SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

POLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR REPORT
13-14 DECEMBER 2011, ERINVALE ESTATE, WESTERN CAPE, SOUTH AFRICA
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RAPPORTEURS
MARK PATERSON AND CHRIS SAUNDERS
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Acknowledgments

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, would like to thank the Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA), Cape Town, and the Swedish Embassy in South Africa, for their generous support which made possible the holding of the policy advisory group seminar in partnership with the Centre for African Studies, Dalarna University, Sweden, at Erinvale Estate, Western Cape, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011. CCR would also like to thank the main funders of its Africa Programme: the governments of the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).

About the Organisers

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in the Western Cape and Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding involving the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and African civil society; Southern Africa’s peacebuilding challenges; the European Union’s (EU) engagement with Africa; and HIV/AIDS in relation to post-conflict societies.

Established in 1977, Dalarna University is one of Sweden’s fastest growing institutions of higher education. The university offers a wide range of educational opportunities at its two campuses in Falun and Borlänge. More than half of all students receive their education through web-based distance learning courses, for which it is nationally recognised as a pioneer. The university’s Centre for African Studies has two main objectives: first, to create the conditions for the promotion of African studies education in Sweden and the European Union; and second, to mobilise support and enhance awareness about Africa and African issues in the region of Dalarna. The Centre has a one-year masters programme in African Studies involving courses such as: Human Rights and Democracy in South Africa; the Modern History of Southern Africa; Dynamics of African Societies; Economic Development in Africa; Education and Change; Religion and Politics in African Societies; Health and Gender; History of the Horn of Africa; African Literature and Postcolonial Studies; and Urban Spaces and Urban Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The programme is currently expanding and in the process of establishing cooperative relations with other universities in Europe, particularly in Italy.

The Rapporteurs

Mark Paterson is a Communications Consultant, and Chris Saunders a Research Associate, at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa.
Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy advisory group meeting at Erinvale Estate, Western Cape, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011 on “South Africa, Africa, and the United Nations (UN) Security Council”. The policy seminar, which was held in partnership with the Centre for African Studies at Dalarna University, Sweden, was made possible through the support of the Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA), Cape Town, and the Swedish Embassy in South Africa.

The meeting took place as South Africa approached the end of the first year of its second two-year term (2011-2012) as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. The seminar focused on: South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the UN Security Council; UN peacekeeping in Africa; and the politics and reform of the Council. It also considered the role of the Security Council in eight case studies: Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan’s Darfur region, South Sudan, and Libya.

1. South Africa and the UN Security Council

In January 2007, South Africa became a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the first time. In its first two-year term on the Council, it voted against draft resolutions on Myanmar and Zimbabwe which condemned the governments in those countries for suppressing legitimate opposition protests, on the grounds that the UN Human Rights Council was the more appropriate forum to discuss such issues. In January 2011, South Africa again became a non-permanent member of the Council. The two key issues before the Council in the early months of 2011 were Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. In each case, Tshwane (Pretoria), under AU auspices, attempted, and failed, to broker a settlement. In March 2011, South Africa voted for Security Council Resolution 1973, which sanctioned the use of ‘all necessary measures’ against Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s government in Tripoli. However, Tshwane subsequently strongly criticised the Anglo-French-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) use of force to remove Qaddafi’s regime. Although South African diplomats argued that they had voted for Resolution 1973 because it was supported by the League of Arab States (LAS) and there was an immediate threat to civilians in Benghazi, critics alleged that Tshwane had failed to anticipate that NATO would use the resolution to bring about ‘regime change’ in Libya. In Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa initially held out against recognising the electoral victory of the challenger, Alassane Ouattara, over the incumbent, president Laurent Gbagbo, before eventually recognising Ouattara as president in March 2011, when the Security Council mandated the UN mission to use “all necessary means” to protect civilians.

2. The UN Security Council and African Regional Organisations

Although Africa has no permanent representation on the UN Security Council (having three rotating two-year seats), more than 60 percent of the Council’s deliberations are concerned with the continent. During its first term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2007-2008, South Africa led discussions to establish a more effective division of labour on issues of peace and security between the UN and Africa’s regional organisations, especially the AU. Though Africa has an extensive institutional architecture for peace and security, its organisations remain logistically and financially weak. Angered at what was seen as a disproportionate use of force by Western countries in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, and the marginalisation of the AU in relation to Libya, South
Africa argued on the Security Council, as its chair in January 2012, that African countries should take the leading role in dealing with conflicts on their own continent. The debate on the issue led to the passage of a Security Council resolution in January 2012 which called for the strengthening of relations between the UN Security Council and regional bodies, in particular the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC), in the areas of conflict management and electoral assistance. The resolution also sought the improvement of regular interaction, consultation, and coordination between the two Councils on matters of mutual interest.

3. UN Peacekeeping in Africa

After the end of the Cold War by 1990, the number of conflicts on which the UN Security Council was willing to act increased dramatically. However, the enthusiasm of Western governments to place their troops in harm’s way to help to resolve conflicts in Africa waned after debacles in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994) in which 18 American and 10 Belgian peacekeepers respectively were killed. Political antipathy to peacekeeping action in Africa led to fatal UN passivity in Rwanda and an utterly avoidable genocide of about 800,000 people. After the Rwandan genocide, Africans were in the forefront of efforts to actualise the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) to prevent such crimes against humanity in future. Between 1990 and 2003, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) undertook major peacekeeping efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire; as did the AU from 2003, first in Burundi, and later in Sudan’s Darfur region, and Somalia. UN support for these missions followed some time after their launch, and often resulted in ‘rehatted’ African peacekeepers coming under a UN umbrella. In 2008, the Joint AU-UN Report on AU Peacekeeping Operations chaired by the Italian former president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, concluded that the UN was shirking its peacekeeping responsibilities in Africa, leaving African organisations, which lack the necessary capabilities, to bear the brunt. In April 2012, about 70 percent of the UN’s 100,000 peacekeepers, and seven of its 16 peacekeeping missions were deployed on the continent – in the Western Sahara, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, South Sudan, and Sudan’s Darfur and Abyei regions. The number, scale, and cost of the wars in Africa have highlighted the importance of peacebuilding – not just peacekeeping – in promoting political and social stability, and helping to redress economic inequalities.

4. Reforming the UN Security Council

The 15-member UN Security Council has a global mandate to maintain international peace and security. It is the organisation’s most powerful body and the only one whose decisions are legally binding on all 193 members. Although proposed as part of a system of collective security, the Council’s open-ended conception and the inequities built into its founding rules for voting and decision-making mean that it has often been used as a tool for promoting security on a selective basis, particularly in support of the interests of the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Council (P-5) – the United States (US), China, Russia, France, and Britain. These countries often initiate and shape, or block, peacekeeping missions to further their strategic interests and to reinforce their historical spheres of influence. The P-5 have decades of experience of manipulating the body’s arcane rules of procedure to their advantage, draft most Council resolutions, and choose all Council committee chairs. The 10 non-permanent members, elected for two-year non-renewable terms, are sometimes excluded from key meetings at which action is agreed on strategic issues. Vital decisions of UN member states are frequently made in national capitals, not at the world body in New York; and the P-5 often shape the implementation, as well as the mandates, of interventions authorised by the Council. The NATO action in Libya in 2011 demonstrated how, once a resolution has been approved, powerful nations, such as the P-3 (the US, France, and Britain), can often determine the nature and ends of a military engagement free from the constraints of a
wider multilateralism and the reservations of fellow members of the Council. This has led to calls for greater accountability and the adoption of the idea of “responsibility while protecting”, proposed by Brazil.

5. West Africa: Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia

The Security Council has been actively involved in trying to bring about peace and stability in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire during and after long-running civil wars in both countries. The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), established in 2004, had about 11,000 peacekeepers in February 2012, with about 450 French troops also deployed. An estimated 1,500 civilians were killed, and about one million people displaced in violence that broke out after Alassane Ouattara defeated Laurent Gbagbo in elections held in November 2010. Gbagbo was captured, with the help of French forces, in March 2011, and subsequently sent to the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague to face charges of crimes against humanity.

In Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, after becoming a joint Nobel Peace Prize laureate, won re-election as president in November 2011 (with the main opposition boycotting the second round), despite fears that unemployed youths would be recruited by warlords to restart the country’s civil war, which raged for 11 years, until 2003, with 250,000 fatalities. In February 2012, a 9,185-strong UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL) provided security in the country amidst its still fledgling national security institutions and in the face of continuing ethnic and religious tensions. Instability across the border in Côte d’Ivoire also remains a serious concern. Liberian mercenaries were involved in the Ivorian conflict, which spilled 160,000 refugees into Liberia. In addition, Guinea remains politically unstable, even as Sierra Leone continues its fragile recovery from a decade of civil war. Liberia is thus precariously located at the epicentre of a volatile Mano River basin.

6. The Great Lakes: the DRC and Burundi

As the DRC sought to emerge from a brutal civil war that has resulted in over three million fatalities since 1996, the Security Council authorised a UN force for the country in 1999, which was still there in February 2012 as the 19,000-strong UN Stabilisation Mission (MONUSCO). The first post-war election in the DRC, held in 2006, gave the government of Joseph Kabila broader legitimacy. The second, in November 2011, preceded by some violence against demonstrators, was strongly criticised by many observers as flawed. The premature departure of the UN from the Congo could threaten the gains made there, especially in stabilising the country’s volatile Kivu and Orientale provinces. Major issues that still need to be addressed in the Congo include integrating irregular forces into the national army, and dealing with the illegal exploitation of natural resources. In Burundi, a peace process began in 1995. South Africa became the key mediator, and an accord was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, in 2000 by most of the parties involved in the conflict. In 2004, the Security Council established the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) which “rehatted” South African-led AU troops, and concluded its mandate in 2006. While the situation has been relatively peaceful since, tensions between the government and the opposition still threaten a renewed outbreak of violence. Concerns continue to be expressed about political tensions, extrajudicial killings, and human rights abuses. Urgent security sector reform also remains a major challenge.

7. The Horn of Africa: Somalia, Darfur, and South Sudan

Somalia has lacked effective national leadership and been wracked by civil war since 1991. The country was abandoned by UN peacekeepers in 1995, until in 2007, the AU established its mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In February 2012, AMISOM had about 11,000 peacekeepers from Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti; and 4,700
Kenyan troops were being integrated into the mission. However, insecurity and piracy remain endemic in Somalia. In September 2011, Somali political groups adopted a UN-sponsored “roadmap” which proposed steps and a timetable to dissolve the current transitional government, and establish new security institutions, a constitutional framework, and processes leading to national elections. However, initial deadlines set by the plan were not met, and the transitional government remains weak and unpopular, though AMISOM has made military gains against the al-Shabaab militia.

The conflict and humanitarian crisis in Sudan’s Darfur region, where an estimated 300,000 people have died since 2003, continued during 2011. The AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which is the world’s largest peacekeeping mission, comprising almost 23,300 peacekeepers, finally reached full strength in January 2012. Furthermore, in 2011, an AU/UN-sponsored “roadmap” for peace in Darfur was agreed by the government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). However, 17 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) still remain trapped in camps in Darfur; the peace process was not joined by the largest rebel factions – the two wings of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM); and fighting has continued sporadically. The long-standing marginalisation of Sudan’s peripheries must be urgently addressed as part of a Sudan-wide constitutional process leading to better governance. Khartoum has complained that key international promises, including pledges by the US to ease sanctions, have not been met, despite the North’s cooperation with the peace process for South Sudan. Furthermore, international engagement with the Sudanese government remains overshadowed by the ICC arrest warrant issued in 2009 against its president, Omar al-Bashir, for alleged war crimes in Darfur. The AU has called for suspension of the warrant to encourage al-Bashir to continue to make peace, while opponents of this call have argued that this promotes impunity. Meanwhile, unresolved issues between Sudan and the new state of South Sudan – in particular over borders, efforts to decentralise power, and the sharing of oil wealth – could lead the two governments to renewed conflict as both sides continue to support local proxies. In 2011, the Security Council established a UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and an operation in the disputed border area of Abyei – the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) – which numbered about 5,500 and 3,800 peacekeepers, respectively, in February 2012.

8. North Africa: Libya and the “Arab Spring”

After Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi, launched a brutal crackdown against protestors in February 2011, the UN Security Council passed a resolution in February 2011 referring Qaddafi and members of his government to the ICC, and called for the imposition of an arms embargo on Tripoli. The Council then adopted another resolution in March 2011, which sanctioned a “no-fly zone” and the use of force to protect civilians. The AU’s “roadmap” for peace in Libya was ignored, and a NATO-led “coalition of the willing”, largely directed by France and Britain, targeted the Qaddafi regime. As part of the justification for the NATO intervention, Qaddafi’s human rights atrocities were singled out, while less attention was focused on the kidnapping, torture, and killing by rebel forces of migrant workers from Chad, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. After the NATO intervention ended in October 2011 with the assassination of Qaddafi by rebels in his hometown of Sirte, the Security Council established a UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to bolster a transition to democracy. Serious questions, however, remain over whether the new government will demonstrate a capacity to represent all Libyans – particularly those formally loyal to Qaddafi – and the indebtedness of the country’s new rulers to the P-3 may alienate Tripoli from the AU.
Policy Recommendations

The following 20 policy recommendations emerged from the policy advisory group seminar:

1. South Africa and the UN Security Council
   - South Africa should use its current two-year term on the UN Security Council to advance African interests, working closely with the Africa Group at the UN;
   - Relations between South Africa and Nigeria – the two main regional hegemons in sub-Saharan Africa – should be urgently improved to provide leadership to rally a united African diplomatic front at the UN and other international diplomatic fora;

2. African Regional Organisations and the UN Security Council
   - Relations between the UN Security Council and African regional bodies – in particular, the AU’s Peace and Security Council – must be strengthened. African members on the UN Security Council should coordinate their decisions and collaborate with the Africa Group at the UN more effectively through the AU office in New York, taking into account key AU decisions;

3. UN Peacekeeping in Africa
   - UN peacekeeping operations should not be used to advance the parochial national interests of powerful member states. Leadership of the peacekeeping, political, and humanitarian affairs departments at the UN Secretariat in New York, which presently rests with France, the US, and Britain, respectively, should be more equitably distributed to reduce the dominance of the P-3 in decision- and policy-making;
   - Political leadership of peacekeeping missions in Africa should have strong African representation within a UN structure. Hybrid operations, such as the AU/UN mission in Sudan’s Darfur region, must be carefully considered in future as, although they can overcome the reluctance of national governments to engage with international peacekeepers, they may also pose coordination, logistical, and accountability challenges;
   - The AU needs to develop its African Standby Force (ASF) to react rapidly in support of urgent missions led by African regional bodies. The recommendation in the Prodi report of 2008 that these missions should be funded by the UN for six months and then taken over by the world body should be expeditiously implemented;
   - Post-conflict reconstruction efforts are critical to sustaining peace. The UN Peacebuilding Commission and international financial institutions like the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank should play a more effective role in such efforts in Africa, based on a clear division of labour among African actors, the UN, and the European Union (EU);

4. Reforming the UN Security Council
   - The Security Council must be reformed in terms of membership, decision-making, and working methods. The Council needs to be democratised to reflect the modern world’s demographics, particularly to ensure permanent representation from Africa and Latin America, and to counter the body’s continued manipulation by the P-5;
   - “Responsibility while protecting” should be incorporated into the implementation of the “responsibility to protect” concept. Peacekeeping interventions, including those justified under R2P, must be subjected to
continuing scrutiny by the UN Security Council. Such actions should only take place when diplomacy has been exhausted; they should entail the proportionate use of force; and must seek to avoid fatalities wherever possible;

5. West Africa: Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia

- The UN should remain involved in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, helping with security sector reform; rebuilding infrastructure; cross-border security; national reconciliation; and managing a transition to long-term development;
- Steps should be taken to resolve the logistical and communication problems caused by the siting of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and ECOWAS’s Commission in different capital cities – Dakar, Senegal; and Abuja, Nigeria, respectively;

6. The Great Lakes: the DRC and Burundi

- The interconnected and often cross-border problems of the Great Lakes region must be tackled regionally and multilaterally. South Africa, having played a major role in bringing peace to Burundi, should remain actively involved there; and the UN and regional bodies should also urgently address instability in the DRC;
- Learning lessons from the controversy over the elections in the Congo in 2011, electoral observers should investigate polls carefully before pronouncing them to be “free and fair”. All parties should work to ensure that losers stay involved in the electoral process and accept the outcome of elections. A “winner takes all” electoral system may be inappropriate in highly diverse societies, and, in these cases, systems of proportional representation should be considered;

7. The Horn of Africa: Somalia, Darfur, and South Sudan

- A firm deadline needs to be set, as soon as possible, for replacing the transitional government in Somalia with an elected body, and a constitutional framework and electoral processes must be put in place urgently;
- The resolution of the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region would be aided by Khartoum lifting the state of emergency there as part of a constitutional process for Sudan that involves power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and decentralisation;
- The AU Commission and its Peace and Security Council should pay greater attention to Darfur, including visiting the territory more often;
- Sudan and South Sudan need to settle unresolved issues between them as a matter of urgency to avoid the resumption of war either directly between North and South Sudan, or through proxy rebel militias;

8. North Africa: Libya and the “Arab Spring”

- The use of human rights concerns to justify action against one side in a civil conflict at the expense of the other – particularly when the allegations lead to the UN Security Council authorising ICC arrest warrants – should be closely monitored to avoid abuse;
- The AU and its members must work to establish mutually beneficial relations with Libya’s new government, particularly as the country is assessed to pay 15 percent of the organisation’s operating budget; and
- African governments should use their ‘good offices’ to seek to persuade the different parties in Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) to resolve their conflicting interests peacefully within a democratic framework; to act in the interests of all Libyans; and to protect migrant workers from African states.
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy advisory group meeting at Erinvale Estate, Western Cape, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011 on “South Africa, Africa, and the United Nations (UN) Security Council”. The policy seminar, which was held in partnership with the Centre for African Studies at Dalarna University, Sweden, was made possible through the support of the Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA), Cape Town, and the Swedish Embassy in South Africa. This report is based on discussions at this meeting as well as further research.

The Cape Town policy seminar took place as South Africa approached the end of the first year of its second two-year term (2011-2012) as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. The meeting aimed to support the South African government’s efforts on the Security Council to promote sustainable peace in Africa and its call for the democratisation and strengthening of the Council.

The meeting focused on four key themes: South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the UN Security Council; UN peacekeeping in Africa; and the politics and reform of the Council. It also considered the role of the Security Council in eight case studies from four African sub-regions: West Africa, with a focus on Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia; the Great Lakes region, particularly Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); the Horn of Africa, specifically Somalia, Sudan’s Darfur region, and South Sudan; and North Africa, with special attention paid to Libya and the “Arab Spring”.

Objectives

The eight key objectives of the December 2011 policy advisory group meeting were to:

1. Explore South Africa’s role as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council with the aim of strengthening Tshwane’s (Pretoria) ability to produce positive outcomes on the Council in relation to conflict management and human rights;
2. Assess critically how the relationship between the UN Security Council and African regional organisations can be improved;
3. Examine the role of UN peacekeeping in Africa;
4. Assess the relations between the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council and the 10 two-year elected members, and consider prospects for reform of the Council;
5. Explore the role of the Security Council in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia;
6. Consider what the Security Council has done, and can do, to bring peace and stability to the DRC and Burundi;
7. Discuss the Security Council’s role in relation to UN and AU peacekeeping efforts in the newly independent South Sudan, Sudan’s Darfur region, and Somalia; and
8. Assess how the Security Council acted in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya in 2011 to support changes of government in these countries, and the implications of both interventions for future peacekeeping efforts in Africa.
Background

The UN was established in 1945 after the end the Second World War (1939-1945), when weaker countries were left with little choice but to accept that the victors of this conflict would dominate the new world order. The hope was that the United States (US), Russia, China, France, and Britain, who became the five veto-wielding permanent members (P-5) of the UN Security Council, would play by institutional rules and protect the weak. However, during the Cold War, the Council was often paralysed by the casting of vetoes, or the threat to cast them, and became a stage on which Washington and Moscow waged ideological skirmishes. Between 1946 and 1993, the two superpowers cast a total of 193 vetoes in the Security Council. A window of cooperation opened as the Soviet bloc crumbled in 1989 and the Cold War ended. In November 1990, the UN Security Council mandated the use of force against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, and authorised a humanitarian intervention in Somalia in December 1992. But, although fewer actual vetoes were cast after the end of the Cold War, they have continued to be exercised in effect in the Council’s closed-door consultations, where most of the body’s serious business takes place. Competing political interests stymied the UN Security Council’s ability to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in which 800,000 people were killed; to end ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in the Balkans from 1991; and to deal with a range of other serious threats to peace and security. In 2001, P-5 ambassadors told a closed meeting that the UN would be unlikely to react any differently if a new African genocide occurred in Burundi. By contrast, the P-3 members of the Council (the US, France, and Britain) have unilaterally initiated and led multinational military interventions as they have seen fit, without necessarily gaining UN Security Council approval: for example, in Kosovo in 1999, and Iraq in 2003.

Since the end of the Cold War, Africa, in particular, has suffered from the frequent failure of the UN Security Council to take early, decisive, and united action to prevent or halt deadly conflicts. Reflecting on the role of the P-5, former South African President, Nelson Mandela, told the UN General Assembly during the world body’s fiftieth anniversary in October 1995: “The United Nations has to reassess its role, redefine its profile, and reshape its structures. It should reflect the diversity of our universe and ensure equity among the nations in the exercise of power within the system of international relations, in general, and the Security Council, in particular.”

In an effort to secure fairer global representation, a meeting of African Union foreign ministers in Swaziland in March 2005 – in what became known as the “Ezulwini Consensus” – called for an expansion of the UN Security Council from 15 to 26 members, with two permanent seats with veto power for Africa, and three rotating non-permanent seats. However, African insistence on a veto and opposition from some P-5 members – notably China and the US – effectively ended any chances of Security Council reform in 2005. As a result, although African actors and initiatives have continued to help to shape “the UN’s core principles and its engagement with the continent”, African interests have often remained marginalised.

Nevertheless, African countries and regional bodies have continued to seek ways of increasing their leverage on the Council to enable the continent to play a more effective role on the body in defence of African interests, while contributing to efforts to promote global security. And, although the P-5 continue to dominate decision-making on the Council, they have suffered some setbacks: for example, most African states refused to implement sanctions imposed on Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya in 1998 for the Lockerbie airline bombing in 1988, forcing a hasty retreat by their Western backers. In addition, the P-5 have sometimes deferred to African countries on issues concerning the continent which the major powers have generally considered to be an area of low strategic importance. In May 2011, when members of the UN Security Council met the African Union’s 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the fifth annual consultation between the two bodies, there were considerable disagreements expressed on issues such as Libya, Sudan, and Somalia. Regional bodies like the AU, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the European Union (EU); security alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); and bilateral diplomacy between states, also continue to exert a substantial influence on the work of the UN Security Council.

After South Africa was elected to serve as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for a second term from 2011 to 2012, its Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, called for the development of an “effective partnership” between the UN Security Council and the AU. In January 2012, South Africa, as president of the Council, led a debate on the subject, following in the footsteps of previous such discussions, which were chaired by Nigeria in July 2010, and by Tshwane itself, during its first term on the body in 2007/2008.

From left, Professor Adebayo Adebayo, former Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and Executive Director, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, Ijebu Ode, Nigeria; and Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, Joint Special Representative for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Sudan.

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8. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, ‘We Live In A World Where Power Is Not Equally Distributed, And This Shows In UN Decisions’, The Sunday Independent (South Africa), 11 September 2011, p. B.
1. South Africa and the UN Security Council

South Africa was first elected as one of the 10 non-permanent members of the 15-member United Nations Security Council by the 193-member UN General Assembly to a two-year term from January 2007 to December 2008. The country was elected as a non-permanent member for a second two-year term from January 2011 to December 2012.

South Africa had been a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, but was excluded from the UN General Assembly in 1974 and diplomatically isolated because of its racist policy of apartheid. However, a democratic government was established in South Africa in May 1994 under president Nelson Mandela, who five months earlier had become a Nobel Peace Prize laureate in December 1993. The country was readmitted to the UN in 1994.

In its first two-year term on the UN Security Council in 2007/2008, South Africa refused to support a draft resolution calling for sanctions against Zimbabwe, after president Robert Mugabe’s ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party used force to suppress opposition protests. Tshwane also voted against a draft resolution on Myanmar (Burma), after the ruling military junta in that country cracked down on anti-government demonstrations led by Buddhist monks. In both cases, South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) – now the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) – defended its stance by arguing that the events in Zimbabwe and Myanmar did not constitute threats to international peace and security, and that, as a consequence, the UN Human Rights Council, rather than the Security Council, was the more appropriate forum to discuss the issues being raised. Although the refusal to support the proposed resolutions on Zimbabwe and Myanmar received much publicity at the time, Tshwane has emphasised that South Africa was far from being a “spoiler” during its first term on the Security Council and voted for 120 of the 121 Security Council resolutions approved in 2007-2008.

Soon after South Africa again became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in January 2011, it faced two key African cases on the Council: Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. In each country, Tshwane, under AU auspices, attempted, and failed, to broker a settlement. In March 2011, South Africa – along with African members, Nigeria and Gabon – voted for Security Council Resolution 1973, which sanctioned the use of “all necessary measures” against Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s government in Tripoli. However, following strong criticisms within the ruling African National Congress (ANC), Tshwane subsequently strongly criticised the Anglo-French-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s use of force to remove the Qaddafi regime. In January 2012, South Africa’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Baso Sangqu, condemned “the abuse and disregard of basic rule of law requirements in the implementation of Resolution 1973” and called for an investigation to be undertaken to see whether “those who implemented Resolution 1973 correctly interpreted its provisions”, and for them to “be held accountable for the actions they took in implementing this Council’s decisions”. Although South African diplomats argued that they had voted for Resolution 1973 because it was supported by the League of Arab States (LAS) and since there was an immediate threat to civilians in Benghazi, Tshwane had clearly failed to anticipate that NATO would use the resolution to bring about “regime change” in Libya. In Côte d’Ivoire,
South Africa – influenced by fellow SADC member, Angola – initially held out against recognising the electoral victory of the presidential challenger, Alassane Ouattara, over the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo. Tshwane eventually supported Security Council Resolution 1975 in March 2011, which recognised Ouattara as president and mandated the UN mission to use “all necessary means” to protect civilians. In October 2011, South Africa (with Brazil, India, and Lebanon) abstained when Russia and China vetoed a draft resolution on Syria, expressing concern that, in the words of Baso Sangqu, “this resolution should not be part of a hidden agenda to yet again institute regime change, which has been a clearly stated objective by some.” Tshwane later reversed its position on Syria, supporting a similar draft resolution in February 2012.

South Africa’s apparently shifting positions on the Security Council from January 2011 to February 2012 in the cases of Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Syria have been perceived by critics to be undermining Tshwane’s historical role since 1994 as a leading defender of human rights. South Africa’s reservations over supporting actions under the umbrella of the UN against the regimes in those countries have been widely viewed as a willingness to protect autocrats. In addition, critics have accused South Africa of pursuing a contradictory foreign policy in relation to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Tshwane made considerable efforts in support of the international court’s establishment in 2002, yet, since 2009, South Africa has backed AU calls for the ICC indictment against Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, to be deferred for a year by the UN Security Council, due to his key role as a potential partner in peace processes for Darfur and South Sudan.13 South African diplomats have responded to such criticisms by highlighting the often highly complex nature of the cases that come before the Security Council, and the pressures of necessity and Realpolitik that help to shape Tshwane’s decisions. South African diplomats have emphasised the need for a balance between human rights ideals and pragmatic concerns and pointed to the decisive influence that national interests continue to play in international fora like the UN. It has also been argued that the idea that South Africa has a special obligation, deriving from its history, to defend human rights has led to disproportionate and unfair criticisms of Tshwane’s decisions compared with those of other countries on the Council.

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2. The UN Security Council and African Regional Organisations

When South Africa took over the presidency of the Security Council in January 2012, it prioritised the need for greater cooperation between the Council and African regional organisations, particularly the African Union.

Although Africa has no permanent representation on the UN Security Council (having three rotating two-year seats), more than 60 percent of the Council’s deliberations are concerned with the continent. During its first term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2007-2008, South Africa led discussions to establish a more effective division of labour on issues of peace and security between the UN and Africa’s regional organisations, especially the AU. Though Africa has an extensive institutional architecture for peace and security, its organisations remain logistically and financially weak. Nigeria similarly led a debate on relations between the UN and the AU when it was president of the Security Council in July 2010, at which agreement was reached on the format of, and modalities for, annual meetings between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. The importance of improving relations with African regional organisations again rose to the top of the UN Security Council’s agenda when South Africa assumed its presidency in January 2012. Angered at what was seen as a disproportionate use of force in Libya (led by France and Britain) and Côte d’Ivoire (led by France), and the marginalisation of the AU in relation to Libya, South Africa argued that African countries should take the leading role in dealing with conflicts on their own continent. South Africa’s president, Jacob Zuma, complained that the “roadmap” developed by the AU for a political solution to the conflict in Libya in 2011 had been “completely ignored” by the Security Council. “Africa must never be a playground for furthering the interest of other regions ever again,” he noted. Zuma also called for the implementation of Council resolutions to be monitored more effectively. The debate on the issue led to the passage of Security Council Resolution 2033 in January 2012, under South Africa’s chair of the Council. The resolution called for the strengthening of relations between the UN Security Council and African regional bodies, in particular the AU Peace and Security Council, in the areas of conflict prevention, resolution, and management, as well as electoral assistance. It also sought improved coordination between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council on matters of mutual interest; stressed the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability, and flexibility of the financing of regional organisations when they undertake peacekeeping under a UN mandate; and called for a more clearly defined division of labour and responsibilities between the UN and regional organisations.

Though Chapter VIII of the UN Charter calls for the Security Council to use regional bodies to enforce its decisions, as appropriate, and Council authorisation is required for regional peacekeeping efforts, the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Council – the United States, China, Russia, France, and Britain – have

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18 See Article 53 of the UN Charter.
resisted formalising relations with regional organisations such as the AU. P-5 members have expressed concern that this could fetter their room for manoeuvre in deciding on peacekeeping actions to be taken by the Council, and so have maintained these relations on an informal basis.\textsuperscript{19} The P-5 continue to insist that the annual consultations held between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council since 2007 are presented as being between the PSC and individual members of the UN Security Council, rather than with the UN Security Council as a whole.\textsuperscript{20} After the vote on the South African-led Resolution 2033 on relations between the UN and the AU in January 2012, Britain’s deputy permanent representative on the Security Council, Philip Parham, stressed that coordination between it and the PSC “could only occur in the context of the UN Security Council’s primacy regarding the maintenance of international peace and security”.\textsuperscript{21} Fears that the UN Security Council could delay approval of military action needed to maintain regional stability led the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1999, and the AU by 2004, to craft security mechanisms that controversially allowed regional military peacekeeping interventions to be launched before the Council issued official support for the deployment of troops.\textsuperscript{22} Since only the UN Security Council can authorise the use of force, some have questioned the legality of this approach. Burned by the lack of UN response during the Rwandan genocide in 1994, when 800,000 people were killed, even as a 2,500-strong UN mission was withdrawn at the urging of Washington and London, the Africans have insisted that saving lives is more important than legal niceties.

Notwithstanding the obstacles to closer cooperation between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, African countries and regional bodies need to adopt clear, common positions on conflicts in Africa, in order to secure effective international backing in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. During the crisis in Libya in 2011, some key UN departments and African missions in New York found it difficult to obtain information from the AU in Addis Ababa on the regional body’s latest positions. The AU’s failure to communicate clearly and win support for its policies was reflected in divisions on the Council in 2011 between South Africa and Nigeria on Libya and Côte d’Ivoire.

\textsuperscript{19} A discussion on cooperation between the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council held in New York on 3 May 2011 was the first dialogue held between the two bodies in the context of a working group on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa established in March 2002. See “Monthly Forecast: December 2011”, Security Council Report, 1 December 2011 (available at www.securitycouncil.org).
\textsuperscript{20} "UN-AU Strategic Partnership", Security Council Report, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Adekeye Adebajo, “The Tragic Triplets: the UN in West Africa”, in UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2011), p. 140.
3. UN Peacekeeping in Africa

After the end of the Cold War by 1990, the number of conflicts on which the UN Security Council was willing to act increased dramatically. The world body also increased the scale of its interventions in Africa after Egyptian UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, published his report An Agenda for Peace in June 1992 and complained that the Western powers, who directed much of the work of the Security Council, were interested in prioritising “rich men’s wars” in the Balkans to the detriment of Africa’s “orphan” conflicts in places like Somalia and Liberia. 23

The enthusiasm of Western governments to place their troops in harm’s way to help to resolve conflicts in Africa waned after debacles in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994) in which 18 American and 10 Belgian peacekeepers respectively were killed. Political antipathy to peacekeeping action in Africa resulted in fatal UN passivity in Rwanda which led to an utterly avoidable genocide of about 800,000 people. After the Rwandan genocide, Africans were in the forefront of efforts to develop and actualise the concept of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) to prevent such crimes against humanity in future. 24 The principle was fathered by Sudanese scholar-diplomat, Francis Deng, in 1996, and codified in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which was established by Ghanaian UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. In 2005, a UN World Summit formally adopted the principle that, if governments are unwilling or unable to protect populations at risk, then the international community has a duty to intervene. 25 The risk of genocide also informed the AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000, making the body one of the few such organisations to have incorporated R2P ideas into its founding document. 26

However, the UN was often slow to launch missions to protect civilians at risk from conflicts. In 2000, a Panel on UN Peace Operations chaired by Algerian diplomat, Lakhdar Brahimi, produced a report that sought to strengthen the world body’s peacekeeping capacity. Notwithstanding the report’s stated purpose, it largely emphasised the limits rather than the potential of the UN Security Council’s role in maintaining international peace and security. It advised that only missions with mandates that were “credible” and “achievable” should be launched, 27 and focused on the technical, rather than the political, constraints that had shaped UN interventions. The mantra of “African solutions to African problems” that was adopted by the Security Council came to be seen as a pretext for abandoning the UN’s proper peacekeeping responsibilities in Africa. 28 In the meantime, regional bodies in Africa had increasingly been stepping into the breach – between 1990 and 2003, the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) undertook major peacekeeping operations in Liberia (between 1990 and 1998, and again in 2003), Sierra Leone (1998-1999), and Côte d’Ivoire (2003-2004); as did the AU, first in Burundi (2003-2004), and later in Sudan’s Darfur region (2004-2007), and Somalia (since 2007). UN support for these missions followed some time after their launch, and often resulted in “rehatted” African peacekeepers coming under a UN umbrella.

In 2008, the Joint AU-UN Report on AU Peacekeeping Operations chaired by the Italian former president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, concluded that the UN Security Council was shirking its peackeeping responsibilities in Africa, leaving African organisations, which lack the necessary capabilities, to bear the brunt. Though African regional bodies have continued to seek to play a substantial role in peacekeeping efforts on their own continent, they still face serious capacity constraints. Little progress has been made on a pledge made at the UN World Summit in September 2005 to support a ten-year capacity-building programme for the AU that would help to sustain regional peacekeeping in Africa. By the time UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, reported on the progress of the programme in February 2011, the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) had been established in July 2010 with a mandate to support the AU’s establishment of its African Standby Force (ASF), and to provide planning, operational, and logistical support to the AU’s missions in Sudan’s Darfur region and Somalia, as well as to AU mediation efforts in Guinea-Bissau and Kenya. However, no fully fledged programme to fulfil the plan’s objectives had been developed, halfway through its life span. The AU must still develop its African Standby Force to react rapidly in support of urgent peacekeeping missions, while the financial burden of these missions on African states need to be addressed comprehensively. The Prodi report of 2008 recommended that such missions should be funded by the UN for six months and then taken over by the world body.29

UN peacekeeping missions in Africa have further highlighted the importance of winning the consent of national governments, and sub-regional and regional organisations for international interventions. All but three (Namibia, Western Sahara, and Ethiopia/Eritrea) of the UN’s post-Cold War peackeeping missions in Africa have dealt with civil wars, and the use of new humanitarian norms, such as R2P, to justify and shape international interventions in intra-state conflicts has, in some cases, challenged the national sovereignty of African governments.30 The leaders of Chad and Burundi asserted their authority by requesting UN missions to leave their countries. The government of the DRC also asked the UN mission there to withdraw by 2013.31 The Sudanese government of president Omar al-Bashir insisted on an AU presence as a condition for accepting a UN mission in Darfur. These are all signs of a growing wariness of UN peackeeping on the continent. Hybrid operations, such as the AU/UN mission in Sudan’s Darfur region, must be carefully considered in future as, although they can overcome the reluctance of national governments to engage with international peacekeepers, they may also pose coordination, logistical, and accountability challenges.

Although the UN Charter of 1945 gives the Security Council the primary responsibility for keeping peace, the world body has no substantial dedicated force of its own, and has to draw on the armies of its member states each time it needs to deploy a force.32 In the absence of a standing UN army ready to obey its commands, the

30 Under the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) principle, if a national government fails to protect its own people, the international community may intervene diplomatically and militarily to enforce compliance. In Africa, R2P has been invoked by the UN in Sudan’s Darfur and Abyei regions (from 2006, and in 2011, respectively), Kenya (in 2008), and Côte d’Ivoire (in 2011). See UN, The Role of Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary General, 28 June 2011, A/65/877-S/2011/393, pp. 9-10. Aziz Pahad, the former South African Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, argued in September 2011 that UN instruments were increasingly being co-opted in a new ‘Scramble for Africa’ that sought to recolonise the continent’s resources. See Mark Paterson and Chris Saunders, ‘What Does UN Peacekeeping Cost African Countries?’ The Sunday Independent, 16 October 2011.
31 The South African Special Representative to the Great Lakes Region, Welile Nhlapo, noted in October 2011 that the presence of UN ‘blue helmets’ can serve to destabilise already fragile states. He said that the alien and very visible UN peackeepers in their distinct uniforms and white vans can actually heighten the sense of insecurity among local populations. Other ‘unintended consequences’ highlighted by Nhlapo included an increased threat of economic inflation, sparked by the spending power of relatively well-paid foreign peacekeepers. See Paterson and Saunders, ‘What Does UN Peacekeeping Cost African Countries?’
32 The exception that proves the rule was the establishment, in December 1996, of the Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG), which was closed down in 2009. See Adam Roberts, ‘Proposals for UN Standing Forces’, in Lowe et al (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War, p. 120.
world body has also, in urgent cases, mandated rapid-reaction forces under national or alliance leadership to intervene – so-called ‘coalitions of the willing’. However, the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011 reignited concerns about the P-5’s manipulation of UN peacekeeping mandates and actions to further the strategic interests of the Security Council’s powerful members and to reinforce historical spheres of influence in Africa and elsewhere.

In April 2012, about 70 percent of the UN’s 100,000 peacekeepers, and seven of its 16 peacekeeping missions were deployed on the continent – in the Western Sahara, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, South Sudan, and Sudan’s Darfur and Abyei regions. The number, scale, and cost of the wars in Africa have highlighted the importance of peacebuilding – not just peacekeeping – in promoting political and social stability, and helping to redress economic inequalities. A UN Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Support Office were established within the UN Secretariat in New York in 2006. The Commission’s mandate is to improve planning and international coordination to promote a holistic approach to conflict prevention. However, the Commission’s impact has been widely criticised as disappointing to date, lacking the peacebuilding resources and political clout to coordinate the UN’s activities. Meanwhile, African peacebuilding efforts lack substantial international funding compared with the much larger sums made available to UN peacekeeping missions. Between 2008 and 2009, $6.8 billion was spent to meet the direct needs of UN peacekeeping missions; by contrast, ‘quick impact’ projects to help local communities accounted for a mere $10.8 million in the same period.

4. Reforming the UN Security Council

When the United Nations was established in 1945, the US, Russia, China, France, and Britain became veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council, which was given the primary, although not exclusive, responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and great flexibility to make decisions as its members saw fit in pursuit of this mandate.35

Notwithstanding the one-sided bargain struck by the powerful in the formation of the Council,36 the widely held hope was that the P-5 would interpret the institutional rules to refrain from initiating wars, and act to protect the most vulnerable members of international society as necessary.

The 15-member UN Security Council remains the organisation’s most powerful body and the only one whose decisions are legally binding on all 193 members. Although proposed as part of a system of collective security, the Council’s open-ended conception and the inequities built into its founding rules for voting and decision-making mean that it has often been used as a tool for promoting security on a selective basis – particularly in support of the interests of the P-5. These countries often initiate and shape, or block, peacekeeping missions to further their strategic interests and to reinforce their historical spheres of influence. The remaining 188 members of the UN can only join the Security Council as non-permanent members who are elected to the Council for two-year non-renewable terms. The P-5 have been said to have sometimes referred disparagingly to the 10 rotating members as ‘tourists’. The permanent members represent the Council’s institutional memory, have greater knowledge of the legal precedents that influence many of its decisions, and have decades of experience of manipulating the body’s arcane rules of procedure to their advantage. They enjoy privileged access to UN documents from secretariat staff, who often consult privately with P-5 ambassadors before proposing recommendations to the full Council; draft most Council resolutions; and choose all Council committee chairs. The 10 non-permanent members are sometimes excluded from key meetings at which action is agreed on strategic issues. Divide-and-rule tactics, political intimidation, and economic threats are often employed, as a lack of consensus among the non-permanent members can allow the P-5 to refrain from taking action. Nine positive votes and no veto from a P-5 member are needed to take action on substantive issues. Members of the P-5 sometimes use the threat of the power of veto to bring non-permanent members in line. Vital decisions of UN member states are frequently made in national capitals, not at the world body in New York. The US is sometimes referred to as the P-1 because of its disproportionate weight in decision-making on the Council.37

As the lead countries on the Security Council on all the UN’s peacekeeping missions in Africa, the P-3 (the US, France, and Britain) chair discussions and, to a great extent, set the agenda for these interventions. At present, the US is the lead country on the Council on Liberia (UNMIL), the UN mission to South Sudan (UNMISS), and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA); Britain is the lead country on Darfur (UNAMID); while France is the lead country on the UN missions in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the DRC (MONUSCO). The only UN peacekeeping mission jointly overseen by some countries outside the P-3 is the UN Mission for the Organisation of the Referendum in

35 It has been argued that while the breadth of scope of the Council’s powers and means of exercising them has ensured its continuing relevance in a changing world, that breadth and scope have also exacerbated the fundamental inequality of the Council’s representation and raised the stakes politically for reforming its system of membership. See Edward Luck, ‘A Council For All Seasons: The Creation of the Security Council and Its Relevance Today’, in Lowe et al (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War, pp. 61-85.
37 This discussion has summarised some of the rich insights of Mahbubani, ‘The Permanent and Elected Council Members’.
Western Sahara (MINURSO), which is led by the Group of Friends of Western Sahara, comprising Russia and Spain, as well as the US, France, and Britain. The P-5 often shape the implementation, as well as the mandates, of interventions authorised by the Council. The NATO action in Libya in 2011 demonstrated how, once a resolution has been approved, powerful countries on the Council can often determine the nature and ends of a military engagement free from the constraints of a wider multilateralism – the AU was sidelined in this case – and the reservations of fellow members of the Council. France, in particular, argued that the urgency of the need for action to prevent Muammar Qaddafi’s regime from slaughtering Libyans overrode diplomatic concerns such as building a broader international consensus for the intervention. The country also provided arms to National Transitional Council (NTC) rebels in contravention of a Security Council arms embargo to which it had earlier agreed. These actions in Libya highlighted how allegations of violations of human rights principles can be employed selectively to justify the use of force in countries in which Security Council members have interests. This has led to calls for greater accountability and the adoption of the idea of ‘responsibility while protecting’, proposed by Brazil in 2011.  

Multilateral bodies, such as the AU and Africa’s developing sub-regional security mechanisms, can play an important role in promoting greater rules-based diplomacy. African countries bear a responsibility to take account of the positions of the Addis Ababa-based AU’s Peace and Security Council, since they are expected to defend African interests on the UN Security Council. To enhance the accountability and capacity of the three African members of the UN Security Council to represent the continent’s interests more effectively, greater coordination among the African countries on the Council is needed, along with improved mechanisms for consultation with the 54-strong Africa Group at the UN in New York, and a stronger lead is required from the AU Peace and Security Council. The UN Security Council’s accountability could also be improved if its composition were reformed to reflect the modern world’s demographics, particularly to ensure permanent African and Latin American representation. However, the immediate prospects of an expanded, more representative Council remain dim. While the P-5 have traditionally sought the views of African countries on the Council on issues concerning the continent, they have also refused to cede the primacy of the Security Council on peacekeeping action, or to dilute their own power as veto-wielding permanent members.

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38 A note on ‘responsibility while protecting’ was presented to Ban Ki Moon for the attention of the UN General Assembly by Brazil’s permanent representative to the world body, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, in November 2011. See ‘Responsibility While Protecting: Elements for the Development and Promotion of a Concept’, 11 November 2011, A/66/551–S/2011/701.

39 African countries often win their seats on the Security Council with the support of the AU.

40 See Rushdy, ‘When Will is Not Enough’.

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5. West Africa: Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia

The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire comprised about 11,000 peacekeepers in February 2012, with about 450 French troops also deployed.

The mission was established in 2004 after clashes mounted between troops loyal to Laurent Gbagbo, who had been elected as president in 2000, and rebel forces supporting Alassane Ouattara, who had been excluded from the poll in 2000 on the accusation that one of his parents had been born outside of Côte d’Ivoire. The conflict had already led a French-funded ECOWAS mission of almost 1,300 peacekeepers to intervene in 2003 with the support of French forces. As civil war spiralled in 2004, the UN imposed an arms embargo on both sides. By 2006, South African president, Thabo Mbeki, the AU-appointed mediator, was replaced by Burkinabè leader, Blaise Compaoré. Gbagbo declared that he would accept Ouattara as a legitimate candidate at the next presidential election. After the much-delayed poll was eventually held in October and November 2011, Ouattara was declared the victor by the country’s electoral commission, although Gbagbo disputed the constitutionality of this outcome. The international community and most African governments recognised Ouattara as the new president. However, the post-electoral dispute escalated, with the two contestants for the presidency both claiming executive authority over state institutions. In January 2011, armed clashes erupted between the national army loyal to Gbagbo, and the Forces Nouvelles, which backed Ouattara.

An estimated 1,500 civilians were killed, and about one million people displaced in the violence. In March 2011, ECOWAS asked the Security Council to review UNOCI’s mandate to allow it “to use all necessary means to protect life and property and to facilitate the immediate transfer of power” to Alassane Ouattara. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1975 in March 2011, seeking an end to hostilities and mandating UNOCI to protect civilians. In April 2011, Gbagbo was captured by forces loyal to Ouattara, assisted by UNOCI armed personnel (then numbering over 9,000 troops and police), and French special forces. Subsequently, Russia and other members of the UN Security Council suggested that the UN peacekeepers had “overstepped their mandate to be neutral”. After Gbagbo’s capture, the Security Council encouraged Ouattara to form an all-inclusive government and to cooperate with an investigation by the UN Human Rights Council into allegations of human rights abuses during the recent Ivorian conflict. In the aftermath of the power struggle in Côte d’Ivoire, serious questions were raised about the diplomatic stance that had been adopted by South Africa, which, instead of supporting Ouattara’s presidential bid, had backed a negotiated solution, leading to a different approach from that of fellow African member of the UN Security Council, Nigeria.

41 An earlier UN political mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) had been authorised by the UN Security Council in 2003.
42 France has maintained a military base in Côte d’Ivoire since the country won its independence from French colonial rule in 1960. The number of French troops in the country rose to 4,000 in 2003, and was 1,000 at the height of the conflict in 2011.
In November 2011, Gbagbo was sent to the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague to face charges of crimes against humanity. Accusations of “victor’s justice” continue to be made by Gbagbo’s supporters as allegations of atrocities committed by Ouattara’s military supporters have not been probed with equal urgency. This situation could negatively impact the process of national reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire. The role of the ICC in relation to African countries remains controversial, in part because, to date, only African citizens have been indicted by the body, and in part because, while the UN Security Council can refer cases to the Court, powerful members of the Council – the US, Russia, and China – have not themselves joined the ICC. In December 2011, parliamentary elections in Côte d’Ivoire were undermined by a low turnout of 35 percent, as Gbagbo’s supporters boycotted the poll. 

In January 2012, despite the country being more stable, at least 15,000 displaced people remained in camps, and many of the 500,000 returned refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) still required food aid. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) gave warning that the shortage of aid could lead to renewed conflict. The world body has been urged to remain engaged in Côte d’Ivoire, after the UNOCI mandate expires, through its Peacebuilding Commission, and to support disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants; the development of transitional justice mechanisms; and efforts to protect human rights.

France is the lead country on Côte d’Ivoire on the UN Security Council. The issue of UNOCI’s intervention resulted in divisions on the Security Council from the outset. Russia and China expressed reservations about the political language used to justify increasing the size of the UN mission in January 2011, and the extension of its mandate to encompass the use of “all necessary means” in March 2011. In addition, Russia and South Africa were concerned about UN and French aerial bombardment of the Ivorian presidential palace, where Gbagbo was besieged, in April 2011. By contrast, Nigeria, France, Britain, Portugal, Germany, and the US readily supported the UN’s adoption of more stringent measures against Gbagbo and his forces, particularly since Washington and the European Union had already imposed additional sanctions against his regime. Differences also emerged on the Security Council over the AU’s diplomatic efforts and a Nigerian threat to intervene militarily in the crisis. South Africa, Russia, and China welcomed the AU’s creation of a high-level panel to find a negotiated political solution to the electoral impasse and expressed reticence about endorsing Nigeria’s proposed use of force. However, the US, France, Britain, and Germany were reluctant to offer unreserved support for the AU’s diplomatic initiative, while Britain was quick to back a Nigerian-led ECOWAS military intervention in principle. In March 2011, Gabon also announced its support for a much stronger ECOWAS position.

In 2011, post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Liberia continued as the country held its second national presidential election since the end of an 11-year civil war, in which an estimated 250,000 people were killed. Although the UN Security Council’s initial response to the conflict had been sluggish after the conflict erupted in 1989, it did subsequently support diplomatic and military interventions pursued by ECOWAS, under Nigerian leadership, to bring the conflict to an end; and, in 2004, established a peacekeeping mission in Liberia. In February 2012, the 9,185-strong mission provided security in support of Liberia’s still fledgling national security institutions in the face of continuing ethnic and religious tensions. UNMIL had also become increasingly involved in peacebuilding efforts after Liberia was placed, at its own request, on the agenda of the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission in September 2010. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, after controversially becoming a joint Nobel Peace Prize laureate (with Liberian peace activist Leymah Gbowee, and Yemeni democracy campaigner, Tawakkul Karman) four days before presidential polls, won re-election in November 2011 (with the main opposition boycotting the second round), despite fears that unemployed youths would be recruited by warlords to restart the country’s civil

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50 These UN Security Council dynamics are based on the monthly forecasts provided by Security Council Report (accessed at www.securitycouncilreport.org).
war. Instability across the border in Côte d’Ivoire also remains a serious concern. Liberian mercenaries were involved in the Ivorian conflict, which spilled 60,000 refugees into Liberia. In addition, Guinea remains politically unstable, and it is feared that Sierra Leone’s fragile recovery from a decade of civil war, which ended in 2002, could be jeopardised by presidential and parliamentary polls set for November 2012. Liberia is thus precariously located at the epicentre of a volatile Mano River basin. The UN Security Council has suggested that UNOCI and UNMIL co-ordinate their operations more closely along the Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire border, particularly to counter the illicit arms trade. The continued engagement of ECOWAS and the UN in support of efforts to deliver a peace dividend to Liberians has been strongly backed by Ban Ki-Moon.

The US is the lead country on Liberia on the UN Security Council. In February 2011, Council members agreed that Liberia was continuing to make significant progress, due in great part to the willingness of the government to work with the UN and other international efforts, although some members expressed concern that Liberia could become overly dependent on UNMIL and bilateral assistance from a too narrow donor base. In August 2011, Liberia became a mildly contentious item on the Council’s agenda, when France, Britain, Germany, and Portugal raised issues relating to financing and competing demands for peacekeeping resources and quenched the mission’s prolonged stay in Liberia. There have traditionally been tensions on the Council, with Washington strongly backing UNMIL and opposing efforts by Paris to transfer UN peacekeeping assets from Liberia to Côte d’Ivoire – as happened in 2011, when peacekeepers and equipment were temporarily reassigned to UNOCI from the mission in Liberia.

While the Security Council and other UN institutions generally take action in relation to individual countries, the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) has a regional mandate. UNOWA was the first office authorised by the Security Council in 2001 to harmonise the activities of UN agencies on a regional basis. However, logistical and communications problems have been caused by the siting of UNOWA in Dakar, Senegal, while the ECOWAS Commission is in Abuja, Nigeria. More positively, UNOWA has worked to coordinate the efforts of UN peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.

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53 UN, “Twenty-third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia”.

54 These UN Security Council dynamics are based on the monthly forecasts provided by Security Council Report (accessed at www.securitycouncilreport.org).

6. The Great Lakes: the DRC and Burundi

The UN Security Council has been involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since immediately after its independence from Belgium in June 1960, when a 20,000-strong UN mission (ONUC) — the world body’s first major engagement in an intra-state conflict — sought for four years to stabilise the country and counter secessionist threats.

This mission became embroiled in the country’s civil war, undermining the UN’s credibility in Africa as the world body was accused of taking sides in the conflict. Twenty-five years later, in 1999, as the DRC sought to emerge from a brutal civil war that has resulted in over three million fatalities since 1996, the Security Council authorised another UN force in the Congo, which was still there in February 2012 as the 19,000-strong UN Stabilisation Mission. The UN’s renewed engagement was accompanied by the withdrawal from the DRC of troops from Rwanda, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in 2002; and Uganda in 2003. The UN mission sought to provide security across the country, as Congolese political parties came together to agree to a transitional government headed by Joseph Kabila in 2002, and a referendum on a new Constitution, which was held in 2005. The first post-war election in the DRC, which took place in 2006 at a cost of more than $422 million — funded largely by the European Union — was conducted fairly according to international observers, giving Kabila’s government broader legitimacy. However, UN peacekeepers remained in the country, mainly in the eastern Congo, after renewed conflict erupted. Kabila expressed growing opposition to the world body’s presence and, in 2010, repeatedly asked for it to be withdrawn before the next presidential poll scheduled for a year later. However, the UN insisted that its mission, which was costing about $1 billion a year, had an important role to play in the election, and the peacekeepers remained, although the mission’s name was changed to stress its “stabilisation” role. In November 2011, Kabila won the country’s second post-war presidential poll. Although the election was preceded by some violence against demonstrators, and was strongly criticised by many observers as flawed, it was not followed by the major violence that some had feared. However, Kabila’s main challenger, Etienne Tshisekedi, has continued to reject the results of the poll, pronouncing himself as president.

Bitter contests at elections – often in the form of boycotts, and sometimes in the shape of violence – clearly result in instability. Strong institutions to support free, fair, and appropriate polls – and to ensure that they are not undermined by low turnouts – are needed in the Great Lakes region and across Africa, as well as mechanisms to discourage losing parties from refusing to accept the results of elections. The premature departure of the UN from the DRC could threaten the gains made there, especially in stabilising the country’s volatile Kivu and Orientale provinces. Major issues that still need to be addressed in the country include integrating irregular forces into the national army, and dealing with the illegal exploitation of natural resources. In September 2010, Kabila

57 See Adebajo, “ ‘No More Congos!’ The UN in the Great Lakes Region”, in UN Peacekeeping, pp. 67-70.
58 The mission, which had been called the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC (ONUC), was reconstituted as the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in July 2003.
59 See Adebajo, “ ‘No More Congos!’”, in UN Peacekeeping, p. 86.
60 The eastern DRC has been at the epicentre of much of the country’s bloodiest conflict since 1996. The region was seriously destabilised in 1994 as Hutu groups fled across the border seeking refuge there in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide of 1994.
62 In addition to widespread allegations of fraud at the ballot box, publication of the results of the polls held in November 2011 was delayed. The country’s Independent Electoral Commission only announced the final confirmed results of parliamentary elections, which had been held at the same time as the presidential poll, in January 2012. Foreign Staff, “Congo’s Electoral Commission Delays Results”, Business Day, 25 January 2012 (accessed at http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=163259).
banned all mining activities in the eastern Congo to enable the state to counter what he described as “mafia” networks engaged in illegal mining. Western, South African, and Chinese companies have all been fingered over their involvement in the unauthorised extraction of, and trade in, minerals from the Congo. A report by a UN panel of experts endorsed Kabila’s stance, and, in November 2010, due diligence guidelines for companies trading in minerals from the eastern Congo were endorsed by the UN Security Council.

France is the lead country on the DRC on the UN Security Council. During 2011, contention on the Council in relation to the DRC centred on the issue of the UN’s role in the country’s elections. In January 2011, Council members were in agreement that the forthcoming presidential poll in the DRC had to be monitored closely. A fair electoral process was seen as crucial by some members in order to ensure credible governance and to enable the Council’s engagement with the Kabila government to produce results on the ground. However, concerns about the fragile security environment for the poll mounted, and, in May 2011, following the dispute over elections in Côte d’Ivoire, some Council members argued that UN involvement in all electoral processes should be limited. They worried that substantive involvement on the part of the world body might dent its impartiality in the Congo and jeopardise MONUSCO’s ability to maintain cooperation with all parties after the election. Other members of the Council, however, disagreed with this line of argument as a matter of principle, asserting that a stronger UN role could have helped to ensure the credibility of the polls.

After decades of conflict between Burundi’s majority Hutu and its ruling Tutsi minority since the country won independence from Belgian colonial rule in 1962, former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere initiated a peace process for the country in 1995. Following the 1994 genocide in neighbouring Rwanda, it was feared that mass killings would also take place in Burundi. In the event, political reforms, which had led to the introduction of a multi-party system and the election of the country’s first ever Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, in 1993, stalled – leading to the assassination of the president, an estimated 200,000 deaths, and imposition of sanctions by regional heads of state. However, in 2000, after South Africa’s former president, Nelson Mandela, took over from Nyerere as the key mediator in the peace process, an accord was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, by most of the parties involved in the conflict. South Africa sent troops, which, from 2003, became part of the AU’s first-ever peacekeeping mission (AMIB). In 2004, the Security Council established the 5,650-strong UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), which “rehatted” AMIB troops. The mission concluded its mandate in 2006. Members of the UN Security Council, who visited the country in November 2005, had noted that Burundi could benefit greatly from the support of the newly-constituted UN Peacebuilding Commission. The suggestion was seized upon by the government in Bujumbura, which asked the world body to concentrate on reconstruction efforts and withdraw its peacekeepers. While the situation has been relatively peaceful since, and Burundi itself has been supplying troops to the AU force in Somalia from 2007, tensions between the government of president Pierre Nkurunziza and the opposition still threaten a renewed outbreak of violence. A small UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), which was established in January 2011 to promote peace, democracy, and development in the country, expressed continued concern in November 2011 about political tensions, extrajudicial killings, and human rights abuses. In addition, much-needed security sector reform remains a major challenge in a country that is still one of the poorest on the continent. In December 2011, the UN Security Council extended BNUB’s mandate until February 2013, to enable it to support Burundi’s socio-economic development more actively. France is seen as the lead country on Burundi. In recent years, Burundi has
not been an issue on which Security Council members have diverged greatly. The Council has generally viewed the security situation in the country as stable, while being aware of its fragility due to its past history of conflict. For many Council members, the relatively successful presidential election of June 2010 was a key factor in agreeing to terminate BNUB in favour of a scaled-down political mission concerned with capacity-building and peacebuilding. However, a number of Council members remained interested in encouraging the government and the opposition to begin a political dialogue, after the latter boycotted the poll in 2010.  

Many of the problems of the Great Lakes region are interconnected, and a multilateral approach to them involving all the interested parties is essential. Following the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the idea of an internationally-backed grouping to promote peace, security, development, and democracy in the region gained ground. After consulting the African governments concerned, the Security Council called for such a body to be established in 2000, and a secretariat for it was established in Nairobi, Kenya, under the umbrella of the AU and the UN. The resulting International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) now has 11 members: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. The Conference relies on a Group of Friends and Special Envoys to provide financial, diplomatic, technical, and political support. In another regional initiative, the UN established an Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), based in Libreville, Gabon, in 2011, to promote peace and security in this region. UNOCA's remit covers the DRC and Burundi, as well as the other eight countries in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS): Angola, Cameroon, the CAR, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Principe. The UN also has a peacebuilding office in the CAR. Regional peacebuilding efforts also include those made by the East African Community (EAC), which includes Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda as members; and the Southern African Development Community, to which the DRC belongs.

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68 These UN Security Council dynamics are based on the monthly forecasts provided by Security Council Report (accessed at www.securitycouncilreport.org).
70 The Group of Friends and Special Envoys is co-chaired by Canada and the Netherlands. Its member countries include: Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, and Greece. Other members are: the Holy See, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Britain, and the United States. See International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, ‘Who We Are’, 25 November 2000 (accessed at https://icglr.org/spip.php?article).
71 The DRC and Burundi are also both members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), with Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
7. The Horn of Africa: Somalia, Darfur, and South Sudan

Somalia has lacked effective national leadership and been wracked by civil war since 1991. The country was abandoned by UN peacekeepers in 1995, until in 2007, the AU established its mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

In February 2012, the UN Security Council raised the troop ceiling for AMISOM to more than 17,700, which will include the forces already in the country - about 11,000 peacekeepers from Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti; and 4,700 Kenyan troops who were being integrated into AMISOM - as well as additional troops to come from Uganda and Burundi. Britain, which is the lead country on the UN Security Council on Somalia, pushed strongly for the Council to agree to this reinforcement of the AU mission. London also hosted an international conference on the country in February 2012, which was attended by the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, and senior representatives from 40 countries. The meeting considered cantonising Somalia and empowering its regional governments, rather than continuing with protracted and unsuccessful efforts to create an effective national authority in the capital of Mogadishu.\(^72\)

International attention was focused on Somalia in 2011, when famine spread throughout the Horn of Africa, claiming an estimated 80,000 Somali lives and leaving a further 250,000 people still starving in January 2012.\(^73\) In December 2011, Ban ki-Moon made the first visit to Somalia by a UN Secretary-General since 1993 – when Boutros Boutros-Ghali had visited at the height of a massive UN-led intervention in the country – and pledged to move the headquarters of the UN political mission for the country (UNPOS) from the Kenyan capital of Nairobi to Mogadishu, which occurred in January 2012.\(^74\) American interest in Somalia has also increased despite the failure of an ill-fated invasion by Ethiopian troops between 2006 and 2009 that the US had supported. In its ‘war on terror’, the American administration of president Barack Obama considers al-Shabaab rebels in southern Somalia (linked to the al-Qaeda terror network) to be a threat to global security, and has intervened sporadically in the country, sending military drones to kill alleged terror suspects. In 2011, Ban ki-Moon’s regular reports on Somalia to the Security Council all highlighted the need to counter al-Shabaab, which is fighting forces allied to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) with military support from Ethiopia in central Somalia, and has come under attack from Kenyan troops in the south. In addition, AMISOM has made some military gains against al-Shabaab in Mogadishu. However, insecurity and piracy remain endemic in Somalia.

In September 2011, leaders of the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu, regional governments in Puntland and Galmudug, and the former rebel militia, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a, adopted a UN-sponsored ‘roadmap’ crafted by the UN Political Office for Somalia led by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Tanzanian diplomat, Augustine Mahiga. The plan proposed steps and a timetable to dissolve the current transitional government, and to establish new security institutions; a constitutional framework; and processes leading to national elections. However, initial deadlines set by the “roadmap” were not met. A final

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deadline of August 2012 has been agreed for the plan’s implementation. In the light of the weakness and unpopularity of the alliance of unelected clan leaders that presently constitutes Somalia’s government, it is important to adhere to the schedule set by the ‘roadmap’ in September 2011 for replacing the transitional authority with an elected body.

The dynamics on the UN security Council on Somalia have shifted considerably since December 2010, when Britain opposed any increase in UN financial support for AMISOM. France, the US, and Russia firmly supported the British position, while other members, including China (which has historically played an active role on Somalia on the Council) and Japan, argued that there should be some willingness to compromise on the funding mechanism for the mission. By contrast, there was generally consensus on the Council on the slow pace of the political process towards a new Constitution and an elected government in Somalia, with many members expressing a high level of frustration with the political performance of Somali leaders and their continued infighting. However, the dynamics on the Council shifted after the ‘roadmap’ for ending the transitional government was adopted in September 2011. Some optimism was expressed that the peace process might be starting to move in the right direction. The AU, which has consistently framed its military intervention in Somalia as part of a holistic approach that sought political resolution of the conflicts in the country, was granted some increased logistical support for AMISOM – although only following bilateral consultations between Britain and the three African Council members: South Africa, Nigeria, and Gabon. These talks took place after South Africa had asked the UN Security Council to take account of the wishes of the AU Peace and Security Council. A further – and perhaps greater– shift in the dynamics on the Security Council took place after Kenya sent troops into southern Somalia in October 2011, in a move that was generally welcomed on the Council as potentially increasing the chances of defeating al-Shabaab. At the London conference on Somalia in February 2012, the British publicly supported greater UN financial support for an expanded AU mission, which would integrate the Kenyan troops and move beyond Mogadishu to seek to pacify the rest of the country. However, London’s approach ran into opposition over the cost of AMISOM’s expansion from the US, France, Germany, and Portugal during discussions on Security Council Resolution 2036, which authorised an increased troop ceiling, expanded UN support, and the use of ‘all necessary means’ against al-Shabaab.

The conflict and humanitarian crisis in Sudan’s volatile Darfur region, where an estimated 300,000 people have died since 2003, continued during 2011, although the number of reported fatalities in clashes between government forces and rebels fell during the first three months of 2011 to 342, from 1,039 deaths over the same period in 2010. A rapprochement between Sudan and Chad also improved the security situation. In addition, the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, which is the world’s largest peacekeeping mission, comprising almost 23,300 peacekeepers, finally reached full strength in January 2012. Furthermore, the government of Sudan and the opposition militia, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), concluded the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) in May 2011, and an AU/UN-sponsored ‘roadmap’ for peace was drafted. However, 1.7 million IDPs still remain trapped in camps; the peace process was not joined by the largest rebel factions – the two wings of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – and fighting has continued sporadically. The formation in 2011 of a new alliance of rebel militias, the Sudan Revolutionary Front, may also signal a hardening of opposition demands and a resurgence of military activity against the government in Khartoum.

75 UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 9 December 2011, p. 1.
76 These UN Security Council dynamics are based on the monthly forecasts provided by Security Council Report (accessed at www.securitycouncilreport.org).
In 2009, former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, the chair of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) coordinating efforts to support Sudan’s 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South, noted that the conflict in Darfur should not be viewed in isolation, but as a manifestation of the crisis in Sudan, arising from decades of ignoring the interests of many local communities, unaccountable over-centralisation of power and wealth, and governance challenges, particularly in the area of justice. The long-standing marginalisation of Sudan’s peripheries needs to be addressed urgently as part of a nationwide constitutional reform process. However, Khartoum has complained that key international promises, including pledges by the US to ease sanctions, have not been met, despite the North’s cooperation with the peace process for South Sudan. Furthermore, international engagement with the Sudanese government remains overshadowed by the ICC arrest warrant issued in 2009 against its president, Omar al-Bashir, for alleged war crimes in Darfur. Although al-Bashir has announced that he will not stand again for election to the presidency in 2015, he remains the head of a state with strong intelligence and military institutions, with which Washington has cooperated closely in its global ‘war on terror’. The AU has called for suspension of the arrest warrant for a year to encourage al-Bashir to continue to make peace, while opponents of these calls have argued that this approach would promote impunity.

Meanwhile, the creation of the new state of South Sudan in July 2011 – and the consequent emergence of a radically different state in the North – have given rise to an uncertain balance of power and new tensions, particularly after northern Sudanese forces entered the disputed Abyei region in May 2011 and an increasingly bitter stand-off over oil supply and revenues escalated between the two countries in January 2012. The newly configured state in the North has lost a quarter of its former population and one third of its land and revenues. The unresolved issues, which include disputes over borders and efforts to decentralise power, could lead Khartoum and Juba to renewed conflict, as both sides continue to support local proxies. In July 2011, the Security Council established a UN Mission in South Sudan; and, in the same month, an operation was deployed to the disputed border area of Abyei – the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei – which numbered about 5,500 and 3,800 peacekeepers, respectively, in February 2012.

Britain is the lead country on Darfur on the UN Security Council. During 2011, the Council was divided in its approach to the situation in Darfur, particularly on the viability of the Darfur-based political process (DPP), in which the Sudanese government and the LJM are engaged. The US and Britain expressed reservations about the feasibility of this process, given ongoing repression by the Sudanese government. It was argued that the DPP would not lead to real peace, but would instead be a Khartoum-dominated charade. However, for lack of a better option, others, notably the African Council members – South Africa, Nigeria, and Gabon – and Russia, were more supportive of the DPP. Nigeria and South Africa also expressed concern that a proposed call for

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78 In January 2012, four countries were listed by the United States as ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. The US subjects the countries on the list to a range of sanctions on arms sales, exports, and finance, as well as restricting American foreign aid (accessed at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/c14151.htm).

79 Divisions have been caused on the UN Security Council by ‘substantive differences ... regarding the International Criminal Court’s work in Darfur’. At issue was how the Security Council should react when signatories to the ICC failed to enforce its arrest warrants – in this case against al-Bashir when he entered their territories. See Security Council Report, ‘Monthly Forecast: December 2011’, 1 December 2011 (available at www.securitycouncil.org).

80 The Centre for Conflict Resolution held a two-day policy advisory group seminar in Cape Town in August 2010 on the domestic, regional, and international challenges facing Sudan as the country prepared for the January 2011 independence referendum in South Sudan. See CCR, Stabilising Sudan: Domestic, Sub-regional, and Extra-regional Challenges, policy report and brief, Cape Town, August 2010 (available at www.ccr.org.za).

an enabling environment as a precondition for the political process in Darfur contravened the wishes of the AU Peace and Security Council on the issue, and violated the spirit of AU partnership with the UN in relation to Darfur. By December 2011, while some Council members remained wary of Khartoum’s intentions with regard to the DPP, others considered that it had made credible efforts to support peace in Darfur which should be recognised. Council members also differed on the appropriate level of pressure that should be applied to rebel groups in Darfur to bring them into the peace process.

The US is the lead country on South Sudan, as well as on issues pertaining to Sudan-South Sudan relations, and the situation in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, on the UN Security Council. A perceived lack of reliable information exacerbated tensions on the Council during 2011 with regard to South Sudan and its relations with its northern neighbour. Council members complained about a lack of adequate information, particularly in relation to fighting in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan areas of Sudan. Many of the countries on the Council do not receive direct diplomatic reports from Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Juba; and the expiry of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in August 2011 exacerbated this reporting vacuum. As a result, Council members expressed an unwillingness to take action on these issues without a proper grasp of developments on the ground. This temporary paralysis of the Council was accompanied by complaints from the 10 elected members of the Council that they had been excluded from important consultations in April 2011 and June 2011 on the wording of key statements by the Council’s presidency (Colombia and Gabon respectively) on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan, and the situation in Abyei, as well as last-minute drafting of a resolution on the new UN peacekeeping mission in the South. From August 2011, the US, France, Britain, Germany, and Portugal pushed for express condemnation of human rights violations and aerial bombings undertaken by the Sudan Armed Force (SAF) in South Kordofan. However, other members noted the need to respect Sudan’s sovereignty, especially with regard to the government’s efforts to fight rebels challenging its authority. Some members also questioned the severity of the human rights violations. In January 2012, the US again emphasised the enormity of the humanitarian crisis in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan, and in February 2012, the Council finally reached consensus on the wording of a press statement on the issue, which was discreetly released.\(^{82}\)
8. North Africa: Libya and the “Arab Spring”

In 2011, the UN Security Council faced the consequences of the “Arab Spring”, during which popular uprisings in North Africa ousted Tunisian president, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, in January 2011, after 23 years in power; and Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, in February 2011, after 30 years of autocratic rule.

This popular unrest soon spread to Libya. After the Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi, who had been in power for 42 years, launched a brutal crackdown against protesters in February 2011, describing them as “rats” and vowing to cleanse Libya “house by house”, the UN Security Council passed a resolution in February 2011 referring Qaddafi and key members of his government to the International Criminal Court, and called for the imposition of an arms embargo on Tripoli.

In March 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, which authorised a “no-fly zone” and the use of force to protect civilians. This second resolution, which permitted the use of “all necessary measures”, found its justification in “reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population” – and the “responsibility to protect” became a rallying cry for the French and British governments which largely directed the subsequent military intervention. The three African countries on the UN Security Council in 2011 – South Africa, Nigeria, and Gabon – voted in favour of both resolutions. However, South Africa was the only country in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping to support Resolution 1973. Five members of the Council abstained on the resolution: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Germany. Furthermore, although the resolutions on Libya were supported by the League of Arab States under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which outlines the need for coordination with regional organisations, the AU’s “roadmap” for peace in Libya was effectively ignored.

After Resolution 1973 was passed, a NATO-led “coalition of the willing” targeted the Qaddafi regime during a seven-month air operation, actively supporting rebel actions with a large-scale bombing campaign (including air strikes on Qaddafi’s compound in Tripoli in May 2011, which killed one of his sons, Saif al-Arab, and three of his grandchildren). Military training was provided to the rebels by Qatari forces, and arms were supplied by France and Qatar in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1970 of February 2011. Following these events, South Africa joined the other BRICS countries in criticising the way in which NATO was enforcing the “no fly zone” and was publicly championing the idea of “regime change”. Tshwane argued that the organisation’s actions exceeded the humanitarian aims of Resolution 1973.

In August 2011, as Qaddafi’s regime fell from power, divisions emerged among the 10 non-permanent members of the Security Council over whether or not Libya’s National Transitional Council, which had been established by the rebels, should be recognised as the sole representatives of the Libyan people. About 20 African

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85 AU, “Framework Agreement for a Political Solution to the Libyan Crisis”, adopted by the AU Peace and Security Council in March 2011, and by the Assembly of the AU in July 2011. The AU’s five-point road map to peace advocated: protection of civilians and cessation of hostilities; protection of certain sections of the population, such as migrant workers; political dialogue; management of a transition period; and political reforms in Libya.
87 The NATO “coalition of the willing” included: Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Jordan, the Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the US.
88 The Director-General of South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Jerry Manjana, made the point that no mechanism exists to adjudicate the interpretation of Security Council resolutions. See also Dan Sassen, “The Security Council’s Authorisation of Regional Arrangements to Use Force: the Case of Nato”, in Lowe et al (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War, pp. 226-247.
countries, including Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, recognised the NTC. However, South Africa would not recognise the Council at first, arguing instead for an all-inclusive approach to any political settlement in Libya, and opining that the NTC could not be recognised as it had come to power unconstitutionally. Tshwane also initially refused to support a UN draft resolution seeking to unfreeze Libyan assets since this implied recognition of the NTC. Only when the draft was reworded to omit references to the NTC, did South Africa finally agree to back it. The AU – and South Africa – eventually agreed to recognise the NTC in September 2011.

As part of the justification for the NATO intervention, Qaddafi’s human rights atrocities were singled out, while less attention was focused on the kidnapping, torture, and killing by rebel forces of migrant workers from Chad, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. After the NATO intervention ended in October 2011 with the assassination of Qaddafi by rebels in his hometown of Sirte, the Security Council authorised a UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in November 2011 to bolster a transition to democracy. The mission was established to support the restoration of public order and promote the rule of law; aid political dialogue and reconciliation; embark on making a new Constitution and holding elections; strengthen the state; protect human rights; support economic recovery; and coordinate international efforts. It has been estimated that more than $200 billion will be required to rebuild Libya. The consolidation of security, including measures to demobilise, disarm, and reintegrate fighters, as well as steps to establish a functioning police service and judiciary, were identified as key priorities by Ban ki-Moon in November 2011.

Serious questions remain, however, over whether the new government will demonstrate a capacity to represent, and provide security for, all Libyans – particularly those formally loyal to Qaddafi. Furthermore, the indebtedness of the country’s new rulers to Paris, London, and Washington may alienate Tripoli from the AU.

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89 The AU’s opposition to recognising the National Transitional Council was based on a sanction articulated in its founding Constitutive Act of 2000 that bans the recognition of regimes that come to power as a result of unconstitutional changes of government.
Security Council Resolution 1973, passed in March 2011, represented the first time that the UN had used R2P explicitly to justify a military intervention. American, British, and French officials have sought to justify the scale, speed, and means of the action on the grounds that Libyan civilians were facing an imminent threat of mass murder. However, NATO was accused of exceeding the aims of the resolution, of disproportionate use of force, of transforming a rebellion into a civil war, and of breaching Libya’s national sovereignty. A permanent member of the Security Council, France, armed the rebels, breaking the Council’s embargo to which it had earlier agreed. South Africa and Russia called on the Council to investigate the number of civilians killed and wounded by NATO’s bombing. When Russia again called for an independent investigation into claims of civilian deaths due to NATO’s bombings, the US, France and Britain stated that such an inquiry would be “redundant”. However, some diplomats have argued that the R2P criteria were undermined in Libya and have cast doubts on whether, as a result, the principle may be used with credibility to justify future UN-sponsored interventions. Brazil led calls for the R2P concept to be subject to proper accountability and monitoring by all Security Council members. Russia and China used the manner in which Resolution 1973 had been manipulated by NATO to justify the vetoes that both countries cast in October 2011 and February 2012 to block Security Council action against the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, whose regime had killed over 8,000 civilians by March 2012, a year after protests erupted. The case of Syria divided African members of the Security Council in 2011. South Africa abstained in a Security Council vote on action against the government in Damascus, tabled by France, Britain, and Germany, and supported by Nigeria and Gabon in November 2011. Then, in February 2012, South Africa, Togo, and Morocco voted in favour of a proposed Security Council resolution calling for action against Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Britain is the lead country on Libya on the UN Security Council. The Council was divided on how to respond to the situation in Libya from the outset in 2011. Both Russia and China expressed concern in February 2011 about a need for verifiable information before deciding to take action against the Qaddafi regime, while media reports of aerial bombardments and mercenaries from other African countries appeared to persuade some members of the Council that the situation posed a threat to international peace and security. In March 2011, France and Britain led calls for a “no-fly” zone, although the US, Germany, and Portugal expressed caution about this plan. Beijing and Moscow expressed resistance to the military option in the absence of any clear evidence of a trigger event such as mass atrocities. Brazil and India also sought a greater focus on the more proactive use of conflict prevention approaches. Soon after the NATO intervention was launched in March 2011, Russia expressed concern that the authorisation to protect civilians not extend to the use of air power to support an offensive by Benghazi rebel forces. From April 2011, the BRICS group on the Council repeatedly raised fears that NATO’s air strikes were exceeding the terms of the UN mandate. At the same time, other members of the Security Council offered increasing recognition to the Benghazi authorities: France recognised the NTC in March 2011, and the US, Britain, and Germany also offered diplomatic recognition a month later. These Western powers also made clear that they considered Qaddafi to have lost his legitimacy to lead and that he should be excluded from Libya’s political future. By contrast, African and Arab members of the Council (South Africa, Nigeria, Gabon, and

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Lebanon) cautioned that Qaddafi’s anticipated exit from power should not be a product of violent regime change. This difference of approach led to divergent views on the importance of seeking a ceasefire in Libya in May 2011. BRICS members pushed for this solution as a priority. However, other largely western Council members argued that a ceasefire without a credible political process might create a stalemate and prolong the suffering of the population. The polarisation on the Council also took the form of continued drift between the diplomatic efforts of the AU and those of the UN’s special envoy, Jordanian diplomat, Abdel-Elah al-Khatib. A meeting in June 2011 between members of the AU High Level Ad-Hoc Committee on Libya and the Security Council only highlighted these divisions. Despite growing international support for the intervention in Libya in July 2011, most of the Council’s 10 elected members expressed frustration at their apparent exclusion from oversight of, and input into, the UN-sponsored political process in Libya. These tensions were exacerbated after France publicly confirmed its arms drop to Libyan rebels in June 2011. Although these differences have continued since the end of the NATO intervention in October 2011, Council members have also appeared to recognise the perils of continuing political divisions while the situation in the country remains fragile.95
Policy Recommendations

The following 20 policy recommendations emerged from the policy advisory group seminar:

1. South Africa and the UN Security Council
   - South Africa should use its current two-year term on the UN Security Council to advance African interests, working closely with the Africa Group at the UN;
   - Relations between South Africa and Nigeria – the two main regional hegemons in sub-Saharan Africa – should be urgently improved to provide leadership to rally a united African diplomatic front at the UN and other international diplomatic fora;

2. African Regional Organisations and the UN Security Council
   - Relations between the UN Security Council and African regional bodies – in particular, the AU’s Peace and Security Council – must be strengthened. African members on the UN Security Council should coordinate their decisions and collaborate with the Africa Group at the UN more effectively through the AU office in New York, taking into account key AU decisions;

3. UN Peacekeeping in Africa
   - UN peacekeeping operations should not be used to advance the parochial national interests of powerful member states. Leadership of the peacekeeping, political, and humanitarian affairs departments at the UN Secretariat in New York, which presently rests with France, the US, and Britain, respectively, should be more equitably distributed to reduce the dominance of the P-3 in decision- and policy-making;
   - Political leadership of peacekeeping missions in Africa should have strong African representation within a UN structure. Hybrid operations, such as the AU/UN mission in Sudan’s Darfur region, must be carefully considered in future as, although they can overcome the reluctance of national governments to engage with international peacekeepers, they may also pose coordination, logistical, and accountability challenges;
   - The AU needs to develop its African Standby Force (ASF) to react rapidly in support of urgent missions led by African regional bodies. The recommendation in the Prodi report of 2008 that these missions should be funded by the UN for six months and then taken over by the world body should be expeditiously implemented;
   - Post-conflict reconstruction efforts are critical to sustaining peace. The UN Peacebuilding Commission and international financial institutions like the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank should play a more effective role in such efforts in Africa, based on a clear division of labour among African actors, the UN, and the European Union (EU);

4. Reforming the UN Security Council
   - The Security Council must be reformed in terms of membership, decision-making, and working methods. The Council needs to be democratised to reflect the modern world’s demographics, particularly to ensure permanent representation from Africa and Latin America, and to counter the body’s continued manipulation by the P-5;
   - “Responsibility while protecting” should be incorporated into the implementation of the “responsibility to protect” concept. Peacekeeping interventions, including those justified under R2P, must be subjected to
continuing scrutiny by the UN Security Council. Such actions should only take place when diplomacy has been exhausted; they should entail the proportionate use of force; and must seek to avoid fatalities wherever possible;

5. West Africa: Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia

- The UN should remain involved in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, helping with security sector reform; rebuilding infrastructure; cross-border security; national reconciliation; and managing a transition to long-term development;
- Steps should be taken to resolve the logistical and communication problems caused by the siting of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and ECOWAS’s Commission in different capital cities – Dakar, Senegal; and Abuja, Nigeria, respectively;

6. The Great Lakes: the DRC and Burundi

- The interconnected and often cross-border problems of the Great Lakes region must be tackled regionally and multilaterally. South Africa, having played a major role in bringing peace to Burundi, should remain actively involved there; and the UN and regional bodies should also urgently address instability in the DRC;
- Learning lessons from the controversy over the elections in the Congo in 2011, electoral observers should investigate polls carefully before pronouncing them to be ‘free and fair’. All parties should work to ensure that losers stay involved in the electoral process and accept the outcome of elections. A ‘winner takes all’ electoral system may be inappropriate in highly diverse societies, and, in these cases, systems of proportional representation should be considered;

7. The Horn of Africa: Somalia, Darfur, and South Sudan

- A firm deadline needs to be set, as soon as possible, for replacing the transitional government in Somalia with an elected body; and a constitutional framework and electoral processes must be put in place urgently;
- The resolution of the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region would be aided by Khartoum lifting the state of emergency there as part of a constitutional process for Sudan that involves power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and decentralisation;
- The AU Commission and its Peace and Security Council should pay greater attention to Darfur, including visiting the territory more often;
- Sudan and South Sudan need to settle unresolved issues between them as a matter of urgency to avoid the resumption of war either directly between North and South Sudan, or through proxy rebel militias;

8. North Africa: Libya and the “Arab Spring”

- The use of human rights concerns to justify action against one side in a civil conflict at the expense of the other – particularly when the allegations lead to the UN Security Council authorising ICC arrest warrants – should be closely monitored to avoid abuse;
- The AU and its members must work to establish mutually beneficial relations with Libya’s new government, particularly as the country is assessed to pay 15 percent of the organisation’s operating budget; and
- African governments should use their ‘good offices’ to seek to persuade the different parties in Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) to resolve their conflicting interests peacefully within a democratic framework; to act in the interests of all Libyans; and to protect migrant workers from African states.
Annex I

Keynote Address

By Professor Ibrahim Gambari, Joint Special Representative, African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

“The Politics Of The United Nations Security Council: Lessons Learned From Rwanda And Darfur”

Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honour and privilege for me to be with you today. I would like to thank the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) for their kind invitation and for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you on the important topic addressed by this conference. I will focus my remarks on the UN’s role, particularly in relation to the failure in Rwanda in 1994 and how this has impacted the creation and deployment of the AU/UN Mission in Darfur. I will draw on the Rwandan case to provide some vital lessons learned and will conclude with some suggestions on how Africa, and African governments, can act to strengthen the implementation of the principles of the “responsibility to protect”. As a caveat, I should note that these represent my personal views and should not be construed as representing those of the United Nations organisation.

While the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was key in achieving many victories for justice, these successes on the part of the international community cannot detract from the fact that the case of Rwanda exemplified the Security Council’s inability to address post-Cold War intra-state conflicts. The crisis in Rwanda in 1994 exposed serious structural and policy failures in the UN system. In particular, the case revealed that the Security Council, which had received plenty of warnings about the impending tragedy in Rwanda, failed to fulfill its responsibility to maintain peace and security. As Nigeria’s permanent representative on the UN Security Council during the events leading up to the 1994 Rwandan crisis and the genocide that followed, I was in a privileged position to see events in the Council at close range. Without a doubt, it was the Council, especially its most powerful members, which failed the people of Rwanda in their gravest hour of need.

It will be recalled that, as the genocide began, 10 Belgian soldiers were killed while serving in the 2,500-strong UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). As a result, Belgium not only decided to withdraw its battalion from the intervention, but also embarked on diplomatic efforts to bring down the entire mission. Bangladesh followed the Belgian lead and withdrew its own contingent and, by 19 April 1994, the first batch of UNAMIR soldiers had already been evacuated to Kenya. In a real sense, therefore, the Belgians triggered the collapse of UNAMIR. The withdrawals of the UN contingents were a signal to the perpetrators of the genocide that the world was not interested in stopping them. In hindsight, one of the most serious flaws in the mandated mission in Rwanda was that Belgium, an ex-colonial power, which could not be perceived as an impartial actor in the politics of Rwanda, was allowed to contribute troops for UNAMIR. This is my first lesson learned: Peacekeeping should never be used or abused to advance parochial national interests. Furthermore, actors with a direct stake should not be permitted to take part in a peacekeeping force where there is a conflict of interest.

Equally disturbing during the Rwandan crisis were the political positions adopted at the UN’s headquarters in New York by many member states, which seemed concerned only about their own troops and the potential
political repercussions, in their respective capitals, of peacekeepers returning home in bodybags. While such concerns were legitimate, it is my view that these countries ignored the moral and overriding duty to help to save defenceless civilians who were being massacred in broad daylight. This is my second lesson learned: If a member state is not ready and willing to walk the talk, it should not contribute its troops to peacekeeping operations. Contributing to peacekeeping is a serious exercise and unless the member state is willing to implement the mandate fully, the international community is better served if that state does not pretend to be ready and willing.

In response to the pressure on the United Nations to act, then UN Secretary-General, Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented a report to the Security Council on 20 April 1994 that offered three alternatives. Option one was the deployment of an immediate and massive reinforcement of several thousand additional troops to UNAMIR and a change in its mandate under Chapter VII to coerce the opposing forces into a ceasefire. Considering the fiasco in Somalia, where the deaths of 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu in October 1993 had led to the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, this was not a politically feasible option for some members of the Security Council. Option two was a reduction in UNAMIR’s size to a small group to be headed by the force commander, Canada’s Romeo Dallaire. This deployment would remain in Kigali and act as intermediary between the two parties in an attempt to bring about a ceasefire, and would assist with the resumption of humanitarian relief operations. For this reduced mandate, the UN Secretary-General estimated that a force of about 270 observers would be sufficient. Option three foresaw a complete withdrawal, which Boutros-Ghali did not favour. This would have amounted to a complete abandonment of the people of Rwanda and a total betrayal of the ideals of the United Nations and hopes of collective security.

Faced with these three options, the Council chose the second, ordering a sharp reduction in the size of UNAMIR’s force. Not only did this reinforce the message of a passive international community, it also exacerbated the genocide on the ground, which eventually resulted in 800,000 deaths. In retrospect, the Secretary-General should have endorsed the first option more clearly, despite the almost certain opposition to strong action by the most powerful members of the Council. It was Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s duty to persuade the Council to do the right thing. This is my third lesson learned: Under similar circumstances, the Secretary-General should be clear and forceful in his engagement with the Council. He should ensure that the fate of a whole people does not become the victim of the politics of the most powerful nations. At the least, the Secretary-General should assume the high moral ground in defence of the powerless.

The Rwandan tragedy also illustrated an enormous contrast between the international community’s will to prevent, or halt, genocide, on the one hand, and the Security Council’s support for interventions authorised by its most powerful members, on the other. While the Council refused to deploy a robust, large-scale force to stop the genocide, it stood behind the French when they asked for a mission that served a specific, limited purpose. While the entire world watched the ongoing tragedy unfold, the Council authorised France to carry out Operation Turquoise under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNAMIR, by contrast, was only authorised under Chapter VI, which remained the platform for its mandate.

Thus, the Council proved itself to be what it is - a political institution that functions in concentric circles of interests and relative influence. And this is my fourth and final lesson learned: Unless the membership of the Security Council is reformed and democratised, and reflects today’s economic, demographic, and political realities, and unless Africa is fully represented and taken into consideration, the body will continue to be an institution that selectively safeguards narrow interests and is of limited use to the people who need it the most.
In striking contrast to the Security Council’s response to the Rwandan crisis has been its response to the events in Sudan’s Darfur region in 2003. In a real sense, the Security Council’s more engaged and proactive response to the violence being directed against the civilian population in Darfur owes significantly to the Council’s earlier failure to respond to the tragedy in Rwanda. The cry of “Never again!” seems to have been heard. While some argue that the UN response in Darfur was not as prompt as, or in the form that, they would have preferred, no one can dispute that the Security Council moved forward in Darfur, rather than retreating.

The genocide in Rwanda had the additional unintended consequence of reawakening governments in Africa to an appreciation of their own responsibility to protect civilian populations beyond their territorial borders and narrow political interests. It highlighted that Africans should not rely on the good will of the larger international community to police and resolve conflicts on the continent. The need for Africa to develop its own resources and mechanisms to initiate effective and robust engagements to resolve the problems of the continent became increasingly apparent. It has been shown that when the continent acts forcefully and concretely to provide security and protection for its own people, the international community is more inclined to respond in kind.

From the beginning of the international conversation on Darfur, Africa and the Security Council were jointly engaged in seeking solutions. A critical lesson had been learned: If an issue is important to Africa, it must be championed by African nations. The deployment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in June 2004 was a testament to such engagement. It showed that Africa was willing to put its boots where its politics lay. The 5,000 AMIS troops worked nobly under harsh conditions, with some of them paying the ultimate sacrifice for the mission. They embodied another important lesson learned from Rwanda: the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) from AMIS put their troops in harm’s way to stem a potential humanitarian and human rights disaster. When the final history of Darfur is written, the work of those troops, from 2004 to the deployment of UNAMID in December 2007, will be seen as a flawed, but nonetheless essential, contribution to avertting what could have been another Rwanda.

Today, through UNAMID, the United Nations and the African Union have found a new form of engagement in the area of peace and security – the first hybrid AU-UN mission. As Joint Special Representative, I represent both the United Nations and the African Union in leading the mission. Despite some complexities that are inherent to implementing such a mission, the African Union’s engagement in the daily workings of the mission provides a much-needed balance to the political interests of key members of the UN Security Council. This engagement enables strong and clear communication of the views of the region and the continent on how the peacekeeping mandate should be implemented in Darfur. Through the African Union, the voices of the continent can be heard over those emanating from the capitals of the permanent members of the UN Security Council – at least as far as conflicts in Africa are concerned.

Furthermore, UNAMID is serving as a real testing ground for the African Union’s Peace and Security Council established in 2004. Seven out of 16 UN peacekeeping missions are located in Africa, and the demonstrated reluctance of many nations to put their troops in harm’s way on the continent indicates that the type of hybrid operation seen in Darfur may represent the future. In that case, the AU Peace and Security Council will play a vital role in marshalling African leaders to adopt unified perspectives on intra- and inter-state conflicts. Through UNAMID, the AU is dealing on a large scale with the practical realities of peacekeeping and, hopefully, learning lessons that will encourage it to seek a more active engagement with UN peacekeeping in future.

For African countries on the Security Council, the AU’s engagement with UNAMID provides a unified African approach that these states can use to bolster their positions on the Council. In a real sense, the three African
members of the Security Council should become the institutional voice of the African Union and thus represent all the countries of the continent on the Council. Although such an approach may not overcome the Security Council’s reluctance to act in key cases, or free it of its dominance by its most powerful members, it could temper the language employed in the chamber, and shift debates to take better account of African views. Furthermore, the more effective the African nations are in articulating their perspectives and positions, the more difficult it becomes to ignore the calls for the reform of the Security Council.

UNAMID represents a new kind of engagement between Africa and the UN Security Council. However, we on the continent must be thoughtful and visionary, as well as vigorous enough to seize the opportunity that this mission offers. Rwanda was the Security Council at its least effective in responding, or more accurately, not responding, to security challenges in Africa. If we continue to engage the Council, speak with one voice on behalf of the AU Peace and Security Council, and as members of the UN and the Security Council, and are vigilant in monitoring and balancing the rhetoric and policies of the powerful members of the Council as they address the mission in Darfur, UNAMID has the potential to be one of our finer moments.

The international community has the power to prevent genocide, but it does not always choose to do so. The real key to this is the political will to act promptly and decisively. In the case of Rwanda, there was a glaring and tragic lack of political will to intervene to stop the genocide, particularly on the part of the most powerful members of the UN organisation. In Darfur, the will was there. And, as a result, while the conflict has taken too many lives, the African Union and the United Nations are there, acting as a buffer and a facilitator for peace. I wish to conclude with some practical suggestions on ways to strengthen the implementation of the “responsibility to protect” in peace missions:

**On the Responsibility to Prevent:**

- In conflicts, we need to address with total determination spoilers who pursue victory at any cost;
- We need to institutionalise early warning mechanisms and preventive capacity-building activities in UN peace missions, and establish presences in the field in countries threatened by genocide or mass atrocities; and
- On the ground, we need to improve information exchange within the UN system and among UN agencies and NGOs in order to improve understanding of the motivations of belligerents, to assess their activities in a timely manner, and to evaluate any changes in situation that could lead to genocide.

**On the Responsibility to React:**

- We need to include concerned regional groups in Security Council consultations when the issue addressed relates to possible genocide and mass atrocities. These regional bodies must be engaged to take an active role in monitoring and addressing conflict and to function as vital early warning systems. This is particularly important since the security and humanitarian consequences of such terrible events have a direct impact on these institutions;
- We need to empower regional organisations to create responsive in-house mechanisms to address the threats of genocide and mass atrocities, including operational capacity to deploy quick response forces. Regional organisations could supplement the UN in this area, particularly when consensus in the Security Council proves to be unattainable. A better use of Chapter VIII is more necessary today than ever before; and
• We need to streamline communication between the UN Secretariat and the Security Council on issues related to genocide and mass atrocities, enabling the Secretary-General to share his concerns with the Council promptly and to recommend clear action.

On the Responsibility to Rebuild:

• We need to reinforce existing peacebuilding mechanisms to help countries and communities exposed to genocide or mass atrocities to achieve reconciliation, social cohesion, and economic prosperity. The strengthening of the UN Peacebuilding Commission would represent one such step; and
• The UN must identify, support, and empower reform of national institutions to help stakeholders to develop their own vision for the future, their own approaches to the rule of law, and their own processes for reaching out to all social groups and civil society.

Finally, when member states collectively make disastrous decisions, such as in Rwanda, there is a tendency to blame the UN as an institution, especially the Secretary-General. However, as Lord Caradon, the late British statesman and permanent representative to the UN from 1964 to 1970, said: “There is nothing wrong with the UN that is not attributable to its members.” While the UN Secretariat and UN agencies bear the most responsibility for preventing genocide, it is imperative to reaffirm that the world body can only be as effective and responsive as its member states want it to be. In this regard, I would like to make two final comments. First, special responsibilities must be assumed by those with special privileges, especially on the Security Council, which, according to the UN Charter of 1945, has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Secondly, the Security Council must be reformed, as a matter of urgency, in terms of its membership, as well as its methods.

Thank you for your kind attention.
Annex II

Agenda

Day One    Tuesday 13 December 2011

09.00 – 09.30 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Ms Zohra Dawood, Executive Director, Open Society Foundation for South Africa, Cape Town, South Africa

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Amr Sabet, Associate Professor, Dalarna University, Sweden

09.30 – 10.45 Session I: Keynote Address

Chair: Professor Adebayo Adedeji, former Executive Secretary of the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Africa

Speaker: Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, Joint Special Representative for the African Union (AU)/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur

“The Politics of the UN Security Council: Lessons from Rwanda and Darfur”

10.45 – 11.00 Coffee Break

11.00 – 12.30 Session II: South Africa and the UN Security Council

Chair: Ms Erica Barks-Ruggles, Consul-General, United States Consulate, Cape Town

Speakers: Ambassador Leslie Gumbi, Chief Director, UN Political, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa

Ms Nicole Fritz, Executive Director, Southern African Litigation Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa

12.30 – 13.30 Lunch
13.30 – 15.00  Session III: West Africa: Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia

Chair:  Mr Leon Levy, Commissioner, Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration, Cape Town

Speakers:  Ambassador Martin Uhomoibhi, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria
          Ms Ngozi Amu, Political Affairs Unit, Conflict Prevention and Mediation, UN Office to the AU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

15.00 - 15.15  Coffee Break

15.15 – 16.45  Session IV: Libya, the “Arab Spring”, and the UN Security Council

Chair:  Dr Amr Sabet, Associate Professor, Dalarna University, Sweden

Speakers:  Mr Na’eem Jeenah, Executive Director, Afro-Middle East Centre, Johannesburg
          Professor Chris Landsberg, Head of the Politics Department, University of Johannesburg

19.30  Dinner
Day Two       Wednesday 14 December 2011

09.15 – 10.45 Session V: The Great Lakes: Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Chair: Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Member of the AU Panel of the Wise

Speakers: Ambassador Roeland van de Geer, Head of the European Union Delegation to South Africa  
Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

10.45 – 11.00 Coffee Break

11.00 – 12.30 Session VI: The Horn Of Africa: Somalia, Darfur, and South Sudan

Chair: Ambassador Tiina Myllyntausta, Ambassador of Finland to South Africa

Speakers: Ambassador James Jonah, former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, New York  
Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, Joint Special Representative for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur

12.30 – 13.30 Lunch

13.30 – 14.45 Session VII: From Suez to Sudan: Lessons of UN Peacekeeping in Africa  
Book launch of UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts by Adekeye Adebajo

Chair: Ambassador James Jonah, former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, New York

Speaker: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

14.45 – 15.15 Coffee Break and Completing Evaluation Forms

15.15 – 16.15 Session VIII: Rapporteurs’ Report And Way Forward

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Rapporteurs: Mr Mark Paterson, Communications Consultant, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town  
Professor Chris Saunders, Research Associate, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Annex III

List of Participants

1. Dr Adekeye Adebajo  
   Executive Director  
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2. Ms Tasneem Adams  
   Bookkeeper  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
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3. Professor Adebayo Adedeji  
   Executive Director  
   African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies  
   Ijebu Ode, Nigeria

4. Ms Ngozi Amu  
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   United Nations (UN) Office to the African Union (AU)  
   Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

5. Ms Erica Barks-Ruggles  
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   United States Consulate  
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6. Mr Sondre Bjotveit  
   First Secretary  
   Royal Norwegian Embassy  
   Tshwane, South Africa

7. Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse  
   Member of the AU Panel of the Wise  
   Accra, Ghana

8. Mr Carlos Cuenca  
   First Secretary  
   Head of Political Section, Embassy of Brazil  
   Tshwane

9. Ms Zohra Dawood  
   Executive Director  
   Open Society Foundation for South Africa  
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10. Ms Nicole Fritz  
    Executive Director  
    Southern African Litigation Centre  
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11. Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari  
    Joint Special Representative for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur  
    El Fasher, Sudan

12. Ambassador Leslie Gumbi  
    Chief Director: UN Political Department of International Relations and Cooperation  
    Tshwane

13. Mr Tyrone Gunnie  
    Acting Deputy Director  
    Department of International Relations and Cooperation  
    Tshwane

14. Mr Na’eeem Jeenah  
    Executive Director  
    Afro-Middle East Centre  
    Johannesburg
15. Ambassador James Jonah  
   Former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs  
   New York, United States

16. Professor Gilbert Khadiagala  
   Head of Department of International Relations  
   University of the Witwatersrand  
   Johannesburg

17. Professor Chris Landsberg  
   Head of Politics Department  
   University of Johannesburg

18. Mr Leon Levy  
   Commissioner  
   Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration  
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19. Mr Mark MacGinty  
   Senior Finance Manager  
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   Programme Advisor, UN Development Programme/Economic Commission for Africa Joint Governance Initiatives in Africa  
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   Consulate of the Republic of France  
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22. Mr Ollen Mwalubunju  
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23. Ambassador Tiina Myllyntausta  
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24. Ms Dawn Nagar  
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25. Mr Johannes Oljelund  
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31. Professor Chris Saunders  
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32. Dr Martin Uhomoibhi  
   Permanent Secretary  
   Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
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33. Ambassador Roeland van de Geer  
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## Annex IV

### List of Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France-Presse</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>AU Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>AU Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress (South Africa)</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUHIP</td>
<td>African Union High-Level Implementation Panel</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCEAO</td>
<td>Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (West African Regional Bank)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNUB</td>
<td>UN Office in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCR</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDPD</td>
<td>Doha Document for Peace in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Darfur-based Political Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Networks (UN)</td>
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<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement (Sudan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<tr>
<td>LJM</td>
<td>Liberation and Justice Movement (Sudan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>UN Mission for the Organisation of the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Mission in the DRC</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council (Libya)</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>UN Operation in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>UN Operation in the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSF-SA</td>
<td>Open Society Foundation for South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>The US in its role as the most powerful permanent member of the UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-3</td>
<td>The US, France, and Britain as a powerful alliance on the UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the US, China, Russia, France, and Britain)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council (AU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudan Armed Forces</td>
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<td>SAPA</td>
<td>South African Press Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<td>SLM</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop-contributing country</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>UN Interim Security Force for Abyei</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>UN Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOAU</td>
<td>UN Office to the African Union</td>
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<td>UNOCA</td>
<td>UN Office for Central Africa</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<td>UNOWA</td>
<td>UN Office for West Africa</td>
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<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>UN Political Office for Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>UN Support Mission in Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

African perspectives on the United Nations’ (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa’s democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.
This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

This meeting, held in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

This two-day policy seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.
This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, “ethnic cleansing” or crimes against humanity.

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military co-operation, and migration.

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.

This seminar, held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.
This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.

**Volume 34**

**Stabilising Sudan: Domestic, Sub-Regional, and Extra-Regional Challenges**

This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition—the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

**Volume 35**

**Building Peace in Southern Africa**

This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa from 25 to 26 February 2010 assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security and governance challenges.

**Volume 36**

**Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa from 19 to 20 April 2010 considered how to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN) and the international community in consolidating peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

**Volume 37**

**State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia from 9 to 10 June 2011 assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.
Notes
As South Africa continued to play a key role on the United Nations (UN) Security Council during its second two-year term (2011-2012) as a non-permanent member, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, and Dalarna University, Sweden, brought together about 30 high-level practitioners and scholars to support Tshwane's efforts on the Council. The meeting focused on how to strengthen South Africa's position on the Security Council in pursuit of greater cooperation between the UN's most powerful body and regional organisations, and a more democratic Council, in order to build sustainable peace in Africa. The policy advisory group seminar considered: South Africa's role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; UN peacekeeping in Africa; the politics and reform of the Security Council; and the Council’s role in West Africa, the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa.