CONCEPT PAPER

For a

Research and Policy Seminar on

The African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group and the European Union

Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR)
Cape Town, South Africa

Cape Town, South Africa
October 2012
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, South Africa, will hold a research and policy seminar on the theme “The African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group and the European Union (EU)”. The seminar will take place at the Vineyard Hotel in Cape Town on Monday 29 and Tuesday 30 October 2012. This work builds on previous CCR seminars and publications, including two policy seminars on Africa-Europe relations in November 2007 and September 2008, as well as two policy reports and two policy briefs: *Eurafrique? Africa and Europe in a New Century;*¹ and *From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa.*² The project will also build on a 22-chapter CCR book, *The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa* published in 2012 by Columbia University Press, Hurst, and Wits University Press.³ These seminars and publications have been groundbreaking in a field hitherto largely dominated by institutions in Europe. Another important aim of this new project is to further policy research and constructive dialogue on the 79-member ACP grouping and the 27-member EU among scholars, policymakers, and civil society groups. Much of the research and analyses on this vital relationship has been conducted by non-ACP scholars and institutions. This project thus represents an effort to reverse this trend, and ensure that more ACP voices contribute meaningfully to these critical debates.

Seminar Themes

The Cape Town seminar of October 2012 will draw on the participation of about 30 scholars and practitioners from a wide range of backgrounds and geographical locations, including ACP countries, the ACP Secretariat, and the EU. Several ACP officials and ambassadors based in Brussels, as well as key South African and EU officials will be invited to attend the policy meeting. The seminar will also aim to assist the efforts of the ACP ambassadorial working group which is seeking to chart a new course for the organisation in a rapidly changing world. The following nine key broad themes will form the basis of presentations and discussions during the meeting, and will subsequently be organised into the chapters for the post-seminar publication:

- The Past, Present, and Future of the ACP/EU Relationship;
- Historical Dimensions of the ACP/EU Relationship;
- The ACP/EU Trade Relationship;
- The Impact of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) on the ACP/EU Relationship;
- The Relationship between South Africa, the ACP, and the EU;
- The EU/Africa Strategic and Security Relationship;
- A Comparative Analysis of Regional Integration in the EU, Africa, and the Caribbean;
- The Role of Migration in the EU’s Relationship with the ACP states; and
- An Assessment of Geo-political changes with the creation of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping and the impact of these events on the ACP grouping.

Objectives

The main objective of the Cape Town policy seminar is to bring together about 30 policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors from ACP countries and Europe to explore critically the nature of the relationship between the ACP and the European Union; and the potential for their further strategic engagement.

Building on CCR’s previous two seminars on EU-Africa relations in 2007 and 2008 and its 2012 publication on this subject, this project is broadening the scope of the Centre’s work to focus on the political, economic, and social dimensions of the ACP’s relationship with the EU. The project will analyse developments since the inception of the ACP-EU relationship in the areas of trade, development cooperation, peace and security, institutional development, migration, and regional integration in order to gain a deeper understanding of current initiatives and directions within the relationship.

The figures below demonstrate the skewed nature of the relationship between the European Union, the ACP, and its richest state: South Africa. This large gap could make the task of achieving a genuine partnership between the ACP and the EU more difficult.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Grouping</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>$12.6 trillion</td>
<td>$35,116</td>
<td>10,180,000 km²</td>
<td>739 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>$363.7 billion</td>
<td>$10,700</td>
<td>1,219,912 km²</td>
<td>49.9 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figure taken from the International Trade Statistics Report from the World Trade Organisation

1. **The Past, Present, and Future of the ACP/EU Relationship**

   The 79-member African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States was established by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975 with the four key aims of: promoting the sustainable development of its member states and integrating them into the global economy on equitable terms; coordinating the activities of the Group within the framework of the ACP/European Economic Community (EEC) Partnership Agreements; consolidating unity and solidarity among ACP members and citizens; and establishing and consolidating peace and stability in free and democratic societies. The ACP Group’s main policy organs consist of the Summit of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers; and the Committee of Ambassadors. Its Brussels-based secretariat oversees implementation of its decisions under a Secretary-General who is
currently Ghana’s Mohamed Ibn Chambas. The Group has 48 states from Africa, 16 from the Caribbean, and 15 from the Pacific. As part of an important institutional reform process, the ACP Secretariat is presently seeking to achieve a functional cooperation model based on pooling higher levels of expertise and decentralising its administration. The Secretariat is currently undergoing an organisational repositioning based on seven key pillars: developing a new vision, mission, and values statement; administrative restructuring; culture change and enhanced professional development and training; transforming the body into a knowledge institution and development agency; enhancing its financial viability; creating an ACP Trade and Investment Bank to foster economic ties among its 79 members; and seeking alternative partnerships and alliances with emerging economic powers.

The ACP Council’s Ambassadorial Working Group on the Future Perspectives of the ACP Group has been meeting regularly in Brussels to chart a way forward for the organisation until the conclusion of its mandate in 2014. This process seeks to help influence positively the 2015 third and final five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 which comes to an end in 2020. The ACP Group has, however, been criticised for focusing too much on process rather than policies. Based on a widespread feeling that the EU’s 2007 Lisbon Treaty and what many in the ACP Group considered to be Brussels’ heavy-handed negotiation of the Economic Partnership Agreements have strained ACP/EU relations, the Group is focusing its efforts on three key focal areas: deepening the ACP’s relationship with the EU; outlining the ACP’s future relations with additional partners, particularly within the context of South-South and Triangle Cooperation; and political dialogue and engagement. The ACP has formed two ad hoc groups to conduct its work: one on the structure and functions of the organs of the Group; and another on the ACP-Wide Development Cooperation.

Despite the EU proposing 32 billion euros of funding for the ACP in the 2014-2020 period, the ACP/EU relationship continues to be criticised for being a traditional “donor-recipient” one, and there have been strong calls for the ACP to broaden its ties beyond its Brussels-based chief patron, the European Union, which still provides 50 per cent of the ACP’s operational expenses. The current reform process is also examining key issues such as: the continued relevance and achievements of the ACP Group; the functioning of the organs of the Secretariat; a review of ACP/EU relations in light of the Second Revised Cotonou Partnership Agreement; the Economic Partnership Agreements negotiations; the New Lisbon Treaty and relations with other development partners; and identifying the comparative advantage of the ACP Group. Among weaknesses identified in need of urgent action include: the imperative for the ACP Group to speak with one voice; the need for the Committee of Ambassadors to have a formal political mandate outside the ACP/EU Cotonou Agreement; reversing the overconcentration of the ACP Secretariat on Brussels and focusing more on ACP regions; and the need for the Secretariat to be more political in its agenda-setting, and to attract more high-level ACP representation to its meetings.

There have also been calls in this reform process for the ACP to: focus more on issues relating to the BRICS and the developing world; to use South Africa to build closer links with the BRICS and work more closely with BRICS ambassadors in Brussels; for the ACP Secretariat to develop more capacity for

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4 The 79 ACP states include: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Cape Verde, Comoros, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

5 I am grateful for the information in this paragraph and the rest of this section to “The Progress Report from The Ambassadorial Working Group on the Future Perspectives of the ACP Group to the 851st Meeting of the Committee of Ambassadors,” ACP House, Brussels, 15 and 16 May 2012, ACP/27/016/12/EOA/mgf; and “Brainstorming on Future Perspectives for the ACP,” London, Royal Overseas League, 16-17 April 2012.
technical analysis for its members; for the Group to be more financially self-sustaining in order to increase its independence; to gain more voice and visibility particularly by coordinating its efforts better at the UN (through the Group of 77) and other key international fora; to nurture Southern alliances in order to be able to tackle issues such as trade negotiations and climate change more effectively; and to consider affiliating with the Group of 20 (G20) major economies. There have been further calls in the reform process for the ACP to focus more on issues relating to desertification, youth, food security, health, demography, migration, cultural diversity, and intellectual property rights; to implement development cooperation programmes with private sector entities and multinationals; and to work towards developing an ACP Free Trade Area.

2. Historical Dimension of the ACP-EU Relationship

ACP-European Cooperation dates back to the Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community in 1957. In it, the signatories expressed solidarity with European colonies and overseas countries and territories and committed themselves to contributing to their prosperity through trade preferences and non-reciprocal market access. The first association of ACP and EEC countries occurred through the Yaoundé I (1963-69) and Yaoundé II (1969-75) agreements, named after the city in Cameroon where they were signed. The lion’s share of the development aid resources then went to French-speaking Africa to build infrastructure in the wake of the process of decolonisation. Economic cooperation was the leitmotiv in this era.6

British entry into the EEC in 1973 led to the signing of the wider Lomé I agreement in 1975 between 46 ACP countries (now also including the anglophone ex-colonies) and the then nine EEC member states. The effective creation of the ACP Group came about as a result of a number of common interests (notably sugar, bananas, and beef), but principally because the Caribbean and Pacific contingent wanted to take advantage of Africa’s considerable bargaining power.7 Since then, the ACP has grown to a membership of 79 states. The ACP Group is governed by a Council of Ministers and has regular and well-established mechanisms, fora, and summits with the EU in order to promote, strengthen, and consolidate the partnership. However, in the wake of the bitter Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations and the ongoing economic crisis in Europe and its growing debt levels, of what significance will continued engagement between the ACP and the EU be? Is the ACP grouping still relevant in regulating trade agreements with the EU? Are new groupings and alliances taking over the roles previously played by the ACP?

3. The ACP-EU Trade Relationship and the Impact of the EPAs

The current debate on trade between the EU and the ACP is still dominated by the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations. The process and negotiations surrounding the agreements illustrate the nature and content of this relationship.8 The 27-member European Union9 is the major trading partner for most ACP countries. This “special” trade relationship dates back to 1975, when the European Economic Community granted the ACP countries unilateral market access preferences under the first Lomé Convention, which was renewed four times until 1990. The unilateral preferences of the EU-ACP relationship was disallowed

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9 The 27 EU members are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
by World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules as discriminating against other developing countries, particularly least developed countries (LDCs).

With the Lomé Convention coming to an end imminently, Europe proposed a new trade and development regime - the Cotonou Agreement – in 1996. This came into force four years later. Cotonou advocated the establishment of reciprocal trade agreements between the EU and six regional blocs of 78 ACP countries by creating Economic Partnership Agreements which were scheduled to come into force by January 2008. Aiming for regional agreements among six regional blocs rather than the ACP as a whole raised concerns that the ACP Group was being divided and weakened. However, the EU insisted that these accords would strengthen regional integration within the ACP.

Although the EU Commission in Brussels was aiming for comprehensive, WTO-compatible trade deals with the six ACP regions, it did not properly align its goals with those of the ACP. The three main disagreements in this acrimonious process included: divergent interpretations of the development dimensions of the EPAs; a lack of agreement on “WTO plus” components; and different approaches to applying the regional components of the EPAs. By 2008, only two regional EPAs had been created: one for the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) and another for the East African Community (EAC). Only the EAC region, however, finalised a joint liberalisation schedule. For CARIFORUM, the EPA appears to have only one regional liberalisation schedule, but in reality contains 15 country-specific overlapping schedules. Thus, it seems that the EAC is the only regional body to have strengthened regional integration as a result of the EPA process. At the other extreme is West and Central Africa. Only two West African and one Central African country had, by 2012, signed an EPA with separate liberalisation schedules. Over 80 percent of West and Central African states had thus failed to sign EPAs by 2012.

Southern Africa appears to have occupied a middle position. Each signatory in the region had agreed on the same text, but with different liberalisation schedules. An added complication in Southern Africa is South Africa’s membership of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), as well as its separate trade agreement with the EU. Issues around aligning the South Africa-EU trade accord of 1999 to SACU and SADC integration efforts, allowing South Africa to reintroduce tariffs on certain sensitive SACU products, and debates around the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) principle, have all dominated and complicated these negotiations, almost resulting in the disintegration of SACU. Has the trade aspect of the ACP and EU relationship resulted in permanent damage to these various relationships? Will this incomplete EPA process derail historical ties among African states and between the ACP and the EU?

4. South Africa, the ACP, and the EU

South Africa’s relationship with the ACP Group is unique in that geographically and historically – as an ex-British colony – Pretoria should automatically have had access to the grouping in 1975. However, due to its apartheid policies, South Africa did not become a member of the ACP and shared in none of its benefits. With South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, ACP and Lomé Convention membership became the preferred approach for the country in its relations with Brussels. This strategy was based on the premise that such membership would contribute to regional integration and economic development if all of Southern Africa had similar access to Europe. The EU, however, argued that South Africa’s technological sophistication - with a gross domestic product larger than some EU members such as

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\(^{10}\) Cuba was the only country that excluded itself from this accord.

\(^{11}\) See, for example, Norman Girvan, “Some Lessons of the CARIFORUM-EU-EPA,” Trade Negotiations Insights, vol.8 no.8 October 2009, pp.8-9.

\(^{12}\) This section draws on Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “Africa and Europe: Ending a Dialogue of the Deaf?”, in Adebajo and Whiteman (eds.) The EU and Africa, pp.217-235.
Ireland, Portugal and Greece, and three times the size of the next largest Afro-Caribbean Pacific member - caused it to be considered a threat to other ACP countries as well as to some EU members. Instead of full membership, South Africa joined the Lomé Convention as a qualified member in June 1998, being able to participate fully in its institutions, although not in all of its trade and aid benefits.

South Africa negotiated a stand-alone trade agreement with the EU - the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) - in 1999. Once the Lomé Convention expired by 2000 and it became clear that Southern African states would have to negotiate their own trade agreements with Brussels, South Africa was given access to the talks in order to assist its neighbours to align their new accords with its own existing TDCA. This duality in market access arrangements has given rise to numerous complications in accommodating Southern Africa in its trade arrangement with Europe as well as South Africa. The signing by some Southern African Customs Union members (excluding South Africa and Namibia) of interim EPAs threatened to end the 100-year old Customs Union, since different tariff schedules with a third party undermines the core function of a customs union.\(^{13}\) Was the decision not to grant South Africa full Lomé membership the “original sin” in complicating regional integration in Southern Africa and souring the relationship not only between South Africa and Europe but also between South Africa and its direct neighbours in SACU? Can South Africa still play a leading role within the ACP grouping, or has its past, qualified membership cast it as an outsider and mere observer? How can South Africa use its membership of BRICS to strengthen the ACP?

The European Union–South Africa bilateral relationship has evolved into a seemingly important political and economic relationship, which, on the surface, has deepened since South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994. The relationship has had many periods of strengthening and weakening, but the ultimate direction of this partnership remains uncertain though Brussels has identified South Africa as one of only ten strategic partners globally. The other nine countries in this elite group include the members of the BRICS alliance, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, and China (of which South Africa became a member in 2011), and the United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and South Korea. South Africa is thus the EU’s only strategic partner among the 79-member ACP Group.

An analysis of the strategic dimension of the EU–South Africa relationship must necessarily evaluate the nature of these ties. At first glance, this is a complicated relationship. On the one hand, South Africa is a major recipient of EU aid – total commitment for 2007–2013 is 980 million euros, not including EU member states’ bilateral contributions – and the country benefits tremendously from European interest in its development. Yet on the other hand, the relationship is highly fraught by the ongoing and seemingly endless negotiations surrounding the Economic Partnership Agreements. While there are synergies in terms of the foreign policies of Tshwane (Pretoria) and Brussels, especially towards the Southern African subregion, there are also as many divergent outlooks, especially when it comes to international processes such as the negotiations in the World Trade Organisation and climate talks, where South Africa and Brussels often sit on opposites sides of the table. Can the South Africa-EU Strategic Partnership heal some of the rifts caused in the EPA negotiations? At the three South Africa–EU summits between 2006 and 2011, the two parties discussed progress against the joint action plan and highlighted several agenda items, including development assistance, investment, global governance, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), climate change, EPAs, and peace and security in Sudan and Zimbabwe. These are all critical issues for South Africa, and they may require the political and economic clout of the EU to promote a favourable outcome.\(^{14}\)


\(^{14}\) This section draws from Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, “South Africa and the EU: Where Lies the Strategic Partnership?” in Adebajo and Whiteman (eds.) The EU and Africa, pp.121-135.
5. The EU/Africa Strategic and Security Relationship

Mineral resources in ACP states have for centuries been the source of disputes, insecurities, and wars among European colonial powers. At present, these resources are much coveted by emerging countries and industrialised nations alike. While providing development opportunities, this situation also presents many challenges, especially in the security arena.¹⁵ The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 makes provision for a financial envelope to be spent on an array of issues including peace and security. In the EU’s 2007-2013 budget, there is explicit mention of the important link between security and development, on the premise that no development can take place without a secure environment. Cotonou highlights the interdependence between security and development and seeks to tackle security threats collectively. Attention is paid to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. A comprehensive approach combining diplomacy, security, and development cooperation is thus evolving for situations of state fragility.

The EU is seeking to help build an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in order to foster the continent’s efforts at conflict management and prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Brussels thus supports the AU’s key security organs: a continental early warning system, a Panel of the Wise, the 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU Special Fund (for peace and security), and the African Standby Force (which aims to create a force of at least 25,000 rapid reaction troops and 980 military observers, as well as training centres across the continent). The EU had already provided €1 billion to APSA by 2010.¹⁶

The EU’s Artémis peace support operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) Ituri province took place in 2003 (the first ever pan-European security exercise in Africa). This was followed by the EUPOL (European Police Mission) and EUFOR (European Forces) missions at the time of the DRC elections in 2006/2007, as well as the EUFOR intervention in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR) in March 2008. Both the 2003 Artémis and the 2006 EUFOR succeeded in their limited missions because they had narrow time-frames with clear objectives and exit dates.¹⁷ The EU has, for some time, made the Congo, Chad/CAR, and Sudan, key priority areas in Africa. Apart from Artémis, EUPOL, and EUFOR; the EU has been involved in a joint action to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. This mission is aiming to contribute to a successful integration of the Congolese army. A proposal, in December 2008, for a new European force in the DRC to act as a stabilising presence in the volatile Great Lakes region was vetoed by some EU members, including Britain. The EU also appointed Torben Brylle as its Special Representative for Sudan in 2007. ¹⁸ Until his retirement from the post three years later, the Danish diplomat worked with the UN and the AU to promote peacemaking efforts in the country.¹⁸ The Cape Town policy meeting will specifically address the evolving EU/Africa security relationship as well as the EU mediation role in Sudan.

6. Comparative Regional Integration: Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean

The institutional environments of Africa and Europe have undergone fundamental changes in the two decades of the post–Cold War era. The African Union’s Constitutive Act of 2000 stresses important values of democracy, peace, security, and development. Attempts have also been made to broaden

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¹⁵ These sections draw on Garth le Pere, “AU-EU Security and Governance Cooperation”, in Adebajo and Whiteman (eds.), The EU and Africa, pp.257-275.
¹⁸ See Adekeye Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2011), pp.185-216.
democratic participation with the establishment of a Pan-African Parliament as well as the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), while the 2001 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) has sought to serve as the continent’s own socio-economic blueprint, and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of 2003 has tried to address important governance and development deficits. AU member states agreed to move the continent towards incremental integration and unity on the basis of strengthening their regional economic communities. But as an AU audit report of 2007 noted, there were serious failings with these efforts which will make the aspiration to create an African Common market by 2028 difficult.

The EU’s work in the areas of foreign policy, diplomacy, defence, and security are contained in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which were outlined in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. The EU has gone further than any other region in the world in creating a regional integration scheme with some supranational powers. Clearly, the organisation’s integration agenda has moved through these various steps culminating in a common currency (adopted by 17 of its 27 member states) and a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The EU, however, is currently experiencing severe economic difficulties which could threaten the future of the euro. The CFSP has also sometimes been difficult to implement with strong divisions over issues such as Bosnia and Iraq.

In the ACP, the integration agenda has been less successful, with most regions not moving beyond a free trade area. Many argue that the level of integration achieved by the EU should not be seen as the key goal, but rather focusing on those elements of integration that can possibly be adapted to the ACP context. Is the African Union’s vision of a united continent too ambitious? What are some of the lessons from efforts at regional integration in Europe for Africa and the Caribbean? Do recent developments in Europe caution ACP states to take a slower approach to integration?

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) established a single market and economy through the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas which started implementation in 2006. The main objectives of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) are: to make full use of labour and other factors of production; and to achieve competitive production resulting in more diverse and increased products and services. The CSME also aims for: free movement of goods, services, capital and labour; a common external tariff; a common trade policy; a regional stock exchange and development fund; harmonization of company, intellectual property and related laws; and ultimately, a common currency. As with regional integration schemes in Africa, however, many of these lofty goals and ambitions are still to be implemented. The Pacific remains highly fragmented due to the composition of the region, including both rich economies (Australia and New Zealand) and tiny, least developed island states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Member States</th>
<th>Level of Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern African Customs Union (SACU)</td>
<td>South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland</td>
<td>Functioning Customs Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Implementation Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern African Development Community (SADC)</td>
<td>SACU plus Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).</td>
<td>Partial implementation of a free trade area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA)</td>
<td>Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East African Community</td>
<td>Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda</td>
<td>Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.</td>
<td>Customs Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)</td>
<td>Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea</td>
<td>Integration project, very fluid due to conflicts in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARIBBEAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)</td>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>Common market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACIFIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA)</td>
<td>Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Nauru, Palau, Marshall Islands</td>
<td>Starting to implement Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. The ACP-EU Migration Relationship

The ACP-EU history begins with migration, as Europeans migrated to ACP territories during the slave trade and colonial eras, often exploiting and conquering their populations. Towards the end of the colonial era, and continuing up to date, the migratory patterns have reversed with many more citizens of ACP countries seeking entry into European countries as job-seekers and “economic refugees” from conflict areas. It is estimated that almost 140 million people of African descent live outside the continent. Many of these are not immigrants, but members of families who have lived in destination countries for many generations. New immigrants from Africa to the Western hemisphere are estimated at 30 million, and many still have close contact with their countries of origin. These individuals play an important role in sending home remittances, the flow of which was estimated at $351 billion by the World Bank in 2011. Top recipients relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were Tajikistan, Lesotho, Nepal, Samoa, and Tonga.

During the decade of 2000–2010, European migration and asylum policies became harsher and often shaped the behaviour of non-member states. Relations between the ACP and Europe are, however, complex, as countries can be sending, receiving, or acting as transit countries for migrants. Sometimes, there is a combination of all three phenomena at play. The actions of the EU in the field of migration have focused excessively on security concerns, much to the annoyance of ACP governments seeking to extend the relationship to encompass critical issues of aid, trade, development, and human rights. While EU
governments have often complained about the “threat” posed by migration, ACP governments have often advocated more focus on the root causes of migration.23

For ACP states, access to European labour markets is not only critical to the nationals who seek entry, but also to family members at home and even to the national budgets of ACP states. It is estimated that remittances play an increasingly significant role in the GDP of member states, and hence to their development. According to the World Bank, remittances sent home by migrants to developing countries are three times the size of official development assistance (ODA). Despite the global economic crisis of 2007/2008, it is estimated that such remittances will exceed $593 billion by 2014, of which $441 billion will flow to developing countries.24

The Africa-EU Migration, Mobility, and Employment partnership was launched in 2007 to improve prospects for employment in Africa and the management of migration flows between Africa and the European Union. The first action plan under the joint strategy, covering 2008-2010, was endorsed at the EU-Africa Summit in Libya in November 2010. This partnership has seen the establishment of the African Remittances Institute, the Human Trafficking Initiative, and the Diaspora Outreach Initiative: all aimed at understanding the various facets of migration better and developing sound policy responses to this phenomenon. Such initiatives can perhaps be incorporated into broader ACP/EU migration relations.

8. The Impact of Geo-political Shifts on the ACP-EU Relationship

The recent rise of China, Brazil, and India as global economic and political powers has had two distinct impacts on the ACP-EU relationship. In the first instance, these emerging powers’ appetite for raw materials has resulted in increased investment and trade between the ACP, China, Brazil, and India. Secondly, seen within the context of a politically waning ACP-EU relationship and increased diversification of trade from former colonial powers, the debate within ACP countries has increasingly focused on how to strengthen South-South Cooperation through bodies such as the BRICS.

Recognising these shifts, and its own potential need for continued access to the raw materials of ACP states, the EU presented a Communication to the European Parliament and the Council in November 2008, entitled “The Raw Materials Initiative (RMI) – Meeting Our Critical Needs for Growth and Jobs in Europe.”25 This initiative aimed to provide a policy response to Europe’s growing concerns regarding access to raw materials, given the increasing global demand from new emerging powers and the likely supply shortages that this could entail. The document was not well received within the ACP grouping, which felt that it perpetuated sentiments of the ACP’s usefulness to Europe mainly as a source of coveted raw materials. It was widely felt among the ACP Group that the document was again – just as with the EPA - pushing the idea of trade agreements to open up access to markets of developing countries on unequal terms of competition. At the same time, interest from China and other emerging economies have been better received by many ACP governments and sometimes viewed within the context of South-South Cooperation as carrying less historical baggage.

Given these criticisms, the EU released a new Communication in 2011, entitled, “Tackling the Challenges

23 This section draws on Andrew Geddes, “Migration and ‘Fortress Europe’”, in Adebajo and Whiteman (eds.), The EU and Africa, pp.405-418.
in Commodity Markets and on Raw Materials”. This document has a far larger scope, addressing issues of financial markets, development, trade, industry, and external relations. Brussels is also increasingly seeking to strengthen trilateral cooperation among the ACP, China, and the EU.

The ACP urgently needs to formulate an effective strategy between its old and new trading partners on access to, and the development of, its own raw materials. The Cape Town seminar in October 2012 will explore this area of global interaction within the context of current and future ACP-EU relations.

Dissemination

The dissemination of CCR’s publications has always sought to contribute to bridging the gap between the global South and the industrialised North in the area of knowledge production, and often allowed for more African voices and perspectives to be placed on the global agenda. CCR’s policy brief and seminar report from the Cape Town seminar will be sent to 1,200 recipients including the ACP Secretariat and member states; EU institutions and governments; foreign embassies in South Africa; African missions at the AU; UN missions; university libraries and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in ACP and EU countries; as well as the South African government and parliamentarians. About 200 copies of the edited volume will also be sent to a smaller group, prioritizing key practitioners and scholars in ACP and EU states. As part of its post-seminar monitoring and evaluation efforts, CCR will systematically employ follow-up communication and meetings with key ACP and EU officials to ascertain how best the policy recommendations that emanate from its research can best enhance their work. A book launch and other strategic meetings will also be held in Brussels with ACP and EU officials.

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26 See the European Union report on the preparation for a second Raw Materials Initiative. The Commission invited stakeholders to comment on a range of questions on raw materials policy issues. The results of this open consultation provided important input into the Communication on Commodities Markets and Raw Materials, which was published in February 2011 (Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/public-consultation/contributions/index_en.htm).