CONCEPT PAPER
for a policy advisory group seminar on

The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan

Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa
11–12 December 2015

Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa

November 2015
1. Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, will host a two-day policy advisory group seminar at Burgers Park Hotel in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa, from Friday, 11 December to Saturday, 12 December 2015, on “The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan”.

The Centre has, for more than 45 years, worked on a pan-continental basis to promote a just and sustainable peace in Africa, with an emphasis on strengthening the capacity of African institutions and civil society actors to resolve conflicts and to build peace in their own communities. This project builds on CCR’s policy development and research on issues pertaining to South Sudan since 2006, as well as its sustained capacity-building work in the country since 2012. In April 2006, CCR organised a policy advisory group seminar on “South Sudan within a New Sudan” which devised concrete recommendations on how the emerging country could use the opportunity of the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to establish strong governance institutions. The Centre held a further policy meeting in August 2010 that focused on the domestic, sub-regional, and external challenges facing Sudan, as South Sudan prepared for its landmark referendum in January 2011. Based on this experience, since 2012, CCR has been working on a sustained basis in South Sudan to build the capacity of diverse local actors in the areas of human rights, security sector reform, conflict resolution, and HIV/AIDS. Six capacity-building workshops have been held in Juba, South Sudan, with the most recent workshop – held in March/April 2015 – focusing on building the conflict management capacities of local human rights and peacebuilding non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in South Sudan.

The December 2015 Tshwane seminar will take place at a particularly politicised, uncertain, and critical juncture in South Sudan’s nearly five-year history as an independent state. The high expectations accompanying South Sudanese independence in July 2011 have been devastated by the ongoing civil conflict that began in December 2013, precipitated by a leadership crisis, but with roots in deeper political tensions, within the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Failure to resolve the political differences between the SPLM’s top leaders – in particular, South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir Mayardit, and his former vice-president, Riak Machar – rapidly translated into a violent, inter-ethnic conflict, drawing key regional actors into the situation. These have included the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations Security Council.
the African Union (AU), as well as individual countries such as Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa. Notably, in December 2013 Uganda deployed troops in South Sudan to support Salva Kiir, while peace negotiations have been held since the start of the crisis under the auspices of IGAD.\(^6\)

The current conflict has displaced more than 2.2 million South Sudanese and killed tens of thousands of people,\(^7\) stretching the ability of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and international agencies to respond adequately and effectively to the humanitarian crisis. The IGAD-led peace talks, meanwhile, have been fraught with difficulties. The eventual signing of a peace accord in August 2015 between Salva Kiir’s government and the main rebel opposition – Riak Machar’s South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) – has been met with cautious optimism. However, the realistic prospects for a genuine and sustainable peace remain in the balance, rendering a more inclusive peacebuilding process a major policy imperative.

2. Seminar Objectives

CCR’s December 2015 Tshwane seminar will take place two years after the outbreak of violence in Juba in December 2013, with the recent and still fragile August 2015 peace accord providing the backdrop to the meeting. Building on the Centre’s well-established academic and policy networks, and ground engagement in South Sudan, the meeting will bring together about 30 key – mainly South Sudanese – civil society activists and scholars, as well as senior officials from South Africa and major external partners organisations such as IGAD, the AU, and the United Nations (UN), to reflect critically on the record of, and prospects for, civil society in peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan. The seminar will also aim to develop concrete, actionable recommendations for strengthening the capacity of local civil society organisations to play a more effective role in ongoing and future peacebuilding processes in South Sudan.

The policy advisory group will seek to achieve six key objectives:

1. To understand the challenges facing South Sudanese civil society in the context of the current conflict, and the uncertain political prospects for the August 2015 peace accord;
2. To identify lessons from past experiences of civil society involvement in South Sudanese peace processes that can assist local NGOs in the country to contribute more effectively to peacebuilding efforts;
3. To reflect critically on the role of, and prospects for, civil society in the dissemination and implementation of the August 2015 peace accord, as well as in the resolution of local conflicts in South Sudan;
4. To assist South Sudanese civil society in developing peacebuilding strategies that can accommodate the disparate needs of local communities across South Sudan;

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5. To explore ways of strengthening civil society engagement with issues of accountability, reconciliation, justice, gender equality, and women’s empowerment as important aspects of peacebuilding in South Sudan; and
6. To identify concrete ways in which key external actors – such as South Africa, IGAD, the AU, and the UN – can support South Sudanese civil society’s peacebuilding roles more effectively.

3. The Role of Civil Society in South Sudan: Challenges and Opportunities

The issues facing civil society and peacebuilding in present-day South Sudan derive from a history of international engagement in conflict resolution and peace processes in Sudan. The period from 1989 to 2005 is particularly significant for understanding the history behind, and context of, the challenges facing civil society in South Sudan, although independence in 2011 and the current conflict have in many ways changed circumstances significantly. During this period, international humanitarian engagement in Southern Sudan was mostly organised under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)-Southern Sector. A more prominent role for “civil society” came into being as a result of the South Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement’s (SPLA/M) efforts to be seen to undertake reform. In March 1993, SPLA Commander-in-Chief John Garang permitted the creation of the first so-called indigenous NGO, the Cush Relief and Rehabilitation Society. However, civil society was generally seen as “weak”.

Moreover, OLS took civil society to be the realm of formal and informal organisations outside state control. In Southern Sudan, this meant outside SPLA control. Barring the church, however, there was no network of autonomous NGOs in the region. International understanding of civil society further tended to ignore existing institutions, in particular local chiefs and forms of traditional authority. “Civil society” was consequently approached as a lacuna to be filled through the creation and strengthening of Southern Sudanese NGOs. The NGO Forum was created in 1996 to coordinate non-governmental organisations working in Southern Sudan, and has since played a pivotal role in the development of the NGO sector in South Sudan. By 2015, the South Sudan NGO Forum comprised about 160 national and 142 international non-governmental organisations working in the country. This underscores the importance of external NGO engagement in South Sudan, as well as the means and extent to which external aid can build civil society.

Today, civil society in South Sudan operates in a political context dominated by militarised governance. Following independence in July 2011, the SPLA/M’s “process of transforming the

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8 The Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) consortium, made up of assorted agencies coordinated by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), was not the only such engagement. Some non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Norwegian People’s Aid, preferred to be independent. See, for example, David Keen, *The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983–1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
Governance in South Sudan has been underpinned by the army and national security system, with militarism rendered more severe by the current conflict and the further proliferation of small arms since December 2013. Some observers have noted a climate of fear which, in a highly politicised environment, circumscribes the scope of independent civil society, contributing to a lack of dialogue between state and non-state actors. The governing authorities have further sought to regulate tightly the work of civil society organisations including through legislation. Pre-existing tensions between the media and government too have worsened in the context of the current conflict. Amid shifting patterns of fighting, it is also important to consider relations between the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition and civil society organisations. This includes international NGOs, given the efforts of the SPLM-IO’s relief wing – the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA) – to seek to manage, and garner legitimacy, from UN and other international agencies.

The challenges facing South Sudanese civil society are considerable, given the complexities and impact of the country’s conflicts at multiple levels across South Sudan. This includes the mammoth scale of human displacement and the 4.6 million people deemed by the UN to be “severely food-insecure” as of October 2015. South Sudan’s internal conflicts have also affected its relations with Sudan, and drawn the involvement of myriad external actors including the UN, the Troika (the United States [US], Britain, and Norway), and China, as well as all manner of international humanitarian agencies. Below the level of elite politics, the impact of the current conflict on South Sudanese society has been devastating and further damaged social ties between and within diverse communities, including but not confined to the Nuer and the Dinka.

Furthermore, the civil war has significantly altered not only the context in which civil society organisations work at the grassroots level in South Sudan, but also damaged relations within and between these organisations by sharpening divisions based on a combination of political and ethnic affiliations. Several South Sudanese activists have noted internal mistrust as an obstacle that local civil society must overcome in order to play a more effective peacemaking and peacebuilding role in South Sudan. A key aim of the December 2015 Tshwane seminar will be to facilitate interaction among key civil society actors working in the country, with a view to improving relations, and enhancing the cohesion and sense of common purpose within South Sudanese civil society.

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13 In May 2015, South Sudan’s National Legislative Assembly passed the 2015 Non-Governmental Organisations Bill. This created a regulatory framework for the operations of national and international NGOs. President Salva Kiir returned the bill for parliamentary scrutiny following concerns raised by civil society and members of the diplomatic community over the regulatory provisions of the bill. This framework was rejected by the opposition as unconstitutional.
15 UN OCHA, “Humanitarian Bulletin: South Sudan: Bi-Weekly Update”.

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4. Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Local and National Processes

Local conflict resolution is a key area in which South Sudanese civil society has the potential to make a tangible difference, as demonstrated by the people-to-people peace process that helped produce the 1999 Wunlit Peace Agreement between the Nuer and Dinka in the West Bank of the Nile. The need for local conflict management and reconciliation efforts has, meanwhile, been magnified and complicated by the destructive impact of the current conflict on social relations at the community level. The role of traditional authority, in particular, requires serious consideration.\(^\text{16}\)

The 2011 Transitional Constitution provides for the inclusion of traditional authority as a key institution of local government. Yet, new challenges to established traditional authority have emerged in many parts of South Sudan, not only as a result of generational change and the violent fracturing of social relations wrought by the current conflict, but also due to a broader set of crises related to legitimate authority, control, and conflict resolution mechanisms. The prospects for engaging traditional authority in peace processes are thus related to the emergence of new forms of authority deriving legitimacy from the “rule of the gun” and to the changing role of chiefs in responding to conflicts. The striking diversity of responses to violence by chiefs and religious authorities in Unity, Upper Nile, and Western Equatoria states, for example, suggests the need for an array of inter-connected solutions. It also highlights the imperative of securing a better understanding of micro-dynamics, including the impact of conflicts across many different parts of South Sudan and its adjacent regions. Grassroots peacebuilding and civil society initiatives have a key potential role to play in taking peace processes beyond the domain of elites. However, this requires a deeper understanding of the myriad ways in which the role of local chiefs and traditional leaders has been affected by the ongoing conflict.\(^\text{17}\)

Furthermore, the economic context is an important influence on national and local peacebuilding processes in South Sudan. Oil is crucial for any consideration of current and future conflicts, as well as possibilities for peace and the efficacy of peacebuilding strategies in South Sudan. Prior to 2013, the country’s political economy had been concentrating wealth in Juba and the various state capitals, while leaving the hinterlands of Jonglei and Upper Nile states out of economic development. This is not to say that economic issues were the sole, or primary, cause of previous conflicts such as the Yau Yau rebellions in Jonglei between 2010 and 2012. Rather, the broader point is that oil wealth distribution, alongside other issues such as ethnic conflicts, cattle raids, and border and land disputes, had contributed to insecurities even before the start of the current civil war in December 2013.\(^\text{18}\)

Oil is central to current arguments by anti-government opposition groups that Juba has become the “new Khartoum”, and that the new South Sudan is characterised by corruption, oil-based patronage, and the squandering of public resources.\(^\text{19}\) As international agencies struggle to deal with “economic stress” – food insecurity, austerity economics, livelihoods, and local economies – civil society engagement with governance and economic


issues in South Sudan is vital for improving transparency and accountability, and for effectively tackling the nexus between conflict and corruption.

A key challenge relates to how civil society can best be supported in developing an independent critical function that provides checks and balances to the work of the government. The European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS), for example, was involved in efforts to build the capacity of affected local groups in the oil-producing areas of South Sudan to tackle oil exploitation and promote greater accountability. While the space for local civil society activism on the issue has been significantly curtailed since December 2013, and the oil fields either shut down completely (such as in Unity) or operate at much reduced production capacity (for example, in Upper Nile), the need for such work has been enhanced by the ongoing conflict. However, whether – and if so, how – civil society can engage in this area is open to debate. Prior to December 2013, civil society groups had been undertaking work on the social and environmental impacts of oil in South Sudan. Local communities in the oil-producing regions of Upper Nile and Unity were active stakeholders in terms of asserting themselves more forcefully through the new 2012 Petroleum Act on questions such as compensation for oil-induced displacement, losses, and environmental impact. The escalation of violence centred on the oil fields from December 2013 onwards set these efforts back considerably.

5. The Role of Civil Society in Implementing the 2015 Peace Accord

As South Sudanese sought to respond to the rapid, exceedingly violent escalation of conflict after December 2013, the critique of elite-based peacemaking was well-established, notably in relation to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Partly as a result of this criticism of previous experience, there was concerted pressure by the Troika (the US, Britain, and Norway) and the European Union (EU) for the IGAD-led peace talks aimed at resolving South Sudan’s current conflict to broaden participation beyond the narrow group of belligerents comprised of protagonists before and after the 2005 CPA. This led to the so-called “stakeholder phase” involving some civil society participation in the peace talks between May and September 2014. During this period, it became evident that South Sudanese civil society held a multiplicity of views about the conflict and options for ending it. This rendered the challenge for the mediation process even greater. Once this attempt at a more inclusive approach broke down, the negotiations returned to being a narrow elite-driven process. This experience underlines the importance of learning from previous Southern and South Sudanese peace processes in considering the options for, and prospects of, South Sudanese civil society’s engagement in peacebuilding.

Given that the process leading to South Sudan’s August 2015 peace accord was disconnected from ordinary South Sudanese, the role of civil society will be all the more vital in moving the

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20 For a more recent working paper, see David Deng, “Oil and Sustainable Peace in South Sudan”, South Sudan Law Society, Juba, February 2015.
peace process forward – particularly in terms of the dissemination and implementation of the agreement. The peace accord features certain provisions for limited civil society inclusion in its implementation. This includes minor representation in some of the entities the agreement is supposed to establish, such as the Boards of the Special Reconstruction Fund, and of the Economic and Financial Management Authority. The agreement also provides for consultation with “other stakeholders and the civil society” concerning the establishment of a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing.  

Even if the views of civil society are not ultimately decisive in shaping political reforms, it could have an important role to play in advancing the political reforms that the agreement codifies.

Should the 2015 August peace accord endure, the return and reintegration of South Sudanese refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are key areas in which civil society could contribute. The existence of a massive and dispersed population of uprooted South Sudanese presents a major challenge for any future peacebuilding strategy. According to the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), there were about 1.65 million IDPs and over 630,000 South Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries, as of October 2015. The nature of civil society in UNMISS civilian camps in South Sudan and the ways in which the South Sudanese IDP and refugee populations have self-mobilised, as well as South Sudanese and international responses to their needs, are vital to consider in debates on the reintegration of these populations as part of future peacebuilding initiatives in South Sudan.

6. Gender, Peace, and Security

Even before the outbreak of conflict in December 2013, women in South Sudan suffered more than men from inadequate access to services including education, justice, and maternal and child healthcare. As of January 2012, for example, only 37 percent of girls between the ages of six and 13 were attending school. South Sudan’s 2011 Transitional Constitution accords women full and equal dignity, the right to equal pay for equal work, and the right to equal public participation. It also provides for “affirmative action” through a quota of at least 25 percent in the country’s legislative and executive organs. At the same time, the Constitution includes “customs and traditions of the people” as a source of legislation. Furthermore, customary laws and courts are the primary means by which the vast majority of South Sudanese access justice. However, in a deeply patriarchal society, these have the “potential to reinforce practices that perpetuate gender inequality”. Translating constitutional principles on gender equality into practice remains a formidable challenge that has been exacerbated by the country’s ongoing civil conflict.

24 See Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, 17 August 2015.
26 Friederike Bubenzer and Orly Stern (eds.), Hope, Pain and Patience: The lives of Women in South Sudan (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2011).
29 Friederike Bubenzer and Elizabeth Lacey, Opportunities for Gender Justice and Reconciliation in South Sudan, policy brief no. 12, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), Cape Town, July 2013, p. 6.
Upon attaining independence in 2011, South Sudan further agreed to the African Union’s 2006 Post-Conflict, Reconstruction, and Development strategy, which calls for gender mainstreaming to inform nation- and state-building; and ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in September 2014. In addition, the South Sudanese government and the UN signed a joint communiqué to address conflict-related sexual violence in October 2014. Accurate data on sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence is difficult to find, but such violence is widespread in South Sudan. Its scale and severity have further increased since the outbreak of civil conflict in December 2013, with the UN describing women and children “being deliberately targeted, with countless incidents of sexual violence, including gang rapes, abductions, killings, arson and displacement”. This only underlines the nature and scale of the challenges of dealing with issues related to gender equality, and women in peace and security in South Sudan. The potential roles of civil society organisations in ensuring the inclusion of gender justice in community, state, and national reconciliation; promoting women’s empowerment through greater engagement, dialogue, and advocacy; and ensuring a gendered approach to peacebuilding, all need to be actively explored.

7. Accountability, Reconciliation, and Justice

The thorny issue of whether accountability, reconciliation, and justice can and will be properly addressed in South Sudan is prominent in the efforts of South Sudanese civil society groups to address the causes, nature, and aftermath of violence. These take into account past conflict, and are currently framed around the applicable provisions of the August 2015 peace accord. Many argue that the avoidance of pursuing accountability in past reconciliation processes has been an obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding in South Sudan. After December 2013, South Sudanese civil society groups called for the creation of a commission of inquiry into atrocities committed during the eruption of violence. The work of the proposed Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing may further be crucial in this regard. Any process of accounting for past crimes needs to be South Sudanese led, as seen in the current debate on how the country’s civil society can support a Hybrid Court for South Sudan as per the August 2015 peace accord; and how it can be involved in and contribute toward transitional justice, while drawing lessons from other African cases such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and South Africa; and utilising appropriate international expertise. In current political conditions, what scope is there for civil society activism on such sensitive issues of justice, including criminal accountability?

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31 UN Security Council “Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (Covering the Period from 14 April to 19 August 2015)”, S/2015/655, 21 August 2015, p. 15.


34 “Civil Society Statement on the Establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into Atrocities Committed During the Conflict in South Sudan”, signed by 16 South Sudanese NGOs, 25 January 2014.

About 80 percent of South Sudanese use customary, as opposed to formal, justice mechanisms.\(^{36}\) Within the context of customary justice and legal pluralism, the role of the church, in particular, in reconciliation and peacebuilding is of vital importance. In many rural areas, pastors and church leaders are the only local civil society with a permanent presence and established networks.\(^{37}\) The church further has a track record of important work on questions of peace and reconciliation. For example, it played a leadership role in the process of inter-communal dialogue for reconciliation in the wake of violence between the Lou Nuer and Murle communities in Jonglei in 2011.\(^{38}\) The South Sudan Council of Churches has also been involved in various initiatives to address the most recent conflict, and launched a peace plan in April 2015 that seeks to build reconciliation and to be independent of political peacemaking while connecting local grassroots communities with national political leaders. Many South Sudanese civil society organisations clearly expect the church to assume a leadership position in peacebuilding.

8. The Role of External Actors in Peacebuilding

The Djibouti-based Intergovernmental Authority on Development has taken a lead role in external efforts to end the current conflict in South Sudan, appointing three special envoys in December 2013 to lead the mediation process: Ethiopia’s Seyoum Mesfin, Kenya’s Lazaro Sumbeiywo, and Sudan’s Mohammed Ahmed Moustafa El Dabi. The IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) was subsequently established to monitor compliance with the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, signed by the two main warring South Sudanese parties in January 2014, and to inform the work of the IGAD special envoys. This IGAD-led peace process has been supported in various ways by the “IGAD-plus” comprised of IGAD members;\(^{39}\) the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa); the Troika; China; the EU; the UN; and the IGAD Partners Forum. Parallel peace initiatives include the intra-party dialogue process under the framework of the January 2015 Agreement on the Reunification of the SPLM, with Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) as co-guarantors of the process.

On the ground, the 12,783-strong United Nations Mission in South Sudan is the main organised framework for external engagement in South Sudan. Established in 2011, the UN operation has since changed in scope and size, and currently has a mandate that includes protecting civilians; monitoring and investigating human rights abuses; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and supporting the IGAD peace process. Furthermore, in October 2015, when extending the mandate of the mission, the UN Security Council urged “an open and fully inclusive national dialogue … including through the full and effective participation of youth, women, diverse communities, faith groups, civil society, and the formerly detained political

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\(^{37}\) Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Andreas Øien Stensland, “The UN Mission and Local Churches in South Sudan: Opportunities for Partnerships in Local Peacebuilding”, *Conflict Trends* no. 3 (2011), p. 34

\(^{38}\) In April 2014, the Committee for National Healing, Peace, and Reconciliation in South Sudan joined the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission, and the National Assembly’s Specialised Committee on Peace and Reconciliation, in forming a joint National Reconciliation Platform to engage South Sudanese and the IGAD-led political process.

\(^{39}\) These are: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda.
leaders”, while encouraging “IGAD, the African Union, and the United Nations to support implementation of the [August 2015] Agreement”. The UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for South Sudan, meanwhile, provides the basis for the work of various UN development agencies implementing programmes in South Sudan, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), among others.

Working relations between South Sudanese and international NGOs are another important consideration when considering how to enhance the peacebuilding role of external actors. In 2011, a major evaluation of donor support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Southern Sudan between 2005 and 2010 recommended that norms be developed and applied “to ensure that INGO [international NGO] activity provides better support both to government and Sudanese NGOs” in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. While recognising the need for “inclusive state building”; during this period, international NGOs such as Saferworld, Save the Children, and World Vision had “[tended] to relegate Sudanese NGOs to minor roles”. The lessons of INGO-NGO relations in South Sudan from different phases of the past thus need to be identified and incorporated into current and future peacebuilding efforts. On the whole, international support for South Sudanese civil society needs to be reformed with a view to addressing the challenges of peacebuilding more effectively and to assisting the development of civil society in South Sudan. While there are notable areas of South Sudanese civil society expertise (for example, in-depth knowledge of diverse local conditions) that can be harnessed to the operational benefit of international agencies, the question of how the latter can better support different kinds of South Sudanese civil society groups in the current political and conflict-affected context remains unanswered. South Sudanese civil society must have real “ownership” of their own local peacebuilding processes.

Much remains contingent on the uncertain prospects of the August 2015 peace accord. The dominant international response to the situation in South Sudan has remained in emergency humanitarian mode. While there is concern that “development” in states not directly affected by conflict has been neglected, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan for 2015 – focused on humanitarian concerns – includes little by way of peacebuilding. Implementation of the August 2015 accord will involve an important support role for international actors. However, in the face of ongoing political challenges at the leadership level, as well as renewed fighting, the prospects for South Sudan going beyond a formal peace remain uncertain.

9. Dissemination

After the December 2015 Tshwane seminar, a six-page policy brief and a 30-page seminar report, documenting the meeting’s discussions, will be produced by CCR. These will be widely disseminated within and outside Africa through the Centre’s established distribution databases,

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including African governments, sub-regional bodies on the continent such as IGAD, diplomatic missions at the AU in Addis Ababa, the AU Commission, UN missions in New York, key foreign embassies in Africa, African university libraries, and African and relevant past participants at the Centre’s policy seminars. The publications will further be disseminated, through a targeted approach, to NGOs, UN agencies, and diplomatic missions in South Sudan, as well as key external actors engaged in stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts in the country, in particular, South Africa, the Troika (the US, Britain, and Norway), the EU, and China. The documents will also be made available on CCR’s website.