CONCEPT PAPER
for a policy research seminar on
Towards a New *Pax Africana*: Making, Keeping, and Building Peace in Africa

Stellenbosch, South Africa
28-30 August 2013

Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa
Introduction
The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, will hold a policy research seminar at the Spier Hotel in Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013 on “Towards a New Pax Africana: Making, Keeping, and Building Peace in Africa”. The Centre has organised a series of major policy and research seminars on issues related to conflict prevention on the continent and produced three volumes on the subject: *From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations*, in 2009; *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts*, in 2011; and *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa*, in 2012. The Stellenbosch seminar in August 2013 will build on this work.

Since the creation of the United Nations (UN) Security Council in 1945, Africa has played a key role in shaping the nature of the world body’s efforts to maintain international peace and security, particularly after the end of the Cold War by 1990. Following fatal UN passivity in Rwanda in 1994 and the preventable genocide of about 800,000 people there, Africans were in the forefront of efforts to actualise the concept of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) to prevent such crimes against humanity in future. As Western governments were disinclined to place their troops in harm’s way to keep peace on the continent following peacekeeping debacles in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) undertook major peacekeeping efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire between 1990 and 2003. The African Union (AU), which replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, was equipped with greater powers of intervention than its predecessor in cases of egregious human rights abuses and unconstitutional changes of government. The continental body’s shift from “non-intervention” to “non-indifference” was accompanied by the adoption of a greater peacemaking role by some African leaders and the launch of AU peacekeeping interventions in Burundi (2003-2004), Sudan’s Darfur region (2004-2007), and Somalia (since 2007), as well as plans to create a 15,000-strong African Standby Force (ASF) to support future peacekeeping missions.

Furthermore, the concept of peacebuilding gained greater support on the continent – in particular through the post-conflict reconstruction frameworks developed by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union in 2005 and 2006 respectively. On the global stage, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was founded in 2002 to address genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; while the UN Peacebuilding Commission was established in 2005 to help to redress the high rates of relapse into conflict. The World Bank has also adopted a new statebuilding focus for its post-conflict reconstruction funding. The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed a resurgence of military interventions on the continent led by external actors, including the US, France, and Britain, some of which, like in Libya in 2011, have been controversial. In contrast to Western powers, Asian countries such as China, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have contributed peacekeepers to Africa under the banner of the UN. In June 2013, eight of the UN’s 16 peacekeeping missions and about 75 percent of the world body’s 92,541 peacekeepers were deployed on the continent. While conflicts persist, or have recurred, in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, the politics of making,

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keeping, and building peace – and who should lead and fund these efforts – continue to create tensions between African and external actors.

Seminar Themes and Objectives
The August 2013 Stellenbosch policy seminar will bring together about 30 mostly African scholars, policymakers, and civil society actors to present and discuss 22 policy research papers in four broad topic areas:

1. **Conflict Prevention and Peacemaking in Africa**, with a focus on preventing mass atrocities on the continent; the role of the International Criminal Court; and the nature and impact of mediation and peacemaking processes in Africa including in Kenya, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Mozambique, and the DRC;

2. **Peacekeeping in Africa**, including the political factors that shape peacekeeping interventions; the accountability of peacekeepers; the roles of the African Standby Force and regional brigades in peace support operations; managing HIV/AIDS in such missions; the roles played by Nigeria and France in Mali; and Hollywood’s portrayal of peacekeeping efforts in Africa;

3. **Peacebuilding in Africa**, including the role of the UN Peacebuilding Commission; the practice of peacebuilding (particularly in Somalia and the CAR); and the impact of economic aid on efforts to build peace in post-conflict countries; and

4. **The Peace and Security Role of External Actors in Africa**, including the roles played by the UN, the United States (US), France, and Britain; as well as the role of Asian peacekeepers from China, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh on the continent.

The papers presented at the meeting will form the basis of a 22-chapter edited volume, which will build on CCR’s three volumes produced between 2009 and 2012. The meeting and the new book will assess the progress being made by the African Union and Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) in peacemaking and in operationalising the continent’s peace and security architecture; and seek to assist these bodies in building peace in countries emerging from conflict. The project will also explore the peacekeeping relationships between Africa’s regional organisations and the United Nations; the role of other external actors and their contributions to African peacekeeping efforts; and the regional and international dimensions of the challenges to peacebuilding, including statebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. In particular, the volume will consider the lessons from UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding cases in Africa and how these could inform the establishment of an effective division of labour between the UN and Africa’s fledgling security organisations, which require urgent strengthening.

1. **Conflict Prevention and Peacemaking**
In his 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, the first African UN Secretary-General, Egyptian scholar-diplomat, Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued for a need to re-think the balance between sovereignty and the protection of human rights. After the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which an estimated 800,000 people were killed, in 2001, the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) put forward the principle of the “responsibility to protect”, building on the idea of “sovereignty as responsibility” originally articulated by Sudanese scholar-diplomat Francis Deng. Although R2P is still a controversial concept globally, it has been given its most concrete expression in the continent in the African Union’s Constitutive Act of 2000. Article 4(h) of the Act grants African countries the collective right to intervene in a member state to prevent mass atrocities, marking a significant departure from the Organisation of African Unity’s attachment to the principle

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5 Adebajo (ed.), *From Global Apartheid to Global Village*; Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping in Africa*; and Curtis and Dzinesa (eds.), *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa*.
of non-intervention.\(^8\) Subsequently, in 2005, the UN General Assembly agreed on a three-pillared responsibility to prevent, and to protect populations from, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity through peaceful means, state capacity-building, and, if necessary, coercive measures. R2P has since been invoked by the UN Security Council in a number of cases, including in Sudan’s Darfur region and Libya in 2006 and 2011 respectively. In 2004, Francis Deng was appointed the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, and in 2008, Edward Luck became the first Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. However, a number of UN bodies including the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Peacebuilding Commission, and the Human Rights Council have important roles to play in the implementation of R2P, working in collaboration with African leaders and organisations.\(^9\) A key challenge is to explore and articulate linkages between the principle of R2P and the various means to operationalise it in a manner that is coherent and effective.\(^10\) In particular, the responsibility to prevent conflicts – through early warning mechanisms and tackling of root causes – has been largely neglected.\(^11\) Accountability also remains a major concern,\(^12\) as underscored by what critics regarded as the abuse of R2P in Libya in 2011 and by the failure to discharge it in the ongoing crisis in Syria, in which about 90,000 people had been killed by June 2013.\(^13\)

The emergence of R2P as an evolving norm has been instrumental in drawing increased international attention to the role of mediation in conflict resolution.\(^14\) Established in 2006, the UN’s Mediation Support Unit (MSU) seeks to provide support to international mediators in their peacemaking efforts; and serves as a repository of mediation experiences and lessons learned. However, conflicts in Africa have their own distinct characteristics, and there is no single approach to mediation on the continent. Local ownership of mediation processes, and coordination between the UN, the AU, and sub-regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Economic Community of West African States; the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), as well as influential external actors, is thus important.\(^15\) In some instances, the UN may have the comparative advantage in mediating a dispute in Africa, while in other instances it might be the AU or a sub-regional organisation.

Good offices and mediation have been used to address conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Kenya, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, with varying degrees of success. An AU mediation effort, led by former UN Secretary-General, Ghana’s Kofi Annan, helped to prevent an escalation of violence in Kenya following disputed elections results in December 2007 in which 1,500 people were killed and 600,000 internally displaced. A power-sharing agreement was subsequently brokered between president Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga in February 2008. This accord did not, however, address the statebuilding issues that were the root causes of the crisis.\(^16\) Despite more peaceful elections in Kenya in March 2013 (won by ICC-indictees Uhuru Kenyatta, and his deputy, Wamai, “Exploring Factors That Contributed to ‘Success’ in the Kenyan Mediation Process in 2008”. See also Monica Kathina Juma, “African Mediation of the Kenyan Post-2007 Election Crisis”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2009, pp. 407-430.


\(^11\) Alex J. Bellamy, “Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect”, Global Governance, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2008, pp. 135-156. Also, the UN Secretary-General’s forthcoming report on R2P in 2013 is expected to focus on prevention.

\(^12\) Deng, “From ’Sovereignty as Responsibility’ to the ’Responsibility to Protect’”, pp. 370.


\(^15\) CCR, United Nations Mediation Experience in Africa.

William Ruto), the country still remains politically fragile. In contrast, an African Union high-level panel, appointed in January 2011 to mediate post-electoral conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, was unable to craft a political solution to the crisis, leading to a military intervention in April 2011 by France and the UN. In 2002, then South African president, Thabo Mbeki – working within the framework of an AU-sponsored Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) – brokered the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC and a power sharing-agreement, which included despatching 1,400 South African troops to the 20,000-strong UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC). However, the fragile nature of peacemaking in the DRC was recently highlighted by the invasion of the eastern Congolese city of Goma by rebel M23 forces in November 2012. In 2008, Mbeki also helped to produce – under the auspices of SADC – a Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe, providing for a government of national unity that has increased political and economic stability in the country. His successor, Jacob Zuma, has continued to lead SADC’s efforts to implement this agreement. Zuma also engaged in seeking a resolution to the constitutional crisis in Madagascar in 2010.

Justice is an essential component of sustainable peace, and many believe that there can be no peace without justice. However, the experiences of the International Criminal Court show that pursuing the interests of justice in conflict situations in which gross human rights atrocities have been committed can generate tensions during a peacemaking process. The Hague-based ICC, created by the Rome Statute of 1998, came into existence in 2002, and is the world’s first permanent, treaty-based international criminal court that prosecutes individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. There have been criticisms that Africa is being turned into an experimental guinea-pig for the ICC, even as abuses go un-investigated elsewhere such as in Sri Lanka and the Middle East. Currently, the Court is involved in eight conflict situations, all of which are in Africa – the Central African Republic; Côte d’Ivoire; Sudan’s Darfur region; the DRC; Kenya; Libya; Mali; and Uganda, involving 27 African indictees. It is worth noting that the situations in the CAR, the DRC, Mali, and Uganda are self-referrals by the states, while the investigations in Darfur and Libya have been requested by the UN Security Council, three of whose permanent members – the US, China, and Russia – are not themselves signatories to the ICC statute. Furthermore, ICC arrest warrants against two sitting African heads of state – Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta and Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir – raise complex and unprecedented political and legal challenges. While the UN Security Council can indefinitely defer prosecutions for 12 months at a time in support of peacemaking efforts, frequent recourse to deferral could risk losing gains that Africa has made in the fight against impunity and for accountability of human rights violations on the continent. The issue is not to achieve peace at the expense of justice, but to aim for the attainment of both peace and justice.

Peacemaking is a complex and fraught process, heavily dependent on various contextual factors ranging from the strategic location of a conflict situation to the adequacy of mobilised resources, and the political dynamics of the wider region, as demonstrated by the case of Somalia. The growth of international terrorism and maritime piracy have been instrumental in re-engaging the interest of the UN, regional organisations, and other key external actors in the Somali peace process after over a decade of neglect. In 2006, the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia was established by the US and Norway. In 2007, the UN Security Council gave its support to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Following the Djibouti Agreement of 2008, the creation of an inclusive, ongoing Somali-Somali dialogue within a secure environment provided by the current 17,731-strong AU mission in the country has been integral to beginning the long-term process of political reconciliation in the fragile country. Similarly, support from the UN Security Council and regional actors, in particular

Botswana, as well as local church groups and the lay Catholic order, Sant’ Egidio, played a critical role in the peace process in Mozambique that came to fruition with the signing of a General Peace Agreement in October 1992, ending a 16-year civil war in the country. Between 1992 and 1994, the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMUZ) successfully provided security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the repatriation of four million Mozambicans; investigated ceasefire violations; verified the conduct of national elections; and oversaw the disarming, demobilising, and reintegration (DDR) of 90,000 soldiers and combatants. Later in the decade, in the absence of adequate international assistance, the 1997 ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention in Sierra Leone’s civil war – a consequence of the conflict in neighbouring Liberia – could not prevent a resumption of fighting in 1998. The Lomé Peace Accord was signed in July 1999, but tensions between ECOWAS (in particular Nigeria) and the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), as well as within UNAMSIL itself, hindered the return of stability, necessitating a brief 800-strong British military intervention in 2000. The decade-long civil war in Sierra Leone cost about $5 billion and formally ended with UN-monitored elections only in May 2002, after a difficult peacemaking and peacekeeping process.

2. Peacekeeping

The founders of the United Nations envisaged that the maintenance of international peace and security would be promoted by its Security Council, assisted by regional bodies and employing a range of methods along a continuum from preventive diplomacy to peace enforcement. The Council was given the primary, although not exclusive, responsibility for the task, and great flexibility to make decisions as its members saw fit in pursuit of this mandate. Notwithstanding the one-sided bargain struck by the powerful in the formation of the Council, the widely-held hope was that its five veto-wielding permanent members (P-5) – the United States, China, Russia, France, and Britain – would interpret the Security Council’s institutional rules to protect the most vulnerable members of international society. From the Council’s creation in 1945, Africa has helped to shape the nature of the world body’s peacekeeping efforts. Since 1948, over 40 percent (30 out of 68) of the UN’s peacekeeping and observer missions have been deployed in Africa; more than half (28) of the world body’s 55 missions in the post-Cold War era have occurred on the continent. However, the UN’s actions during its intervention in the Congo from 1960 to 1964, when it was accused of taking sides, dashed the expectations of many African leaders that the world body would serve its purpose as an impartial guarantor of global peace and security, and reinforced reservations over the powers vested in the Security Council and the P-5. The crisis led to a “Congo Allergy” and accelerated the creation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963. The new continental body sought to protect Africa’s newly independent states by forbidding interference in each other’s internal affairs. This led to serious violations of human rights being ignored in some African countries. The end of the Cold War by 1990 resulted in increased cooperation between the US and Russia, which facilitated the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia. However, the enthusiasm of Western governments to place their troops in harm’s way to help to resolve conflicts in Africa waned after peacekeeping disasters in Somalia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994, in which 18 American and 10

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24 Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, pp. 148-152.
30 Adebajo, “Introduction”.

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Belgian peacekeepers respectively were killed. Political antipathy to peacekeeping action in Africa led to fatal UN passivity in Rwanda and the genocide of about 800,000 people. Subsequently, Africans were in the forefront of efforts to develop and implement the concept of “responsibility to protect” to prevent and halt mass atrocities in future. In 2002, the creation of the African Union established a 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) and vested the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government with the power to intervene in a member state in cases of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

The AU and Africa’s sub-regional blocs are important producers, as well as consumers, of peace and security. Between 1990 and 2003, ECOWAS undertook major peacekeeping efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. The African Union launched its own missions in Burundi (2003-2004), Sudan’s Darfur region (2004-2007), and Somalia (since 2007), again in reaction to the international community’s failure to respond to crises in these countries. The mission in Darfur was turned into the 20,071-strong AU/UN Hybrid Operation (UNAMID) from 2007, while the 17,731-strong AU Mission in Somalia is supported politically and financially by the US, the European Union (EU), and a trust fund established by the UN. Nevertheless, in 2008, the Joint AU-UN Report on AU Peacekeeping Operations chaired by the Italian former president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, concluded that the UN was shirking its peacekeeping responsibilities in Africa, leaving African organisations, which lack the necessary capabilities, to bear the brunt of keeping the peace on the continent. In addition, the AU’s lack of influence over external interventions led by the UN Security Council and the P-5 – who often have their own more parochial interests – has sometimes resulted in undesirable outcomes. The politics of peacekeeping have often played a greater role in determining the success or failure of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa than the technical and logistical constraints of these missions. While the P-5 have traditionally sought the views of African countries on the Council on issues concerning the continent, they have also refused to cede the primacy of the Security Council on peacekeeping action, or to dilute their own power as veto-wielding permanent members. However, without proper African engagement, “pure” UN missions on the continent risk losing their value and credibility, as has been demonstrated by the termination of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in 2008, and the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in 2010, as well as the continuing difficulties of the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO).

In June 2013, eight of the UN’s 16 peacekeeping missions were deployed on the continent – in Western Sahara, Mali, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, South Sudan, and Sudan’s Darfur and Abyei regions. About 75 percent of the world body’s 92,541 peacekeepers continue to be deployed in Africa, while 60 percent of the UN Security Council’s deliberations are focused on the continent. However, peacekeeping in Africa sometimes resembles an apartheid system in which Africans and Asians risk their lives on the frontline, while powerful Western nations foot some of the bills. None of the top ten funders of UN peacekeeping operations are among the top ten troop-contributing countries, all of which are African or Asian. Peace enforcement can also raise serious questions about the impartiality of interventions, particularly since these missions often operate in the midst of civil conflicts. Such enforcement must not appear to be taking sides with the armed forces of either central governments or of rebels. In addition, UN officials and peacekeepers need to be seen to be accountable for their actions – cases of rape and child sex abuse that have been reported in the DRC and Sierra Leone have further damaged the world body’s reputation in Africa.

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32 Adebajo, “Introduction”.
33 Adekeye Adebajo, “Conclusion”, in Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, pp. 227-244.
34 UN, “Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations”, 31 May 2013. In May 2013, the top ten contributing countries were, in order of the number of personnel provided: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Nepal, Jordan, Ghana, and Egypt.
35 Adebajo, “Conclusion”. 
Since the establishment of the AU in 2002, the concept of Pax Africana – the idea that peace on the continent is “to be assured by the exertions of Africans themselves”\(^{36}\) – has started to take material shape in the form of the African Standby Force. This is envisaged as an integrated 15,000 strong pan-African force consisting of five sub-regional standby brigades\(^{37}\) ready for rapid deployment within 30 to 90 days\(^{38}\) to execute a wide range of missions, from disaster relief to traditional peacekeeping operations, as well as peacebuilding activities. However, the ASF is still a long way from being able to undertake its ambitious goals, and the deadline for its operationalisation has now been moved from 2010 to 2015. Meanwhile, the AU often has to rely on regional hegemons to implement some of its decisions on peace and security within a clear legal framework. In line with this principle of subsidiarity, sub-regional bodies – such as ECOWAS under the guiding hand of Nigeria, and SADC under South Africa – have sought to keep peace in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC. However, regional hegemons sometimes have to compete with external actors over peacekeeping interventions.

In West Africa, Nigeria created ECOWAS in 1975 as a way of reducing French influence in the sub-region.\(^{39}\) Nevertheless, France continued to launch military operations. Subsequently, as its military spending has reduced, Paris has sought to multilateralise its interventions – most recently, in 2013, through the UN’s mission to Mali (MINUSMA), and as it had earlier done in Côte d’Ivoire alongside the UN since 2003, and in CAR/Chad with the EU and the UN between 2008 and 2010. Rather than seeking to counter this move by lobbying for a genuine international force in Mali under a single UN command, Nigeria instead opted to give support in the form of 1,200 troops who could, in effect, become auxiliaries of Gallic foreign policy.

The attempts by external actors to impose their agendas on peacekeeping in Africa have often received support from Hollywood. For example, the film Black Hawk Down, made with the assistance of the Pentagon (the US Defence Department) and released as Washington launched its “war on terror” in 2001, made no effort to show the suffering of ordinary Somalis in a civil war in which 300,000 people died.\(^{40}\) Instead it depicted them as bloodthirsty hordes bent on killing the film’s American “heroes”. Other movies such as Hotel Rwanda (2004) have, however, arguably provided a more nuanced understanding of peacekeeping issues in Africa. Critics have argued that the mainstream film industry in the US, which has huge global “soft power”, has a responsibility to provide better context and understanding in its representations of the continent.

The emergence of new African security mechanisms since 2002 has coincided with the HIV/AIDS pandemic with 20-60 percent of African armies afflicted by the virus,\(^{41}\) although African defence and security practices and policies have often failed to acknowledge the national and human security aspects of this pandemic. However, HIV/AIDS programmes in African militaries present a unique opportunity to halt the epidemic within a key sector of society. Since soldiers can be champions of safer sex and can carry HIV prevention messages to local populations, HIV/AIDS programmes in the defence sector, particularly among peacekeepers, can have an important ripple effect on societies across Africa.

3. Peacebuilding\(^{42}\)


\(^{41}\) See CCR, HIV/AIDS and Militaries in Africa, policy brief and report based on a series of seminars held in Windhoek, Namibia, in February 2006; Cairo, Egypt, in September 2007; and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November 2007.

\(^{42}\) This section largely draws on a concept paper by Devon Curtis for a CCR seminar on “Peacebuilding in Africa” in Gaborone, Botswana, 25-28 August 2009 (available at www.ccr.org.za); and Curtis and Dzinesa (eds.), Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa.
During the Cold War from 1960 to 1990, about 40 civil wars in Africa killed 10 million people and displaced another 10 million. By 1992, long-running conflicts had subsided in some parts of the continent such as Namibia and Mozambique, but continued in others such as Sudan and Somalia. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, conflicts in Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were brought to an end through regional and UN peacekeeping efforts.\(^{43}\) The recent reduction in war in Africa has provided a window of opportunity to address the root causes of conflicts and to build a more durable peace on the continent. Peacebuilding as a concept was popularised by the publication in 1992 of *An Agenda for Peace* by Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali at the start of his tenure as UN Secretary-General. This important report defined peacebuilding as the medium- to long-term process of rebuilding war-affected communities through identifying and supporting structures to consolidate peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.\(^{44}\) Peacebuilding currently involves the process of rebuilding the political, security, and socio-economic dimensions of societies emerging from conflict. The concept also entails the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of former fighters; the reform of security forces; and the establishment of structures of governance and the rule of law in order to consolidate reconciliation, reconstruction, and development. Increasingly, scholars and policymakers have highlighted the complementarity between peacebuilding and statebuilding in line with a growing recognition that well-capacitated states are necessary to promote development, peace, and security in Africa.\(^{45}\)

Since the end of the Cold War by 1990, a wide range of local, regional, and international actors have established programmes and mechanisms to build peace with varying degrees of success. In 2005, the UN established the Peacebuilding Commission. The World Bank, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other international bodies have also created special units to deal with post-conflict reconstruction. In Africa, NEPAD\(^{46}\) and the AU separately developed post-conflict reconstruction frameworks – in June 2005 and July 2006 respectively – which have included the participation of African civil society actors.\(^{47}\) The AU’s current strategy is based on the premise that each country should adopt a peacebuilding plan that fits its own context.\(^{48}\) It has been suggested, however, that the AU and Africa’s sub-regional bodies should establish a division of labour, where they would focus on peacemaking and peacekeeping – as well as leveraging their comparative advantage in areas such as strengthening state institutions and enhancing socio-economic development – while the better-resourced and more experienced UN, World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB) would carry more of the burden for post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa.\(^{49}\)

Peacebuilding strategies tend to pursue four key goals: greater security; political institutions that are broadly accepted; a revitalised economy; and a mechanism for dealing with past injustices and violence.\(^{50}\) The specific way in which these peacebuilding elements are put together will vary from case to case, and might not correspond to the dominant formulas put forward by international actors. Since regional and global institutions transmit particular ideas and norms about peacebuilding, the question of who does what and how, in the context of African peacebuilding, has enormous

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\(^{43}\) Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping in Africa*.


\(^{45}\) Curtis and Dzinesa (eds.), *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa*. See also Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (eds.), *Building States to Build Peace* (Boulder and London: Lynne Riener, 2008).

\(^{46}\) NEPAD is a socio-economic development plan devised by African leaders in 2001 to attract aid, investment, and trade in exchange for particular forms of political and economic governance.


\(^{50}\) Curtis, “Peacebuilding in Africa”, concept paper, p.5.
implications for the continent. The establishment of an appropriate division of labour among and between the relevant actors and programmes is therefore critical to facilitate effective peacebuilding in Africa. A potentially important player in these efforts is the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission, which was created in December 2005 as a subsidiary body of the Security Council and the General Assembly in response to international frustration at the high rate of relapse into conflict. It was estimated in 2005 that about half of countries that emerge from war fall back into conflict within five years as a result of inadequate peacebuilding. The creation of a body committed to promoting post-conflict reconstruction was destined to fill a “gaping hole” in UN peace efforts, according to In Larger Freedom, the 2005 report by then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The new body was mandated to “bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery”. However, the Commission was crippled at birth by its founding mandate which excluded a wider definition of peacebuilding to prevent conflicts from arising in the first place, as this was seen by the P-5 as encroaching on the Security Council’s role, and developing countries also feared such interventions might be abused by powerful countries.

The Peacebuilding Commission includes a 31-member organisational committee appointed on a two-year renewable basis, a secretariat – the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) – and a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The committee consists of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and two of the Council’s non-permanent members; seven members of the UN Economic and Social Council with experience of post-conflict recovery; seven members elected by the General Assembly; five of the UN’s largest donor countries; and five of the world body’s largest contributors to peacekeeping. Representatives from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also attend its meetings. All the six countries currently on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda are African: Burundi, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea (which is the only one to have referred itself to the body). The Commission’s engagement with these states is shaped by the principle of national leadership of the process. The UN Peacebuilding Commission has, however, been criticised for promoting a “liberal peace” model that emphasises democratic elections and market liberalisation rather than tackling underlying causes of conflicts and changing the “bitter minds” that often sustain conflicts. Others have argued that expectations that the Commission could successfully address the roots of conflicts were inflated, given that even civil societies in the countries themselves often cannot. The body’s effectiveness is further circumscribed by its isolated position within the UN system: neglected by the Security Council, and yet disconnected from the world body’s preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping efforts.

The Peacebuilding Commission has engaged in security sector reform (SSR) efforts in Guinea-Bissau, providing pensions to former military commanders; and mobilising donor support for the holding of elections there. SSR efforts have also been the focus of the body’s engagement in Guinea. The Commission has further sought to support disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration processes in the CAR and Burundi, and provided material assistance for the holding of elections in both countries. In Liberia, the UN body has provided impetus to national reconciliation initiatives and sought to extend the rule of law by supporting the establishment of five hubs across the country housing police and courts which aim to provide more citizens with access to judicial and security services. In Sierra Leone, the Commission has encouraged talks between government and opposition leaders to resolve disputes that had led to political violence, and supported preparations for a credible

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elections process in 2012. Several lessons can thus be learned from the diverse experiences of African countries that have experienced conflict and their successes and failures in building peace.

The case of Somalia shows that peacebuilding is a fluid and continuous endeavour that requires a shift in attitudes on the ground in order to prevent a renewal of hostilities. Key challenges there have involved identifying the relevant local actors and instilling confidence in them that the political process can address the roots of the conflict. The secure environment provided by the 17,731-strong AU Mission in Somalia has also been integral to beginning this long-term process of political reconciliation in the country. However, the continuing ad hoc nature of the relationships between the key African and international actors engaged in the Somali peace process does little to support its sustainability. In the Central African Republic, which has been described as an “aid orphan” and has experienced protracted violent conflict since independence in 1960, peacebuilding initiatives have proceeded in fits and starts. The ousting of president François Bozizé in March 2013 followed the failure of his government to fulfil its pledges under a peace deal signed with rebels in Libreville in 2008, which the UN Peacebuilding Commission had promoted. However, continuing instability in the CAR appears to validate concerns that local actors there have not been empowered to own the peacebuilding process in their country. In addition, peacekeeping interventions supported by regional and international actors including the Economic Community of Central African States, the European Union (led by France), and the UN, have failed to deliver the security necessary for effective peacebuilding in the country, which still remains wracked by instability.

By December 2012, the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund had helped to mobilise $500 million. In addition, the Peacebuilding Commission’s strategy to align the efforts of donors had resulted in the World Bank and the African Development Bank pledging a further $500 million. However, the Fund remains dwarfed by the $5 billion a year that the UN spends on peacekeeping (about 90 percent of this on its own missions rather than on post-conflict peacebuilding efforts), and the demand for resources for comprehensive peacebuilding remains largely unmet. The type and source of economic aid for peacebuilding and statebuilding can have a critical impact on peacebuilding outcomes.

The World Bank, for example, wields substantial power in its dealings with potential post-conflict aid recipients, often setting the terms for further foreign investment flows. The IMF and the World Bank have provided technical expertise and finance to assist post-conflict reconstruction and development processes in Africa. Eschewing an overtly political role, the World Bank lends funds according to neoliberal economic principles that have historically failed to identify the specific needs of countries emerging from conflicts. For example, World Bank and IMF support to Mozambique from 1986 followed the model of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), demanding strict fiscal discipline, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and the opening of domestic markets to international trade. Although Mozambique survived the free-market cure and benefitted from the funding for infrastructure that became available as it emerged from conflict after 1992, the involvement of the Bank and the IMF elsewhere in Africa arguably fostered instability and militarism that undermined peace – such as in Rwanda and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. In relation to engaging with the UN’s peacebuilding agenda, the World Bank has provided funding for DDR, reconstruction, governance,
and development. Although the Bank’s economic prescriptions still indicate a one-size-fits-all approach that seeks to channel funding for peacebuilding into the neoliberal macro-economic vision outlined by its Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), they are increasingly shifting from overtly promoting privatisation to supporting statebuilding.

4. The Role of External Actors

A cornerstone of the international security architecture, the 15-member UN Security Council is the only organ with the power to start or end peacekeeping missions by the 193-member world body.62 Chapter VIII of the UN Charter of 1945 provides the basis for cooperation between the Security Council and Africa’s regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. However, after UN failures in Angola, Somalia, and Rwanda in the 1990s, the Security Council’s reluctance to authorise robust peacekeeping interventions led both the AU and ECOWAS to craft security mechanisms that controversially allow the deployment of regional peacekeepers without prior authorisation from the UN Security Council.63 The record of the regional initiatives has been mixed, with many of them lacking sufficient financial, technical, and logistical capacities to be truly effective. The ECOMOG missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia were taken over by the UN in 2000 and 2003 respectively, as were the AU missions in Burundi and Darfur in 2004 and 2007 respectively.64 Effective burden-sharing between the UN and Africa’s regional organisations remains an urgent priority.

A UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) – currently headed by Algeria’s Said Djinnit, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for West Africa – was established in Dakar, Senegal, in 2001 to strengthen security cooperation with ECOWAS and to promote an integrated approach to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding in the sub-region. In 2010, a UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) was created in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, with an authorised staff of 63, to strengthen coordination with the continental body and to support its evolving security architecture. While UN-regional cooperation has increased recently, this collaboration remains perfunctory and weak. Annual consultations between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council have been presented by powerful members of the P-5 as meetings between the PSC and individual members of the UN Security Council, rather than with the Security Council as a whole.65 Yet, without proper local engagement, UN missions in Africa risk losing their value and credibility, as demonstrated by the continued difficulties faced by the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC, which led to the Southern African Development Community’s decision in February 2013 to deploy a 3,000-strong Neutral Intervention Force (NIF) in the eastern Congo.66

In 2012-2013, the UN Security Council’s P-5 rejected AU and ECOWAS proposals to deploy troops to pacify the threat of Islamist militias in northern Mali until a French military mission in January 2013, that addressed the militant threat but which critics dismissed as an old-style, neo-colonial intervention. ECOWAS troops from Benin, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, and Niger have also deployed to Mali, with tensions being evident between the AU and ECOWAS on which organisation should take the lead in this mission. In April 2013, the UN Security Council established the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali, with French troops deployed in the country remaining outside the UN chain of command – replicating the model previously used in Côte d’Ivoire from 2003,67 and resulting in further criticisms of French peacekeeping in Africa as a vehicle for the pursuit of parochial Gallic interests. Suspicions that Paris – having earlier been discredited by unilateral interventions in Rwanda (1994) and the DRC (1997) – has been seeking multilateral UN and European Union cover for its interventions in Africa (over 40 by 2012), have also been raised by the

63 Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, p. 234.
64 Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, p. 234.
67 See Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, pp. 152-161.
French-instigated EU and UN forces deployed in Chad and the Central African Republic between 2008 and 2010.\(^{68}\) Britain, on the other hand, has often avoided the direct military adventurism of France in Africa in the post-colonial era. However, not unlike Paris, London has preferred to participate in UN-authorised, rather than UN-led, peacekeeping missions. British governments have also used permanent membership of the UN Security Council to leverage control and influence over peacekeeping operations in areas of strategic interest to them, while providing a small number of Blue Helmets and training support packages for other UN troop-contributing countries.\(^{69}\) The British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 only occurred after the UN Mission in Sierra Leone was beset by hostage-taking. The 800-strong British force helped to stabilise the crumbling UN mission. However, like Paris, London kept its troops outside the UN chain of command. After the intervention, Britain continued to be involved in Sierra Leone’s post-conflict statebuilding efforts, lending sustained support to security sector reform initiatives, in particular, between 1999 and 2008. Led, supported, and funded mainly by the British government, the reform process entailed restructuring the Sierra Leonean army and police force; reorganising the country’s ministry of defence; supporting the establishment of a national security office; and advising on a range of issues including civil-military relations and the development of a national security strategy.\(^{70}\)

The establishment in October 2008 of a new US military command – the Germany-based Africa Command (AFRICOM) – responsible for all American security interests in Africa, has led to fears that this approach will further militarise US engagement with the continent and transform Africa into a battlefield for external powers.\(^{71}\) AFRICOM, which now has 100 training programmes and exercises in 35 African countries, was involved in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Libya in 2011, and is combating piracy and oil bunkering in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as fighting drug-trafficking in West Africa.\(^{72}\) While Washington has provided $335 million to the AU Mission in Somalia, many African militaries continue to argue that they need more logistics and equipment, rather than counter-terrorism training. Furthermore, the Barack Obama administration has dispatched drones to Somalia and Mali. US Special Forces have also been deployed to the Great Lakes region to hunt down Ugandan warlord, Joseph Kony, while 1,500 US soldiers remain in Djibouti to track terrorists.

Meanwhile, there has been a 20-fold increase in another P-5 member, China’s, peacekeeping contributions to UN missions - including in Liberia, the DRC, South Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire – from fewer than 100 personnel in 2002 to nearly 2,000 in 2011.\(^{73}\) Additionally, Beijing played a key role in convincing the government of Sudan to accept a joint AU/UN peacekeeping force in Darfur in 2007. However, large Chinese arms exports to African countries, including Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan, remain a matter of continuing concern.\(^{74}\) Over the past decade, the most consistent and largest troop-contributors to the UN have been the South Asian trio of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India, with the bulk of their peacekeepers deployed in Africa. In May 2013, 8,836 Bangladeshi; 8,230 Pakistani; and 7,868 Indian uniformed personnel were deployed as part of UN missions around the

\(^{72}\) The rest of this paragraph is drawn from Adekeye Adebajo, “The Wave of ‘Obamamania’ in Africa Peeters Out”, Business Day, 3 June 2013.
world. However, Indian and Pakistani Blue Helmets were accused of sexual misconduct in the DRC and Haiti respectively. Another challenge relates to the fact that the top donor countries to UN missions are distinct from the top troop-contributing countries, which often lack political and strategic influence over the operations in which they participate.

Dissemination
Following the Cape Town policy research seminar in August 2013, a six-page policy brief and 30-page seminar report will be produced by CCR, and widely disseminated in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the US, including to African governments, sub-regional bodies on the continent, diplomatic missions at the AU in Addis Ababa, the African Union Commission, UN missions in New York, key foreign embassies in Africa, African university libraries, and African and relevant past participants at the Centre’s policy seminars. The policy report and brief will also be made available on CCR’s website. The seminar will further form the basis of an edited volume that will be disseminated to African policymakers, African embassies worldwide, key officials of African governments and parliaments, the secretariats of sub-regional organisations on the continent, important representatives of Western and Asian governments, academia, and civil society. The book will be launched in key African capitals, with the UN community in New York, and the EU community in Brussels. Launches will also be organised in key Asian capitals.