AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE UNITED NATIONS’ SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
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About the Organisers

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in the Western Cape and Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding involving the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and African civil society; Southern Africa’s peacebuilding challenges; the European Union’s (EU) engagement with Africa; and HIV/AIDS in relation to post-conflict societies.

The Rapporteurs

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy advisory group seminar at Erinvale Estate, Western Cape, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012 on “Africa, South Africa, and the United Nations’ (UN) Security Architecture”.

In December 2012, South Africa completed its second two-year term (2011-2012) as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, after its earlier tenure in 2007-2008. The Cape Town seminar convened about 30 leading practitioners, civil society actors, and scholars, from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the United States (US), to assess South Africa’s current and past performance on the Security Council. The meeting, which focused in particular on the institutional dynamics that help to shape the work of the Council, also crafted concrete policy recommendations for strengthening the diplomatic role adopted by Tshwane (Pretoria) and promoting Africa’s interests at the UN and other international fora.

1. The Political Dynamics of the UN Security Council

The UN Security Council’s decision-making remains driven by the parochial interests of its five veto-wielding permanent (P-5) members – the United States, China, Russia, France, and Britain. Although the US plays a leading role on the Security Council, Washington and Paris have differed in their approaches to crises in Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Syria, with France favouring more interventionist responses. Tensions between the P-3 (the US, France, and Britain) and the P-2 (Russia and China) have become more pronounced since the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Libya in 2011, with Moscow and Beijing thrice vetoing Western-sponsored draft resolutions on Syria in 2011-2012. These dynamics could complicate Africa’s efforts to respond effectively to the ongoing crisis in northern Mali and the wider Sahel region.

Although eight out of 15 UN peacekeeping operations are currently deployed in Africa, the Security Council has been reluctant to establish clear modalities for engagement with the African Union (AU) on such interventions. Annual consultations between the 15-member AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the 15-member UN Security Council – held since 2007 – are presented as meetings with individual members of the UN Security Council rather than with the organ as a whole. Africa’s influence on the Security Council is also inhibited by a lack of consensus and coordination among the AU’s 54 member states. In March 2011, for example, South Africa voted for Security Council Resolution 1973 authorising the use of force against Libya in the absence of clear AU guidance. Furthermore, in 2013, Morocco, Rwanda, and Togo are unlikely to constitute a sufficiently strong African presence on the Council. Rwanda has also been accused of intervening in the DRC, while Morocco’s presence could obstruct progress on Western Sahara, a territory which it has occupied since 1975.

2. Africa and the Reform of the UN Security Council

It is extremely unlikely that negotiations on UN Security Council reform – ongoing since 1994 – will end soon in a grand bargain on composition and membership. About 75 percent of the UN’s 92,541 peacekeepers are deployed in Africa, while 60 percent of the UN Security Council’s deliberations are focused on the continent. Yet, it remains one of only two regions in the world (the other being Latin America) without permanent representation on the world’s most powerful diplomatic body. Africa has arguably become hostage to its own maximalist position – reflected in the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus – in favour of two additional African permanent members with veto power to add to its existing three rotating seats.
Even as they press their case for permanent representation on the Security Council, African governments could leverage their membership of the Council’s various working groups and sanctions committees to exert greater influence over its decisions. However, countries have been reluctant to exploit such opportunities, with the recent exception of South Africa delaying the unfreezing of assets on the Libyan sanctions committee in August 2011. The P-5 have ownership over the penmanship of Council resolutions and have used discussions on working methods to drag out any serious reforms. There has also been a tendency towards outsourcing crisis management to informal groups and expert panels that lack proper accountability to the full membership of the Council.

In addition, there has been an overemphasis on the enforcement powers of the UN Security Council. African countries should advocate use of the full repertoire of tools in the world body’s Charter to address conflicts on the continent. The African Group could also coordinate better with other regional blocs to advance the continental agenda for UN reform. However, in order to undertake concrete initiatives effectively, African countries and institutions must reduce their financial dependence on external donors, particularly among the P-5.

3. The African Group at the United Nations

The 54-member African Group at the United Nations accounts for over a quarter of the 193-member UN General Assembly, enabling African countries collectively to punch above their weight while providing an opportunity for the continent to pursue its interests at the world body more effectively. The Group is also in a position to brief and influence the three African non-permanent members of the Security Council, as well as African representatives on other UN bodies. However, the African Group’s members are occasionally treated as little more than ‘voting cattle’. The Group lacks a clearly defined common purpose, and its cohesiveness has often been challenged by the lack of a mechanism to ensure continuity of leadership.

Although the African Group is mainly comprised of all the AU member states at the UN, it is not an arm of the continental body, and includes Morocco, which never joined the African Union. Consequently, the role of the AU at the African Group has been confined to one of influence rather than control. Furthermore, the Group’s recommendations are non-binding and are not always respected by individual African member states, even though decision-making is consensual. The accountability of the three African non-permanent members on the UN Security Council to the African Group is also weak, while both the AU and the UN secretariats sometimes bypass the Group in their consultations, thus contributing to its marginalisation.

4. The African Union and the United Nations

Notwithstanding Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on regional arrangements, cooperation between the AU and its sub-regional building blocks and the UN Security Council on issues affecting the continent has been perfunctory. Without proper engagement, peacekeeping missions in Africa risk losing their value and credibility, as demonstrated by the continuing deficiencies of the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Hybrid peacekeeping, as embodied by the current African Union/UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), could improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in Africa, though powerful members of the UN Security Council and the world body’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) remain hostile to this idea. For its part, the AU, too, needs to take its oversight of operations conducted jointly in its name more seriously to ensure their effectiveness.
Neither the UN Office to the AU in Addis Ababa nor the AU Permanent Observer Mission at the UN in New York possess the capacity and remit to create a genuine partnership between the two organisations. Moreover, to build proper synergy between the continental and world bodies, the dominance of the P-5 has to be addressed. Africa lacks a similar core group of the “able and willing” at the AU Peace and Security Council, which could act in coalition and with the consensus of others to draft key initiatives and to drive security cooperation with the UN. African governments must also forge and adhere to common positions on key issues, and strengthen their own domestic polities, sub-regional bodies, and the AU, in order to increase their leverage over the international security agenda.

5. South Africa, Africa, and the UN Security Council

During its two terms on the UN Security Council (2007-2008; and 2011-2012), South Africa promoted the broader African peace and security agenda on the Council with some success. In January 2012, South Africa convened a high-level debate that led to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2033, which reiterated the Council’s commitment to more effective collaboration with the AU. However, continuity on this issue will depend on the political will and ability of the new African non-permanent members of the Security Council.

While South Africa attracted criticism for its apparently shifting positions on the crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya in 2011, both cases also revealed fault lines in Africa’s peace and security architecture. The AU failed to articulate and communicate in a timely manner a clear position on Libya to African delegations at the UN, while a unified African position on Côte d’Ivoire could at first not be forged on the UN Security Council given differences in approach between South Africa and Nigeria. In addition, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) warrant of arrest against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir posed a particular challenge for South Africa on the Security Council in 2011-2012. Tshwane has supported the AU’s position in favour of deferring prosecution, as permitted by the ICC’s Rome Statute, though there is little clarity about the conditions under which this could happen. Recourse to deferral also risks losing the gains that South Africa and Africa have made in the fight against impunity and for accountability of human rights violations on the continent.

Furthermore, South Africa’s experience on the Security Council demonstrates that African countries have to leverage different groups at the UN on different issues in order to strengthen their influence within the Council. Even in configurations such as the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) bloc, homogeneity is lacking. For example, while the five countries were united in criticising NATO’s use of Security Council Resolution 1973 to achieve “regime change” in Libya, differences emerged over their responses to Syria, with South Africa and India voting for a draft resolution backing an Arab peace plan, vetoed by Russia and China in February 2012.

6. Africa and the UN Peacebuilding Commission

The UN Peacebuilding Commission, which was created in 2005, was handicapped at birth by its founding mandate which excluded a wider definition of peacebuilding to prevent conflicts from arising in the first place, as this was seen by the P-5 as encroaching on the Security Council’s role. All six countries on the Commission’s current agenda are African: Burundi, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea. The body’s engagement with these states is shaped by the principle of national leadership of the process, although the resulting initiatives have proceeded in fits and starts, particularly when the government concerned is unstable. By December 2012, the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) had raised $500 million. However, critics have noted that the Commission has no influence over the market-driven approaches of larger
donors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which can sometimes undermine peacebuilding efforts. Although the Peacebuilding Commission has had some successes, it has also been criticised for promoting a ‘liberal peace’ model that emphasises democratic elections and market liberalisation rather than tackling underlying causes and changing the “bitter minds” that often sustain conflicts. However, others have argued that expectations that the Commission can successfully address the root causes of conflicts are inflated, given that even civil societies in the countries themselves often cannot resolve such issues. The Peacebuilding Commission’s effectiveness is further circumscribed by its isolated position within the UN: under the authority of, but neglected by, the UN Security Council, and disconnected from the world body’s preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping efforts. Even the countries on its agenda do not broadcast their involvement loudly.

The case of Somalia shows that peacebuilding is a fluid and continuous endeavour that seeks a shift in attitudes on the ground in order to prevent a renewal of hostilities. The key challenges there have been to identify the relevant local actors and to instill a sense of confidence about the political process. The creation of an inclusive, ongoing Somali-Somali dialogue, within a secure environment provided by the 17,000-strong AU mission (AMISOM) has been integral to beginning the long-term process of political reconciliation in the fragile country. However, the continuing ad hoc nature of the relationship between the key African and international actors engaged in the peace process, does little to support its sustainability.

Policy Recommendations

The following 10 policy recommendations emerged from the policy advisory group seminar.

1. African states must find sustainable ways of funding peacekeeping missions on the continent, as well as of operationalising the African peace and security architecture (APSA), and should reduce the continent’s dependence on external donors, who fund 97 percent of its security operations. The African Union, as well as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), could learn from the example of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has used a community levy to raise resources for its peacekeeping and related activities;

2. Although there is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that governs the relationship between the AU and Africa’s sub-regional organisations, problems have persisted in implementing the principle of subsidiarity, and greater clarity is required from African governments on the relationship between sub-regional organisations, the AU Peace and Security Council, and the UN Security Council. The AU and Africa’s sub-regional blocs are important producers, as well as consumers, of peace and security. The recommendation of the Romano Prodi-led 2008 joint African Union-United Nations panel on peacekeeping, for the world body to provide funding for AU-led, UN-authorised missions for up to six months and then take them over, must be urgently implemented;

3. Given the current political stalemate in negotiations on reform of the UN Security Council’s composition and membership, it is important for African countries to revisit the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus. Consideration should be given to modifying the common African position by removing the insistence on the veto (as Nigeria and South Africa had argued in 2005, and as accepted by Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil) in order to be able to enact reform;
4. African countries – in particular, the three African non-permanent members on the UN Security Council – must make a more concerted and proactive effort to chair important Council committees and working groups, and to have a substantive role in drafting the resolutions that emanate from them; in order to ensure a strong and consistent African voice on the UN Security Council, African countries need to agree on a formal mechanism for selecting non-permanent members that possess the power and capacity to serve the interests of the continent on the world body’s most powerful decision-making body;

5. The African Group must identify and agree on a mechanism to improve the accountability of Africa’s three non-permanent members on the UN Security Council to the Group, which usually endorses their election to the body. The African Group should be given a place within the structure of the AU – including through the appointment of an advisor to the AU Chair on issues affecting the continent at the UN. For its part, the AU Commission in Addis Ababa needs to provide a stronger lead in the forging of common African positions on key issues and communicating them in a timely manner to African delegations in New York;

6. The intellectual capacity and technical knowledge of the African Group’s member states needs to be improved to increase the effectiveness of their participation across various UN bodies. In this respect, African non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can play an important role by advocating the appointment of competent and activist ambassadors to the world body, and by offering important research and training support to members of the African Group to enhance their decision- and policymaking capacity, and to improve their negotiation strategies in advance of crucial meetings at the UN;

7. Africa’s heads of state must capacitate and revise the mandate and role of the AU’s New York-based Permanent Observer Mission to make it more effective. Additionally, the annually appointed Chair of the AU Assembly (rotating heads of state) should occupy more than a ceremonial role, and must keep the African Group informed about the decisions being made by the organisation in Addis Ababa;

8. The AU should strengthen its secretariat-to-secretariat relations by according the Chair of the AU Commission the power to appoint her/his own Commissioners – just as the UN Secretary-General appoints Undersecretaries-General;

9. Given the growing role of civil society groups in new and emerging powers such as Brazil and India, and their desire to make international organisations more responsive to particular issues and challenges, South Africa should consider expanding its ongoing engagement with these groups. Working with this expanding ‘global’ civil society could help Africa leverage its voice at the UN, and could incentivise the P-5 to act more consistently in the continent’s interests. These NGOs could also become important partners for building an international public constituency in the longer term for reform of the UN; and

10. The UN Peacebuilding Commission should seek to deepen its relationship with the UN Security Council and its Secretary-General to increase its influence within the world body, and should coordinate more effectively with local governments and civil society to promote wider popular understanding of its work.
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy advisory group seminar at Erinvale Estate, Western Cape, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012 on “Africa, South Africa, and the United Nations’ (UN) Security Architecture”. This report is based on discussions at this meeting as well as further research.

The Cape Town seminar took place as South Africa approached the end of its second two-year term (2011-2012) as an elected, non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, after its earlier tenure in 2007-2008. The meeting brought together about 30 leading policymakers, civil society actors, and scholars, from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the United States (US), to assess South Africa and Africa’s current and past performance on the Security Council, with a particular focus on their role in relation to the institutional dynamics that help to shape the work of the body.

CCR has extensive experience of engaging on the topic of United Nations/African relations with leading South African, African, and UN institutions, as well as civil society actors. Since 2004, the Centre has organised seven major policy seminars on issues relating to the UN’s relationship with Africa,1 and published three important books on the subject.2 Building on this expertise, the December 2012 policy advisory group meeting focused on six key themes: the political dynamics of the UN Security Council; Africa and the reform of the Security Council; the role of the African Group at the UN; the relationship between the UN and the African Union (AU); the lessons of South Africa’s second term on the UN Security Council; and the UN Peacebuilding Commission. The seminar also considered the practice of peacebuilding in Africa, particularly in Somalia.

A cornerstone of the international security architecture, the 15-member UN Security Council is the organisation’s most powerful body and the only one whose decisions are legally binding on all 193 members. When the United Nations was created in 1945 after the Second World War (1939-1945), the United States, Russia, China, France, and Britain became veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, which was given the primary, although not exclusive, responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and great

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flexibility to make decisions as its members saw fit in pursuit of this mandate.\(^3\) Notwithstanding the one-sided bargain struck by the powerful in the formation of the Council,\(^4\) the widely-held hope was that its five permanent members (P-5) would interpret the Security Council’s institutional rules to refrain from initiating wars - and act to protect the most vulnerable members of international society as necessary. However, although proposed as part of a system of collective security, the Council’s open-ended conception and the inequities built into its founding rules for voting and decision-making mean that it has often been used, according to critics, as a tool for promoting security on a selective basis, particularly in support of the parochial interests of the P-5. These countries have often been accused of initiating and shaping, or blocking, peacekeeping missions to further their strategic interests and to reinforce their historical spheres of influence. While the P-5 have traditionally sought the views of African countries on the Council on issues concerning the continent, they have also refused to cede the primacy of the Security Council on peacekeeping action, or to dilute their own power as veto-wielding permanent members. The Council’s accountability could be greatly improved if its composition were reformed to ensure permanent representation for Africa and Latin America,\(^5\) which continue to be the only two regions of the world without such representation on the world body.

Though the immediate prospects of an expanded, more representative decision-making body remain dim, African countries and regional bodies have continued to seek ways of increasing their leverage on the Security Council to enable the continent to play a more effective role on it in defence of African interests, while contributing to efforts to promote global security. After South Africa was elected to serve as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for a second term from 2011 to 2012, its Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, called for the development of an “effective partnership” between the UN Security Council and the AU.\(^6\) Although Africa has no veto-wielding permanent representation on the Council (having three rotating seats), more than 60 percent of the body’s deliberations are concerned with the continent. Africa hosts eight of the 15 UN peacekeeping missions globally, and about 75 percent of the world body’s 92,541 peacekeepers are deployed on the continent.\(^7\) Africa has also made important conceptual contributions to the development of UN peacekeeping since the world body launched its first such armed mission during the 1956 Suez Crisis. For example, the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), deployed by 2008, is the first hybrid operation of its kind.

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\(^3\) It has been argued that while the breadth and scope of the Council’s powers and means of exercising them has ensured its continuing relevance in a changing world, that breadth and scope have also exacerbated the fundamental inequality of the Council’s representation and raised the stakes politically for reforming its system of membership. See, for example, Edward Luck, “A Council for All Seasons: The Creation of the Security Council and Its Relevance Today”, in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 61-85.


The four key objectives of the December 2012 policy advisory group seminar were to:

1. Develop concrete policy recommendations for strengthening Africa’s diplomatic role and for promoting its interests at the UN;
2. Consider the pivotal role that Africa can play in relation to key relationships that shape the Security Council’s work, such as those: between the UN and the AU; with the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) bloc; among the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council; among African Security Council members, the General Assembly, and the African Group at the UN; and between the Security Council and its UN Peacebuilding Commission;
3. Discuss the issue of reforming the structure of the Security Council to make it more democratic and representative of the contemporary world; and
1. The Political Dynamics of the UN Security Council

Since the end of the Cold War, Africa, in particular, has suffered from the frequent failure of the UN Security Council to take appropriate action to prevent or halt deadly conflicts.

Competing political interests stymied the Security Council’s ability to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in which 800,000 people were killed; to end the “ethnic cleansing” of about 200,000 people and crimes against humanity in the Balkans between 1991 and 1995; and to deal with a range of other serious threats to peace and security. These failures of the Security Council to halt mass atrocities prompted a debate on humanitarian intervention at the turn of the century, leading to an endorsement by the UN General Assembly in 2005 of the concept of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P): that the international community has a duty to intervene if governments fail to protect their populations. Regional organisations, including the African Union, the European Union (EU), as well as the Organisation of American States (OAS), also launched new initiatives to increase responsiveness to instability and violence within their respective regions. However, the record of these international and regional arrangements has been mixed, with many of them lacking sufficient financial resources and political consensus to be truly effective. In addition, there has been a tendency towards reactive measures and a corresponding neglect of prevention in conflict management efforts.

Notwithstanding its commitment at the level of rhetoric to the normative goal of protection of civilians, the Security Council’s decision-making on conflicts in Africa remains driven mainly by the parochial interests of its five veto-wielding permanent members and their often dissimilar views on sovereignty and non-intervention. In 2001, P-5 ambassadors told a closed meeting that the UN “would be unlikely to act much differently than it did in Rwanda in 1994” if a new genocide occurred in Burundi. By contrast, the P-3 members of the Council (the US, France, and Britain) have unilaterally initiated and led multinational military interventions as they have seen fit, without gaining UN Security Council approval: for example, in Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003 (Paris did not support the later intervention).

Although the United States is the lead player in shaping the Council’s agenda, it does not always enjoy the support of Britain and France. There have been tensions among the P-3, especially between the US and France over the current crises in Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Syria. Paris has been in favour of more interventionist responses in all three cases, while Washington has been extremely reluctant about taking robust action given its difficult experiences in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. Tensions between the P-3 and the P-2 (Russia and China) have been yet more pronounced, notwithstanding past cooperation in a number of cases such as Somalia and the DRC. In the aftermath of the controversial North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Libya, there has been strong opposition from Moscow and Beijing to any resolution that authorises the use of “all necessary means” for the protection of civilians, prompted by the fear that this might lead to a policy of “regime change” in Syria, as occurred with the government of Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi in 2011. Moscow and Beijing have thus been steadfast in their aversion to robust measures against the Syrian

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regime of Bashar al-Assad, and thrice cast a double veto against Western-sponsored draft resolutions on Syria in 2011-2012, even as the situation on the ground continued to deteriorate (with 80,000 deaths reported by the UN by June 2013), threatening regional stability. This opposition, which paralysed the Security Council, could lead to a reduced role for the body on international peace and security issues.

In particular, the strained dynamics within the Council complicated the efforts of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as they worked with the UN to respond to the subsequent crisis in northern Mali and the broader Sahel region in 2013. Key decisions on how to deal with the asymmetric threat in Mali remained unresolved, with questions surrounding the appropriate level of peacekeeping troops that were required, as well as the adequacy of the multilateral peacekeeping approach to address the crisis. P-5 members, who pledged to contribute 52 percent to the UN peacekeeping budget in 2013, nevertheless remained reluctant not only to authorise and bear the financial costs of difficult military interventions in general, but also, in particular, to endorse ECOWAS's approach towards Mali, believing it to be incomplete and limited. ECOWAS and the AU have also not always agreed on which organisation should lead conflict resolution efforts in the West African country. This situation confronted the three African members of the Council – Morocco, Rwanda, and Togo in 2013 – with a major challenge. Clear and resolute direction from the Security Council is, in many cases, a critical ingredient for successful conflict management.

During its second two-year term (2011-2012) on the Security Council, South Africa played a major role on a number of important issues. It supported the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), led by its former president, Thabo Mbeki; advocated a strong role for the United Nations in resolving tensions in Sudan; and supported the UN logistical support package for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). However, Africa’s influence on the Security Council continues to be inhibited by a lack of consensus and coordination among the African Union’s 54 member states. South Africa and Nigeria both voted in favour of resolution 1973 in 2011, approving a no-fly zone over Libya and authorising all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, even though the Council’s actions in this instance had not been clearly legitimised by the AU. The rivalry between Tshwane (Pretoria) and Abuja for a permanent seat on the Security Council is another potentially complicating factor in increasing Africa’s leverage on the Council. Furthermore, in 2013, Morocco, Rwanda, and Togo are unlikely to constitute a sufficiently strong African presence on the Security Council. Rwanda has been accused by the UN of intervening in the DRC, while Morocco’s presence could obstruct progress on Western Sahara, a territory it has occupied since 1975. Togo is a tiny West African country with limited capacity and clout. The AU must find a formula to ensure that countries with the power and capacity to serve the interests of the continent as a whole have a consistent voice on the UN Security Council.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter of 1945 provides the basis for cooperation between the UN Security Council and Africa’s regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security, and Council authorisation is legally required for regional peacekeeping efforts. Yet, the Council has been reluctant to establish clear modalities for engagement with, and to support the peacekeeping efforts of, Africa’s regional arrangements effectively. P-5 members, in particular, are concerned that formalising relations with regional organisations such as the AU could constrain their room for manoeuvre in deciding on peacekeeping actions to be taken by the Council. They have thus maintained these relations on an informal basis. For example, annual
consultations between the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the UN Security Council, held since 2007, have been presented by powerful members of the P-5 as meetings between the AU Peace and Security Council and individual members of the UN Security Council, rather than with the Security Council as a whole. A joint African Union-United Nations panel was established in September 2008 to consider ways of supporting African regional organisations that undertake peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate. This panel - chaired by former Italian prime minister, Romano Prodi - recommended, among other things, the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund to support the AU’s peacekeeping capacity and the use of UN-assessed funding for AU-led, UN-authorised interventions for up to six months, with the UN then asked to take over the missions. However, the Prodi Report’s recommendations are yet to be implemented, demonstrating the UN Security Council’s lack of commitment to African peacekeeping efforts.

Notwithstanding the Council’s selective approach to peace and security issues, Africa’s leaders must find ways to minimise conflicts on the continent and to operationalise the African peace and security architecture (APSA). African countries are major troop-contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, with African forces comprising about 40 percent of the 92,541 total deployed in March 2013. Ethiopia and Nigeria are respectively the fourth and fifth largest contributors to UN peacekeeping, while Rwanda, Egypt, Ghana, Senegal, South Africa, Morocco, and Tanzania are among the top 20 contributors to peacekeeping globally. Yet, there is evidence of a reluctance among the P-5 to increase financing for peacekeeping missions, the majority of which are in Africa. African states must also find ways of funding African missions and should reduce their dependence on external donors, which continue to provide 97 percent of the AU’s financing in this key area. ECOWAS has used a community levy to raise resources for its peacekeeping and related activities. The African Union and other sub-regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) could learn from this example, though their member states have not yet shown the political will to take such actions.
2. Africa and the Reform of the UN Security Council

Since the end of the Cold War by 1990, the agenda of the UN Security Council has expanded to include a range of non-traditional security-related issues that otherwise fall within the Charter remit of the 193-member UN General Assembly and its 54-member Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

These include, among others, questions pertaining to children and women in conflicts; justice and impunity; poverty; socio-economic development; and HIV/AIDS. Decision-making within the 15-member UN Security Council has also become the near-exclusive preserve of its five permanent members, generating genuine concern among the wider UN membership that the Council’s agenda is being manipulated by the P-5 for the pursuit of their parochial national interests. Free deliberations rarely occur, with most of the body’s formal and informal meetings effectively scripted by the veto-wielding permanent members. Furthermore, outside of an annual retreat (convened by the UN Secretary-General since 1998), the Security Council has limited capacity for effective brainstorming and strategic discussions on an expanding array of critical issues. Consequently, the United Nations’ principal organ for the maintenance of international peace and security is seen as an increasingly anachronistic body, which neither represents nor serves global interests credibly, but instead risks becoming a fig-leaf designed to cover up the naked exercise of power by its five veto-wielding permanent members.

Though urgently needed, it is extremely unlikely that negotiations on UN Security Council reform, which have been ongoing since 1994, will end in a grand agreement on composition and membership in the near future. In 2011, the non-permanent membership of the Council was strong and included Brazil, India, South Africa, Nigeria, and Germany, thereby placing all five members of the new BRICS bloc at the decision-making table for the first time since the group’s inception in 2009 (South Africa joined in 2011). Their collective presence on the Council created an opportunity for the BRICS countries to identify, and collaborate on, issues of common concern, including institutional reform and the pursuit of greater influence over the international security agenda. However, expectations that this would result in a more effective Council were dashed. The P-3 noted that the prospective candidates for future permanent membership of the Council revealed the narrowly vested, rather than truly global, nature of their foreign policies during 2011, as well as an inability to move beyond formulaic calls for further dialogue in the face of fast-evolving crises, particularly in the Middle East. Furthermore, the repeated use of the double veto – an unprecedented three times in 2011-2012 – by China and Russia on Syria, has not only increased anxiety about decision-making paralysis within the Security Council, but also reinforced wariness of any changes in the body’s composition that could further weaken its effective functioning. Despite the debilitating absence of consensus among the P-5, the Council has failed even to refer the deteriorating situation in Syria to the UN General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950, which allows the Assembly to discuss security issues in the event that the Security Council is paralysed.

Moreover, the question of UN Security Council reform is likely to be a source of future tension within the BRICS grouping. While the veto power of the two P-5 BRICS members – China and Russia – is central to the bloc’s power on the Council, it also divides them from the other three members of the group. One of the main objectives of South Africa’s participation in the BRICS is to partner with key players of the South on issues
related to global governance and its reform.\textsuperscript{15} Though there is general consensus among the BRICS on the problem of Southern under-representation in international institutions, there are also differences on the choice of remedy. The three members of the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) bloc all seek permanent membership of the UN Security Council. India and Brazil, along with Germany and Japan, have formed the Group of Four (G-4) in mutual support of their candidatures for permanent membership on the Council and to campaign for its reform. Although South Africa is not a member of this group, India and South Africa expressed mutual support for their respective candidatures in June 2010.\textsuperscript{16} However, China, although broadly in favour of “necessary and reasonable reform” and greater representation for developing countries (especially African countries),\textsuperscript{17} has not been keen on expansion of the Council’s veto-wielding permanent membership,\textsuperscript{18} due especially to its wish to keep Japan out of the body. Russia has also not shown much enthusiasm for Council reform, adopting a position that acknowledges the importance of creating a more representative body, while emphasising the need for proposals that enjoy maximum support in the General Assembly and leave intact the present veto-wielding powers of the P-5.\textsuperscript{19}

With the P-5, in particular, continuing to exhibit a marked reluctance to cede or share power, Africa remains one of only two regions in the world (the other being Latin America) that is without permanent representation on the world’s most powerful diplomatic body.\textsuperscript{20} To some extent, African countries have become hostage to their own maximalist position in favour of two African permanent members with veto power (to add to their existing three rotating seats) on a reformed Security Council, as reflected in the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus.\textsuperscript{3} Arguably, Africa’s rigid stance has made the prospect of other types of reform, including changes to the veto, more difficult to achieve. The alternative view – upon which the Ezulwini Consensus rests in part – holds that Africa can not, and indeed should not, accept permanent seats without veto power on the Council, as this would lead to two categories of membership and fail to narrow the body’s ‘democratic deficit’. Yet, given the current political stalemate in negotiations on Security Council enlargement, there might be a need to modify the Ezulwini Consensus radically by removing the insistence on the veto (as Nigeria and South Africa had argued in 2005, and as accepted by Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil) to be able to adjust to changing circumstances.

For African countries, UN Security Council reform is a critical matter – eight out of 15 UN peacekeeping operations are in Africa, with about 75 percent of the organisation’s 92,541 peacekeepers deployed on the continent. Africa is therefore well positioned to press the case for a more transparent, accountable, and democratic Council. As earlier noted, African countries rank among the largest troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations. Unlike the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC), the African Group also carries significant electoral weight at the UN (54 out of 193 votes in the General Assembly), with the three African non-permanent members of the Council accountable – in principle, if not always in practice – to the Group. In this context, it is noteworthy that African countries have played a pioneering role in the development

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of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, moving forward the discussion on the role of regional organisations from a debate about competition to a dialogue about complementarity with the Council’s work. Deployed by 2008, the African Union/UN Mission in Darfur is the first hybrid operation of its kind, and has been mooted as a possible model for future operations on the continent, though powerful members of the UN Security Council and the world body’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) oppose the dual command of such operations.

The UN Charter set up six principal mechanisms that together comprise an effective system of checks and balances. However, this system has been neglected, while too much emphasis has been placed on the enforcement measures at the disposal of the Security Council to resolve conflicts. African countries can, and should, advocate use of the full range of tools in Chapters VI (peacemaking), VII (peace enforcement), and VIII (collaboration with regional bodies) of the UN Charter to advance their interests on the Council. This repertoire includes article 34 of the Charter, which empowers the Council to investigate disputes but remains underutilised. Similarly, article 36, which allows the Council to refer cases to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has only been used twice (over the Corfu Channel incidents in 1947; and the Aegean dispute in 1976), but could be particularly useful for resolving territorial disputes such as between Sudan and South Sudan. In its resort to Chapter VII, the Council has also tended to move straight to the imposition of sanctions (article 41) and the use of force (article 42), often overlooking article 40 which authorises the use of provisional measures, and could increase the effectiveness of non-coercive responses to crises. Furthermore, African countries should consider a more proactive use of article 99, by which the UN Secretary-General can place a crisis situation on the Security Council’s agenda.

Notwithstanding the dominance of the P-5, the UN Security Council is not a monolithic body. African states can leverage their membership of working groups and sanctions committees, where decision-making is by consensus, to exert greater influence over the Council’s decisions. Yet, countries have been reluctant to exploit such opportunities, with the recent exception of South Africa on the Libyan sanctions committee in August 2011, when Tshwane held out for better accountability in the unfreezing of $1.5 billion in assets for use by Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) before the fall of Muammar Qaddafî’s regime in Tripoli. The loss of transparency and accountability in the subsidiary bodies of the Council is deeply troubling. The process by which the chairs of these groups are elected remains undemocratic in a system dictated by the preferences of the P-5. Furthermore, while the P-5 – by common consensus – do not hold chair positions, they control the penmanship of Council resolutions, including of its sanctions committees. African countries must make a concerted and proactive effort to chair important committees and to have a substantive role in drafting the resolutions that emanate from them.

Thus far, the P-5 have used discussions on working methods of the Security Council to delay any serious reforms, and recent changes have represented housekeeping measures rather than a genuine reform of working methods. The increasing opacity of the Council’s working methods, even as it is being pressured to become more transparent and accountable, is cause for grave concern. First, the Security Council has moved towards outsourcing the management of difficult situations to informal groups that lack proper accountability, and over which only the P-5 have any control. For example, no meaningful decisions on the Middle East peace process have recently taken place on the Council. Instead, deliberations are led by a group known as the Quartet, comprising the US, the EU; Russia; and the UN Secretary-General. This is self-evidently detrimental to the notion of collective security upon which the edifice of the UN’s security architecture rests. Second, expert panels are increasingly being employed to support the work of the Security Council and its committees. However, these panels lack transparency, and are often dominated by experts from P-5 countries with a vested
interest in their findings. An internal audit by the UN found that as of December 2009, about 60 percent of the experts serving on the panels were from North America and Europe, raising serious doubts about their independence.\(^\text{22}\) Such panels risk undermining even the limited accountability of the Council to its members, with reports often not published in time or made available to everyone. Finally, the fact that none of the top ten funders of UN peacekeeping operations features among the top ten troop-contributing countries has led to tensions between these two groups that need to be resolved expeditiously to achieve effective UN peacekeeping in Africa and elsewhere.

Although improving the working methods of the UN Security Council is a less ambitious goal than reforming its composition and membership, this is a more pragmatic solution in the short- to medium-term to the Council’s dysfunctional state.\(^\text{23}\) Even as they continue to press the case for permanent African representation on the Council, African governments must also consider and pursue alternative means of reform. In particular, the African Group could coordinate better with other regional blocs to move the continent’s agenda for Security Council reform forward. Similarly, the African Union, too, could work more closely with other regional organisations, such as the Arab League, with which it has a common interest in addressing the crises in Libya, Somalia, Western Sahara, Darfur, and South Sudan. However, in order to undertake concrete initiatives and to do so effectively, African countries and institutions must reduce their financial dependence on external donors, particularly among the P-5.


\(^{23}\) This paragraph is largely based on discussions at the CCR policy advisory group seminar, “Africa, South Africa, and the United Nations’ Security Architecture”, Cape Town, 12-13 December 2012.
3. The African Group at the United Nations

The 54-member African Group at the United Nations, which accounts for more than a quarter of the world body’s membership of 193 states, is in a position to brief and influence the three African non-permanent members of the Security Council, as well as African representatives on other key UN bodies.\(^{24}\)

The Group was formally constituted in 1963, following the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) earlier that year, to increase cooperation and better coordinate strategies on matters of common African concern at the world body. Previously African governments at the UN had belonged to the Afro-Asian Group founded in 1950, when the only African members were Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa. The African Group, which is one of five regional groups officially recognised at the world body in New York (the others are the Asia-Pacific; Eastern European; Latin American and Caribbean; and Western European and Others groups) has a dual responsibility to promote the interests of Africa and the efficient working of the UN.\(^{25}\) However, the world body is highly polarised between developing Southern and rich Northern countries, particularly in terms of diplomatic capacity. When confronted by relatively intractable issues, ambassadors at the UN often look to commonly held positions – such as those held by, for example, the Group of 77 (G-77) countries – although the adoption of such positions tends to exacerbate the bifurcated nature of the political space at the UN, and often fails to represent specific African interests effectively.

The African Group enables individual countries to punch above their weight and to overcome their capacity limits. The Group has sometimes been relatively cohesive. It offers an opportunity to define and pursue Africa’s own interests more effectively and to shape the world body’s agenda accordingly. For example, the African Group was instrumental in efforts to elect the first African UN Secretary-General, Egyptian scholar-diplomat, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in 1991. However, although Africa often speaks with one voice on multilateral bodies such as the UN General Assembly, this can disguise many divisions. Due to their voting power in the General Assembly, the members of the African Group are feared, but not always respected. They are often treated as little more than “voting cattle”. The Group’s strength is the willingness of African countries to support each other, although this solidarity is sometimes challenged by the lack of a mechanism to ensure continuity of leadership. The Chair of the African Group is elected by rotation among its members to serve for only one month, which gives each African country a turn once every four and a half years. The African Group’s impact is enhanced when the monthly chair is occupied by a knowledgeable and experienced diplomat. In this regard, it is worth noting that effective leadership can often depend on the capacity of the individual, rather than the size or power of the country holding the post. The chair enjoys considerable prestige as a symbol of African unity and the official mouthpiece of the continent in its relations with other members of the UN.

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Although the African Group was created in 1963 at the behest of the OAU to promote African interests at the UN and is comprised of the permanent representatives of all of the 54 AU member states at the UN, the Group is not constituted as an arm of the continental body.\(^{26}\) The AU’s New York-based Permanent Observer at the UN – currently Angola’s Tete Antonio – reports back regularly to the Chair of the AU Commission on the debates and decisions of the Group. Nevertheless, the role of the AU at the Group remains confined to one of influence rather than control. Compared with the formal nature of AU decisions, the positions that emanate from the African Group represent informal agreements made in good faith. The Group’s decisions – which are reached by consensus rather than by vote, often after lengthy debates – are non-binding, and African member states sometimes subsequently act contrary to the group’s recommendations. Furthermore, the Group includes Morocco, which is its only member outside the AU. (Rabat left the OAU in 1984 after the organisation recognised the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic’s [SADR] claim to Western Sahara.) North African states often have greater resources and more experienced diplomats than many of their sub-Saharan African peers on the Group, which they sometimes use to obstruct the implementation of common African positions agreed at the AU. Morocco has also sometimes acted as a “spoiler” in the Group, working through client states to promote its own agenda at the expense of a wider continental one. The disjuncture between the African Group and the African Union became evident when Morocco was appointed as one of Africa’s three non-permanent members of the UN Security Council in 2012, despite the AU’s nomination of Mauritania for the position.

Africa’s three non-permanent members on the UN Security Council should also seek to represent the views of the AU and the African Group, which usually endorse their election to the body. The African Group’s powerful Committee on Candidatures reviews the applications of member states for seats reserved for African countries on UN organs and allocated by the world body with regard to the principle of “equitable geographic distribution” outlined in Article 23 of the UN Charter.\(^{27}\) Competition is fierce to join the Committee on Candidatures as one of its nine members who are selected for two-year terms on a regional basis – West Africa has three seats, East Africa two, and North, Central, and Southern Africa one each, with the ninth seat allocated on a floating basis. Members of the Committee have often successfully promoted the candidature of representatives from their countries for key posts, including on the UN Security Council. The Committee seeks to recommend candidates on the basis of their region (the larger regions by number of countries, such as West Africa, can fill more seats); non-accumulation of posts (individual countries should not hold too many positions at once); and length of time since previously occupying the seat (countries are discouraged from pursuing consecutive mandates). Negotiations between individual members can influence nominations, with powerful states often holding the advantage.\(^{28}\)

The secretariats of the AU and the UN sometimes bypass the African Group in their consultations, and thus marginalise the policymaking input of individual African states. This situation has led some of these countries to resist the political positions being advocated by the AU as a result. In addition, members of the African Group

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28 This paragraph is based on Endeley, Bloc Politics at the United Nations.
sometimes refuse to implement decisions made in Addis Ababa when these are perceived to conflict with their national interests. For example, African ambassadors at the UN have followed the lead of their governments on the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), despite clear instructions from the AU on this issue. Since not all African states are signatories to the Court, this remains an issue that lies, in effect, beyond the Group’s remit. The African Group also appeared divided over the issue of the UN’s intervention in Libya in 2011. Africa’s three Security Council members – South Africa, Nigeria, and Gabon – voted for NATO’s “no-fly zone” that enabled its “regime change” agenda. In their defence, there were no clear guidelines emanating from the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. Although the African Group under the OAU used to be united in its opposition to colonialism and apartheid, it has lacked a clearly defined common cause and single voice in pursuit of the AU’s more diffuse agenda. The lack of synergy between Addis Ababa and New York has enabled Africa’s sub-regional organisations such as SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD, and ECCAS to wield increased influence on the Group. The SADC grouping has proved to be one of the most effective blocs at the UN, often coordinating its positions before crucial meetings of the Group, and having an impact on UN Security Council decision-making on the DRC. Despite their sometimes more parochial interests, Africa’s sub-regional bodies could strengthen the Group’s policymaking capacity and power at the world body.

The influence of the AU’s New York-based Permanent Observer at the UN over the African Group is restricted, although the office doubles as the Group’s Secretariat. The continental body thus effectively funds the operation of the Group, but the office is relatively small (with a staff of about 12), overworked, and unable to offer sufficient administrative, information, and political support to its members. Notwithstanding these logistical obstacles, the African Group should be more activist in representing the views of the AU at the UN. Consensus, which sometimes eludes African ambassadors in New York, can be forced through the AU Assembly at summits in Addis Ababa and elsewhere. Africa’s heads of state must capacitate, and revise the mandate and role of the AU’s office in New York to make it more effective. The ambassador to the UN of the country chairing the AU – the post rotates on an annual basis – should occupy more than a ceremonial role, and should seek to keep the African Group informed about the decisions being made by the Chair of the AU Assembly and the Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa. In addition, the Group should be given a place within the structure of the AU – including through the appointment of an advisor to the AU Chair on issues affecting the continent at the UN. This could provide the technical support and political legitimacy that the Group requires to strengthen its influence at the world body, particularly on issues of peace and security in Africa. Finally, a stronger lead from the AU Peace and Security Council could enhance the accountability and capacity of the three African members on the UN Security Council to represent the continent’s interests more effectively.29

Other channels for increased African influence in New York could include representations made by the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA), which was established in May 2003 to support implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and has been headed by Egypt’s Maged Abdelaziz since May 2012, as well as informal regular meetings of a smaller key group of African ambassadors with key officials in the UN Secretariat. However, African diplomats are sometimes more preoccupied with political jostling to

ensure the appointment of their candidates to key positions at the UN, than promoting the broader continental agenda. Within the UN, African ambassadors are also not always respected because they are prepared to accept full-time positions at low – P3 – levels. In addition, a lack of technical knowledge and skills can prevent African members from participating effectively in important committees of the UN, such as the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) of the General Assembly, which have not always been covered effectively by African delegations at the UN. The policy development capacity of the African Group in terms of the quality of its diplomats also needs to be improved. African non-governmental organisations (NGOs) could advocate the appointment of competent and activist ambassadors to the world body and offer important research and training support to members of the African Group to enhance their decision- and policy-making capacity, and improve their negotiation strategies in advance of crucial meetings at the UN.
4. The United Nations and Africa’s Regional Organisations

The founders of the United Nations envisaged that the maintenance of international peace and security would be promoted by its Security Council, assisted by regional bodies (Chapter VIII of the UN Charter) and employing a range of methods along a continuum from preventive diplomacy to peace enforcement (Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter respectively).  

The UN Security Council thus has primary, but not exclusive, responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. However, due to the reluctance of the five veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council to share power in fulfilling this mandate, Chapter VIII is the most underused of the trilogy of chapters, and the partnership between Africa’s sub-regional and regional authorities and the UN Security Council to maintain peace and security on the continent has been unstable. After the end of the Cold War by 1990, the Council was content to leave peacekeeping in the hands of African bodies, which crafted security mechanisms that controversially allowed regional military peacekeeping interventions to be launched before the Council had issued official support for the deployment of troops. For example, the peacekeeping interventions by the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia (between 1990 and 1998) and Sierra Leone (1991 to 1999), which probably saved the two countries from complete destruction, represented a sub-regional initiative in the face of apparent international indifference, with the UN only taking over the missions much later. Subsequently, the African Union launched its own missions in Burundi (2003-2004), Sudan’s Darfur region (2004-2007), and Somalia (since 2007), again in reaction to the international community’s failure to respond to crises in these countries. The mission in Darfur was transformed into the 20,000-strong African Union/UN Hybrid Operation from 2007, while the 17,000-strong AU Mission in Somalia is supported politically and financially by the United States and the European Union. 

However, critics have noted that the UN Security Council has continued to marginalise Africa’s sub-regional and regional organisations in its peacekeeping efforts – notably in 2011, when the African Union was sidelined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s intervention in Libya led by Britain and France. However, some key UN departments in New York also found it difficult to obtain information from the AU Commission in Addis Ababa on the regional body’s latest positions. While the AU failed to communicate effectively a common position on Libya at the time, its warnings over the cross-border threats to regional security posed by the conflict have subsequently been validated by the Security Council’s support for African efforts to control the flow of arms from Libya through the Sahel, and to manage conflicts in other countries in the region such as Mali. The AU and Africa’s sub-regional blocs are important producers, as well as consumers, of peace and security. Without proper African engagement, “pure” UN missions on the continent risk losing their value and credibility, as has been demonstrated by the termination of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in 2008, and the UN Mission in Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad (MINURCAT) in 2010, as well as the continuing difficulties of the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The credibility of MONUSCO has been damaged by its apparent disassociation from regional bodies with strong local knowledge and legitimacy on the ground, and further undermined by the apparent ease with which rebels...
took control of the town of Goma in the eastern Congo in November 2012. After the UN Security Council had initially shown some reluctance to support the increasing role adopted by African actors in efforts to resolve the crisis there – in particular, the decision made by the Southern African Development Community in December 2012 to send a 4,000-strong mission to enforce peace in the eastern DRC – it eventually granted official approval for the regional intervention in March 2013. African regional organisations are likely to increase their resistance to attempts by the UN to impose unilaterally reached decisions on peace and security matters on the continent. In this regard, the hybrid peacekeeping model, embodied by UNAMID, could potentially offer several comparative political, operational, and financial advantages, though the powerful members of the UN Security Council and the world body’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations remain hostile to the idea of hybrid operations.

The three key contact points between the African Union and the United Nations on security issues are between: the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council; the AU Commission and the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations; and the AU Commission Chair and the UN Secretary-General. However, the UN’s engagement with the AU at all three levels has been ad hoc and perfunctory. These contacts have been criticised as mere window-dressing conducted to lend legitimacy to decisions that have already been reached by the powerful members of the UN Security Council. Efforts to improve coordination have included the establishment of the UN Office to the AU in Addis Ababa, and a strengthened AU Permanent Observer Mission at the UN in New York – although political agreement is still required by AU and UN leaders, and these bodies currently lack the capacity and remit to create the genuine partnership on peace and security that Africa needs. The AU should strengthen its secretariat-to-secretariat relations by according the Chair of its Commission the power to appoint her/his own Commissioners – just as the UN Secretary-General appoints Undersecretaries-General. In addition, at country level, the relations between the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) country teams and African governments are often based on mutual understanding, which may usefully be leveraged to strengthen peacebuilding efforts on the continent.

About 75 percent of the UN’s peacekeepers are deployed in Africa, while 60 percent of the UN Security Council’s deliberations are focused on the continent. Africa’s growing economic prospects have increased its strategic value to external actors such as France, China, Britain, and the United States, which have sometimes ignored its sub-regional and continental authorities in pursuit of their own parochial interests. In this regard, the UN Security Council does not grant the AU’s Peace and Security Council equal status in consultations and decision-making on issues of mutual concern affecting the continent. This inequality also fosters the perception that the UN Secretariat’s officials consider themselves to be superior to those of the AU, often resulting in tensions between corresponding departments of both bodies. To build proper synergy between the continental and world bodies, the dominance of the P-5 must be urgently addressed. While the UN Security Council’s five permanent members drive the agenda of the Council, Africa lacks a similar core group of the “able and willing” at the AU’s Peace and Security Council, which could act in coalition and with the consensus of others to discuss and draft key resolutions and mandates. Such cooperation is essential to ensure that the peacekeeping roles of the two organisations are fulfilled within a mutually acceptable political framework. For example, the AU could appoint a country to act as the “pen-holder” on resolutions relating to Somalia – this country could then coordinate with the corresponding UN Security Council member holding the pen (in this case, Britain). Furthermore, African governments must identify, forge, and adhere to common positions on key peace and security issues, and

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strengthen their own domestic polities, sub-regional bodies, and the AU in support of these, in order to increase their leverage over the international security agenda and to render the UN Security Council’s role less dominant in Africa.

In response to the view that Africa must first put its own house in order, rather than seeking stronger and wider representation on a reformed UN Security Council, it should be noted that missions led by African actors – such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Darfur – have provided essential political support and paved the way for subsequent UN peacekeeping operations in these countries. The world body needs the backing of regional organisations, which provide local knowledge and are directly affected by specific interventions, to legitimise its own policies. However, the UN Secretariat has sometimes retreated in its own performance and duties, and the role of the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has diminished in cases when the principle of subsidiarity has been strengthened and a greater role assumed by Africa’s regional organisations. In this regard, the AU can be a relatively cohesive body and has often sought to promote closer relationships between the UN and Africa’s regional organisations.

The crisis in Mali in 2012-2013 has highlighted the difficulties that can be inherent in multilateral relationships. The UN effectively rejected the proposals made by the AU and ECOWAS to deploy an intervention force to pacify Northern Mali which had been taken over by Islamic insurgents until a French military intervention in January 2013. By contrast, the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on Sudan, established in 2009 and led by former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, was accorded more respect and its proposals enjoyed a greater level of acceptance by the UN Security Council. Despite the hostility of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to them, hybrid operations such as UNAMID could help to combine the legitimacy brought by Africa’s sub-regional and regional bodies with the financial and logistical resources that the world body can provide. However, the fact that senior AU officials have spent little time in Darfur has indicated a lack of engagement by the continental body in the joint mission there, and the AU needs to take its oversight of such operations conducted jointly in its name more seriously in order to ensure their effectiveness. Furthermore, African regional bodies often resent the Security Council’s insistence that their peacekeeping missions report to the Council, even when the UN is unprepared to pay for these. Greater resources must be generated within Africa to ensure that its peace initiatives are taken seriously on the global stage, and to lessen the continent’s dependence for its security on powerful external actors with their own narrow political interests. Another approach building on the recommendations of the Romano Prodi report of December 2008 is that African-initiated peacekeeping interventions should be funded by the UN for six months and then taken over by the world body.
5. South Africa, Africa, and the UN Security Council

During its first term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2007-2008, South Africa drew criticism for voting against draft resolutions seeking to impose sanctions on the governments of Myanmar and Zimbabwe for the suppression of legitimate political protests.

Since then, the situation in Zimbabwe has not worsened, but stabilised with the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) of 2008 – brokered by Thabo Mbeki – and the subsequent establishment of a government of national unity. Meanwhile, Myanmar has undertaken important political reforms. In 2010, elections were held in the Southeast Asian country for the first time in 20 years, followed by the release from house arrest of pro-democracy leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. These developments have provided some retrospective justification for South Africa’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach. Additionally, in terms of lessons learned, both South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and its Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York have since sought to communicate Tshwane’s positions more effectively to civil society and the South African public at large.

During its second term on the UN Security Council in 2011-2012, South Africa has attempted to promote the broader African peace and security agenda in the Council and has led discussions to establish a more effective division of labour between the UN and Africa’s regional organisations, which remain logistically and financially weak. In January 2012, as the Council’s rotating president, South Africa convened a high-level debate on strengthening the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the African Union, building on Security Council Resolution 1809 which had been adopted during its previous presidency in April 2008. Following the January 2012 debate, the Council adopted Resolution 2033, reiterating its commitment to more effective consultation and collaboration with the AU Peace and Security Council when dealing with conflicts on the continent. The resolution also stressed the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability, and flexibility of the financing of regional organisations when they undertake peacekeeping under a UN mandate. Demonstrating the positive impact of both of these resolutions, the UN Security Council subsequently authorised an increase in troop levels from 12,000 to 17,700 for the African Union Mission in Somalia and expanded the support package for the intervention. Later, in May 2012, the Council also endorsed the AU Peace and Security Council’s post-secession roadmap for Sudan and South Sudan.

Although the UN Security Council does not represent a level playing field and its five permanent members have advantages that they have gained over time – including the power of drafting resolutions on long-running crisis situations in Africa - South Africa (alongside Nigeria) pushed for more active collaboration with African countries in the Council’s working methods. In May 2011, for example, South Africa’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Baso Sangqu, co-led with the British Permanent Representative, Mark Lyall Grant, a visit by Security Council members to Nairobi, Kenya, to discuss the crisis in neighbouring Somalia. South Africa, again working with Nigeria, has also supported the holding of regular meetings between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, working hard in the face of some resistance from the P-5 to ensure that these meetings did not become a mere formality, but actually addressed substantive issues of interest to Africa. However, ensuring continuity for such efforts will depend on the political will and ability of the new African non-permanent members of the Security Council. It is uncertain how strongly Rwanda, Morocco, and Togo will be able and willing to represent common African positions on the Council. For example, during its tenure, South Africa steadfastly supported the African Union’s stance on self-determination and protection of civilians in
Western Sahara. However, Morocco’s vested interest in the territory conflicts with the broader African position. These developments underscore the need for Africa to address the question of continuity in its positions on the Security Council, in particular through a reconsideration of how the non-permanent members from the continent are selected for their two-year terms on the UN body, and how those elected can be made more effectively accountable to the African Group in New York.

In a manner reminiscent of its previous term, South Africa’s apparently shifting positions on the crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya in the first year of its second term – 2011 – sparked controversy, and were perceived by critics to be undermining Tshwane’s historical role since 1994 as a leading defender of human rights. In Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa initially held out against recognising the electoral victory of the challenger, Alassane Ouattara, over the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, before eventually recognising Ouattara as president in March 2011, when the Security Council mandated the UN mission to use “all necessary means” to protect civilians. In March 2011, Tshwane also voted in favour of Security Council Resolution 1973, which established a no-fly zone over Libya and effectively authorised a military intervention by NATO in the country. Though fellow African council members, Nigeria and Gabon, also voted for the resolution, South Africa faced criticism for having provided diplomatic support to Western powers for the action, which was not supported by the AU as a whole, particularly when NATO also interpreted the Council’s mandate expansively to pursue a policy of “regime change” in Libya. Tshwane responded to this criticism by insisting that it had supported resolution 1973 in good faith and in keeping with its commitment to the protection of human rights, and noted that the AU’s failure to articulate a clear position, and to communicate this position in a timely manner to African permanent missions at the UN, had left the African members of the Council with a difficult decision. Furthermore, according to this view, when NATO countries went beyond the mandate of the resolution to carry out a policy of “regime change”, South Africa strongly criticised the shift and supported the AU position in favour of a peaceful and negotiated solution to the crisis. More generally, South African diplomats have sought to highlight the often highly complex nature of the cases that come before the Security Council, and to emphasise the need for a balance between human rights ideals and pragmatic concerns, pointing to the decisive influence that national interests continue to play in international fora like the UN.

The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 also revealed fault lines in Africa’s peace and security architecture, in particular over the issue of subsidiarity: decisions being taken at the lowest practical level. Faced with contested poll results and an explosion of post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire, the AU Peace and Security Council sought a political solution to the crisis, while Nigeria and the sub-regional organisation, ECOWAS, favoured more robust action. On the Security Council, Nigeria allied with France to table resolution 1975, imposing targeted sanctions on president Laurent Gbagbo (who refused to leave power after losing an election) and his close associates, and authorising the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to use “all necessary means” to protect civilians in its areas of deployment. In the absence of a unified African position, South Africa felt that it was faced with a difficult decision, but voted in favour of the resolution out of respect for the principle of subsidiarity, negotiating as best it could for wording that also left room for the AU’s diplomatic approach. Although there is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that governs the relationship between the AU and Africa’s sub-regional organisations, problems have persisted with its implementation. Greater clarity is therefore required among African governments on the relationship between sub-regional organisations, the AU Peace and Security Council, and the UN Security Council. Common African positions on conflicts afflicting the continent are essential to achieve a strong and influential African voice on the Council, not least because its absence enables the P-5 to exploit the opportunity to advance competing interests. For example, the AU did not have a clear position on Libya in 2011, but the Arab League did, and the US, France, and Britain were able to rely on the latter as evidence of regional support to push their “regime change” agenda forward in that country. In this context,
the AU must also more clearly articulate and communicate its positions to both the African delegations in New York, as well as the mass media. The new Chairperson of the AU Commission, South Africa’s Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, has identified this issue as a priority item on the organisation’s agenda.

Furthermore, South Africa’s experience on the Security Council between 2011 and 2012 demonstrates that African countries have to leverage a range of often fluctuating partners and groups at the UN on different issues in order to strengthen their influence within the Council. For example, while South Africa and France were on opposite sides of the debates on Libya and Syria, the two countries have worked together on addressing the situations in Mali and the broader Sahel, where their interests have coincided. Even in configurations such as the IBSA and BRICS groupings, homogeneity is sometimes lacking. For example, South Africa voted for Security Council Resolution 1973 in 2011, while its IBSA partners abstained. However, the grouping was united in criticising NATO’s implementation of the resolution and advocating a more balanced approach towards the government and rebels in Syria, as civil war erupted there in 2012. Similarly, Tshwane, like Paris, favoured a more robust mandate for the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC, contrary to the positions adopted by Washington and New Delhi, again underscoring the need for case-by-case strategic alliances for African countries in order to promote their agendas more effectively on the Council. South Africa, alongside Nigeria, is a member of the L69 Group – comprised of developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia/Pacific – that is working towards Security Council reform. The group has been actively trying to create convergence between the Ezulwini Consensus of 2005 and the L69 platform in order to build support for Africa’s common position on Council reform. Unlike the African position, the evolving L69 platform does not include an insistence on the right of veto for new permanent members.

During its second term on the UN Security Council, South Africa was well positioned to assess the potential of the BRICS bloc, in particular, to increase its diplomatic influence and advance a wider African agenda, as well as the challenges that the bloc could present for its broader foreign policy objectives. All five BRICS countries were present on the Council for the first time since the bloc’s inception, although Brazil ended its term in December 2011. The unity of the group was sorely tested over Syria. While the BRICS countries initially demonstrated a shared wariness about intervening in the crisis, differences surfaced among them as the security situation in Syria deteriorated. In February 2012, India and South Africa voted for a draft resolution backing an Arab peace plan to stop the violence, while Russia and China exercised their power of veto to block the plan. Both India and South Africa are democracies and members of the IBSA forum (alongside Brazil), which could be a more fruitful avenue for cooperation on some foreign policy issues in light of its members’ similar normative commitment to democracy and human rights at home.

The case of Sudan also posed a challenge for South Africa during its second tenure on the Security Council. Tshwane has supported the African Union’s position in favour of deferring the prosecution of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in the interests of promoting peace and justice in Sudan, as permitted by article 16 of

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the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. However, there is little clarity about the conditions under which this deferral could be granted. There is disagreement, too, about whether, and how, invoking the Security Council’s deferral power would support the peace and reconciliation process in Sudan. For this to be acceptable to Sudanese leader, Omar al-Bashir, a deferral of prosecution would in all likelihood have to be made annually in perpetuity, but there is little guarantee that such an offer could be made by the Council. In this context, it is worth noting that powerful members of the Security Council, in particular the P-5, have on occasion used the ICC for their own parochial ends. Three of the P-5 members – the US, Russia, and China – are not signatories of the Rome Statute, yet they all voted for Security Council Resolution 1970 in 2011, which referred Libya to the ICC. Constant recourse to deferrals under article 16 of the Rome Statute could, however, risk losing the gains that South Africa and Africa have made in the fight against impunity and for accountability of human rights violations on the continent.

Finally, given the poor prospects for procedural reform of the UN Security Council in the near future, South Africa should consider expanding its ongoing engagement with civil society organisations as key partners for effective reform of the organisation. This could be anchored around substantive, human rights-related issues such as the UN’s response to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other gross violations of human rights, in which the non-governmental sector and the wider public are more interested than they are in voting rights on the Council. In addition, the role of civil society groups is also growing in new and emerging powers such as Brazil and India, with many NGOs – both local and international – keen to understand, and use the opportunities offered by, the new political dynamics generated by the “rise of the South” to make international organisations more responsive to particular issues and challenges. Working with this expanding “global” civil society could help Africa leverage its voice at the UN, and incentivise the P-5 to act more frequently in the continent’s interests. These NGOs could also become important partners for building an international public constituency in the longer term for the UN’s reform agenda.
6. Africa and the UN Peacebuilding Commission

The UN’s Peacebuilding Commission was created in December 2005 as a subsidiary body of both the Security Council and the General Assembly and made operational the following year in response to international frustration at the high rate of relapse into conflict. It has been estimated that about half of countries that emerge from war relapse into conflict within five years as a result of inadequate peacebuilding.

The creation of a body committed to promoting post-conflict reconstruction filled a “gaping hole” in UN peace efforts, according to In Larger Freedom, the 2005 report by Ghanaian UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, which proposed the Commission. At the time of the Peacebuilding Commission’s establishment, peacemaking approaches had generally sought to stop wars without tackling underlying causes of conflicts – typically seeking to keep a fragile peace while elections were organised as an end to the war, after which peacekeepers left. The Commission was mandated to “bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.”

However, the Peacebuilding Commission was crippled at birth by its founding mandate, which excluded a wider definition of peacebuilding to prevent conflicts from arising in the first place. The P-5 removed a section proposing a preventive diplomacy role for the Commission as this was seen as encroaching on the Security Council’s role. The United States and the rest of the P-5 also objected to the inclusion of “nation-building” in the new body’s agenda. The exclusion of pre-conflict peacebuilding from the Commission’s founding mandate was partly in deference to the sovereignty concerns of countries in the global South that wished to limit the scope of external interventions. In addition, the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]) refused to engage with the Commission at first.

The Peacebuilding Commission includes a 31-member organisational committee appointed on a two-year renewable basis, a secretariat – the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) – and a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The committee consists of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and two of the Council’s non-permanent members; seven members of the UN Economic and Social Council with experience of post-conflict recovery; seven members elected by the General Assembly; five of the UN’s largest donor countries; and five of the world body’s largest contributors to peacekeeping. Representatives from the IMF and the World Bank also attend its meetings. The Commission currently has six African countries on its agenda – Burundi, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea. With the exception of Guinea, which referred itself, these states were all referred to the Peacebuilding Commission by the Security Council. Country-specific
meetings to support peacebuilding efforts comprise representatives from the state concerned and its neighbours; relevant regional organisations, donor and troop-contributing countries; international financial institutions; as well as UN officials in the field. The Commission’s political engagement with the states on its agenda is shaped by the principle of national leadership of the process, for which an implementation framework is agreed and periodically reviewed. However, peacebuilding engagements can be difficult and have proceeded in fits and starts, particularly when the national government concerned is unstable, as was the case in Guinea-Bissau, where an unsuccessful coup in 2008 sparked a series of leadership crises.

The Peacebuilding Commission has engaged in security sector reform (SSR) efforts in Guinea-Bissau, providing pensions to former military commanders; and has mobilised donor support for the holding of elections there. Security sector reform efforts have also been the focus of the Commission’s engagement in Guinea. In the CAR, the ousting of president Francois Bozizé in March 2013 followed the alleged failure of his government to fulfil its pledges under a peace deal signed with rebels in Libreville in 2008, which the Peacebuilding Commission had earlier promoted. The Commission has also supported disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) processes in the CAR and Burundi, and provided material assistance for the holding of elections in both countries. In Liberia, the UN body has provided impetus to national reconciliation initiatives and sought to extend the rule of law by supporting the establishment of five hubs across the country housing police and courts which aim to provide more citizens with access to judicial and security services. In Sierra Leone, the Commission has encouraged talks between government and opposition leaders to resolve disputes that had led to political violence. It also supported electoral efforts in 2012.

The UN’s Peacebuilding Fund has now raised $500 million. In addition, the Peacebuilding Commission’s strategy to align the efforts of external donors has resulted in the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) committing a further $500 million. All countries on the Commission’s agenda are automatically eligible for support from the Fund, and 60 percent of the finance raised for the Fund has been allocated to the six African countries referred to earlier. By October 2012, the support offered by the Commission to these states totalled: $49.2 million for Burundi; $47 million for Sierra Leone; $23.8 million for Guinea-Bissau; $33.4 million for the CAR; $36.8 million for Liberia; and $30.5 million for Guinea. These sums represent between five and ten percent of the total aid received by each of these countries. The Commission also supports the creation of integrated and costed peacebuilding plans – such as “The Agenda for Change” in Sierra Leone – that seek to coordinate the engagements of the relevant external and national actors to maximum effect. In response to sharp criticism in the UN’s 2010 review of the Commission, the Peacebuilding Commission has also increasingly focused on mobilising resources for peacebuilding efforts by co-sponsoring events with national governments to raise funds, as well as supporting private sector outreach to establish National Investment Councils. A donors’ conference co-organised by the Commission in October 2012 pledged $2.5 billion for poverty reduction in Burundi. However, critics have continued to argue that the Peacebuilding Commission represents only one of a series of parallel initiatives in the field of peacebuilding – other players include the World Bank, the IMF, and the Group of Seven (G-7) finance ministers; and that the international financial institutions partnered by the Commission are not obliged to revise their market-driven approaches to development, even if these are seen to be undermining peacebuilding efforts.  

43 Olonisakin and Ikpe, “The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission”.

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Meanwhile, the Peacebuilding Fund remains dwarfed by the $5 billion a year that the UN spends on peacekeeping, and the demand for resources for comprehensive peacebuilding remains largely unmet. In this regard, the Peacebuilding Commission is seeking to boost its relationship with the AU and Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) to support peacebuilding efforts on the continent – in particular through the African Solidarity Initiative for Peacebuilding (ASIP), which aims to harness the support of wealthier African countries, and those with specific technical skills. ASIP also seeks to create greater access to the continent’s leading training institutions and universities to help countries emerging from conflicts. In 2009, the AU’s 15-member Peace and Security Council sought to include Somalia, among other countries, on the Commission’s agenda. AU engagement in the Commission’s efforts therefore remains crucial.

In practice, peacebuilding is a fluid process that requires addressing the root causes of conflicts and changing attitudes on the ground. This process cannot be categorised neatly as a stage in a continuum of peacemaking activities, but is essential to preventing a renewal of conflict. Critics have argued that the Peacebuilding Commission has tended to pursue a “liberal peace” model which emphasises holding democratic elections and liberalising markets, and noted that the body would be more effective if it focused on tackling the root causes of conflicts, and changing the “bitter minds” that can sustain them, rather than seeking to provide merely technical solutions. Given the rising incidence of conflicts stalling development in Africa, greater attention should be paid to pre- rather than just post-conflict peacebuilding – although this strictly remains beyond the Commission’s remit. In the light of its fundamental lack of sufficient resources, the UN body should consider focusing on addressing the causes of conflict at a deeper level in one or two pilot countries in order to achieve genuine change and provide lessons for more effective peacebuilding on the continent. The Commission’s effectiveness has also been inhibited by the weak role that has often been assigned to civil society actors in the programmes that it supports, and the body should look at moving beyond its work to strengthen governments and seek rather to initiate grassroots projects where its limited financial resources can leverage greater impact. However, it has also been argued that expectations that the Commission can resolve the root causes of conflicts on the ground are inflated, given that even civil societies in conflict-prone countries often cannot identify and resolve these, and considering the many years and great efforts usually required for effective national reconciliation. In this regard, the criteria for when a country can be removed from the Commission’s agenda remain fundamentally uncertain. Although truth and reconciliation structures are sometimes promoted as a panacea for post-conflict societies, they can be difficult to develop and implement, particularly if those in power have a history of engaging in the atrocities that these bodies are created to adjudicate.44

The Peacebuilding Commission’s effectiveness also remains circumscribed by its position within the UN’s organisational architecture. Critics have noted that the composition of its 31-member organisational committee is skewed to favour the participation of the rich countries of the North, with the P-5 guaranteed permanent membership.45 In addition, the Security Council’s powerful members have also been accused of demonstrating a lack of interest in the Commission’s work. The Council only discussed the Peacebuilding Commission’s fifth annual report, which had been published in January 2012, five months later in June 2012, raising concern over the level of its engagement with the body. A related issue is whether the Council’s approach to countries that are on the agenda of both bodies should incorporate greater input from the Commission.46 The UN’s 2010

45 Olonisakin and Ipe, “The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission”.
review of the Commission recommended that the body should be elevated to Policy Committee level within the UN Secretary-General’s office, although this was resisted by the P-5 and the Peacebuilding Commission itself. However, steps to deepen the Commission’s relationship with the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General have been taken in order to increase its influence within the world body. The Peacebuilding Commission now reports to the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee when countries on its agenda are discussed in this forum. Nevertheless, the Commission remains an orphan in the international system: often competing rather than coordinating with the Bretton Woods institutions on funding. The Peacebuilding Commission is also within but apart from the UN, the organisation that gave birth to it. The Commission is further disconnected from mechanisms such as the Mediation Support Unit (MSU) in the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA), with which it could coordinate more closely to promote a more holistic form of peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding Commission is also divorced from the world body’s peacekeeping operations. Even the countries on the Commission’s agenda do not champion their involvement with it very loudly. Although the Peacebuilding Commission has overseen the development and successful implementation of innovative peacebuilding efforts at the country level, including successful institution-building, it has sometimes promoted little popular understanding of its work in the countries on its agenda, and has even failed to engage some of its partner governments effectively in its programmes.

The Case of Somalia

Re-engaging the interest and attention of the United Nations Security Council, regional organisations, and Somalia’s neighbours has been key to reinvigorating the peace process in this fragile country in the Horn of Africa. The death of 18 US soldiers, deployed as part of the UN-authorised Unified Task Force (UNITAF), as well as about 1,000 Somalis, including women and children, in what is commonly known as the “Black Hawk Down” incident in Mogadishu in October 1993, was followed by the withdrawal of the US in 1994 and by the departure of the UN mission in Somalia a year later. The situation in Somalia was subsequently neglected by the UN Security Council, warranting little more than a press statement or a paragraph in the occasional presidential announcement. However, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and neighbouring countries such as Djibouti and Kenya continued their involvement on the ground. Ethiopia also launched a controversial US-backed military intervention into Somalia between 2006 and 2008. Throughout its history, Somalia has often been the victim of its strategic location in the Horn of Africa, and the emergence of international terrorism and maritime piracy in the region has been instrumental in bringing renewed international attention to the country.

In 2006, the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia was established by the US and Norway, and the UN Security Council’s interest in the country again grew. The Security Council gave its support for the African Union Mission in Somalia in 2007, with Uganda and Burundi forming its backbone. The 17,000-strong mission also included Kenyan troops by 2012. The Djibouti Agreement of 2008 between warring Somali parties — specifically, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and some factions of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) — was key for IGAD and the AU to engage the interest of a broader and more diverse group of actors in the implementation of the Somali peace process, including the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and individual countries such as Saudi Arabia.

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The case of Somalia shows that peacebuilding is a continuous endeavour, rather than a discrete category of activities, on a continuum of peace processes that seeks to achieve a shift in attitudes on the ground in order to prevent a renewal of hostilities. The key challenge in Somalia entailed not only identifying the relevant local actors to engage in peacemaking and peacebuilding in an extremely diverse society, but also instilling a sense of confidence about the political process to address the root causes of conflict. In this respect, the creation of an inclusive, ongoing Somali-Somali dialogue has been key to beginning the long-term process of political reconciliation in this troubled country.

Another critical element has been the secure environment provided by AMISOM that has enabled the Somali parties to engage with each other politically. In this context, the UN Security Council’s decision to support the peacekeeping operation through the establishment of a trust fund was particularly important. Together with the hybrid African Union/UN Mission in Darfur, the experience of AMISOM can be seen as a key step towards building a model of partnership between the UN and the AU for the maintenance of peace and security on the continent. However, African countries must be wary of any model that involves the UN providing only the financing, while they provide all the troops on the ground.

In Somalia itself, the peace process is complex and still fragile. Yet, the relationships between the key African and international actors engaged in these efforts have remained on an ad hoc basis. This does little to support the sustainability of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in Somalia.
Policy Recommendations

The following 10 policy recommendations emerged from the policy advisory group seminar.

1. African states must find sustainable ways of funding peacekeeping missions on the continent, as well as of operationalising the African peace and security architecture, and should reduce the continent’s dependence on external donors, who fund 97 percent of its security operations. The African Union, as well as the Southern African Development Community, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the Economic Community of Central African States, could learn from the example of the Economic Community of West African States, which has used a community levy to raise resources for its peacekeeping and related activities;

2. Although there is a Memorandum of Understanding that governs the relationship between the AU and Africa’s sub-regional organisations, problems have persisted in implementing the principle of subsidiarity, and greater clarity is required from African governments on the relationship between sub-regional organisations, the AU Peace and Security Council, and the UN Security Council. The AU and Africa’s sub-regional blocs are important producers, as well as consumers, of peace and security. The recommendation of the Romano Prodi-led 2008 joint African Union-United Nations panel on peacekeeping, for the world body to provide funding for AU-led, UN-authorised missions for up to six months and then take them over, must be urgently implemented;

3. Given the current political stalemate in negotiations on reform of the UN Security Council’s composition and membership, it is important for African countries to revisit the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus. Consideration should be given to modifying the common African position by removing the insistence on the veto (as Nigeria and South Africa had argued in 2005, and as accepted by Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil) in order to be able to enact reform;

4. African countries – in particular, the three African non-permanent members on the UN Security Council – must make a more concerted and proactive effort to chair important Council committees and working groups, and to have a substantive role in drafting the resolutions that emanate from them; in order to ensure a strong and consistent African voice on the UN Security Council, African countries need to agree on a formal mechanism for selecting non-permanent members that possess the power and capacity to serve the interests of the continent on the world body’s most powerful decision-making body;

5. The African Group must identify and agree on a mechanism to improve the accountability of Africa’s three non-permanent members on the UN Security Council to the Group, which usually endorses their election to the body. The African Group should be given a place within the structure of the AU – including through the appointment of an advisor to the AU Chair on issues affecting the continent at the UN. For its part, the AU Commission in Addis Ababa needs to provide a stronger lead in the forging of common African positions on key issues and communicating them in a timely manner to African delegations in New York;
6. The intellectual capacity and technical knowledge of the African Group’s member states needs to be improved to increase the effectiveness of their participation across various UN bodies. In this respect, African non-governmental organisations can play an important role by advocating the appointment of competent and activist ambassadors to the world body, and by offering important research and training support to members of the African Group to enhance their decision- and policy-making capacity, and to improve their negotiation strategies in advance of crucial meetings at the UN;

7. Africa’s heads of state must capacitate and revise the mandate and role of the AU’s New York-based Permanent Observer Mission to make it more effective. Additionally, the annually appointed Chair of the AU Assembly (rotating heads of state) should occupy more than a ceremonial role, and must keep the African Group informed about the decisions being made by the organisation in Addis Ababa;

8. The AU should strengthen its secretariat-to-secretariat relations by according the Chair of the AU Commission the power to appoint her/his own Commissioners – just as the UN Secretary-General appoints Undersecretaries-General;

9. Given the growing role of civil society groups in new and emerging powers such as Brazil and India, and their desire to make international organisations more responsive to particular issues and challenges, South Africa should consider expanding its ongoing engagement with these groups. Working with this expanding ‘global’ civil society could help Africa leverage its voice at the UN, and could incentivise the P-5 to act more consistently in the continent’s interests. These NGOs could also become important partners for building an international public constituency in the longer term for reform of the UN; and

10. The UN Peacebuilding Commission should seek to deepen its relationship with the UN Security Council and its Secretary-General to increase its influence within the world body, and should coordinate more effectively with local governments and civil society to promote wider popular understanding of its work.
Annex I

Agenda

Day One  Wednesday, 12 December 2012

09.00 – 09.30  Welcome and Opening Remarks

Chair:  Ms Zohra Dawood, former Executive Director, Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA), and Director of OSF Indonesia

Speaker:  Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

09.30 – 11.00  Session I: The United Nations and the African Union

Chair:  Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Member of the African Union (AU) Panel of the Wise

Speaker:  Professor Ibrahim Gambari, former Joint Special Representative for the AU/United Nations (UN) Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and former Foreign Minister of Nigeria

Discussant:  Dr Musifiky Mwanasali, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism, UNAMID, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

11.00 – 11.15  Coffee Break

11.15 – 12.45  Session II: Africa and the Reform of the UN Security Council

Chair:  Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

Speakers:  Ambassador Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Executive Director, Security Council Report, New York; and former Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations

Dr James Jonah, former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, New York, United States

12.45 – 13.45  Lunch

Chair: Ms Felleng Sekha, Managing Partner, IQS Strategic Public Affairs Consulting, Johannesburg

Speakers: Dr Kaire Mbuende, former Permanent Representative of Namibia to the UN; and former Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Ambassador Adonia Ayebare, Deputy Permanent Representative of Uganda to the UN

15.15–15.30 Coffee Break

15.30–17.00 Session IV: The Political Dynamics of the UN Security Council

Chair: Dr James Jonah, former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, New York

Speakers: Lieutenant-General Chikadibia Obiakor, former Military Adviser, UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations; and former Force Commander, UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

Ambassador John Hirsch, former United States Ambassador to Sierra Leone

18.00–19.30 Public dialogue: “The United Nations’ Peacebuilding Role in the Greater Horn of Africa”

Chair: Ambassador Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Executive Director, Security Council Report, New York; and former Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the UN

Speakers: Dr Augustine Mahiga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia

Professor Ibrahim Gambari, former Joint Special Representative for UNAMID; and former Foreign Minister of Nigeria

20.30 Dinner
Day Two  Thursday, 13 December 2012


Chair: Dr Agostinho Zacarias, UN Resident Coordinator and UN Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative, Tshwane, South Africa

Speakers: Ambassador Baso Sangqu, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the UN, New York

Ms Nicole Fritz, Executive Director, Southern African Litigation Centre, Johannesburg

10.45 – 11.00  Coffee Break

11.00 – 12.30  Session VI: Africa and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission

Chair: Dr Augustine Mahiga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia

Speakers: Mr Ejeviome Eloho Otobo, Director of Strategic Planning and Deputy Head, UN Peacebuilding Support Office, New York

Dr Funmi Olonisakin, Founding Director, African Leadership Centre; and Director of the Conflict, Security, and Development Group, King’s College, London, England

12.30 – 13.30  Lunch

13.30 – 15.00  Session VII: The Practice of Peacebuilding in Africa: The Case of Somalia

Chair: Dr Comfort Ero, Africa Programme Director, International Crisis Group, Nairobi, Kenya

Speaker: Dr Augustine Mahiga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia

Discussant: Dr James Jonah, former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, New York

15.00 – 15.30  Coffee Break and Completing Evaluation Forms
Session VIII: Rapporteurs’ Report

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Rapporteurs: Mr Mark Paterson, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Annex II

List of Participants

1. Professor Hamid Abdeljaber  
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2. Dr Adekeye Adebajo  
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3. Ms Ngozi Amu  
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African Union (AU)  
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4. Ambassador Adonia Ayebare  
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to the UN  
New York, United States

5. Ms Erica Barks-Ruggles  
Consul-General of the United States  
Cape Town

6. Mr Nick Birnback  
Chief of Public Information,  
UN Political Office for Somalia  
Nairobi, Kenya

7. Ms Zohra Dawood  
Former Executive Director,  
Open Society Foundation for South Africa  
Cape Town

8. Dr Comfort Ero  
Africa Programme Director,  
International Crisis Group  
Nairobi

9. Ms Nicole Fritz  
Executive Director,  
Southern African Litigation Centre  
Johannesburg, South Africa

10. Professor Ibrahim Gambari  
Former Joint Special Representative for the  
AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

11. Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse  
Member of the AU Panel of the Wise  
Accra, Ghana

12. Ambassador John Hirsch  
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Johannesburg
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   University of Johannesburg

16. Commissioner Leon Levy
   Commission for Conciliation, Mediation,
   and Arbitration
   Cape Town

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   Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
   General for Somalia; and Head, UN Political
   Office for Somalia

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   Southern African Development Community

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   Centre for Conflict Resolution
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   Cape Town

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   Peacekeeping Operations; and former Force
   Commander, UN Mission in Liberia

24. Mr Johannes Oljelund
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   Embassy of Sweden
   Tshwane

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   and Director, Conflict, Security and
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   England

26. Mr Ejeviome Eloho Otobo
   Director, Strategic Planning; and Deputy Head,
   UN Peacebuilding Support Office
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28. Ambassador Baso Sangqu
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30. Ms Felleng Sekha
   Managing Partner, IQS Strategic Public
   Affairs Consulting
   Johannesburg
31. Mr Chris Trott  
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Cape Town

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New York

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Norwegian Embassy  
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UN Resident Coordinator,  
and UN Development Programme Resident Representative  
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Centre for Conflict Resolution  
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### Annex III

#### List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African peace and security architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARS</td>
<td>Alliance for the Reiberation of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIP</td>
<td>African Solidarity Initiative for Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUHIP</td>
<td>AU High-Level Implementation Panel (on Sudan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUPD</td>
<td>AU High-Level Panel on Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCR</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>Group of Four (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-7</td>
<td>Group of Seven (the US, France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-77</td>
<td>Group of 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>Global Political Agreement (Zimbabwe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRULAC</td>
<td>Group of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India, Brazil, and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Contact Group (on Somalia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSU</td>
<td>Mediation Support Unit (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council (Libya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of Islamic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSAA</td>
<td>Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSF-SA</td>
<td>Open Society Foundation for South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2</td>
<td>Permanent two members of the UN Security Council (China and Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3</td>
<td>Permanent three members of the UN Security Council (the US, France, and Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Permanent five members of the UN Security Council (the US, China, Russia, France, and Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Support Office (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council (AU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional economic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADR</td>
<td>Saharan Arab Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force (Somalia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VOLUME 1
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S SECURITY
THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA

The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

VOLUME 2
SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA
THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE

The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

VOLUME 3
THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA’S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

VOLUME 4
A MORE SECURE CONTINENT
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

African perspectives on the United Nations (UN) High Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.

VOLUME 5
WHITHER SADC?
SOUTHERN AFRICA’S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

VOLUME 6
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY
AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

VOLUME 7
BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY

This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.

VOLUME 8
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.

Other publications in this series
(Available at www.ccr.org.za)
This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

This two-day policy seminar held in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

This policy and research seminar held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

This policy advisory group seminar on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.
This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, ‘ethnic cleansing’, or crimes against humanity.

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military co-operation, and migration.

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.

This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.

This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.

This policy seminar held from 8 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.

This policy seminar held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.
This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.

This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community in building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

This policy advisory group seminar held in Savonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011 assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.

This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.
VOLUME 40
SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa’s region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.

VOLUME 39
THE EAGLE AND THE SPRINGBOK:
STRENGTHENING THE NIGERIA/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONSHIP
This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help to “reset” the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.

VOLUME 41
THE AFRICAN UNION AT TEN:
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS
This international colloquium held in Berlin, Germany, from 30 to 31 August 2012, reviewed the first ten years of the African Union (AU); assessed its peace and security efforts; compared it with the European Union (EU); examined the AU’s strategies to achieve socio-economic development; and, analysed its global role.
Notes
In December 2012, South Africa completed its second two-year term as an elected non-permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, after its earlier tenure in 2007-2008. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, convened about 30 leading policymakers, civil society actors, and scholars to assess Africa’s current and past performance on the Security Council, with a particular focus on its role in relation to the institutional dynamics that help to shape the work of the body. The seminar also crafted concrete policy recommendations for strengthening Africa’s diplomatic roles and for promoting the continent’s interests at the UN as well as other international fora. The meeting focused on six key themes: the Political Dynamics of the UN Security Council; Africa and the Reform of the Security Council; the Role of the African Group at the UN; the Relationship between the UN and Africa’s Regional Organisations; the Lessons of South Africa’s Two Years (2011-2012) on the UN Security Council; and the Performance of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.