CONCEPT PAPER

for a policy research seminar on

Africa and External Actors

Cape Town, South Africa
24–25 August 2016

Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa

August 2016
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, will hold a two-day policy research seminar at the Townhouse Hotel in Cape Town from 24–25 August 2016 on “Africa and External Actors”. This meeting builds on previous policy development and research involving seven seminars and seven books published between 2006 and 2016.1 Key issues pertaining to Africa’s relations with global actors will be discussed under the following three broad themes:

1. Bilateral Relations with Traditional Powers: the United States (US), Russia, China, France, Britain, and Portugal;
2. Bilateral Relations with Non-Traditional Powers: Brazil, India, Japan, the Nordics, and the Arab World; and,
3. Multilateral Relations: the United Nations (UN); the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) bloc, the European Union (EU); the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Momentary Fund (IMF).

This meeting will thus examine Africa’s relations with 11 key bilateral actors and six major multilateral actors, assessing the progress in the continent’s efforts to increase its leverage in global politics through engagement with external actors.

The Cold War affected the African state system by prolonging destabilising liberation wars and by creating military instability in countries like Somalia, Ethiopia, Liberia, Angola, and Mozambique. As the Cold War ended by 1990, the two superpower blocs - led by the United States and the Soviet Union - along with France, abandoned autocrats like Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko, Somalia’s Siad Barre, and Liberia’s Samuel Doe who had served as reliable Cold War clients. After the Cold War, African actors sought to achieve greater autonomy within the international system through alliances with external actors in order to be able to promote security and development more effectively and to achieve a stronger African voice within international institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO.2 These efforts have proved largely unsuccessful.

Africa’s quest for security was also evident in post-Cold War efforts to improve the effectiveness of the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). But these institutions have often proved to be weak, and in the security field, the UN has often had to play a leading role. A lack of capacity and unity has also frustrated Africa’s quest for autonomy within the international system. The Afro-Asian coalition that was born at the Bandung conference of 1955 has also been largely frustrated in its efforts to shape global institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO in ways that could increase the autonomy of the Third World against powerful Western actors. The

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2 This paragraph and the next are drawn from Adebajo, The Curse of Berlin.
contemporary role of China on the continent – its largest bilateral trading partner – could, however, potentially reduce Africa’s dependence on Western powers like the US, France, Britain, and Portugal, while increasing the continent’s diplomatic and economic leverage. But, it is far from certain that African governments will be able to craft a common approach to engaging China and developing new ties with other emerging powers like Brazil and India.

Moving to the post–Cold War era, it is perhaps unfair to expect a single African voice to emerge from African governments and the African Union (AU) given the multiplicity of African views expressed by its 54 member states, and given the context of Europe, which, despite the EU’s successful integration efforts, continues to lack a single voice in many areas. For example, although the EU has made advances in the promotion of a single trade diplomacy for Europe, its 28 member states generally continue to speak for themselves in bilateral and multilateral political fora, and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Italy’s Federica Mogherini, and the President of the European Council, Poland’s Donald Tusk, can only speak on foreign policy matters that have been agreed by all the body’s members. Africa also lacks adequate representation on, and influence over, the strategic direction and actions of the UN Security Council, the Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the IMF – and the World Trade Organisation, all of which continue to be dominated by powerful, largely Western countries. In the context of an increasingly globalised world, the exclusion of a significant African voice at such fora must be reversed as a matter of urgency through increased leverage and professionalism representing Africa’s interests.

Africa could consider appointing a foreign policy tsar and ask the chair of the AU Assembly to be appointed on a bi-annual basis to ensure policy continuity. Acceptance of the principle of subsidiarity, under which Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) are mandated to act as the AU’s implementing organs, could improve the coherence of African responses to crises. Despite its strong call for an immediate end to the violence in Libya, in February 2011, the continental body was effectively sidelined in multilateral decision-making during the crisis. Africa’s lack of international voice is partly due to the continent’s financial dependence on external actors, with over 90 percent of the AU’s funding in the security area provided by external donors. African diplomats in multilateral fora in Addis Ababa, New York, Geneva, and Vienna must coordinate their positions more effectively. The African Group of Ambassadors in key capitals already seeks to harmonise disparate views before these are presented to the rest of the world, and, with the help of improved coordination with national capitals, these diplomats could more effectively voice African positions on areas of common interest. African governments should perhaps in the short term not be diverted from their responsibility to promote the continent’s interests by squabbles about permanent seats on the 15-member UN Security Council that are currently not on offer. Consideration should be given to creating a mechanism to formalise how the AU selects African non-permanent representatives to the UN Security Council. For example, one of Africa’s three non-permanent seats could be rotated between the continent’s major powers (Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, and Ethiopia); another between its middle powers; and the third between smaller African states.

Strong leadership is forged by effective responses to important contemporary issues. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development’s (NEPAD) drive to promote Africa’s socio-economic development and to eradicate poverty, and the continent’s continued marginalisation, represent major causes around which continental leaders can forge strategic bilateral and multilateral relations and frame global debates. However, the preponderance of the voices of the more powerful African states at different multilateral fora on these and related issues can sometimes fragment African voices rather than provide continental leadership. The invitation of African leaders to summits of the Group of Eight (G8) industrialised countries has often represented, for many Africans, a form of participation without voice. The Group of Twenty (G20) countries, according to critics, also does not substantively reflect African priorities, even though South Africa is part of this body. African states could therefore develop clear, coordinated positions on their goals and the strategies for achieving them. This should be done – for example in relation to China at the Forum on China–Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC); in relation to Japan at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), and in respect of other rapidly emerging economies in the global South such as Brazil and India. In particular, African governments could adopt a clear, common position on engaging the BRICS economic bloc to promote economic development and to strengthen the South’s geo-strategic role in world politics.3

Main Seminar Objectives

The Cape Town seminar in August 2016 seeks to bring together about 30 key scholars, policymakers, and civil society activists to assess bilateral and multilateral relations between Africa’s traditional and non-traditional actors in the post–Cold War era. Bilateral relations will be examined with the US, Russia, China, France, Britain, Portugal, Brazil, India, Japan, the Nordics, and the Arab World, while multilateral relations will be assessed with the UN, the BRICS, the EU, the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF. The following five key questions will be addressed in the seminar:

1. How have relations between external actors and Africa changed since the Cold War era?
2. What are the key political dynamics of these relationships in the post–Cold War era?
3. What are the key economic dynamics in the post–Cold War era?
4. What are the social and cultural dynamics in the post–Cold War era? and,
5. Have these relations been mutually beneficial, exploitative, a mixture, or is there another characterisation that is more appropriate?

Seminar Themes

_Africa’s Bilateral Relations with Traditional Powers_

1. **Africa and the United States**

During the Cold War, United States policy towards Africa often ignored basic democratic principles and socio-economic development, and focused instead on resisting the spread of communism in Africa by supporting autocratic client regimes in countries like Zaire and Liberia. The Bill Clinton administration’s (1993-2000) policy towards Africa was termed “enlargement” – increasing democratic governments – but this was often contradicted in support for autocratic regimes in Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia. Under George W. Bush (2001-2008), US policy towards Africa was seen as arrogant, unilateral, and focused on America’s “war on terror”. The US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was widely regarded as illegal since it was not authorised by the United Nations Security Council. President Barack Obama’s 2008 election as the first black president of the US generated great expectations in Africa of a positive change in Washington’s policy towards the continent. As he visited South Africa, Senegal, and Tanzania in June/July 2013 (having briefly visited Egypt and Ghana in June and July 2009), the unrealistic expectations that the first black US president would radically transform US–Africa policy had, however, not even come close to being fulfilled. Despite Obama’s Kenyan ancestry, as president, he has had other pressing policy priorities (the economy, health-care, Afghanistan, the Middle East, China, Iran, Cuba, and North Korea) which have taken precedence over the continent. Still, the Obama administration provided important support to HIV/AIDS and Ebola challenges in Africa totalling $750 million in 2014,4 and contributed to peacemaking and UN and AU peacekeeping efforts between 2009 and 2014 in Sudan

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3 This paragraph and the previous is based on CCR, “The African Union at Ten: Problems, Progress, and Prospects” Berlin, Germany, 30-31 August 2016 international colloquium report (available at www.ccr.org.za).
($3.8 billion), South Sudan ($635 million), Mali ($288 million), and Somalia ($976 million). In 2015, Africa’s total trade with the US was $37 billion. Real questions must, however, be posed about the Obama administration’s commitment to democratic governance in countries like Egypt and Rwanda, and whether the “war on terror” did not continue to dominate US policy towards Africa.

2. Africa and Russia

During the Cold War, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) provided support to national liberation struggles in African countries such as South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia was economically weak and initially disengaged from Africa. Moscow focused on efforts to transform its internal political and economic system. Vladimir Putin was elected president in 2000, and has overseen a more assertive and autonomous foreign policy that has sought to reassert Russia’s global role. Recognition of the potential geo-political and economic importance of Africa in furthering Russia’s national interests led to Moscow pursuing closer relations with Africa after 2000. This includes participation, together with South Africa, in the BRICS bloc. Sub-Saharan Africa is, however, mentioned in only one paragraph (out of 104) in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013, outlining Moscow’s diplomatic priorities and objectives. Russia’s economic interests have mainly focused on business interests in South Africa, as reflected in a $50 billion nuclear deal between the two countries in 2014 which will increase Tshwane’s (Pretoria’s) nuclear power-generating capacity. Russian business interests in South Africa are concentrated in the mining, oil, gas, and petro-chemical sectors. Bilateral trade between Russia and Africa has been lopsided: in 2015, its total exports to Africa were worth $7.3 billion while Africa’s total exports to Russia were worth $2.3 billion.

3. Africa and China

China is an increasingly influential actor in world politics, with geo-political interests that have expanded into Africa since the 1960s. African countries will continue to be important to Beijing, as China’s economic growth is likely to increase its demand for Africa’s strategic resources. Beijing is also adopting a more assertive foreign policy befitting its rapid socio-economic development and rising power status as the world’s second largest economy after the United States. China’s economic engagement with Africa is shaped by its appetite for the continent’s vast resources, and disproportionately focuses on extractive industries compared to secondary and tertiary sectors. Beijing has been criticised for destroying textile industries and for using over 70,000 Chinese workers on its projects rather than employing African labour. Furthermore, China’s partnership with Africa has been affected by issues such as environmental degradation caused by its companies and the fact that African governments lack the capacity to negotiate with Beijing from a position of strength.

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China’s predisposition for bilateral cooperation in Africa could negatively impact the continent’s long-term development efforts. Beijing established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000 as a platform for collective consultation and dialogue. China is Africa’s largest trade partner with $300 billion in 2015 and invested in, and bought, its raw materials and minerals.\textsuperscript{11} It has sought to enhance its global status while contributing to Africa’s infrastructural development. However, one of the major challenges facing this partnership is that Africa does not seem to have a long-term strategy for engaging with China. At the sixth FOCAC summit held in Johannesburg, in December 2015, the Chinese government pledged $60 billion to assist the development of African countries in 10 priority areas including infrastructure development; upgrading of health-care facilities; supporting drought-stricken countries; and providing scholarships for African students. The summit further adopted the Johannesburg Action Plan, which is expected to be implemented between 2016 and 2018, and seeks to deepen political, economic, social, security, and diplomatic relations between Beijing and Africa. China’s evolving partnership with Africa should also be seen in the wider context of the BRICS grouping. In February 2016, the Africa Mining Indaba expressed concerns regarding the negative impact on the African mining industry of declining Chinese investments.\textsuperscript{12} It is thus critically important that African governments develop a common long-term strategic plan to engage with China.

4. Africa and France\textsuperscript{13}

Since 1960, France has pursued a neo-colonial fifty-year relationship with Africa known as Françafrique.\textsuperscript{14} Africa has historically represented a stage on which Paris has sought to maintain the illusion of being a global power. There are three pillars to the hegemonic French policy in Africa: military, financial, and politico-cultural. Though all francophone African countries were eventually granted nominal independence by 1963, most signed military and economic pacts that gave France continued influence over their sovereign affairs. Paris maintained military bases across Africa, intervening over fifty times to prop up or depose assorted tyrants in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Gabon, Togo, and the Central African Republic (CAR). An important aspect of French policy was to keep trespassers out of its pré carré (backyard) or chasse gardée (private hunting-ground), often frustrating efforts at regional integration across Africa.

With the discrediting of Gallic interventions following a dubious French role during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the fall of Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko three years later, and the reduction of military spending, Paris sought to multilateralise its previous unilateral interventions using the United Nations and the European Union in countries like the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali. France’s image was, however, badly damaged when its troops were alleged to have sexually abused children in the CAR in exchange for food or money between December 2013 and June 2014, amidst allegations of a cover-up by senior French and UN officials.\textsuperscript{15} In 2016, France still had about 10,000 troops deployed in Africa. With regard to trade, French trade with Africa totalled $69.9 billion in 2015, and nearly half of Africa’s exports to France were in the distillation products, mineral fuels, and oil sectors.\textsuperscript{16}


\textsuperscript{12} See African Mining Indaba website (available at https://www.miningindaba.com/ehome/indaba/event_schedule/).

\textsuperscript{13} This section is based on Adekeye Adebajo, “An Axis of Evil? China, the United States, and France in Africa” in, Adebajo, The Curse of Berlin, pp. 163–191.


5. Africa and Britain

Britain unlike France, has not maintained the same extensive political, security, and economic ties in its former African colonies. British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 was seen as a means of disengaging from a number of Commonwealth obligations that were absorbed into Europe’s budding development policy, especially the Lomé Convention of 1975. The end of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994 was an important milestone, but Africa continued to be thought of as a marginal British foreign policy interest, even with the coming to power of the Labour Party’s Tony Blair in 1997, who deployed a short-term military intervention to Sierra Leone in 2000 that helped to stabilise a crumbling UN mission. However, British interest in Africa’s natural resources and energy sector has not diminished since the Cold War era. Such interests are evident in the oil-producing countries of Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea. According to the World Bank, Britain is a major source of remittances to Africa, with Nigeria being the second largest recipient of remittances ($21 billion in 2016). Moreover, in 2014, Britain’s Foreign Direct Investment (outward FDI) in Africa totalled £42.5 billion. When Britons voted to leave the European Union in June 2016, a wave of instability swept across global markets, including African markets. It is crucial that post-Brexit developments are monitored as far as Anglo-African relations are concerned, particularly in strategic countries for London such as South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya.

6. Africa and Portugal

For Portugal, in spite of the trauma of decolonisation in the 1970s, once it had joined the European Community in 1986, Lisbon came to see itself increasingly as a bridge between Europe and its former African colonies. Portugal – a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – was used by the Americans in Angola and Mozambique to pursue Cold War interests. Relations between Portugal and Angola improved after the death of the controversial rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi, in 2002. Lisbon saw Africa as a means of providing a small European country with a stronger voice in global politics. This approach was developed through the proposal for European Union-Africa summits, which were held in Cairo (2000) and Lisbon (2007), and subsequently in Tripoli (2010) and Brussels (2014). However, most lusophone African countries were marginal to Portugal, except for its second largest export market: oil and diamond-rich Angola. In 2015, bilateral trade between Portugal and Africa totalled $ 10.2 billion. The relationship with Africa constitutes one of the pillars of Portuguese foreign policy. This policy was reformulated after the Lisbon coup in 1974 according to two founding principles – decolonisation and European integration – and articulated in three geo-political axes: Europe, determined by integration into the European Community since 1986; the Atlantic, subsumed into integration into NATO; and Africa, involving the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) which, along with Brazil and East Timor, constitutes the original Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) of 1996. Portuguese foreign policy in Africa has since been based around bilateral agreements, almost exclusively centred on PALOP, and marked by three aspects: aid and cooperation; trade and economics; and political and strategic mediation. Lisbon is today seen as a bridge for contacts with PALOP - particularly with Angola and Mozambique - by countries like Turkey seeking to strengthen their ties with Africa. However, the CPLP is an ill-defined regional forum, and the major emerging powers represented in it – Angola and Brazil – are not its principal drivers.

Africa’s Bilateral Relations with Non-Traditional Powers

7. Africa and Brazil

In the post–Cold War era, Brazil increased its presence in Africa and in Portuguese-speaking African countries such as Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Equatorial Guinea. This is evident in Brazilian multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in the gas, oil, mining and construction industries in some lusophone African and other Brazilian companies in Africa”, 2012 (available at Brazil’s foreign. Between 2003 and 2011, Brazilian companies have been involved in mineral extraction. This led to widespread over-exploitation of cooperation among the BRICS and in their relations with the continent. Much of these activities have been undertaken on an individual country basis and under the UN umbrella, with key differences in approach to issues such as the “responsibility to protect” (R2P). Ownership has become a key feature of Africa’s discourse on, and approach to, peace and security cooperation, as has the promotion of democracy and human rights.

8. Africa and India

Africa’s relations with India historically saw its founding premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, leading efforts for the liberation of Africa and promoting a policy of non-alignment in the 1960s. More recently, relations have focused on trade with the continent and, particularly, on New Delhi’s role in UN and African peacekeeping. India has long been among the top five UN troop contributors in Africa. Yet, peace and security cooperation is an under-exploited area of cooperation among the BRICS and in their relations with the continent. Much of these activities have been undertaken on an individual country basis and under the UN umbrella, with key differences in approach to issues such as the “responsibility to protect” (R2P). Ownership has become a key feature of Africa’s discourse on, and approach to, peace and security cooperation, as has the promotion of democracy and human rights.

African countries have also attracted increasing interest from Indian mining companies that have been involved in mineral extraction. This led to widespread over-production in steel, coal, and diamond mining agreements with Zimbabwe in 2015, mainly to India’s benefit. New Delhi’s trade relations with Africa have been improving exponentially: total trade with Africa grew rapidly from $25 billion in 2007 to $70 billion in 2015.23 In July 2016, India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, visited Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa in a bid to strengthen Africa-India partnerships and agreements. The Modi government is, however, focused on conducting more development finance projects with Tanzania, Kenya, and Mozambique, with a view to increasing

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maritime security and strengthening India-Africa partnerships to become more focused around the Indian Ocean.24

9. Africa and Japan

Since its inception in 1993, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development has evolved into a multi-stakeholder process, including state parties, international agencies, and civil society organisations, to promote the continent’s development based on the principles of African ownership and international partnership. Although Tokyo initiated the process and all the summits were held in Japan between 1993 and 2013, TICAD meetings are co-organised with the United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (UN-OSAA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank. Even so, the process remains principally a Japanese effort to harness lessons from East Asia’s development successes for Africa; and to implement its development approach that economic growth must be led by the private sector, with official development assistance acting as a catalyst. Most of Japan’s total trade with Africa during the Cold War was largely with the apartheid South African regime, which estranged Tokyo from the rest of Africa. In 1974, for example, apartheid South Africa was Japan’s main supplier of platinum metals for its vibrant vehicle industry, and Tokyo was also Pretoria’s leading African trade partner in 1987. In the post-apartheid era, and as a sign of its intentions to build relations with South Africa’s new democratic leadership, Japan offered two aid packages to South Africa: the first in 1994 amounted to $1.3 billion, while the second in 1999 was valued at $1.5 billion. These aid disbursements were the largest ever provided by Japan to any African country, and were mostly comprised of loans and overseas trade and investment insurance aimed at encouraging investment in South Africa, particularly by Japanese enterprises. In 2015, bilateral trade between Japan and Africa totalled $20 billion.25 In 2014, Tokyo provided training in support of 11 peacekeeping operations across Africa. In addition, the Yokohama Plan of Action under TICAD V sought to align with the AU’s Agenda 2063 in support of infrastructure development including transportation corridor development, provision of low-carbon energy, optimisation of energy use, and ICT infrastructure. The sixth TICAD conference will take place in Africa for the first time in Nairobi, Kenya, on 27-28 August 2016.

10. Africa and the Nordics

Due to the similarities in the socio-economic models and foreign policy approaches of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland), outsiders often misleading view these countries as a united group. The common model has been termed the “Nordic Model”, while their foreign policy relations comprise an array of “middle-power” attributes and ambitions. The foreign policy of the Nordic countries can be said to represent activism and consensus-seeking multilateralism; normative values such as equality, redistribution, and peaceful conflict resolution; support for the United Nations and its agencies; and aid to developing countries. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, in particular, have a long history of engagement on the continent and played an active role in the liberation of Southern Africa. A significant policy shift is, however, evident in Sweden’s increasing focus on its national interests compared to earlier discourses on development assistance in Africa. A similar rhetoric is also noticeable in Denmark and Norway’s Africa policies.26 Between 2010 and 2015, Stockholm prioritised trans-border issues such as climate change, migration, peace and security, as well as cooperative research and combating corruption. In addition, Copenhagen and Oslo’s Africa policies have sought to adopt an integrated approach on trade, aid, climate change, and development. In 2015, trade relations between Denmark and Africa totalled $1.9 billion; Norway-


26 Anne Hammerstad, “The Nordics, the EU, and Africa” in, Adebajo and Whiteman (eds.) The EU and Africa, pp. 385-402.
Africa trade amounted to $3 billion; while Finland’s Africa trade was $1.9 billion. Sweden had the greatest trade with the continent, reaching $4.9 billion in 2015.\(^{27}\) There is a need to investigate what the Nordics’ social-democratic middle-power approach consists of, and how it has affected their policies towards, and relationships with, the African continent. It is equally important to investigate whether the many strong ties and affinities between the Nordic countries have resulted in a common and coordinated Nordic approach towards Africa.

11. **Africa, Europe, and the Arab World**

Since the inception of the European Economic Community in 1957, there have been efforts to develop relations with the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. By the beginning of the 1980s, there were a series of bilateral association accords with the Maghreb and Mashrek countries, which consolidated the important and diverse trade relations between countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, as well as Northern European countries. Between 1995 and 2005, exports to the European Union from what are called the Euro-Med countries to the south and east doubled, halving the region’s total deficit with the EU to 10 per cent of total trade.\(^{28}\) The Barcelona process, launched in November 1995, was also intimately affected by the EU’s sporadic involvement in the interminable Middle East peace process, with Europe continuing to play second fiddle to American mediators.\(^{29}\) The EU has always been more of a paymaster than a peacemaker in this region.

The “Afro-Arab Spring” of 2011 will have potentially radical consequences for the mental map of Africa and for relations between Africa, the Arab world, and the European Union. In terms of policy, the African continent might become divided into a Northern and a Southern part, cut off by the Sahara desert. The North is mainly Muslim-dominated and inward-looking, with every country focused mainly on its own survival. European policy has increased attention on this Northern part, with a special focus on political stability and the reduction of the number of refugees and migrants flowing across the Mediterranean into Europe. Thus, through security and migration issues, Europe is becoming more closely involved with North Africa, while the reverse may be the case for the EU’s relationship with sub-Saharan Africa which is increasingly developing ties with countries such as China, Brazil, and India. In the coming decades, the number of young men from both the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa trying to migrate to Europe will remain significant and might increase further, forcing the EU to develop a more sensible and practical migration regime towards the continent.\(^{30}\)

**Africa’s Multilateral Relations**

12. **Africa and the United Nations**

Founded in 1945, the United Nations had only four African states at the time: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa. Today, 54 African countries represent over a quarter of the world body’s total of 193 member states. Much of the UN’s socio-economic and humanitarian work occurs in Africa, and Nairobi (the site of the UN Environment Programme [UNEP]) remains one of only four UN headquarters around the world – together with New York, Geneva, and Vienna. About half (29 out of 56) of the UN’s peacekeeping missions in the post–Cold War era have taken place in Africa. In the 2015–2016 financial year, the nine UN-deployed missions in Africa (out of 16 globally) cost

\(^{27}\) See Trade Map (available at [http://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx](http://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx)).


$6 billion (about 82 percent of all missions). There were 101, 270 UN peacekeepers deployed in these nine missions in Africa in April 2016 (about 86 percent of all UN peacekeepers deployed globally).\textsuperscript{31} In May 2016, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) had 1,067 projects in Africa, including in Zimbabwe, South Sudan, and the DRC.\textsuperscript{32} The world body has also established sub-regional offices in West Africa, the Great Lakes region, and Central Africa, as well as peacebuilding offices in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, CAR, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. Two Africans – Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Ghana’s Kofi Annan – were Secretaries-General of the UN during the critical post–Cold war years of 1992 to 2006, while Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, and South Sudanese scholar-diplomat Francis Deng, were respectively involved in leading some of the most important conceptual debates and initiatives on UN peacekeeping, and issues involving the emerging norm of R2P. While 60 percent of the 15-member UN Security Council’s deliberations focus on Africa, the continent remains one of only two major regions of the world – along with Latin America – without a permanent seat and veto power on the UN’s most powerful body.

13. Africa and the BRICS

Notwithstanding its regular summity, the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is still a relatively new grouping with an expanding, but still evolving, agenda for cooperation. Doubts persist about the bloc’s ability to coalesce into an agenda-setting actor with a harmonised approach to addressing global challenges. At the same time, the lack of cohesion among the BRICS countries makes it difficult to categorise them as being “for” or “against” the existing Western-dominated world order. The IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) Dialogue Forum – created in June 2003 – could provide an alternative focus for India, Brazil, and South Africa. The evolution of the BRICS agenda beyond trade and investment has raised questions about IBSA’s ability to retain a unique niche on the global stage. If managed well, both BRICS and IBSA could potentially play a critical and complementary role in advancing the interests of the “global South”. In addition, Tshwane is the only African member of the BRICS bloc, and South Africa has – according to critics - sought rhetorically to use this platform to promote Africa’s voice while pursuing its own more parochial interests. However, the extent to which the BRICS countries’ interests in Africa converge with the continent’s own interests remain uncertain.

At the Fortaleza/Brasília summit in July 2014, the BRICS bloc agreed to establish a New Development Bank (NDB), “with the purpose of mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies”.\textsuperscript{33} The BRICS bank is a timely response to continental initiatives such as the AU Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) of 2011–2040 (adopted in July 2012), whose aggregate price tag will amount to about $368 billion, with 51 priority programmes and projects envisioned. However, it remains to be seen how the BRICS bank will fare as a provider of development finance, given that the NDB’s entire initial subscribed capital is only $50 billion. Still, the usefulness of the BRICS bank for African countries extends beyond the provision of capital and includes knowledge-sharing about innovative ways to meet the demands of development in the “global South”. In this respect, the New Development Bank could create space for BRICS and other developing and emerging economies to contribute more meaningfully to their own sustainable development.

14. Africa and the European Union

Relations between Africa and the European Union have for some time been considered as a laboratory for North-South relations. This was certainly the case in the 1970s when the Lomé

Convention of 1975 was signed. The term “partnership” has often been used to characterise this relationship. However, for many Africans, the relationship has been unequal and is more of a situation of uneasy co-existence than a mutually beneficial relationship. For example, the EU Strategy for Africa of 2005 sought to provide a framework for a comprehensive, integrated long-term relationship, but was almost completely prepared by the European Commission in Brussels, Belgium, without much input from African states. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) in Lisbon in December 2007, however, involved African input and contained valid ideas on creating an environment for sustainable and inclusive development in Africa. The JAES sought not only to streamline Brussels’ engagement with the continent, but also to move it beyond development aid and Africa-focused issues to include political dialogue and cooperation in areas of mutual interest and concern, as well as on global challenges. Beside other political, economic, and geo-strategic interests, the EU needs a strong continental organisation to deal with African issues.

The evolving relationship between Africa and the EU has often lent itself to two dominant interpretations. On the one hand is the optimistic view that recognises obstacles in Africa-EU relations, but views the relationship as a work in progress and a pioneering experience in inter-regional cooperation. This perspective is largely informed by the EU’s financial and technical support to Africa through programmes such as the African Peace Facility (APF), the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (AIFT), and the African Union Support Programme (AUSP). By 2016, Brussels had contributed more than €1.3 billion to support the AU’s peace and security agenda through the APF. The EU has further provided peacekeepers to African conflicts, having deployed troops to the DRC (2003 and 2006), Chad (2008–2009), and the Central African Republic (2014–2015). Moreover, the European Union has awarded over 80 grants for infrastructure projects in Africa worth over €6.5 billion. On the other hand, a fairly pessimistic view argues that the rhetorical commitments emanating from political dialogue between African and EU leaders are rarely matched by effective implementation, and that Brussels is little more than the AU’s most prominent paymaster. The EU’s perceived imposition of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) on African countries has also recently poisoned Africa-EU relations.

15. Africa and the World Trade Organisation

The World Trade Organisation was established in January 1995 as an institutionalised version of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that had been created in November 1947. The WTO has 162 member states, and deals with global trade rules in ensuring fair trade among its members. The Doha Declaration of November 2001 provided a further mandate to the organisation for negotiations with a view to the abolition of food and agricultural subsidies in industrialised countries, and in support of developing countries being able to protect their infant industries. The WTO has had major difficulty in finalising trade talks between developing and industrialised countries since December 1999, with the latter failing to open their markets to clothing and food – the most important exports from poor countries. At the November 2001 WTO Doha round of multilateral talks held in Qatar, discussions on development and opening of markets in agriculture, manufacturing, and services failed to achieve results. Six subsequent meetings were held between 2003 and 2008 to address this impasse. The WTO marked its 20-year anniversary by holding its Tenth Ministerial Conference in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi in December 2015. The conference discussed a number of historical agreements including: agriculture, cotton, and issues of specific interest to least developed countries, as well as measures to assist low-income cotton producers to gain access to new markets. It also focused on abolishing tariffs on 201 information technology (IT)
products with a total annual trade value of $1.3 trillion. Moreover, two important WTO agreements remain partially unsigned by its member states, and will enter into force once two-thirds of its member states commit to the agreements. The outstanding agreements are: the trade facilitation agreement approved at a WTO ministerial conference that was held in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2013; and another on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS). The WTO’s rules of trade policymaking are thus important to Africa’s efforts to achieve a more balanced rule-based multilateral trading system. The organisation must also address important issues such as investment, competition policy, e-commerce, and climate and trade.

16. **Africa, the World Bank, and the IMF**

The two Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – were established in 1944 to support major economic and political developments in the world. However, underlying ideological and governance assumptions about politics and development have largely shaped the policy interventions of these two institutions in Africa. For example, in 1963, the World Bank approved an investment of 80 million British pounds to develop the railway system of the racist state of Rhodesia while refusing to complete the Tazara railway for socialist Tanzania. This project was eventually completed in the 1960s with the backing of Chinese funds of $450 million. The World Bank and the IMF continued to dominate Africa’s political, social, and economic development agendas. The controversial Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s created by the IMF and the World Bank for African states, advocated: the lifting of market restrictions; free access to markets and relaxed tariffs and taxes; encouragement of inward investment and external trade; and liberalised labour markets. This resulted in major underdevelopment in Africa with massive cuts in health and education. After the Cold War, the Bretton Woods institutions became involved in post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. In the 1990s, the World Bank’s post-conflict funds benefitted Uganda, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Mozambique, and Rwanda. The results of these peacebuilding initiatives have, however, been mixed amidst a continued lack of effective international coordination and inadequate funding.

**Dissemination**

CCR’s Cape Town policy research seminar in August 2016 will produce a six-page policy brief, a 30-page seminar report, and an 18-chapter edited volume. These publications will be widely disseminated within and outside Africa. They will also be sent to African governments and parliamentarians; Africa’s sub-regional bodies; the AU Commission and embassies in Addis Ababa; African and other university libraries; Western governments; the UN; the World Bank; the IMF; and the WTO, as well as past participants of the Centre’s policy seminars. The policy report and brief will also be made available on CCR’s website.

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