries, continue to consist largely of raw materials. Yet ASEAN’s current intra-regional trade is almost double that of Africa, at 22 percent in 2013, as a result of its members having diversified their productive base.

Latin America’s common market, the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), was founded in 1991, and comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. MERCOSUR’s primary interest has been to eliminate
obstacles to regional trade such as high tariffs and income inequalities. Brazil accounts for 75 percent of MERCOSUR’s GDP and about 70 percent of its population. However, the sub-regional hegemon trades more with Europe and the United States (US) than with its partners in MERCOSUR. Members have also found it increasingly difficult to keep pace with implementing the bloc’s many multilateral agreements. In addition, an increasing number of trade accords have been signed with the European Union. These have often benefited Brussels while undermining Latin America’s integration efforts. Nevertheless, MERCOSUR’s management of its trade relations with Europe can provide some useful lessons for Africa in future trade talks with the EU.

7. The African Union, the European Union, and the Role of Visionaries in Region-Building

The trade relationship between the 28-member European Union and the 79-member African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group (ACP) was established in 1975 on the principle of non-reciprocity. However, after 2000, economic partnership agreements (EPAs) were introduced by Brussels to replace the earlier preferential non-reciprocal trade deals agreed with ACP members. Subsequently, the EU’s partnership with Africa has appeared increasingly to be shaped by European trade interests rather than by Africa’s development priorities.

Related to economic integration, visionaries like France’s Jean Monnet, Argentina’s Raúl Prebisch, and Nigeria’s Adebayo Adedeji historically promoted regional integration and economic development across Europe, Latin America, and Africa respectively. The three technocrats led the restructuring of national economies after cataclysmic events: the Second World War of 1939–1945, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the Nigerian civil war of 1967–1970. Placing Monnet, Prebisch, and Adedeji in historical context highlights the role that individuals with vision and forceful personalities can play in driving institutions to adopt ideas, but also demonstrates the institutional, regional, and external constraints on the implementation of these ideas, which still rely on the decisions and vested interests of powerful national governments and other important actors.

Policy Recommendations

The following 10 policy recommendations emerged from the Cape Town policy research seminar:

1. Africa should rationalise the proliferation of regional economic communities on the continent. Each of its five sub-regions should be led, to the extent possible, by one body: SADC in Southern Africa; ECOWAS in West Africa; ECCAS in Central Africa; IGAD and the EAC in Eastern Africa; and the AMU in North Africa, with COMESA acting as a technical agency to promote trade more widely across the continent.

2. African governments should create dedicated ministries of economic integration equipped with the authority to implement trade agreements. Both the African Action Plan (AAP) of 2010–2015, and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) of 2011–2040, urgently need to be implemented. Some of the best practices to facilitate trade include the “one-stop border post”, which can potentially help expedite procedures at cross-border points on major transport corridors across Africa’s five sub-regions.

3. Consensus decision-making should be replaced by majority decision-making on sub-regional and continental bodies in order to promote effective development and implementation of plans in key areas of regional integration.
4. African Union summits and those of Africa’s sub-regional bodies should seek to take fewer decisions, while monitoring member states more closely to ensure the implementation of such decisions.

5. COMESA, the EAC, and SADC must address the skewed trade with their three powerful economies – South Africa, Egypt, and Kenya – and promote intra-regional trade that generates positive spill-over effects and boosts national economies. South Africa should also seek to regulate its private sector to be able to contribute more effectively to inclusive development in Southern Africa.

6. Both SADC and COMESA should revisit and legally strengthen their trade agreements, imposing fines on member states that violate jointly agreed trade preferences through external commerce. The two blocs should further suspend the voting rights of states that have not paid their dues to their respective secretariats.

7. Development agencies and regional banks have promoted infrastructural development in Asia, and institutions like the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), and the BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB) should do the same in Africa. This role should not just be left to governments.

8. Africa needs to develop a coherent strategy to promote its own interests more effectively in the sub-regional EPAs being negotiated with Brussels, with a more capacitated AU playing a more prominent role in EPA talks. The €57.5 billion of annual EU subsidies to European farmers restricts the market for African agricultural products, and Brussels should consider making compensatory payments to the continent.

9. Africa should pursue a developmental approach to market integration. Institutions must be established that are functional equivalents, rather than poor imitations, of their European counterparts. Rules to promote the harmonisation of domestic economic policies also need to be established in the critical area of monetary union.

10. Governments and regional bodies in Africa should strengthen their consultation mechanisms to give domestic interest groups such as civil society and the private sector a greater voice in, and enhance the transparency of, region-building efforts on the continent.
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy research seminar in Cape Town, from 28 to 30 April 2014, on “Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa”. This report is based on discussions at the meeting, as well as on further research.

The main objectives of the Cape Town seminar were to enhance understanding of region-building and regional integration processes in Africa; to advance African efforts to promote peace, security, and socio-economic development on the continent; and to strengthen the capacities of institutional frameworks for intra-continental trade, including through improved coordination between the African Union (AU) and the continent’s sub-regional bodies.1

Region-building is commonly defined as the effort by states in a common region to cooperate in ways that enhance their political, economic, social, security, and cultural integration. In general, regional integration in Africa requires strengthening the capacity of individual states to fulfil their core functions. Effective region-building often requires democratic governance, political will, visionary leadership, and the adoption of common values to advance and implement the objectives of regional integration. Yet most African national economies remain weak, and historical divisions have worked against effective regional integration, while institutional capacity has been lacking for national, sub-regional, and continental bodies promoting regionalism. For African regional bodies, the high transactional costs of doing business caused by overlapping regional memberships and the failure to improve the continent’s inadequate infrastructure, as well as its trade and non-trade barriers, have further impeded region-building efforts. In addition, emerging issues such as food, energy, water security, arms and drug trafficking, HIV/AIDS, migration, xenophobia, and climate change are becoming more important in the development and implementation of institutional strategies for promoting regional integration in Africa.2


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Africa and Europe in a New Century”, held in Cape Town in October–November 2007. The 2014 Cape Town seminar also built on CCR’s solid expertise in the area of region-building over the past decade, including work on the African Union and on regional integration efforts in Southern, West, Eastern, Central, and North Africa.

The 2014 Cape Town seminar considered issues relating to the “new regionalism” debates; the role of African “agency” in region-building efforts; recent reflections on the history and concept of regionalism; and a comparative assessment of regional institutions in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. The seminar considered four key objectives:

1. Themes and concepts of region-building and regional integration in Africa and how these have informed approaches to region-building on the continent;

2. The political economy of Africa’s region-building and regional integration efforts, including the roles played by important regional powers, development finance institutions (DFIs), informal networks, and civil society actors;

3. The role, challenges, and potential of the AU and sub-regional organisations in Southern, Eastern, West, Central, and North Africa, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), in promoting region-building and regional integration over the past five decades; and

4. Potential lessons for Africa from the comparative experiences of the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and South America’s Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR).

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8 The Southern African Development Community comprises 15 member states: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

9 The East African Community comprises five member states: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.

10 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa comprises 19 member states: Burundi, Comoros, the DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.


12 The Economic Community of Central African States comprises 10 member states: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

13 The Arab Maghreb Union comprises five member states: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.

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From left, Professor Chris Landsberg, South African Research Initiative Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg, South Africa; Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa; and Dr Tomaz Augusto Salomao, Former Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community (SADC)

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1. Themes and Concepts of Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa

Region-building is recognised as a necessary condition for long-term economic sustainability and successful poverty reduction. However, in the five decades since the emergence of a pan-African ideology that sought the political emancipation of territories under colonial domination through regional integration, the results of region-building efforts on the continent have been disappointing.

The African Union’s efforts to institutionalise a collective voice for its members could enhance political cooperation among African countries, and increase their leverage at multilateral fora such as the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). However, Africa’s attempts to deepen economic integration through the creation of free trade areas (FTAs), and customs and monetary unions, have achieved comparatively little success. Africa remains the only continent on which a mere 12 percent of total trade is conducted among regional states. Most African countries continue to export raw materials and cash crops, thus creating a continental market that is more competitive than complementary. It is therefore imperative that efforts to promote regional integration be urgently accelerated. Although an institutional framework towards regional integration exists in Africa, implementation of the many protocols signed over the past five decades has often been hampered by ineffective coordination between the African Union – and before then, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) – and Africa’s sub-regional bodies.

Since the 1960s, Africa has attempted to strengthen weak economies through robust trade and market integration efforts. In April 1980, African heads of state adopted the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) – an OAU initiative supported by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) – under its dynamic Executive Secretary, Nigeria’s Adebayo Adedeji. The Lagos Plan of Action promoted the idea of continent-wide regional integration through import-substitution industrialisation. It provided a blueprint for establishing regional economic communities (RECs) in West, Central, Eastern, Southern, and North Africa, and building a continental economic community on these sub-regional foundations. The plan’s main goal was to promote the collective, accelerated, self-reliant, and self-sustaining development of African states as well as to foster greater inter-state cooperation.

Unfortunately, the “spill-over effects” from the global economic crisis of the 1970s complicated regional integration efforts in Africa, resulting in the “lost decade” of the 1980s. During this decade, the conditionalities of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) imposed on African states by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank contributed to the adoption of austerity programmes that negatively impacted regional integration efforts on the continent. These policies included relaxation of tariffs and taxes, increased inward

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15 This section is partly based on presentations made by John Ravenhill, “Regional Integration in Africa: Theory and Practice”, and Samuel K.B. Asante, “The Political Economy of Region-Building and Regional Integration”, at the CCR policy research seminar “Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa”, Cape Town, 28-30 April 2014. 
17 Ravenhill, “Regional Integration in Africa”. 
19 The term “lost decade” was coined by Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa from 1975 to 1991. 
investment and external trade, liberalisation of labour markets, and reduction of government spending on education and health. As a result, interest in implementing the Lagos Plan of Action diminished. In the absence of effective regional economic integration, intra-African trade has remained low – at a mere 12 percent of total trade – with primary commodities from the extractive industries (gold, diamonds, copper, uranium, and platinum) and agriculture (beef, cocoa, palm oil, coffee, and sugar) accounting for the bulk of the continent’s exports. However, the subsequent creation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in 1993, together with the adoption of a common currency – the euro – by the European Union in 1999, and the rise of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations after that sub-region’s financial crisis in 1997/1998, renewed Africa’s interest in coordinating its effort at the continental level to diversify its trade and achieve stronger economic growth. In 1991, the OAU took on the challenge of regional integration by adopting the Abuja Treaty. This agreement sought to coordinate, harmonise, and integrate Africa’s regional economic communities as building blocks for the creation of an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028. The 2007 audit report of the African Union reaffirmed the 1991 Abuja Treaty as the blueprint for regional economic cooperation and the roadmap for integration efforts in Africa. These initiatives, however, have remained mostly unsuccessful to date. African development efforts have been undermined by the continuing role played by the rich North in shaping the terms of trade with the “global South”. Furthermore, African governments have offered insufficient political support to the African Union’s regional integration programme since this continental body was created in 2002 in place of the OAU. In addition, Africa’s dominant states have been largely unwilling to underwrite the foundations of regional integration. Hegemonic powers like Nigeria and South Africa, which account for three-quarters of the economies of West and Southern Africa respectively, thus need to provide greater leadership to regional integration efforts in Africa by diversifying trade and promoting integration in their respective sub-regions.

Competition between the AU and Africa’s eight main regional economic communities – SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD, the EAC, ECCAS, the AMU, COMESA, and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States – has also hampered region-building efforts. In addition, a number of African countries belong to more than one regional economic community, which has hindered the coordination of sub-regional trade liberalisation timetables. In order to address these issues, African states should renew their commitment to securing long-term peace and security through economic growth, and support the establishment of stronger regional economic communities and greater convergence among them.

African governments have sometimes chosen forms of regionalism that constrain domestic policymaking autonomy while generating few benefits. Furthermore, many African leaders have been unwilling to cede sovereignty to sub-regional and continental bodies. The direct control of sub-regional and continental organisations by heads of state has often compromised the executive authority of these bodies, with parochial national interests at times taking precedence over the strengthening of regional institutions. Some efforts at conceding sovereignty have been made, such as the inclusion of a commitment to supranationality in the Abuja Treaty of 1991 to create an African Economic Community, the restructuring of ECOWAS under a revised treaty in 1993, the establishment of SADC in 1992, and the creation of COMESA in 1994. However, many of the commitments to region-building

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21 Asante, “The Political Economy of Region-Building and Regional Integration”.
22 Asante, “The Political Economy of Region-Building and Regional Integration”.
23 Asante, “The Political Economy of Region-Building and Regional Integration”.
25 Asante, “The Political Economy of Region-Building and Regional Integration”.
embodied in these instruments have not been fulfilled, leading to delays in ratification of protocols, failures to meet target dates for implementation of agreements and initiatives, and late payments of contributions to sub-regional and continental budgets. Successful region-building also requires governments to demonstrate the political will to adhere to appropriate sub-regional and continental agendas, as well as the design and implementation of regional mechanisms that can offer economic rewards for increased collaboration.

The success of region-building and regional integration efforts in Africa is linked to the potential leadership role of strategic countries in their respective sub-regions, such as South Africa in Southern Africa; Nigeria in West Africa; Kenya in Eastern Africa; the conflict-affected Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in Central Africa; and Algeria in North Africa. Such countries could potentially lead future efforts to strengthen regional arrangements and promote stability and development through integration in their respective sub-regions.27 Widening gaps in national interests and the distribution of power and resources between and within states, however, still persist. This has exacerbated economic polarisation across the continent. The preoccupation of individual African governments with national problems has further slowed the progress of regional integration processes. Some African governments have also failed to put in place efficient and effective domestic mechanisms for monitoring the consistency of national policies in alignment with regional frameworks. Finally, Africa’s sub-regional bodies and their member states are also moving at different speeds with respect to integration processes. It is thus important to redefine how regional integration is able to accelerate Africa’s development efforts, given the huge economic disparities evident across the continent.

In Africa, the emergence of “developmental states” is seen as a significant factor towards effective region-building. However, such states require robust partnerships, including regional relationships, to function optimally.28 In this regard, although regional integration in Africa has evolved, market integration still lags behind.29 This can be seen in what has become termed “shallow integration” of goods, services, and markets on the continent, which has left African producers with few opportunities to climb up the value-chain, both regionally and globally.30 The continent’s record of intra-African trade is sobering, estimated at 12 percent of total trade between 2007 and 2011 on average as previously mentioned, compared to Latin America’s 27 percent,31 Asia’s 50 percent,32 and Europe’s 70 percent.33 The direction of Africa’s trade also continues to be greatly influenced by its former colonial ties with European powers, as more than 50 percent of Africa’s total trade still takes place with France, Britain, Portugal, and Belgium, as well as with the United States (US), although China’s trade with Africa has increased tremendously in the past decade, accounting for $200 billion in 2013. Africa’s sub-regional bodies have different approaches to dealing with non-tariff barriers to trade, and some of these organisations have yet to establish monitoring systems to track these barriers. The world’s oldest customs union, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU),34 for example, has not created a single cross-border project since its formation in 1910. Africa requires deep integration, which implies liberalisation of markets to enable African industries to become more competitive.

34 The Southern African Customs Union comprises five member states: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.
The lack of political stability in most sub-regions on the continent has further stalled economic integration, with conflicts emerging in post–Cold War theatres such as Angola, Algeria, the DRC, Liberia, and Somalia. Peace and security across the continent are essential for attracting greater foreign direct investment. The African Union’s Assembly of Heads of State, at its summit on “Boosting Intra-African Trade” in January 2011, adopted a declaration that sought to accelerate and deepen the continent’s market integration efforts through the establishment of a continent-wide free trade area. Some of the best practices to facilitate trade include the “one-stop border post”, which seeks to expedite procedures at cross-border points on major transport corridors in various sub-regions.

Inadequate sequencing of regional integration efforts has also created challenges. Most regional economic communities, with the exception of SADC’s forerunner, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which was established in 1980, have prioritised the promotion of trade liberalisation and market integration without due regard for regional infrastructural development, particularly in the areas of transport and communications. The drive towards greater market integration has also been hampered by the low levels of intra-African trade. Few developing countries in Africa have forged major economic partnerships with each other. Although cooperation by sub-regional and continental economic partners to meet national import needs can create long-term benefits, even the best-designed regional trade schemes are unlikely to boost intra-African trade significantly at present. For example, a comprehensive free trade agreement for the continent would probably increase intra-African trade to only about 15 percent of total trade in the next decade. Informal cross-border trade in Africa, should also be measured and included in official statistics.

In this regard, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) designed to promote import-substituting growth are likely to produce few gains and may divert attention from other, more beneficial forms of collaboration in the areas of infrastructure development and trade facilitation. Rather than focusing disproportionately on reducing tariffs, African policymakers should prioritise structural economic transformation to increase productive capacity through industrialisation and improved infrastructure. However, such efforts have been undermined by the inadequate funding of region-building and regional integration in Africa, as well as by the African Union’s dependence on external donors for budgetary support. In July 2012, the AU adopted the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) as the integrated strategic blueprint for continental infrastructure transformation from 2012-2040 which will require $68 billion for priority infrastructure project implementation until 2020 and an additional $300 billion up to 2040.

Regional integration in Africa has also been hampered by insufficient internalisation of sub-regional and continental protocols by member states, and by inadequate coordination of national and regional development policies. Many governments lack national mechanisms for integrating regional policies and initiatives. Where these mechanisms exist, as in the case of ECOWAS and SADC, which established national committees in 2001, they often lack the resources and political clout required to shape government policies. A further challenge to effective region-building has been increasingly raised by the adoption of “two-speed” schemes within blocs such as the EAC and SADC, which aim to accelerate integration on the basis of “variable geometry”. For example,
tensions within the EAC increased from 2013 as Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya sought to accelerate their cooperation with each other by excluding Burundi and Tanzania from their "fast track" integration efforts. 39

An additional impediment to region-building efforts in Africa has been the lack of popular participation in integration processes. African governments, which should be the principal advocates of region-building, have done little to engage their one billion citizens in regional integration initiatives. Governments and sub-regional and continental bodies must thus strengthen their consultation mechanisms to give domestic interest groups a voice in, and enhance the transparency of, region-building efforts. In this regard, the role of visionaries and policy entrepreneurs in driving integration forward is important.

Effective regionalism is a global challenge, not just an African one. However, African governments have too often attempted to imitate the European model for regional integration without creating comparable institutions and mechanisms capable of distributing resources from richer to poorer states. In addition, the continent’s adoption of the inappropriate functionalist model for regional integration adopted by the EU, which is based on market integration, has failed to address the fundamental constraints imposed by low intra-African trade: a lack of productive capacity and inadequate infrastructure. Africa should thus instead pursue a developmental approach to market integration. Institutions must be established that are functional equivalents, rather than poor imitations, of their European counterparts. Rules to promote the harmonisation of domestic economic policies also need to be established in the area of monetary union.

In order to foster greater regional integration on the continent, three important steps need to be taken. First, African governments should create dedicated ministries of economic integration equipped with the authority to implement trade agreements. Second, both the African Action Plan (AAP), covering the period 2010-2015 (developed by the AU and endorsed by the New Partnership for Africa's Development [NEPAD] Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee [HSGOC] in July 2010), and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa, covering the period 2012-2040 (developed by the AU, NEPAD, and the African Development Bank [AfDB] and endorsed by the HSGOC in January 2012) urgently need to be implemented. 40 Third, consensus decision-making should be replaced by majority decision-making on sub-regional and continental bodies in order to promote effective development and implementation of plans in key areas of regional integration.

Greater efforts by the African Union and Africa’s regional economic communities to advance economic cooperation and peace and security more effectively could substantially enhance Africa’s region-building efforts. However, historical divisions have often worked against effective region-building initiatives, 41 and many African governments continue to struggle to manage conflicts and to promote democratic governance. 42 Between 1960 and 1990, no ruling party on the continent lost power, while one-party states and military

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governments multiplied. Africa’s region-building efforts are still hampered by financial constraints, weak institutions, and poor governance. Meanwhile, growing globalisation and multilateralism have increased the need for effective regional integration. In this regard, Africa should rationalise the proliferation of regional economic communities on the continent. Each of the continent’s five sub-regions should be led, to the extent possible, by one body: SADC in Southern Africa; ECOWAS in West Africa; ECCAS in Central Africa; and the AMU in North Africa; and IGAD and the EAC in Eastern Africa; with COMESA acting as a technical agency to promote trade more widely across the continent. However, a lack of regionally agreed legal frameworks has hampered the efforts of national governments to harmonise standards and regulations in support of increased sub-regional and continental trade. Poor governance, which reduces commerce between member states of sub-regional bodies also constitutes a major barrier to trade integration on the continent.

2. Regionalism, Cross-Border Interactions, and Developmental States

The political economy of Africa’s region-building and regional integration efforts has been consistently underpinned by the ideas and values of “pan-Africanism”.

It was Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first president, in embracing a continental vision for political unity among African countries, who advocated the adoption of a pan-African vision that incorporated regional integration for the entire African continent.\(^{45}\) In 1961, Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s first post-independence president, argued for initiatives towards regional integration in East Africa.\(^{46}\) This period was known as the first wave of region-building and regional integration in Africa. However, the pan-African vision was overtaken by the development of autonomous national administrations and a growing sentiment among African leaders to preserve colonially inherited economic structures. In this context, it was argued that regional integration should take the form of a gradualist and functionalist approach,\(^{47}\) and that economic integration had to precede political integration. During the Cold War, the experience of region-building and regional integration in Africa was further characterised by the divisions between the capitalist and socialist worlds. African leaders recognised the need for regional integration as a mechanism to attenuate the fragmentation of domestic markets by creating regional markets to exploit economies of scale and to pool resources for investments.\(^{48}\)

The second wave of region-building and regional integration in Africa started in 1991, following the end of the Cold War, with the signing of the Abuja Treaty. Under this second wave of regionalism, often referred to as the “new regionalism”, it was argued that political considerations were as important as economic considerations in consolidating region-building efforts on the continent. A multi-dimensional approach towards economic, political, social, and cultural integration was adopted, taking region-building and regional integration beyond the mere creation of free trade regimes or security alliances. This approach involved discussions around trade facilitation; providing an enabling environment for private sector development; pursuing infrastructure programmes in support of economic growth and region-building; enhancing the development of strong public sector institutions; engaging more effectively with civil society; contributing to regional peace and security initiatives; building regional programmes; and strengthening interactions among the regions of the world. In Africa, the “new regionalism” has also meant consolidating regional political structures and creating a united voice to represent the continent’s interests on international political bodies such as the World Trade Organisation.\(^{49}\) However, although African leaders have widely advocated political, economic, and security integration, as well as institutional cooperation, their rhetoric has not been matched by actual implementation of agreements, due to lack of political will, institutional incapacity, and resource constraints. Promoting

44 This section is partly based on presentations made by Daniel Bach, “Cross-Border Interactions: From Regionalisation to Regional Integration”, and Timothy M. Shaw, “The Role of Regional Powers and Developmental States in Regional Integration in Africa”, at the CCR policy research seminar “Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa”. Cape Town, 26–30 April 2014.
supranationalism remained a challenge for Africa’s states, as did the enforcement of “good governance” and the rule of law. In this regard, region-building in Africa has often taken the form of “symbolic” regionalism. As Adebayo Adedeji noted in 2004, regionalism requires a strong and sustained political commitment if it is to take root, let alone develop and prosper, on the continent.

The “new regionalism” approach, which has been adopted against a background of global economic restructuring, seeks to harness a wide range of constituencies already engaged in trans-border activities within regionalisation processes that were previously dominated by states. These actors include traders, migrants, diasporas, multinational and transnational corporations (MNCs and TNCs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations, and the informal sector. Alliances among these constituencies are forging new networks alongside national governments, as well as sub-regional, continental, and international institutions engaged in region-building efforts.

The arbitrary national borders imposed on Africa by European colonialism beginning in the 19th century led to a wide range of disparate fiscal, monetary, and tariff regimes among the continent’s newly independent states. At the same time, these sovereign borders enabled African governments to raise funds through customs and excise revenues. As a result, African policymakers seeking to foster region-building faced a series of dilemmas after the end of the colonial period, beginning in the late 1950s, which were exacerbated by continuing external military interventions on the continent. The development of joint trade policies in West and Central Africa was dominated by French-led schemes, including the creation of a common currency – the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc – as well as the establishment of the Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) in 1973 following the failure of the Union Douanière de l’Afrique Occidentale (UDAO) of 1959 and the establishment of the Union Douanière et Économique de l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) in 1964. However, substantial tariff and fiscal discrepancies existed among the countries that were parties to these schemes – for example, among the six francophone countries in West Africa: Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal, which belonged to the UDAO. In response to these discrepancies, and as a means of survival for smaller economies dependent on cross-border trade, trans-state regionalisation emerged.

Cross-border trade to meet the diverse needs of Africa’s fragmented markets evolved from informal interactions across borders, into complex networks that infiltrated state bureaucracies. As a result, formal and informal region-building efforts diverged. Counter-balancing the top-down imposition of the franc zone, bottom-up regionalism through increased re-exports emerged in entrepôt states such as Benin, Gambia, and Togo. Although the entrepôt states belonged to sub-regional communities, they often disregarded the official trade policies of these blocs. Their economic priorities were rather generally shaped by the great rewards offered by the informal, and often illegal, patterns of trade that connected their sub-regional neighbours to global markets. For example, in 1989, Gambia withdrew from the Senegambia Confederation, which had been founded seven years earlier, in 1982, because its customs union with Senegal could not recompense Banjul for the lost income and employment opportunities that a burgeoning re-export trade could provide. Increasing flows of commodities, such as cars and trucks; drugs; weapons; gold; diamonds and other gems;

53 Bach, “Cross-Border Interactions”.
ivory; cigarettes; and narcotics, were shipped through entrepôt states. Tariff disparities led to Côte d’Ivoire being displaced by Ghana as the world’s leading cocoa exporter; while Benin, which was not itself a cocoa producer, nevertheless raised substantial government revenue from trade in this commodity. In another case, groundnuts from Nigeria were exported to Niger, from which they were re-exported to external markets through Nigeria’s railways. The unprofitable nature of this trade led to groundnut production dwindling in Nigeria. Due to a lack of transparent trade policies and inadequate border controls, “illegal” commerce became entrenched across West Africa and has continued since the 1960s.

These patterns of trade have tended to integrate Africa’s commerce with that of the rest of the world at the expense of intra-continental flows. In order to remedy this anomaly and increase intra-African trade, the World Bank has recommended since the 1990s that Africa’s regional bodies seek to defragment the varying trade regulations imposed by their members. Such defragmentation could address the growing divergence in Africa’s regional integration agenda between bottom-up “regionalism” and top-down “region-building”. This divergence emerged as a crucial challenge following the failure of the Doha round of world trade talks in July 2008. After the Doha negotiations came to a standstill, talks on intra-African free trade areas proliferated, accelerating integration initiatives among the continent’s regional economic communities. Building on World Bank encouragement to defragment national trade rules, the African Union proposed a leaner integration model to be implemented by its 54 member states at sub-regional levels. The programme recommended introducing a range of non-tariff and regulatory barriers to raise transaction costs and limit the illegal movement of capital, goods, services, and people across borders. This model also sought harmonisation of the trade policies of member states.

The African Union’s approach recognises the importance of African border markets in attracting investments from emerging economic powers. The continent has become the home of burgeoning frontier markets, which promise higher returns, as well as greater risks for investors. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) has become the hub for exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in support of such investments. Frontier markets have generally supported the expansion of “developmental states”. For example, South Africa’s membership in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) bloc has helped to connect high-risk investors and exchange-traded funds to the continent, as well as supporting Tshwane’s (Pretoria’s) international leadership aspirations. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, established in 1967, pioneered this approach to regional development, exploiting cross-border interactions across its regional frontier for economic gain. Increased capital flows to Africa have reduced the dependence of African economies on external aid flows. Accordingly, the continent’s policymakers are increasingly seeking to exert autonomous control over the direction of Africa’s development. A number of “potential developmental states” are being created on the continent, including Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Mauritius, and Rwanda – although accurate assessment of the success or otherwise of such states can only happen retroactively after a period of at least 20 years. In addition, developmental states are often threatened by “crony capitalism” through the corrupt tendering and management of contracts by government officials. In this regard, it is important that democratisation that enhances the transparency of government processes form part of the “developmental state” model.

Furthermore, Africa’s structural and capacity constraints severely limit the benefits that can be accrued from exploiting increased inward flows of capital. In this regard, continental trade can be greatly increased by inter-

54 Bach, “Cross-Border Interactions”.
55 Shaw, “The Role of Regional Powers and Developmental States”.
56 Shaw, “The Role of Regional Powers and Developmental States”.
regional trade; as well as economic initiatives such as the tripartite SADC/COMESA/EAC free trade area; the
African Union’s integrated mining vision of 2011; the Kgalagadi Trans-Frontier Park; the Nile Basin Initiative/
Dialogue; as well as infrastructure projects such as the Maputo/Johannesburg trade corridor of 1995 and the AU’s
programme for an Eastern African energy grid from Juba to Maputo. A range of other key multilateral initiatives
have also been increasingly shaped by African perspectives and experiences, including the 1997 Ottawa treaty to
ban landmines, as well as the Partnership Africa Canada; the Kimberley Process, established in 2003; and the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which champions greater commercial transparency and seeks
to break the links between conflicts and illegal mineral extraction and trade. These new economic and political
regionalisms can further enable the continent to leverage its development and access new technologies through
international networks engaging civil society, the private sector, states, and intergovernmental agencies.57

Greater regionalism has also been promoted through innovative sources of finance, such as the African
Development Bank and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), which fund value-added
infrastructure projects. SADC created four spatial development initiatives (SDIs) in 1996, in the areas of energy;
oil and gas extraction; electrical power generation; and water and transport. Such “functional regionalism” can
potentially create benefits by sharing water basins more effectively; enabling free movement of goods and
services along transport corridors; and expanding electricity grids such as that established by the Southern
African Power Pool (SAPP) in 1995. However, functional cooperation can also impose constraints on the
autonomy of national decision-making and may not always lead to strengthened political collaboration. For
example, the substantial functional cooperation established by the East African Community has been marred
by political rivalry among its members as well as by intra- and inter-state conflicts.58 These difficulties had led to
the demise of the original EAC by 1977.

In addition, the continent’s transport, energy, and communications networks remain inadequate. The cost of
redressing Africa’s infrastructure deficit is estimated at $38 billion worth of investments a year, and a further $37
billion annually is needed in operations and maintenance costs, bringing the total price tag to $75 billion.59 This
figure represents 12 percent of Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP), and there currently exists a funding gap
of $35 billion a year.60 Most African countries have struggled to cover infrastructure costs effectively on their
own.61 Transport costs are generally expensive in Africa, and long overland distances are often traversed on
poorly maintained roads.62 Physical infrastructure such as railways and roads should be managed collaboratively
in order to facilitate transport and trade services to unlock Africa’s 15 landlocked countries63 to regional and
global markets, as well as to avoid border delays that slow international road freight by about 10 kilometres an
hour.64 In addition, regional collaboration in continental fibre-optic submarine cables for communications can
reduce internet and international call charges by 50 percent compared with the cost of satellite
communications.65 Reliable electricity supply is also a major priority for Africa, with the continent accounting

57 Shaw, “The Role of Regional Powers and Developmental States”.
58 Ravenhill, “Regional Integration in Africa.”
60 World Bank, “Fact Sheet: Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa”.
de Développement and World Bank, 2010), pp. 20–21.
62 Michele Ruiters, “African Infrastructure Rising”, Great Insights: Political Economy of Regional Integration vol. 2, no. 7 (October 2013), p. 7. See also
63 The 15 land-locked countries are: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central Africa Republic, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda,
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
64 Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, Africa’s Infrastructure, p. 21.
65 Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, Africa’s Infrastructure, pp. 20–21.
for only 3 percent of the world’s total electricity output. Power shortages inhibit the continent’s capacity to strengthen Africa’s manufacturing and service base and thus diversify its export structure. The power grids in many African countries require less electricity that can be efficiently generated by a single plant. If African countries were to share energy resources more effectively, the cost of electricity could be reduced by $2 billion annually. Water security remains another key infrastructural concern for the continent.

The private sector has a crucial role to play in Africa’s regional integration processes. Informal trading networks have promoted an increase in unrecorded regional trade, but have often failed to promote intra-African trade in place of foreign trade. In addition, informal trading networks tend to erode fiscal and monetary control and have sometimes contributed to social fragmentation, violent conflict, and a decline in the legitimacy and probity of the state in Africa. In this regard, opinion is divided on the potential of informal trade networks to promote regional integration in Africa. One view is that such networks represent authentic “regional integration from below”. The other view is that informal trading and financial networks are forces for economic disintegration, political chaos, criminality, and violent conflict.

On balance, informal trading networks represent potentially valuable institutional resources for the development of a more grounded and flexible regionalism. In this regard, coherent planning to promote more beneficial regionalism requires the creation of appropriate templates to collect accurate data on the precise nature of trans-border trade and related activities, and on how these shape, and are shaped by, broader economic and political forces on the continent. Academics and policymakers often measure trans-border activities in different ways. However, effective policy planning requires that all the relevant factors that can impede or enhance cross-border trade in Africa should be considered – for example, the language barriers that may or may not coincide with national borders. Africa is a linguistically diverse continent with between 1,500-2,000 languages spoken in its 55 countries.

67 Liam Halligan, “Global Africa: The Last Investment Frontier”, in Adehage and Whiteman (eds.), The EU and Africa, p. 188.
68 Foster and Bescoño-Garmendia, Africa’s Infrastructure, p. 2.
69 World Bank, “Fact Sheet: Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa”.
3. Region-Building in Southern and Eastern Africa

Southern Africa

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference was created in 1980 to promote solidarity in efforts to decolonise the sub-region in opposition to apartheid South Africa. In 1992, SADCC reconstituted itself as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which now has 15 members,72 adopted a range of regional integration protocols, including the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) in 2003 and the Spatial Development Initiatives in 1996. A sub-regional free trade agreement was launched in August 2008, and a customs union was to be established by 2010, but both have been delayed. The proposed implementation of a common market by 2015 and a monetary union by 2016 have also been postponed. In 2011, SADC, the EAC, and COMESA met to review their 2008 tripartite agreement involving a free trade area for the bloc’s 26 member states,73 a combined population of 530 million people, and a GDP of $1 trillion in 2013. The initiative aims to boost intra-regional trade, attract investment for development, promote cross-regional infrastructure projects, and remove the costs of overlapping regional memberships by harmonising integration programmes. South Africa still accounts for 70 percent of SADC’s GDP, and progress has been slow in implementing the tripartite agreement. Alongside market integration efforts, peace and security initiatives are also seen as critical to SADC’s region-building efforts. In 2004, the organisation adopted a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), which was revised in 2012. However, the plan has been criticised for being vague and ineffectual. In 2008, the SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) was established to act as a standing regional peacekeeping force for deployment on peace and humanitarian missions as part of an AU-coordinated African Standby Force (ASF) to be established by 2015.

SADC remains confronted by a range of challenges in its region-building efforts: the mixed record of democratic governance;74 the lack of institutional coherence and capacity constraints in ensuring that its more than 40 protocols are ratified and implemented; and the institutional pressures of dominant-party states in the sub-region.75 SADC, like many other sub-regional bodies in Africa, is built on a legacy of solidarity in the struggle for independence and democratic rule, which confers substantial legitimacy on former liberation movements that are now ruling parties. For example, long-serving former struggle leaders, such as Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe (who became SADC chair in August 2014) are treated with considerable deference by other African leaders. However, the status accorded such governments and leaders can impede efforts to promote effective democratic governance in Southern Africa.76

Infrastructural deficits have further hindered regional integration efforts. Development agencies and regional banks have promoted infrastructural development in Asia and should do the same in Africa. This role should not
just be left to national governments. Infrastructure development – consisting of operable roads, ports, and railways – is also essential to promoting effective regional integration. For example, only 30 percent of roads in Africa are paved, and costly road freight remains a major barrier to increased trade. However, South Africa, aside from its support for the Maputo Development Corridor, which was officially launched in May 1996, has not done enough to help improve the sub-region’s roads, even though it remains an intra-regional transport hub.

South Africa also has important responsibilities regarding the regulation of its private sector’s engagement with the rest of the continent. Southern African governments have often lowered conditions for foreign investment in order to attract South African business partners. Meanwhile, white-dominated South African firms have sometimes adopted a form of “corporate neo-colonialism” that undermines local producers, farmers, and small businesses in Southern Africa, as well as exporting apartheid-era labour practices that create popular resentment. Tshwane should therefore seek to regulate its private sector to be able to contribute more effectively to inclusive development in the Southern African sub-region.

The treatment of migrants shapes perspectives of how issues of identity and belonging are interpreted. Since migration policies are crafted at the national level, rather than regionally, they tend to undermine shared rules and norms, and thus impede region-building efforts. Anti-immigrant actions by countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana have sometimes hindered regional integration in Southern Africa, as hostility towards migrants has increased across the sub-region due to increasingly limited resources, lack of industrial development, and heightened economic competition. In May 2008, xenophobic violence in South Africa led to 62 African immigrants being killed and 100,000 being displaced. In Zimbabwe, nationalistic anti-immigrant farming policies have been instituted since April 2000, which have sought to hold Britain, as the former colonial power, responsible for compensating dispossessed landowners. These policies have resulted in often violent occupations of white-owned farms. Five of the 15 SADC member states participated in armed struggles, against former colonial regimes in Angola and Mozambique; and white-settler regimes in Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Countries in the sub-region were part of the group of Frontline States (FLS) which sought the end of apartheid in South Africa. SADC and its forerunner, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, were thus founded on the principles of mutual support and collective behaviour among their members. In this regard, exclusionary migration policies across Africa will need to be revised in order to support trade diversification in goods and services, as well as efficient industrialisation through regional cooperation. SADC must also address the development deficits that have fuelled xenophobia in Southern Africa. However, the sub-regional body has its own constraints, including a lack of resources, a disparate membership with widely varying national interests, and the presence of institutional challenges. In addition, the bloc is dependent on external donors, which are expected to fund 61 percent – $54.2 million – of the sub-regional body’s total $88.3 million budget for 2014–2015.

77 See the Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative website (accessed on 1 August 2014 at http://www.mcli.co.za/mcli-web/mdc/mdc-timeline.htm).
78 Nagar, “The Common Market”.
82 Nagar, “The Common Market”.
Eastern Africa

The East African Community, which has a population of 140 million people, was established in 1967. Ten years later, the organisation collapsed due to ideological differences, leadership contests, and divergent views about the benefits of regional integration. It was revived in July 2000. Intra-regional trade in the five-country bloc, which increased by 16 percent from 2005 to 2010, is higher than in any of Africa’s four other sub-regions. Much of this trade, however, largely benefits Kenya and is driven by manufactured products. In 2013, the East African Community signed a protocol outlining plans to establish a monetary union by 2023. Over the past two decades, the Eastern African sub-region, especially the Horn of Africa, has been deeply divided despite IGAD’s efforts, with states either waging war against each other or supporting each other’s rebels. South Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia remain particularly volatile. A 1,700-strong US military presence in Djibouti has focused narrowly on Washington’s “war on terror”, further militarising the sub-region. The democratic processes in the sub-region also remain fragile, with the credibility of political institutions and electoral outcomes continuing to be questioned in countries like Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda. In 2007, East African states initiated their own security mechanism – the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) – as a sub-regional mechanism to enable rapid deployment of forces for peace support operations as part of the African Standby Force. Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda all contribute to the EASF. However, the EASF’s impact cannot be properly assessed until the force becomes fully integrated and operational, by 2015.

The creation of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African can be traced back to ideals of pan-African solidarity and collective self-reliance that were promoted in the 1960s. A plan to establish a preferential trade area for Eastern and Southern Africa was adopted by trade and finance ministers in the sub-region in 1978. The preferential trade area was later transformed into COMESA in 1994, although South Africa declined to join the body after its democratic transition in the same year. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the sub-regional body suffered from two key challenges, which contributed to its poor economic performance: a rise in the external debt of its 19 member states, and sluggish growth as a result of low industrial and manufacturing outputs. The bloc continues to face a range of issues: protectionist trade policies, bureaucratic red-tape that slows the free movement of goods, the weak harmonisation of principles and protocols concerning democratic governance and human security, and overlapping membership with other regional economic communities. COMESA plays an important role in the tripartite agreement forged with SADC and the EAC in 2008. The principle of trade reciprocity embodied in this agreement is vital for the success of such joint efforts at integration. In addition, this group must address the skewed trade with its three large economies – South Africa, Kenya, and Egypt – in order to promote intra-regional trade that can generate positive spill-over effects and grow economies across the region. In this regard, the tripartite grouping has failed to stipulate clearly how member states can diversify their trade and tailor their productive capacities to reap the greatest benefits from regional integration.

84 The East African Common Market comprises the five member states: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.
87 COMESA comprises 19 member states: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, the DRC, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zanzibar, and Zimbabwe.
88 This paragraph and the proceeding two paragraphs are directly based on, Nagar, “The Common Market”.
The tripartite arrangement is further weakened by the lack of implementation of regional protocols, as well as by contradictory commercial arrangements with other trade schemes that have been agreed by its constituent blocs and members. The unwillingness of member states to subordinate national processes to sub-regional institutions has critically weakened region-building efforts. Both SADC and COMESA should thus revisit and legally strengthen their trade agreements, and impose fines on member states that violate jointly agreed trade preferences through external commerce. The two blocs should further suspend the voting rights of states that have not paid their dues to their respective secretariats.

The three constituent blocs in the tripartite arrangement should also address the urgent issue of leveraging benefits from the exploitation of natural resources. Although agriculture accounts for 18 percent of Africa’s GDP, compared with 7 percent for Asia and Latin America, 2 percent for Europe, and 1 percent for the United States, the continent contributes only 3.5 percent of the world’s food exports. In addition, manufacturing in Southern Africa is still dominated by South Africa (as it was during the apartheid era). In order to promote inclusive development, the members of SADC and COMESA must seek to take advantage of their comparative and absolute advantages, leveraging economies of scale in agriculture and seeking greater beneficiation from the exploitation of natural resources. Both blocs must also address how to add value to the goods produced by their members. For example, in 2012, Zimbabwe – which belongs to both SADC and COMESA – sold $8 billion worth of its raw diamonds to India, which subsequently made a profit of $14 billion by polishing the gems and selling them as finished products.
4. Region-Building in West and Central Africa

West Africa

Following West Africa’s independence from colonial rule, most of its newly sovereign states remained within the spheres of influence of their former colonial powers: France, Britain, and Portugal. This exacerbated divisions among the fledgling African nations, with the neo-colonial role of France in the sub-region in particular perpetuating the split between francophone and anglophone states. West Africa’s new states also had to address their own internal problems. In 1967, the Eastern region seceded as the Republic of Biafra, sparking a bloody three-year civil war. Following the end of this conflict, security was critical to the creation of the Economic Community of West African States, with Nigeria pushing the process after some of its neighbours, like Côte d’Ivoire, had been used to support secessionists during its civil war. Nigeria’s Minister for Economic Development and Reconstruction, Adebayo Adedeji, proposed the idea of ECOWAS at a meeting between Nigeria’s head of state, General Yakubu Gowon, and Togo’s president, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, in April 1972.

Sixteen countries joined ECOWAS when it was created in 1975: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritius (which subsequently left the group in December 2000), Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The bloc identified six priority areas: building a regional road network; creating a regional airline; providing regional infrastructure to facilitate trade and investment; establishing a clearing and payments union; facilitating the free movement of people, goods, and services within West Africa; and abolishing foreign exchange controls. Nigeria sought to lead these efforts as the dominant sub-regional economy, but its efforts were often frustrated by France, which encouraged francophone states to establish rival organisations such as the CEAO in 1973, which later became known as the Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) in 1994.

West Africa has been one of Africa’s most volatile and conflict-prone sub-regions, which has also hindered region-building efforts. Thirty-seven coups took place in West Africa between 1960 and 1990. Civil wars occurred in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau from the 1990s. More recently, Mali, Guinea, and parts of Nigeria have experienced instability. In 1981, ECOWAS adopted a Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence to promote a shared approach to safeguarding regional security. Subsequently, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was established in 1990. ECOWAS established a governance protocol in 2001 and has contributed to democratisation efforts in Guinea, Niger, and Mali. West Africa has gone further than any other sub-region to develop a security mechanism, with ECOMOG deploying several peacekeeping missions since 1990 in: Liberia from 1990-1998; Sierra Leone from 1990-1998; Guinea-Bissau from 1990-1998; Côte d’Ivoire in 2003; Liberia in 2003; and in Mali in 2013-2014. ECOWAS has also scored some notable successes in mediating conflicts and supporting electoral processes within West Africa. Countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone have all benefited from the bloc’s electoral assistance.

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91 Adedeji, “ECOWAS”.
Based largely on ECOMOG’s experiences, the ECOWAS protocol of 1999 called for the establishment of a rapidly deployable standby force (ECOBRIG). This brigade also enables soldiers to undertake exchange programmes in West African military training institutions and engage in external training exercises involving the United Nations and the African Union. As part of the African Standby Force, ECOWAS will contribute 7,000 troops, that can be deployed within 90 days. ECOWAS has further established an innovative funding model for itself, charging a community levy of 0.5 percent on all imports to the bloc; other regional economic communities and the African Union could usefully emulate this model. The revised ECOWAS treaty of 1993 established a sub-regional parliament and a court to safeguard the full participation of member states in decision-making and to adjudicate disputes among them. The sub-regional body has also promoted frameworks in the areas of conflict prevention, governance, and elections. The 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security seeks to provide an operational framework for peacekeeping that defines the respective roles of the military and political leaders in such interventions and also makes provision for preventive diplomacy. The 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance constitutes a normative framework for the promotion of democracy that advocates “zero tolerance” for coups and unconstitutional seizures of power. It also stipulates modalities for the holding of credible elections, including that electoral laws should not be modified in the six months before polls.

However, in contrast to its achievements in promoting security, ECOWAS has generally failed to advance economic integration in West Africa, despite its efforts to establish a trade liberalisation scheme in 1990 and a common external tariff in 2008. Formal and informal intra-regional trade among ECOWAS members constituted a mere 10 and 15 percent respectively of West Africa’s total trade in 2013. Although the sub-regional bloc has issued standard national passports and travel documents across its 15 member states, corrupt and inadequate customs, immigration, and security controls at border posts continue to prevent the free movement of goods and people within the sub-region. However, ECOWAS has promoted greater intra-regional private sector engagement. Feasibility studies have been completed on the establishment of an ECOWAS Investment Guarantee Agency (EIGA), a Credit Risk Database, and a Policy Framework for Private Sector Development and Investment Promotion. Eleven Nigerian firms, with capital markets of over $1 billion, including seven banks, are listed among the 12 largest companies in West Africa.

ECOWAS’s stated mission is “to create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance and where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation”. But the bloc has been critically weakened by widespread corruption among some of its governments. For example, General Sani Abacha embezzled an estimated $3 billion during his five years as Nigeria’s head of state, between 1993 and 1998. Many states in West Africa have also failed to implement democratic governance reforms to ensure that their executives are accountable to their parliaments and people for their policies and actions.

Economic inequality within West African states remains a crucial challenge. In 2014, Nigeria, which has oil reserves of 37.2 trillion barrels (28 percent of Africa’s total), became the continent’s leading economic power. The country’s $510 billion dollar GDP, however, equates to an average per capita income of $3,000 a year. About 136 million Nigerians out of a population of 170 million people live below the poverty line, on less than $1 a day. As a result, Nigeria was listed alongside Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d’Ivoire as having among the world’s worst poverty rates by a Failed States Index produced by the Fund for Peace, a Washington, D.C.-based NGO, in 2013.

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Notwithstanding ECOWAS’s achievements, historical colonial ties continue to undermine regional integration efforts in West Africa. France still wields substantial military, political, and economic clout in the sub-region—a situation that has been exacerbated by the weakness and lack of strategic vision shown by the Nigerian government. The terrorist threat from Boko Haram, which has destabilised Nigeria and Mali, could thus spread to the rest of the sub-region. ECOWAS’s failures illustrate the inability of most African governments to implement effective policies to promote integration at the national and sub-regional levels. Region-building often requires a strong sub-regional hegemon like Nigeria to lead the process. If this leadership falters and the hegemon neglects its domestic socio-economic responsibilities, integration efforts also suffer.

Central Africa

Central Africa’s sub-regional body, the 10-member Economic Community of Central African States, was established in October 1983 by the UDEAC, comprising Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, and Gabon. ECCAS began functioning in 1985, but was inactive for several years because of financial difficulties mainly due to non-payment of membership fees and a lack of political commitment among sub-regional governments. In February 1998, Central African leaders committed themselves to reviving the body. However, the two-decade conflict in the DRC has led to over 3 million deaths, while Burundi and Rwanda remain fragile in terms of democratic governance. At a summit conference of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, in February 1999, ECCAS member states created an organisation for the promotion, maintenance, and consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa, known as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX). The Council established three organs: the Central African Early Warning System (MARAC); the Defence and Security Commission (CDS); and the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC). However, technical problems with creating ECCAS’s structures, as well as the pursuit of parochial national interests by member states, have frustrated the effective operation of these security mechanisms. ECCAS’s members have therefore struggled to agree on the relationship between ECCAS, COPAX, and MARAC. Moreover, Central African states have responded to the failure to create an institutional framework for managing conflicts by seeking membership in alternative sub-regional bodies. ECCAS has established a 2,177-strong regional brigade as its contribution to the African Standby Force, though there is no expectation that such a force would be able to stem instability in this sub-region.

Weak states tend to generate weak regional organisations, and weak regional organisations are often unable to resolve the intra- and inter-state conflicts that generate weak states and undermine national institutions. The Economic Community of Central African States covers 5.4 million square kilometres and a population of 70 million people. However, like its predecessor, UDEAC; ECCAS has been largely ineffective. In 1998, the heads of state of the ECCAS bloc met in the Gabonese capital, Libreville, to try and find lasting solutions to the sub-region’s political tensions, including intra- and inter-state conflicts between Rwanda and Burundi; Rwanda and the DRC; Equatorial Guinea and Gabon; and CAR and the DRC. In 2003, the ECCAS secretariat turned to the European Union for funding assistance to strengthen its peace and security regional mechanisms and instruments. However, the sub-region continues to be riven by conflicts. In particular, the governments of Uganda and the DRC remain at odds, with Kampala continuing to harbour Congolese rebels and providing a

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95 The Economic Community of Central African States comprises 10 member states: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe.
conduit for the export of illegally mined resources from the DRC such as gold, coltan, and diamonds. The failure of region-building efforts in Central Africa can be attributed to the weakness of the sub-region’s states and national institutions which has hindered sub-regional economic integration.

The challenges of region-building in Central Africa have been exacerbated by the conflict and violence that have wracked the sub-region since ECCAS’s establishment. As a result, this sub-regional body lacks strong policymaking and institutional capacities. The DRC, the potential regional hegemon of Central Africa, has been unable to perform this role, due to a weakened state and a continuing bloody war in the east of the country waged by Rwandan-backed rebels. In addition, the Congo’s mineral wealth and abundant natural resources – it boasts large reserves of gold, cobalt, diamonds, coal, and water reserves – have been diverted by the country’s war economy from funding much-needed national and sub-regional development. The government in Kinshasa has further failed to establish functioning and adequately staffed state institutions or to implement coherent national policies. Meanwhile, the tiny state of Rwanda, which has contributed to the destabilisation of the DRC and the looting of its mineral resources (along with Uganda), is one of the few states with the capacity to project military force in the sub-region. Rwanda boasted one of the highest rates of economic growth on the continent in 2014, at 7.5 percent, and has developed its military capacity largely due to the donor support that it received – totalling $4.2 billion – between 2005 and 2012.

Regional integration cannot take place in the absence of stable functioning states with secure borders. Strong governmental institutions are required to establish proper sub-regional regulatory processes, which in turn can minimise corruption and illegal trade, and support inclusive economic growth. Meanwhile, although the bloc has been ineffective in managing conflicts in the sub-region, ECCAS states have played a peacekeeping role in Central African Republic with the deployment of 6,000 troops beginning in 2008, which came under a UN umbrella in September 2014.

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5. Region-Building in North Africa

In February 1989, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia met to hold the first summit of the Arab Maghreb Union. The AMU is based on a trade agreement that seeks to strengthen political and economic cooperation, and unity, among its five member states. In 1994, members agreed to establish a sub-regional free trade zone, though this was never implemented. Many of the more than 90 million inhabitants of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia favour the free movement of goods, services, and people across national borders in the Maghreb. The five AMU member countries, which have a combined GDP of $414 billion, share a cultural, linguistic, and religious heritage, as well as structural links to the dominant former colonial power in the sub-region: France. Support for the idea of regional integration among the developing economies of the Maghreb predates independence. However, the political map of North Africa has hindered region-building efforts. Oil and gas-rich Algeria is the potential hegemon of the Maghreb sub-region, but its divisions with Morocco over the Western Sahara and the two countries’ rivalry over the leadership of Northwest Africa have frozen regional integration and cooperation for four decades. The Arab Maghreb Union remains moribund, and as a group has not met for over a decade. Other challenges facing the countries of the Maghreb include: underdevelopment, environmental problems such as drought, and regional security concerns emanating from instability in neighbouring states such as Mali and Mauritania, as well as threats from armed groups such as al-Qaeda.

Substantial trade barriers – both tariff and non-tariff – have blocked trade among Maghrebi countries, hampering economic integration. Algeria’s border with Morocco has remained closed since 1994. Intra-regional trade remained a paltry 13 percent of the Maghreb’s total commerce in 2010. Maghrebi countries have often developed strong commercial links with countries outside the African Union, preferring economic agreements that strengthen such trade ties. These efforts include a Euro-Mediterranean trade association agreement between the EU and Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia; as well as a free trade agreement between Morocco and the US. In addition, France remains the sub-region’s largest trade partner. Oil and hydrocarbons constitute more than 90 percent of the Maghreb’s export earnings as well as most of its foreign investment, with the Algerian and Libyan economies dependent on these revenues. Algeria, in particular, has sometimes been hostile towards foreign investment, having offered tax exemptions for such investment between 2000 and 2007, before reversing this policy. Trade within the sub-region is further hampered by the limited complementarity of the Maghreb’s economies. For example, Morocco and Tunisia produce similar commodities such as phosphates and textiles.

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100 This section is partly based on presentations made by Azzedine Layachi, “Region-Building in North Africa” at the CCR policy research seminar “Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa”, Cape Town, 28-30 April 2014.
103 Layachi, “Region-Building in North Africa”.
In addition, the Maghrebi states have failed to standardise and harmonise their trade regimes or to build sub-regional institutional capacity through training and information-sharing. Furthermore, competing economic cooperation initiatives, such as the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, have been established, involving AMU states.

Although sub-regional blocs were originally created to promote economic integration, they have also increasingly assumed peace and security responsibilities. In November 2008, the Arab Maghreb Union created the North African Regional Capability Force, though expectations are low that the AMU would be able to meet its obligations under the African Standby Force. North African countries have periodically engaged with the rest of the continent, although they have been criticised for favouring links with Europe and the Arab world. Under Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria led efforts to resolve security issues, such as the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000, and has also supported the $20 billion construction of a pipeline to transport gas from Nigeria through Algeria to Europe. This project is currently on hold due to regional security problems. Morocco has also helped to establish banks across the continent.

Although the Maghreb lacks the necessary economic conditions for market integration, the countries of the sub-region need to seek and foster complementarity among their national economies. Such collaboration would enable them to shield each other from the economic shocks that can occur in an increasingly globalised economy, such as the world financial crisis of 2008-2009. Maghrebi countries can also seek sub-regional convergence through common adherence to minimum commercial standards set by the World Trade Organisation.

Regional integration in North Africa can further be promoted through shared social and religious values. However, the sub-region’s youth and leaders often have opposing political views. The “Afro-Arab Spring”, which started in December 2010 in Tunisia and spread across the sub-region to Egypt and Libya, created an added challenge to sub-regional cooperation and region-building efforts in the Maghreb. In addition, ideological differences – which range from a socialist system in Algeria to monarchical rule in Morocco – continue to prevent the Maghreb from moving towards regional integration. The AMU has thus been rendered obsolete for the past two decades.

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6. Region-Building in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America

Europe

The European Union is an economic and political union of 28 member states established by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993. The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, which was implemented in 2009, is the latest major amendment to the constitutional basis of the European Union. The EU operates through a system of independent institutions and inter-governmental decisions by its member states. The organisation has grown in size, through the accession of new member states, and in power, through the addition of policies that have created a single market for the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital; the adoption of legislation that promotes a common passport and border-control region known as the Schengen Area; and the implementation of common policies on trade, agriculture, fisheries, regional development, and enhanced security. The EU remains the world’s most successful effort at regional integration, and can potentially provide useful lessons for the AU, especially around the development of its Commission, Council, Parliament, and Court of Justice, which all acquired increasing powers as they gained credibility and effectiveness; and around its provision of “public goods” to EU members in the form of an international market, a single currency, and enhanced security.

Five key factors supported European integration after the end of the Second World War (1939-1945): the discrediting of virulent nationalism; the presence of a significant outside threat in the form of the Soviet Union, combined with the availability of outside support from the United States; the importance of maintaining geopolitical relevance in a superpower-dominated era; the need for Germany and Italy to rehabilitate their international reputations after defeat in the Second World War; and greater government involvement in economies, which led to an increasing awareness of economic interdependence. European integration was fostered by two schemes: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951, which promoted cooperation in heavy industry; and the European Economic Community (EEC) of 1957, which built on commercial and trade links between its six founding member states: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

The European Union’s longevity may be attributed to the strong political support provided by its core members, such as France and Germany; the continuing economic incentives offered by the creation of a common market; the adaptability of the EU’s goals and institutions; and the growth of its membership from an original six countries in 1957 to 28 by 2014. The relatively vague preamble of the 1957 Treaty of Rome called for “an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe”, which provided a broad remit for European integration, allowing the project to evolve in ways that would not have been foreseen by its founders or by

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109 This section is largely based on the presentation made by N. Piers Ludlow, “Region-Building in Europe”, at the CCR policy research seminar “Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa”, Cape Town, 28-30 April 2014.
110 The European Union comprises 28 member states: Austria, Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
the Americans who originally promoted Europe’s reconstruction after the Second World War in 1945. The European Union has been advanced, rather than hindered, by a wide range of incentives to integrate, and there have been competing visions of how its institutions should evolve. The organisation’s ability to attract new members among its neighbours has enabled the integration process to continue, although the “widening” of the body has come at the expense of its “deepening”.

The European Union has always been an elite-driven project that has failed to engage its population of 500 million effectively: the “democratic deficit” at the heart of European integration. There was little popular outcry when the continent’s political elites faltered in their drive to continue with European integration following the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Comparable regional structures elsewhere in the world should seek to avoid creating such structural weakness by engaging their populations more closely from the outset.

It will be important for Africa to try to formulate a unifying common political imperative for integration, as there was for the EU. Europe has had the luxury of time and a US security shield in promoting its integration processes. This has not been the case for more recent integration projects in Africa, which may be attempting to implement later stages of integration before the preliminary stages have been effectively completed. In this regard, the Southern African Development Community has opted for relatively limited functional cooperation rather than seeking to imitate the EU’s more ambitious supranational model of regional integration. The history of the European Union teaches the lesson that favourable circumstances and political will are the prerequisites for successful region-building. Although the EU’s support is useful for African integration efforts, Africans themselves must take the lead in building the continent’s organisations and ensuring their popular legitimacy.

Southeast Asia

After the end of the Second World War in 1945, efforts to enhance Southeast Asia’s economic integration were hindered by US political engagement in the sub-region as well as the continuing dominance of Britain and France as colonial powers. In the 1950s, Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore were still colonised by Britain; and Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam by France. ASEAN itself was created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand in response to a perceived communist threat, during the US war in Vietnam (1959-1975) and at the height of Mao Zedong’s “Cultural Revolution” in China during the 1960s. Politically, ASEAN’s original ideological outlook was thus very conservative. In addition, the association was split by conflicts between Malaysia and Singapore, and between Malaysia and the Philippines, until 1971, when the five ASEAN members signed a declaration to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the sub-region. As political turmoil subsided in Southeast Asia in the 1970s, the bloc proved that it could help to maintain peace and security and promote economic development. After 1984, five new members joined: Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. Two other countries – Papua New Guinea and East Timor – have applied to join the association, which now comprises ten members. The bloc also leads other fora, such as the ASEAN Plus Three group, which includes China, Japan, and South Korea; as well as the

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114 Ludlow, “Region-Building in Europe”.
115 Ludlow, “Region-Building in Europe”.
116 This section is partly based on the presentation made by Mely Caballero Anthony, “The Case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)” at the CCR policy research seminar “Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa”, Cape Town, 28-30 April 2014.
117 The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) was signed on 8 August 1967.
118 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations comprises 10 permanent member states: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
ASEAN Regional Forum, which is an informal organisation that seeks to address security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and has 27 members, including Asian and Pacific countries as well as Australia, Canada, the European Union, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States.\textsuperscript{119}

ASEAN has been forced to strengthen its peace and security architecture in response to a series of crises in the region between 1997 and 2008. These included: the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998; political turmoil in East Timor in 1999, which sparked a regional humanitarian emergency; increasing levels of trans-national crime, drug trafficking, and human smuggling; the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak in 2003; the Indonesian earthquake and tsunami of 2004; political turmoil in Myanmar in 2007; and the devastation wrought by cyclone Nargis in 2008.

In an attempt to promote a common market, the ASEAN summit of December 1987 introduced agreements to reduce regional trade barriers. In this regard, the group’s integration efforts were mainly market- rather than institution-led, until the financial crises in Asia in 1997/1998 resulted in the bloc establishing prominent fora with external actors. These included an economic partnership forged with Australia, India, and New Zealand in 2005. The bloc also sought greater cooperation with China, Japan, and South Korea in the energy and food sectors, although this engagement has mainly helped to accelerate economic growth in the East Asian countries, particularly Japan, rather than in the Southeast Asian states. ASEAN adopted this outward- rather than inward-looking approach to regionalism partly due to the sub-region’s relatively limited geographical reach, although it constitutes the largest free trade area in the world in terms of population, with 600 million citizens.

ASEAN’s main aims include: accelerating economic growth and social progress; promoting regional peace, stability, and development;\textsuperscript{120} and providing opportunities for member countries to discuss their differences peacefully.\textsuperscript{121} In 2003, ASEAN moved from region-building language to a community approach, establishing three pillars for its economic, political, and socio-cultural activities, and also set up its Political and Security Community (APSC) that same year. In 2006, the bloc’s economic ministers agreed to develop a blueprint for an ASEAN economic community. A year later, an ASEAN Charter was signed, guaranteeing community rights and setting the terms for the organisation’s future development. Further human rights instruments have subsequently been drafted, including: the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) of 2009; the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) of 2010; and the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights of 2012. However, many of the bloc’s member states have not signed or implemented these important regional instruments; and ASEAN countries must still address the widespread marginalisation of “minority” ethnic groups, which is often reflected in their high levels of poverty.

ASEAN sought to create a single market by 2015, with a master plan for connectivity in the areas of infrastructure, rules, and people-to-people engagement. The bloc’s regional integration experiences can, in some ways, be compared with Africa’s integration efforts, as both ASEAN and Africa are developing regions attempting to break free of former colonial powers. The principal exports of ASEAN countries, like those of African countries,

\textsuperscript{119} The ASEAN Regional Forum comprises 27 participants: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, East Timor, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam.


\textsuperscript{121} See the Association of Southeast Asian Nations website, http://www.asean.org.
continue to consist largely of raw materials. Yet ASEAN’s current intra-regional trade is almost double that of Africa, at 22 percent in 2013, as a result of its members having diversified their productive base. ASEAN’s economic success could provide valuable lessons for Africa in understanding how smaller economies like Cambodia and Laos have been able to participate in production networks with middle- and high-income countries such as Singapore and Malaysia.

ASEAN needs to reduce sub-regional poverty and narrow the development gaps among its members. Two of its ten member states – Cambodia and Myanmar – remain among the poorest in the world. Myanmar’s per capita GDP of less than $1,000 compares with $50,000 in Singapore. The bloc continues to face key challenges in promoting integration and security and in establishing a greater sense of a community among its citizens. In addition, the protection of women’s and children’s rights should be addressed as a cross-cutting issue by sub-regional commissions established by ASEAN.

Latin America

Latin America’s common market, the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), was founded in 1991 following close trade collaboration between Argentina and Brazil. Previously, in 1986, Argentinean president Raúl Alfonsin and Brazilian president José Sarney had signed the Brazilian-Argentine Integration Act, which established the Programme for Integration and Economic Cooperation (PICE) and sought to promote intra-regional trade. Four years later, in 1990, Argentinean president Carlos Menem and his Brazilian counterpart Fernando Collor de Mello sought to accelerate the pace of integration between the two countries by signing the Buenos Aires Act. During the early 1990s, the new governments in both countries embraced the “Washington Consensus” of liberalised economic policies. In 1991, Paraguay and Uruguay joined Argentina and Brazil in forming MERCOSUR after the four countries signed the Treaty of Asunción. The new trade bloc aimed to create a free trade area and a customs union by 1995. Trade liberalisation processes were introduced that sought gradually to remove tariffs among members and to impose a common external tariff, although MERCOSUR states were allowed to choose exemptions in specific sectors. The first two years of regional integration successfully promoted trade among the four countries. In June 2012, the organisation suspended Paraguay for having impeached and ousted its president, Fernando Lugo, through undemocratic processes. Venezuela joined the sub-regional body in June 2012, while Bolivia acceded to the treaty six months later. Members have agreed to create an integrated regional market by strengthening the economic integration process through efficient use of available resources, preservation of the environment, and improvement of infrastructure coordination and the macroeconomic policies of MERCOSUR’s national economies. In 1994, the bloc was transformed from a free trade area into a customs union.

MERCOSUR’s primary interest has been to eliminate obstacles to regional trade such as high tariffs and income inequalities. The prospects for deepening integration within the grouping, however, depend on overcoming political and economic deficits underpinned by economic asymmetries, institutional conflicts, policy divergences, conflicting societal/business interests, and inconsistent political preferences that have diminished

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122 Nagar, “The Politics of Regional Integration in Africa”.
124 This section is partly based on the presentation made by Laura Gomez-Mera, “Lessons from Latin America: MERCOSUR (the Common Market of the South)”, at the CCR policy research seminar “Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa”, Cape Town, 28-30 April 2014.
the prospects for a positive regional integration agenda. Non-compliance has been widespread within MERCOSUR, and the issue of forum-shopping has also been an obstacle to region-building efforts in Latin America. In addition, some of the bloc’s members – which have included Venezuela since 2012 – are part of the free trade area but not of the customs union. Despite MERCOSUR’s recurrent crises and forecasts predicting the bloc’s demise, political cooperation continued after 1999, even though the political and economic rationale for the regional integration project may have slowed.

Brazil accounts for 75 percent of MERCOSUR’s gross domestic product and about 70 percent of its population. However, the sub-regional hegemon trades more with Europe and the US than with its partners in MERCOSUR. Brazil’s perceived reluctance to use its position as sub-regional hegemon to prioritise the bloc’s economic stability has created resentment among the sub-region’s smaller economies. MERCOSUR’s members have also found it increasingly difficult to keep pace with implementing the bloc’s many multilateral agreements. In addition, an increasing number of trade agreements have been signed with the European Union. These have often benefited Brussels while undermining Latin American integration efforts. Nevertheless, MERCOSUR’s management of its trade relations with Europe can provide useful lessons for Africa in future trade talks with the EU. Inaugurated in July 2014, the role of the BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB) in promoting inclusive development and regional integration in Africa and Latin America should also be examined.

Although trade in agricultural products, textiles, and footwear was liberalised under South America’s MERCOSUR, the bloc’s members broke their regional promises, imposing restrictions on intra-regional trade and introducing unilateral changes to the organisation’s common external tariff. Despite diplomatic efforts to resolve these violations, unresolved tariff issues eventually caused serious political rifts within the group. As a result, MERCOSUR established a permanent regional court of appeal and a structural convergence fund. Other subsequent programmes, which have generally been led by Brazil, have also sought to institutionalise integration efforts across the sub-continent. These have included: the 2000 Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), which has promoted intra-continental transport, energy, and telecommunications links; MERCOSUR’s membership in the South American Community of Nations (SACN); and the adoption of a Competition Adaptation Mechanism (CAM) by MERCOSUR in 2006, which provided a legal framework for the introduction of tariff restrictions by member states. However, trade disputes within MERCOSUR have persisted – for example, the continuing dispute between Argentina and Brazil over poultry.

Meanwhile, the two largest members of the bloc – Argentina and Brazil – have been diversifying their trade beyond the sub-region with external partners such as the United States and the European Union. In 2004, Brazil signed a trade partnership with India and South Africa as part of the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) bloc, and has also pursued closer trade with the other members of the BRICS bloc. Brazil’s engagement with external partners has raised its profile as an emerging global power and created important new initiatives such as the BRICS New Development Bank, with a reserve fund of $100 billion and short-term lending due to start in 2016. Partly in response to Brazil’s increasing number of bilateral economic deals, MERCOSUR’s second largest economy, Argentina, has also signed a series of bilateral agreements, including with the US.

MERCOSUR’s failure to strengthen sub-regional economic links, which was shown by the lack of a collective response to the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, indicates the importance of political will to the success of regional integration efforts. The bloc’s weakness has been exacerbated by the disparate bilateral and multilateral trade agreements signed by its leading members. MERCOSUR’s instability has also undermined Brazil’s capacity to leverage its role as a sub-regional hegemon to play a more global role – embodied in its pursuit of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. This grouping could learn lessons from Africa in promoting norms of intervention and building regional security mechanisms. Twenty national elections were held on the African continent in 2014 – thus enhancing the security of citizens and providing the basis for deeper regional integration.
7. The African Union, the European Union, and the Role of Visionaries in Region-Building

In the post-Second World War era, after 1945, the study of region-building and regional integration was dominated by an empirical focus on Europe, in particular theories related to the evolution of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, of the European Economic Community in 1957, and of the European Union in 1993.

The initial aim of the ECSC was to provide a framework to produce and market coal and steel across Europe, to prevent destructive competition, and ultimately to regulate and end tariffs and border controls. In fostering transnational interdependence in one area, the ECSC created the possibility of interdependence in other areas through “spill-over effects” for political cooperation in security initiatives. Since the end of the Cold War, the advent of the “new regionalism” debates has generated an expansion of ideas associated with a non–state centric view of region-building in which the role played by international organisations, civil society actors, and the private sector is seen as being just as important as that played by the policies and practices of state-based organisations. The contemporary debate on region-building also considers the role of emerging powers such as Brazil, China, and India.

Recent shifts in the focus on regionalism have challenged the notion of treating Europe as “the prototype for region-building”. In this regard, Nigerian political economist Claude Ake’s seminal work on the theory of political integration in the 1960s highlighted the difficulties of building a coherent regional political culture within Africa’s regional economic communities. The challenges of promoting a regional political agenda based on a common set of values and principles have been further exacerbated by inter- and intra-regional rivalries between and among member states, and by the weakness of mainstreaming regional commitments into national laws and policies. Subsequent studies have also noted that the European Union’s experience is not transferable to Africa, since the EU was specifically designed to address the political, economic, social, and cultural conditions in Europe. Accordingly, a growing body of contemporary literature has focused on the factors that have made region-building and regional integration difficult in Africa. These include issues related

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135 See Yared Tesfaye Abebe, Regional Integration Schemes in Africa: Limits and Benefits of Taking on the EU’s Model to the AU (Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic, 2011).
to the diversity and conditions of African economies; the unwillingness of African leaders to cede sovereignty to a supranational body; the inability to develop and strengthen regional identities; and the competing interests of member states in regional institutions.\textsuperscript{136}

In relation to the economic ties between Africa and Europe, the trade relationship between the 28-member European Union and the 79-member African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group was established in 1975 on the principle of non-reciprocity. The EU recognised that the developing countries in the ACP often lacked the productive capacity to offer goods for mutual trade on an equitable basis, and thus sought to support their economic development by giving them non-reciprocal access to the European market. However, in 2000, economic partnership agreements (EPAs) were introduced by Brussels to replace the earlier preferential non-reciprocal trade deals agreed with ACP members.\textsuperscript{137} Subsequently, the EU’s partnership with Africa has appeared increasingly shaped by European trade interests rather than Africa’s development priorities. The European Union’s paternalistic insistence on implementing the EPAs in their current form has damaged trust in the relationship between Africa and Brussels. An October 2014 deadline has been set for the ratification of all economic partnership agreements. This deadline has weakened the negotiating positions of African countries, since states failing to ratify the EPAs are likely to incur substantial economic penalties. In particular, conditions are attached to the disbursement of aid by the European Development Fund (EDF), which has allocated a total of €28 billion to ACP countries from 2014 to 2020. If the EU considers that insufficient progress has been made towards signing EPAs, it can thus apply pressure at the country level. Meanwhile, these agreements, which will bind African economies for terms of between 50 and 60 years, will grant Brussels considerable leverage over the continent. The financial returns for Europe from the EPAs are estimated to be 10 times greater than the €28 billion that Brussels is offering to ACP governments in the form of aid.

Africa thus urgently needs to develop a coherent strategy to promote its own interests in the sub-regional EPAs being negotiated with Brussels. The various sub-regional configurations for these agreements – Central, West, Eastern and Southern Africa – are not always aligned with the continent’s existing regional economic communities. The EU’s negotiation of different terms among these blocs and with individual countries within them may thus undermine region-building efforts in Africa. The continent’s four sub-regions in the EPA negotiations must share lessons with each other and coordinate their efforts to improve their negotiation processes. Synergies among the EPAs also need to be explored in more detail.\textsuperscript{138}

Africa should seek to negotiate as a bloc – as the EU does – with a more capacitated African Union playing a greater role in EPA talks. While technical cooperation between the two continental bodies is improving, their relationship remains difficult. However, Africa’s leverage in negotiations may increase as it continues to grow economically and demographically, while the EU’s economic and population growth falls. During the EU/Africa Summit in Brussels in April 2014, there was a growing recognition of the need to foster a new relationship between both continents based on an acknowledgement of Africa’s impressive economic growth and the growing presence of newer investors on the continent such as China, Brazil, and India.

The EU and the United Nations have often developed their strategies for addressing security issues in Africa in relative isolation rather than coordinating their efforts with African regional organisations. These external interventions launched by the EU and the UN are often initiated at a bilateral level, with institutional, financial, and military support provided at a later stage. Some African leaders continue to turn to former colonial powers rather than to African institutions when conflicts erupt, as was the case in Mali and Central African Republic, rendering meaningless the idea of “African solutions to African problems”. Since 2008, the EU has invested more than €600 million in peace and security initiatives in Africa, providing training, supplying equipment, and deploying as well as funding troops. However, the African Union has increasingly sought to take charge of efforts to maintain peace and security on the continent since 2011, when the Anglo-French-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) intervention in Libya unleashed an uncontrolled spread of armed groups and weaponry across the Sahel, destabilising Mali. The AU has led interventions into Sudan (2004 to 2007) and Somalia (since 2007).

Finally, visionaries like France’s Jean Monnet, Argentina’s Raúl Prebisch, and Nigeria’s Adebayo Adedeji promoted regional integration and economic development across the three continents of Europe, Latin America, and Africa. All three prophets of regional integration transcended parochial nationalities to become pan-European, pan-Latin American, and pan-African citizens. Their efforts triggered processes that mainly helped to restructure economies after cataclysmic events: the Second World War of 1939–1945, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the Nigerian civil war of 1967–1970 respectively. It is important, however, to note the differences in the level of economic development and challenges faced by Latin America and Africa in contrast to Europe. Placing Monnet, Prebisch, and Adedeji in historical context highlights the role that individuals with vision and forceful personalities can play in driving institutions to adopt ideas, but also demonstrates the institutional, regional, and external constraints on the implementation of these ideas, which still rely on the decisions and vested interests of powerful national governments and other important actors.

From left, Dr Adekeye Adeboye, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa; Dr Ulrich Golaszinski, Resident Representative, and Regional Project Coordinator for Southern Africa, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Gaborone, Botswana; and Ambassador Ajay Bramdeo, African Union (AU) Ambassador to the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group of States, Brussels, Belgium

139 Adebajo, “The Role of Visionaries in Region-Building”.
140 Adebajo, “The Role of Visionaries in Region-Building”.
Monnet arguably had the greatest impact of the three, since the political will for countries to collaborate with each other already existed in post-war Europe. The Frenchman served as Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations (the precursor to the UN) from 1919 to 1923, and headed the Commissariat du Plan, which was mandated to oversee post-war reconstruction in France. As the author of the 1950 Schuman Declaration, which led to the creation of the ECSC in 1951, Monnet is widely considered to be the “father of European integration”.  

By contrast, Prebisch and Adedeji often pursued their promotion of economic integration and development in relative isolation. Prebisch, who served as the Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) between 1950 and 1963, was a thinker with influence far beyond Latin America. Prebisch challenged dominant theories of global trade and the international division of labour predicated on the export of finished products by the rich North – the “centre” – to a “periphery” of countries in the global South, which in return export unfinished raw materials to the North at uncompetitive prices.  

Adedeji recognised the importance of region-building to the long-term sustainability and development of African countries. As the minister of economic development under the military regime of General Yakubu Gowon from 1971 to 1975, he crafted and implemented a range of infrastructure projects to help rebuild Nigeria after its civil war of 1967–1970. As Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa for 16 years, from 1975 to 1991, Adedeji supported African regional integration processes by establishing the Economic Community of West African States in 1975, the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) in 1981 (which became COMESA in 1993), and the Economic Community of Central African States in 1983, although none of the three organisations have subsequently promoted regional trade sufficiently. Adedeji criticised the structural adjustment programmes implemented by the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s as representing “growth without development”. He also recognised the need to win popular support for ideas of region-building and economic integration among Africa’s one billion citizens. To this end, the continent’s leaders need to start managing the exploitation of Africa’s resources more effectively in order to promote inclusive development that can benefit their populations more widely. Furthermore, the AU’s political clout will continue to be undermined internationally by contradictory positions adopted by its 54 members unless the continental body becomes a truly supranational institution, capable of ensuring implementation of its decisions by African governments. In this regard, AU summits should seek to take fewer decisions, while monitoring member states more closely to ensure the implementation of such decisions.

From left, Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town; Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; and Ms Rosaline Daniel, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Adebajo, “The Role of Visionaries in Region-Building”.
Adebajo, “The Role of Visionaries in Region-Building”.
Adebajo, “The Role of Visionaries in Region-Building”.

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Policy Recommendations

The following ten policy recommendations emerged from the Cape Town policy research seminar of April 2014:

1. Africa should rationalise the proliferation of regional economic communities on the continent. Each of its five sub-regions should be led, to the extent possible, by one body: SADC in Southern Africa; ECOWAS in West Africa; ECCAS in Central Africa; IGAD and the EAC in Eastern Africa; and the AMU in North Africa, with COMESA acting as a technical agency to promote trade more widely across the continent.

2. African governments should create dedicated ministries of economic integration equipped with the authority to implement trade agreements. Both the African Action Plan of 2010–2015, and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa of 2011–2040, urgently need to be implemented. Some of the best practices to facilitate trade include the “one-stop border post”, which can potentially help expedite procedures at cross-border points on major transport corridors across Africa’s five sub-regions.

3. Consensus decision-making should be replaced by majority decision-making on sub-regional and continental bodies in order to promote effective development and implementation of plans in key areas of regional integration.

4. African Union summits and those of Africa’s sub-regional bodies should seek to take fewer decisions, while monitoring member states more closely to ensure the implementation of such decisions.

5. COMESA, the EAC, and SADC must address the skewed trade with their three powerful economies – South Africa, Egypt, and Kenya – and promote intra-regional trade that generates positive spill-over effects and boosts national economies. South Africa should also seek to regulate its private sector to be able to contribute more effectively to inclusive development in Southern Africa.

6. Both SADC and COMESA should revisit and legally strengthen their trade agreements, imposing fines on member states that violate jointly agreed trade preferences through external commerce. The two blocs should further suspend the voting rights of states that have not paid their dues to their respective secretariats.

7. Development agencies and regional banks have promoted infrastructural development in Asia, and institutions like the African Development Bank, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, and the BRICS’ New Development Bank should do the same in Africa. This role should not just be left to governments.

8. Africa needs to develop a coherent strategy to promote its own interests more effectively in the sub-regional EPAs being negotiated with Brussels, with a more capacitated AU playing a more prominent role in EPA talks. The €57.5 billion of annual EU subsidies to European farmers restricts the market for African agricultural products, and Brussels should consider making compensatory payments to the continent.
9. Africa should pursue a developmental approach to market integration. Institutions must be established that are functional equivalents, rather than poor imitations, of their European counterparts. Rules to promote the harmonisation of domestic economic policies also need to be established in the critical area of monetary union.

10. Governments and regional bodies in Africa should strengthen their consultation mechanisms to give domestic interest groups such as civil society and the private sector a greater voice in, and enhance the transparency of, region-building efforts on the continent.

Participants of the CCR policy research seminar, “Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa”, Vineyard Hotel, Cape Town, South Africa
Annex I

Agenda

Day One Monday, 28 April 2014

09:00 – 10:30 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa

Speaker: Dr Tomaz Augusto Salomão, Former Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community (SADC)

“The Problems and Prospects of Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa”

Discussant: Professor Chris Landsberg, South African Research Initiative Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg, South Africa

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee Break

10:45 – 12:15 Session I: Themes and Concepts of Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa

Chair: Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Member of the African Union (AU) Panel of the Wise

Speakers: Professor John Ravenhill, Professor of Political Science; and Director, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

“Regional Integration in Africa: Theory and Practice”

Professor Samuel K.B. Asante, Executive Director, Centre for Regional Integration in Africa (CRIA), Accra, Ghana

“The Political Economy of Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa”

12:15 – 12:30 Coffee Break
12:30 – 14:00  **Session II: Cross-Border Interactions, Regional Powers, and Developmental States**

**Chair:** Professor Pearl Robinson, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Tufts University, Massachusetts, United States

**Speakers:**
- Professor Daniel Bach, Director of Research, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), University of Bordeaux, France
  “Cross-Border Interactions in Africa: From Regionalisation to Regional Integration”
- Professor Timothy M. Shaw, Graduate Programme Director, Department of Conflict Resolution, Human Security, and Global Governance, University of Massachusetts, United States
  “The Role of Regional Powers and Developmental States in Regional Integration in Africa”

14:00 – 15:00  Lunch

15:00 – 18:00  **Documentary Screening: “Ghosts of Rwanda”, directed by Greg Barker and Darren Kemp**

**Discussion Leaders:**
- Professor René Lemarchand, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, University of Florida, United States
- Ambassador Adonia Ayebare, Former Ambassador of Uganda to Rwanda; and Senior Adviser, Peacebuilding and Development, African Union Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations (UN), New York, United States
Day Two  Tuesday, 29 April 2014

09:30 – 11:00  Session III: Region-Building in Southern and Eastern Africa

Chair: Dr Tomaz Augusto Salomão, Former Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community

Speakers: Professor Scott Taylor, Associate Professor; and Director, African Studies Programme, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., United States
“Region-Building in Southern Africa”

Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa
“The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community”

11:00 – 11:15  Coffee Break

11:15 – 12:45  Session IV: Region-Building in West and Central Africa

Chair: Dr Felix N’zué, Head, Economic Policy Analysis Unit, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Abuja, Nigeria

Speakers: Professor Said Adejumobi, Director, Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Lusaka, Zambia
“Region-Building in West Africa”

Professor René Lemarchand, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, University of Florida, United States
“Region-Building in Central Africa”

12:45 – 14:00  Lunch

14:00 – 15:30  Session V: Region-Building in North Africa and Europe

Chair: Ambassador Roeland van de Geer, Head of the European Union (EU) Delegation to South Africa, Tshwane (Pretoria)

Speakers: Professor Azzedine Layachi, Professor of Government and Politics, St. John’s University, New York, United States
“Region-Building in North Africa”
Professor N. Piers Ludlow, Associate Professor, Department of International History, London School of Economics (LSE), England
“Region-Building in Europe”

17:30 – 19:00 CCR Public Dialogue on “The Challenges of Regional Integration in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe”

Chair: Professor John Ravenhill, Professor of Political Science; and Director, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

Speakers: Professor Samuel K.B. Asante, Executive Director, Centre for Regional Integration in Africa, Accra, Ghana
“Regional Integration in Africa”

Professor Mely Caballero Anthony, Associate Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
“Regional Integration in Asia”

Professor Laura Gomez-Mera, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Miami, United States
“Regional Integration in Latin America”

Professor N. Piers Ludlow, Associate Professor, Department of International History, London School of Economics
“Regional Integration in Europe”
Day Three Wednesday, 30 April 2014

09:30 – 11:00 Session VI: Region-Building in Southeast Asia and Latin America

Chair: Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa

Speakers: Professor Mely Caballero Anthony, Associate Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore “The Case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)”

Professor Laura Gomez-Mera, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Miami, United States “Lessons from Latin America: MERCOSUR (the Common Market of the South)”

11:00 – 11:15 Coffee Break

11:15 – 12:45 Session VII: The African Union, the European Union, and the Role of Visionaries in Region-Building

Chair: Dr Ulrich Golaszinski, Resident Representative; and Regional Project Coordinator for Southern Africa, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Gaborone, Botswana


Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa “The Role of Visionaries in Region-Building: Adebayo Adedeji, Jean Monnet, and Raúl Prebisch”

12:45 – 14:15 Lunch and Completion of Evaluation Forms

14:15 – 15:00 Session VIII: Rapporteurs’ Report

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Rapporteurs: Ms Rosaline Daniel, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

15:00 – 16:00 Session IX: Producing the Book Volume

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Annex II

List of Participants

1. Dr Elsadig Abdalla
   Director, Economic Cooperation and Social Development
   Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
   Djibouti

2. Dr Adekeye Adebajo
   Executive Director
   Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR)
   Cape Town, South Africa

3. Professor Said Adejumobi
   Director: Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa
   United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
   Lusaka, Zambia

4. Professor John Akokpari
   Department of Political Studies
   University of Cape Town (UCT)
   South Africa

5. Professor Mely Caballero Anthony
   Associate Professor; and
   Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
   Nanyang Technological University
   Singapore

6. Professor Samuel K.B. Asante
   Executive Director
   Centre for Regional Integration in Africa (CRIA)
   Accra, Ghana

7. Ambassador Adonia Ayebare
   Senior Adviser, Peacebuilding and Development
   African Union (AU) Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations (UN)
   New York, United States

8. Professor Daniel Bach
   Director of Research, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), University of Bordeaux; and
   Professor, Institut d’Études Politiques, Sciences Po, Bordeaux
   France

9. Ambassador Ajay Bramdeo
   African Union (AU) Ambassador to the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group of States
   Permanent Mission of the African Union
   Brussels, Belgium

10. Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse
    Member of the African Union Panel of the Wise
    Accra, Ghana

11. Ms Rosaline Daniel
    Senior Project Officer
    Centre for Conflict Resolution
    Cape Town, South Africa

12. Ambassador René Dinesen
    Ambassador of Denmark to South Africa
    Tshwane, South Africa
13. Dr Ulrich Golaszinski
   Resident Representative Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Botswana; and
   Regional Project Coordinator for
   Southern Africa
   Gaborone, Botswana

14. Professor Laura Gomez-Mera
   Associate Professor, Department of
   Political Science
   University of Miami
   United States

15. Dr Denis Hew
   Director, Policy Support Unit
   Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
   Singapore

16. Professor Jonathan Mayuyuka Kaunda
   Senior Programme Officer: Research, Policy,
   and Strategy Development
   Policy Planning and Resource
   Mobilisation Directorate
   Southern African Development
   Community (SADC)
   Gaborone, Botswana

17. Dr Dan Kuwali
   Lieutenant Colonel
   Deputy Chief of Legal Services
   Malawi Defence Force
   Lilongwe

18. Professor Chris Landsberg
   South African Research Initiative (SARChi)
   Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy
   University of Johannesburg
   South Africa

19. Professor Azzedine Layachi
   Professor of International, Middle East,
   and African Affairs
   Department of Government and Politics,
   St. John’s University
   New York, United States

20. Professor René Lemarchand
   Emeritus Professor of Political Science
   Department of Political Science
   University of Florida
   United States

21. Professor N. Piers Ludlow
   Associate Professor, Department of
   International History
   London School of Economics (LSE)
   England

22. Mr Thapelo Madumane
   Deputy Director: Regional Economic
   Integration (SADC)
   Department of International Relations and
   Cooperation (DIRCO)
   Tshwane, South Africa

23. Ms Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter
   Chief Director: Africa Multilateral
   Economic Relations
   Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
   Tshwane, South Africa

24. Mr David Monyae
   Section Manager: Policy Analysis
   International Relations and Protocol Division
   Parliament of South Africa
   Cape Town

25. Ms Dawn Nagar
   Researcher
   Centre for Conflict Resolution
   Cape Town, South Africa

26. Ms Sharon Ndlovu
   Mediation Officer, Governance, Peace,
   and Security Unit
   Common Market for Eastern and Southern
   Africa (COMESA)
   Lusaka, Zambia
27. Dr Felix N’zué  
   Head, Economic Policy Analysis Unit  
   Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)  
   Abuja, Nigeria  

28. Dr Samuel Oloruntoba  
   Post-Doctoral Fellow  
   Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute  
   University of South Africa (UNISA)  
   Tshwane  

29. Professor John Ravenhill  
   Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo; and  
   Director, Balsillie School of International Affairs  
   Ontario, Canada  

30. Professor Pearl Robinson  
   Associate Professor, Department of Political Science  
   Tufts University  
   Medford, United States  

31. Mr John Roux  
   Organisational Development Consultant and Evaluator  
   Emthunzini  
   Cape Town, South Africa  

32. Ambassador Petri Salo  
   Ambassador of Finland to South Africa  
   Tshwane  

33. Dr Tomaz Augusto Salomão  
   Former Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community (SADC); and Research Fellow, Graduate School of Public and Development Management (P&DM)  
   University of the Witwatersrand  
   Johannesburg, South Africa  

34. Professor Timothy M. Shaw  
   Graduate Programme Director  
   Department of Conflict Resolution, Human Security, and Global Governance  
   McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies  
   University of Massachusetts, Boston  
   United States  

35. Professor Scott Taylor  
   Associate Professor; and Director African Studies Programme  
   Georgetown University  
   Washington, D.C., United States  

36. Ambassador Roeland van de Geer  
   Head of the European Union (EU) Delegation to South Africa  
   Tshwane  

37. Dr Kudrat Virk  
   Senior Researcher  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town, South Africa  

Conference Team  

38. Ms Jill Kronenberg  
   Research Assistant  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town, South Africa  

39. Ms Liliane Limenyande  
   Administrative Assistant  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town, South Africa
# Annex III

## List of Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>African Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACWC</td>
<td>ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AICHR</td>
<td>ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSC</td>
<td>ASEAN Political and Security Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAM</td>
<td>Competition Adaptation Mechanism (MERCOSUR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCR</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Defence and Security Commission (ECCAS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEAO</td>
<td>Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Communauté Financière Africaine (franc)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPAX</td>
<td>Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (ECCAS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBSA</td>
<td>Development Bank of Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFI</td>
<td>development finance institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EASF</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOBRIG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOVAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EIGA</td>
<td>ECOWAS Investment Guarantee Agency</td>
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<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<td>ETF</td>
<td>exchange-traded fund</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FOMAC</td>
<td>Multinational Force of Central Africa (ECCAS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>free trade area</td>
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The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

VOLUME 7
BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECs), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY
This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.

VOLUME 8
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.
This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

This policy advisory group seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2006 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.

This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of “prosecution versus amnesty” for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.

The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.

The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.

The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of “prosecution versus amnesty” for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.

This policy seminar, held in Somerset West, South Africa, on 23 and 24 April 2007, interrogated issues around humanitarian intervention in Africa and the responsibility of regional governments and the international community in the face of humanitarian crises.

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.

This report is based on a seminar, held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.
VOLUME 25
PREVENTING GENOCIDE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
CHALLENGES FOR THE UN, AFRICA, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
This policy advisory group meeting was held from 8 to 10 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity.

VOLUME 26
EURAFRIQUE?
AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY
This seminar, held from 8 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt); peacekeeping and military cooperation; and migration.

VOLUME 27
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

VOLUME 28
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN AFRICA
This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

VOLUME 29
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND PEACEBUILDING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
CIVIL SOCIETY, GOVERNMENTS, AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS
This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.

VOLUME 30
CROUCHING TIGER, HIDDEN DRAGON?
CHINA AND AFRICA
ENGAGING THE WORLD’S NEXT SUPERPOWER
This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.

VOLUME 31
FROM EURAFRIQUE TO AFRO-EUROPA
AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY
This policy seminar, held from 8 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.

VOLUME 32
TAMING THE DRAGON?
DEFINING AFRICA’S INTERESTS AT THE FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA CO-OPERATION (FOCAC)
This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.
This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help to ‘reset’ the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa’s region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.
REGION-BUILDING AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA

VOLUME 41
THE AFRICAN UNION AT TEN
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS
This international colloquium held in Berlin, Germany, from 30 to 31 August 2012, reviewed the first ten years of the African Union (AU); assessed its peace and security efforts; compared it with the European Union (EU); examined the AU’s strategies to achieve socioeconomic development; and analysed its global role.

VOLUME 42
AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE UNITED NATIONS’ SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012, considered Africa and South Africa’s performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council; the politics and reform of the Security Council; the impact of the African Group at the UN; and the performance of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

VOLUME 43
GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTHERN AFRICA
This report considers the key governance and security challenges facing Southern Africa, with a focus on the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) subregion’s progress towards democracy and its peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts.

VOLUME 44
ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGS) IN AFRICA
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 13 and 14 May 2013, considered the progress that Africa has made towards achieving the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and sought to support African actors and institutions in shaping the post-2015 development agenda.

VOLUME 45
THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC (ACP) GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 29 to 30 October 2012, considered the nature of the relationship between the ACP Group and the EU, and the potential for their further strategic engagement, as the final five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the two sides approached in 2015.

VOLUME 46
TOWARDS A NEW PAX AFRICANA
MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING PEACE IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA
This policy research seminar held in Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013, considered the progress being made by the African Union (AU) and Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) in managing conflicts and operationalising the continent’s peace and security architecture; and the roles of key external actors in these efforts.

VOLUME 47
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER TWO DECADES
This policy research seminar held in Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 28 to 30 July 2013, reviewed post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy after two decades, and explored the potential leadership role that the country can play in promoting peace and security, as well as regional integration and development in Africa.

VOLUME 48
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 17 to 18 February 2014 assessed the principles underpinning international investment agreements (IIAs), including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and the implications of these instruments for socio-economic development efforts in South Africa and the rest of the continent.
Notes
This policy research seminar convened about 30 leading practitioners, scholars, and civil society actors to consider region-building and regional integration processes in Africa. The seminar considered four key objectives: first, themes and concepts of region-building and regional integration in Africa and how these have informed approaches to regionalism on the continent; second, the political economy of Africa's region-building and regional integration efforts, including the roles played by important regional powers, development finance institutions (DFIs), informal networks, and civil society actors; third, the role, challenges, and potential of the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in promoting region-building and regional integration over the past five decades; and finally, potential lessons for Africa from the comparative experiences of Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.