Peacebuilding is of special relevance to Africa: nearly half of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War have been in the continent. The term “peacebuilding”, which entered public use some time ago in UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s seminal 1992 report An Agenda for Peace, has gained currency in recent years. The policy seminar took a fresh look at the current peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions that are mandated to build peace. The seminar was organised around the premise that a better appreciation of the interplay between local, regional, and global institutions and ideologies can lead to more effective peacebuilding in Africa.
PEACEBUILDING IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA:
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

RESEARCH AND POLICY SEMINAR REPORT
CO-ORGANISED BY THE CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA;
THE CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BOTSWANA;
AND THE CENTRE OF AFRICAN STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND

GABORONE SUN, BOTSWANA
25-28 AUGUST 2009

RAPPORTEURS
GWINYAYI A. DZINESA AND ELIZABETH OTITODUN
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About the Organisers

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) is based in Cape Town, South Africa. Established in 1968, the organisation has wide-ranging experience of conflict interventions in the Western Cape and Southern Africa and is working increasingly on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research has focused on post-conflict peacebuilding involving the African Union, the United Nations and civil society; the European Union’s engagement in peacebuilding in Africa; Southern Africa’s peacebuilding challenges; and HIV/AIDS in relation to post-conflict societies.

The Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Botswana

The Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Botswana is one of the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network member institutions. Its core objective is the enhancement of democratic management of defence and security and the strengthening of regional co-operation mechanisms. Since its inception in 2001, the centre has organised executive courses in civil-military relations; defence and security management; managing multinational peace missions; security sector governance; and parliamentary oversight of the security sector.

The Centre of African Studies, University of Cambridge, England

The Centre of African Studies (CAS) at the University of Cambridge, England, was established in 1965. The centre supports teaching on Africa at the University of Cambridge through its library and its seminar series. CAS also acts as a platform for interdisciplinary research, bringing the university’s Africanists together with scholars from African, American, and European universities. With support from the Leverhulme Trust, the centre runs the Cambridge-Africa collaborative research programme to facilitate academic and intellectual exchange.

The Rapporteurs

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town; the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS), University of Botswana; and the Centre of African Studies (CAS), University of Cambridge co-hosted a research and policy seminar in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 on the theme “Peacebuilding in Africa”.

The meeting discussed the interplay between local, regional and global forces in relation to peacebuilding challenges in Africa. It focused on six key themes: the theory and practice of peacebuilding in Africa; strengthening the security sector; justice and human rights; gender and peacebuilding; pan-African institutions; and global institutions and ideologies. Twelve case studies were also presented on Central Africa and the Great Lakes; West Africa; Southern Africa; and Eastern Africa.

The term “peacebuilding” has gained currency in recent years especially since its entry into public use through Egyptian United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s seminal 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace, which defined peacebuilding largely in relation to a conflict continuum. Peacebuilding is increasingly seen and understood as a multifaceted concept that includes the process of strengthening the political, security, socio-economic and transitional justice dimensions of societies emerging from conflict.

Peacebuilding in Africa: Theory and Practice

Peacebuilding has assumed a significant place on the international agenda since the end of the Cold War. It is particularly important to Africa, where almost half of the 51 UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed in the post-Cold War era. A range of local, regional and global peacebuilding structures and institutions have been established. These include the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Frameworks of the African Union (AU) of 2006 and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) of 2005, as well as the UN Peacebuilding Commission of 2005. The creation of legitimate and appropriate hierarchies, as well as a division of labour among and between peacebuilding actors and programmes, should help to facilitate effective peacebuilding.

Strengthening the Security Sector

The security environment is central to all peacebuilding initiatives. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and those associated with armed groups is integral to the creation and maintenance of secure frameworks for sustainable post-conflict reconstruction and development. Context-specific DDR strategies that embrace informal reintegration mechanisms are critical. Security sector reform, which usually follows DDR, is often aimed at strengthening the operational capacity of traditional security institutions such as the army and police. Unfortunately, democratic security sector governance has often not been a priority in Africa, while many African parliaments lack the capacity to oversee the security sector effectively.

Justice and Human Rights

The promotion and protection of human rights are perceived as being important to peacebuilding efforts, and have become recognised tasks for contemporary UN peacekeeping missions. A human rights approach can promote the establishment of structures and practices to prevent violations of human rights. Such violations can
lead to a relapse into conflict. The AU is currently setting up its own human rights architecture alongside the global human rights architecture. The operationalisation of these mechanisms could help to prevent conflict and promote peacebuilding in Africa. The Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) is not a peacebuilding institution in the strictest terms. Its primary mandate is to ensure that justice is done. Peace may be an incidental positive outcome of its cases, but justice is its explicit mandate. The court can, however, through its actions, unintentionally intensify or prolong conflict in countries, such as Uganda and Sudan.

**Gender and Peacebuilding**

Mainstreaming gender into peacebuilding initiatives is critical to making societies more equitable and just. A gap exists between established normative international frameworks for engendered peace and security – such as UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 of 2000 and 1820 of 2008 on Women, Peace and Security – and their implementation. The inclusion of women in peacebuilding activities could help to unshackle societies from patriarchy and promote a transformative agenda. Such action must also facilitate the addressing of unequal power relations and gender inequality. Women in Africa have ‘agency’, they cannot and should not be viewed as mere victims. While it is true that they have been subjected to diverse forms of sexual violence, women have also played important roles as peacebuilders in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

**Pan-African Institutions**

The African Development Bank’s (AfDB) statebuilding assistance is important in supporting peacebuilding efforts in Africa. Its technical and financial assistance could help to facilitate the recovery of countries from conflict and have a direct impact on local populations. The Bank works closely with the AU to implement and manage projects related to NEPAD. Another potential peacebuilding body – the Pan-African Ministers Conference of Public/Civil Service – has recognised the contribution that good political governance and enhanced public administration can make to Africa’s stability and development. The evolving AU and NEPAD post-conflict reconstruction frameworks could also promote endogenous programmes and ownership of peacebuilding initiatives by African actors. It is important to involve African civil society in these peacebuilding efforts, though there is some disagreement on how best to do this.

**Case Studies: the Great Lakes and Central Africa**

Regional peacebuilding actors have the capacity to mediate regional conflicts, as evidenced by the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the DRC. The results of this intervention have, however, been limited. Regional and international actors have demonstrated that they often become involved in peacebuilding activities in pursuit of their own interests, which are not always in line with the maintenance of peace in the countries concerned. Regional and international actors have also attempted to resolve the conflicts in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad. The UN Peacebuilding Commission faces major peacebuilding challenges in its efforts to support the reconstruction of the fragile CAR. Oil-rich but fragile Chad occupies an area of important geo-strategic significance. It is important that international actors refrain from exploiting Chad’s weaknesses to impose unsustainable peacebuilding strategies on the country.
Case Studies: West Africa

Local and international actors, notwithstanding inherent tensions and contradictions, are capable of establishing and coordinating partnerships that facilitate contextualised and sustainable statebuilding, as evidenced by the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Internationally driven statebuilding that downplays local ownership and contradicts local realities can have unfavourable outcomes as demonstrated by the contrasting case of Côte d’Ivoire. African governments sometimes perpetuate resource-related instability by colluding with profit-seeking, powerful multinational companies, such as in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region, while neglecting the needs of local populations, some of whom then take up arms to address their grievances. Effective peacebuilding strategies are needed in such cases.

Case Studies: Southern Africa

In Namibia in 1989-1990, the major domestic actors consented to the effective implementation of disarmament and demobilisation, while in Angola in 1992-1998, key local, regional and external actors undermined the potential for DDR to contribute to sustainable peace. Although the UN mission in Mozambique in 1992-1994 was more successful, the presence of the UN failed to ensure effective disarmament. Botswana currently faces challenges in relation to security centralisation and effective oversight of its intelligence services.

Case Study: Eastern Africa

While there has been real progress in the implementation of the political and economic provisions of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, serious challenges remain in implementing its security aspects, such as the pledge to integrate previously warring factions into a national defence force. Weak state institutions in South Sudan also pose a threat to the integrity of the state and could herald a return to conflict, even if Southern Sudanese vote for independence in the referendum scheduled for 2011.

Global Institutions and Ideologies

The creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in December 2005 is important for Africa, as the first four (and, as of May 2010, only) cases to have been listed on its agenda – Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic – are all located on the continent. An array of conceptual, structural and operational constraints, however, threatens the Commission’s potential to implement programmes that could promote durable peace in Africa. The insistence on neo-liberal frameworks for post-conflict reconstruction and development by the Western-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) could aggravate tensions and increase the potential for a return to conflict.
Policy Recommendations

The following ten policy recommendations emerged from the Gaborone seminar:

• First, external partners should ensure that national parliaments in Africa have the capacity and authority to regulate and oversee national security institutions and strengthen civil-military relations in a comprehensive and effective manner. A stronger engagement with civil society is also necessary to enhance the capacity of legislatures to deliver in this area;

• Second, African governments must ensure that they adequately understand the obligations and implications of ratifying international justice instruments and making referrals to the International Criminal Court. In this regard, African civil society actors must ensure that African governments are held accountable in this area through such bodies as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, as well as other AU organs and institutions including the AU’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the Pan-African Parliament, NEPAD, and the African Peer Review Mechanism;

• Third, the decision about appropriate transitional justice mechanisms must be made taking local needs into account, while learning from experiences from other parts of the world. Each country’s post-conflict needs are distinct, and transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions and war crimes tribunals must respond to each post-conflict country’s specific set of circumstances in a way that promotes both peace and justice;

• Fourth, the AU and Africa’s regional economic communities must identify their own comparative advantage in the area of post-conflict reconstruction and development initiatives in order to be able to contribute effectively to the success of peacebuilding in Africa. Lacking the resources of the UN, the World Bank and the IMF, these bodies should prioritise areas such as strengthening state institutions, promoting democratic governance and economic growth, and enhancing socio-economic development;

• Fifth, African governments must deliver on their commitment to implement on the ground international instruments such as UN Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security in order to support peacebuilding efforts on the continent. With regard to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, a broader definition of “combatant” should be used to encourage women who were general “helpers” of armed forces to participate actively in DDR processes. Considering the prevalence of gender-based violence and the consequent spread of HIV/AIDS in post-conflict societies, DDR programmes should include a comprehensive system to address the psychological effects of violence and conflicts on women;

• Sixth, consideration should be given to funnelling more external financing of post-conflict peacebuilding through the African Development Bank, which in many ways could operate as NEPAD’s implementation and financial management arm. Such a process must complement the role of external donors, such as the UN, the World Bank and the IMF, in ways that strengthen African decision-making in peacebuilding processes;
• Seventh, international economic institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF should give countries emerging from conflict sufficient time and adequate resources to address immediate post-conflict challenges before they seek to impose Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). These external efforts must also be aligned to Africa’s peacebuilding structures and institutions such as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Frameworks of the AU and NEPAD in order to ensure greater African ownership and legitimacy;

• Eighth, the UN Peacebuilding Commission must improve coordination with other UN agencies and work more effectively with African regional bodies and civil society. Although the Commission is mandated to act mainly as an advisory body, there are four key areas that require intervention for effective peacebuilding in Africa: mobilising resources; developing and recommending reconstruction strategies; helping to build political, judicial and administrative institutions; and coordinating the activities of important peacebuilding stakeholders;

• Ninth, local involvement in mechanisms such as the UN’s Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies and Strategic Peacebuilding Frameworks, as well as the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, should go beyond national governments and the co-opting of self-appointed elites. The aim should be to ensure emancipatory local ownership of these processes. This can be done through greater involvement of civil society and the establishment of new mechanisms for consultation and participation. Such engagement should also go beyond existing state institutions and customary local authority structures, and needs to be linked more closely to existing state structures and external peacebuilders; and

• Finally, it is important for all relevant stakeholders to promote and ensure a better understanding of the hierarchy and power relations that prevail among the wide array of domestic, regional and external peacebuilding actors in order to establish appropriate complementarity, division of authority, and a more effective division of labour for peacebuilding efforts in Africa.

ABOVE: Ms Margaret Kilo, African Development Bank, Tunis, Tunisia
MIDDLE: Dr Tomaz Augusto Salomão, Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community
RIGHT: Mr Tanki Mothae, Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Southern African Development Community
1. Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa; the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS), University of Botswana; and the Centre of African Studies (CAS), University of Cambridge, England, co-hosted a research and policy seminar in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 on the theme “Peacebuilding in Africa”. This report is based on the seminar concept paper as well as discussions and papers presented at the policy seminar.

The Botswana policy seminar brought together 46 scholars and practitioners based in Africa, Europe, and North America to examine peacebuilding challenges and the main institutions that are mandated to build peace in Africa. Peacebuilding is of special relevance to Africa as nearly half of the 51 United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War have been in Africa, the continent currently hosts eight of the 17 present UN peacekeeping missions, and 70 percent of international peacekeepers are deployed in Africa. The persistence of conflict in parts of Africa, despite the end of the Cold War, has led to the development of new institutions and approaches to peacebuilding. These international and regional peacebuilding mechanisms include the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Frameworks of the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 2 and Africa’s regional economic communities such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Local programmes and practices also play formal and informal roles in peacebuilding efforts in Africa.

The premise of the Botswana seminar of August 2009 was that a better appreciation of the interplay between local, regional, and global institutions and ideologies might lead to new conclusions about the nature of, and possibilities for, effective peacebuilding in Africa. Peacebuilding strategies tend to pursue four key goals: greater security; political institutions that are broadly accepted; a revitalised economy; and a mechanism for dealing with past injustices and violence. The specific way in which these peacebuilding elements are put together will vary from case to case, and might not correspond to the dominant formulas put forward by international actors. Lessons can, however, be learned from the diverse experiences of African countries that have experienced conflict, as well as the peacebuilding successes and failures of these states.

The seminar addressed six key themes and considered twelve case studies from four African sub-regions:

- Peacebuilding in Africa: Theory and Practice;
- Strengthening the Security Sector;
- Justice and Human Rights;
- Gender and Peacebuilding;
- Pan-African Institutions;
- Case Studies: Central Africa and the Great Lakes;
- Case Studies: West Africa;

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1 This introduction is based on the concept paper written by Devon Curtis at the University of Cambridge for the Peacebuilding in Africa seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana, 25-28 August 2009.

2 NEPAD is a socio-economic development plan devised by African leaders in 2001 to attract aid, investment, and trade in exchange for sound political and economic governance.
Peacebuilding involves many different actors and a range of relatively new institutions and ideas, but the practice of peacebuilding itself is not new. Between 1960 and 1964, a 20,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission focused on restoring stability to the war-torn Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The UN prevented the secession of mineral-rich Katanga, but did not stay on to invest in long-term peacebuilding. After the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, it was the Nigerian government, assisted by a fortuitous oil boom, that largely undertook reconstruction efforts in the country. It was only after the end of the Cold War that systematic international attention was paid to post-conflict peacebuilding. Since the UN's first multidimensional operation – in Namibia in 1989-1990 – peacebuilding has been widely recognised as a distinctive area of policy and operations.\(^1\) An Agenda for Peace, published in 1992 by the first African UN Secretary-General, Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali, provided a coherent conceptualisation of peacebuilding for the post-Cold War era. This important report defined peacebuilding as the medium- to long-term process of rebuilding war-affected communities through identifying and supporting structures to consolidate peace and to avoid a relapse into conflict.\(^4\) The definition of peacebuilding has gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches to addressing violent conflict at different phases of the conflict cycle. Peacebuilding has thus become a multifaceted concept that includes the process of building or rebuilding the political, security, socio-economic, and transitional justice dimensions of societies emerging from conflict.

Since the 1992 publication of An Agenda for Peace, an increasing number of institutions have developed peacebuilding programmes and initiated peacebuilding projects covering different themes and priorities. UN agencies, programmes, and offices; the World Bank; the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); and other international agencies have since created special units to deal with post-conflict reconstruction. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) created its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in 1993, while ECOWAS established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Peacekeeping in 1999. More recently, the African Union has recognised that there is an urgent need to adopt a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy in order to achieve its goals of sustainable peace and development on the continent. NEPAD and the AU separately developed post-conflict reconstruction frameworks – in June 2005 and July 2006 respectively – which have included the participation of African civil society actors.\(^5\)

The AU’s current strategy, developed during a meeting of AU permanent representatives in Durban, South Africa, in September 2005, is based on the premise that each country should adopt a peacebuilding strategy that responds to its own particular context.\(^6\) Essentially, this policy framework provides an overall strategy from which individual country programmes can develop their own context-specific plans. It has been suggested, however, that the AU and Africa’s sub-regional bodies should establish a division of labour, where they would focus on peacemaking and peacekeeping, while the better-resourced and more experienced UN, the World

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Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) would carry more of the burden for post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa. Tensions have surfaced between the AU and NEPAD over subsuming the latter under the former’s authority. In addition, NEPAD’s top-down approach and neo-liberal economic policies have been questioned by many African civil society actors.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission, established in December 2005, has particular significance for Africa. The establishment of the commission was hailed as an historic international commitment to the promotion of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Post-conflict peacebuilding was identified by the then UN Secretary-General, Ghana’s Kofi Annan, as a “gaping hole” in UN efforts to help countries recovering from war to make the transition to durable peace. At the 2005 UN Millennium Summit in New York, Annan noted that international responses to countries emerging from conflict often lacked sufficient funds, were vulnerable to a lack of international co-ordination, and suffered from a tendency by key actors to withdraw before peace had been fully consolidated. In this context, the UN Peacebuilding Commission was envisioned to be central “in assisting countries emerging from conflict to achieve sustainable peace and stability.”

Regional and global institutions transmit particular ideas and norms about peacebuilding, and the question of who does what and how, in the context of African peacebuilding, has enormous implications for the continent. Identifying the appropriate institutions, activities, and ensuring effective co-ordination among diverse stakeholders present some of the main peacebuilding challenges in Africa.

7 Centre for Conflict Resolution, African Perspectives on the UN Peacebuilding Commission, CCR policy advisory group seminar report, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-4 August 2006. (See http://www.ccr.org.za/)
8 Centre for Conflict Resolution, African Perspectives on the UN Peacebuilding Commission, p. 9
The wide range of peacebuilding actors and programmes operating in Africa raises critical questions about politics and hierarchy. Without hierarchy, there can be no peace, yet hierarchies can also be a source of problems and further conflict. For example, hierarchy both within and between countries can become a source of grievances and might explain the persistence of conflicts in some parts of Africa. Furthermore, hierarchy in the global system can lead to enormous discrepancies in terms of the distribution of resources for peacebuilding. The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 might exacerbate these discrepancies and pose significant constraints for institutions based in Africa.

Hierarchies also exist within the arena of knowledge production. This might mean that certain Northern voices have been privileged in peacebuilding debates and discussions over others from the global South. It is worth asking whether there is sufficient room for African voices and African perspectives within the international knowledge-production system. African voices and perspectives within peacebuilding debates are critical, and can contribute to closing the gap between decisions taken in the rich North and the realities on the ground in Africa.

The issue of hierarchy is thus central to the peacebuilding enterprise. The questions of who gets resources for peacebuilding, who sits at the peace negotiation table, who will be demobilised, and who decides on economic priorities, are all matters of hierarchy. Likewise, gender discrimination and the maltreatment of children during armed conflicts are often due to hierarchical systems. The former is rendered more complex by the interplay of hierarchy and patriarchy.

The challenge is therefore to establish legitimate hierarchies. What is the appropriate division of labour among and between local, regional, and global peacebuilding institutions and programmes? How can a fair distribution of resources be achieved and maintained? A key question is whether African actors are better informed about peacebuilding processes on their continent than their international counterparts. How can global institutions such as the UN and the World Bank work more effectively with regional and local actors in the early planning of peacebuilding operations? How can women’s voices be heard in peacebuilding processes? A number of structures and mechanisms exist that could help the UN to provide more effective support to the AU and Africa’s regional economic communities in fulfilling their peacebuilding mandates. Evolving African sub-regional security frameworks (involving early-warning systems, as well as political, military, and legal structures) could also be used to support peacebuilding efforts on the continent more effectively.

Hierarchies operate through formal as well as less formal mechanisms. Each actor with a stake in peacebuilding brings their own ideas, norms, and practices to a situation that is highly political and that might alter the local landscape in unexpected ways. Likewise, the local context should also interact with regional and international institutions, thus providing an opportunity for learning and change. A better understanding of the mutually reinforcing nature of these relationships can lead to better peacebuilding practice. In other words, it is...
important to gauge the likely interaction between local contexts and ideas and the institutional peacebuilding frameworks that involve international and regional actors, including the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Frameworks of the AU; Africa’s regional economic communities; NEPAD; the UN Peacebuilding Commission; and the policies of financial development institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Development Bank.

Peacebuilding involves setting priorities and establishing legitimate institutional hierarchies at the level of the state. Here again, however, tensions and contradictions exist. The policies that various peacebuilders promote, and the practices that they support, are often based on particular conceptions of peace, governance, and the international system. For example, a neo-liberal notion of peacebuilding has been widely accepted, particularly among Western donors and the UN, but also within the AU. This approach stresses formal institutions and rules, political representation through elections, and the strengthening of civil society. Yet criticisms have been lodged against this perspective. In addition, points of disjuncture and tension exist between different peacebuilding goals. For example, programmes that are designed to build the capacity of civil society organisations might have the unintended effect of perpetuating low state capacity, authority, and legitimacy, since such assistance is often channelled through civil society organisations rather than through local authority structures.

13 See, for example, Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence (New York: Norton, 2000).
Activities and programmes in different peacebuilding sectors demonstrate that different institutions and actors have different notions of the foundations for peace, sometimes leading to tensions in peacebuilding programming and co-ordination and unintended consequences on the ground. Privileging certain conceptions of peace over others necessarily means prioritising certain activities over others. When peacebuilding projects fail to achieve their objectives, this is usually blamed on poor implementation or lack of commitment, rather than a flaw in the logic of the peacebuilding process itself. Being cognisant of the wide range of interests and views involved in peacebuilding could lead to questions about whether this activity should continue to be described primarily in non-ideological terms as a ‘force for good’.

Two decades have passed since the end of the Cold War and the initial post-Cold War optimism about prospects for peace in Africa. Over the course of these past twenty years, violent conflicts have subsided in some parts of Africa such as Angola, Mozambique, and Liberia, but have increased in others such as the DRC, Nigeria’s Niger Delta, and Somalia. A wide range of local, regional, and global institutions, mechanisms, and programmes to end conflict and build peace have been established with varying degrees of success, and a growing but disparate body of academic work has attempted to make sense of recent peacebuilding efforts and their consequences in different African contexts. In light of the new institutions set up to support peacebuilding efforts on the continent, the increase in peacebuilding activities, the emergence of Africa-wide peacebuilding initiatives and institutions, and the changed economic climate following the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, the Botswana seminar of August 2009 was organised to re-assess peacebuilding concepts and practices in Africa over the past two decades. The assumptions underlying post-Cold War peacebuilding programmes on the continent were examined, and the ways in which local, regional, and global spaces for peace in Africa have been altered through the discourse and practice of peacebuilding over the past two decades were also discussed.

A growing recognition has emerged that peacebuilding policies and initiatives must be country-specific and relevant to local contexts. For example, peacebuilding initiatives introduced by the UN through its Peacebuilding Commission can founder if local contexts are not sufficiently recognised and understood during the planning phase. Therefore, for external actors, a better understanding and appreciation of the culture, history, and political contexts of the countries being assisted is increasingly seen as essential for sustainable peacebuilding. The expertise and experience of the AU, Africa’s regional economic communities, and African civil society actors are needed by international actors such as the UN and the World Bank. The Botswana seminar addressed the complex ways in which regional and global ideas about peacebuilding interact with local ideas and contexts.

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2. Peacebuilding in Africa: Theory and Practice

Whose Peace? Politics, Power, and the Peacebuilding Context

The post-Cold War evolution of peacebuilding, characterised by the emergence of a wide array of local, regional, and international institutions, mechanisms and programmes with varying outcomes in different African contexts, has generated extensive debate among scholars.

Peacebuilding practice and outcomes are subject to different interpretations. They have resulted in the attainment of relative peace and stability in African countries such as Namibia and Mozambique. However, tragic failures in Rwanda and Somalia exposed peacebuilding to greater scrutiny. For example, some analysts fear that peacebuilding can prioritise negative peace (the absence of direct physical violence) through ceasefires, over positive peace (the absence of structural violence), thus neglecting other important insecurities and inequalities.

Policymakers and peacebuilders have also been criticised for improperly sequencing programmes, mechanisms, and trade-offs – for example, by emphasising rapid political and economic liberalisation that can trigger renewed conflict in fragile post-conflict situations.

Peacebuilding can also be undermined by an inadequate understanding of the political economy of war and peace, including the interests of arms and natural resource traders in prolonging conflicts. A consistent criticism of peacebuilding has been that it uses a top-down approach that ignores local contexts, actors, and initiatives which, if taken into account, could lead to longer-term, context-specific peacebuilding programmes as well as better outcomes. Concern is also growing in Africa that the peacebuilding project could be a form of “disguised imperialism”, since it often appears to be driven by foreign donors and external models of development.

Partially in response to some of these criticisms, numerous regional, continental, and international peacebuilding institutions have been established. The new institutions include the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which came into existence in 2006. NEPAD and the AU separately developed Africa-specific post-conflict reconstruction frameworks in June 2005 and July 2006 respectively. These efforts have been accompanied by a concerted review of peacebuilding mechanisms and programmes to address issues of context-specificity and local ownership.

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16 See, for example, Ali and Matthews (eds.), Durable Peace; International Peace Academy, The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa; Call, Building States to Build Peace; Pugh, Cooper and Turner (eds.), Whose Peace?
19 See, for example, Ali and Matthews (eds.), Durable Peace; Elizabeth M Cousens and Chetan Kumar (eds.), Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2001); and Jean Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998).
Tensions and contradictions can, however, still arise due to the diverse conflicting agendas and priorities of peacebuilders in four key spheres: guaranteeing security; establishing state institutions; reviving the economy; and promoting transitional justice. The wide range of peacebuilding actors and programmes operating in Africa also raises important questions about politics and hierarchy. Without hierarchy, peacebuilding can be harder to achieve; yet hierarchies can also be a source of problems and further conflict. Concern has been expressed that hierarchy both within and between countries can become a source of grievances and might explain the persistence of conflicts in some parts of Africa. Hierarchy in the global system leads to enormous discrepancies in the distribution of resources for peacebuilding. The global financial downturn of 2007-2009 can exacerbate these discrepancies and pose significant constraints for institutions based in Africa.
3. Strengthening the Security Sector

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration\(^{21}\)

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants is an integral component of peacebuilding. There is a symbiotic relationship between peacebuilding and DDR. Successful peacebuilding is important for successful DDR; DDR contributes to the secure contexts necessary for sustainable post-war recovery.\(^{22}\)

Removal of weapons from combatants, discharging combatants from military structures, and ensuring their sustainable social and economic reintegration into society can often transform ex-combatants into active participants in the peace process. A wide range of international institutions, such as the UN and its development agencies, the World Bank, the donor community, and non-governmental actors, have therefore been involved in DDR programmes implemented as a part of peacekeeping efforts. International DDR policy is often informed by neo-liberalism and its emphasis on the links between security, democracy, and development during the transition from war to peace.\(^{23}\) Templates for planning and implementing DDR tend to be designed by Western-dominated international agencies. Country-specific contexts – political, military, economic, social and cultural – should, however, also influence the design and outcomes of DDR processes.

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The specific nature of Africa’s armed conflicts demands the design of tailor-made DDR processes. It can be difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians in the aftermath of Africa’s predominantly civil wars. Ambiguity over the identity of participants eligible for DDR can lead to problematic self-demobilisation and reintegration by many combatants outside formal DDR programmes. In order to be effective, such programmes should include tailor-made projects for vulnerable groups including women, children, and disabled combatants.

Informal or traditional mechanisms such as ritual cleansing, which might be considered to be “primitive” by some external actors, and therefore excluded from formal DDR programmes, can sometimes facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants into local communities. Such mechanisms can also foster local ownership of these processes. For example, among the Acholi of Uganda, the ritual of stepping on eggs and jumping over branches of okwu shrubs sometimes facilitated the acceptance of demobilised National Resistance Army soldiers into their local communities during the 1990s.

On their own, DDR programmes cannot resolve or prevent conflicts. They should be developed and implemented as part of a wider strategy of peacebuilding in order to be sustainable. The overall economic situation in which DDR is implemented can either facilitate or impede the process. Economic expansion and reconstruction is critical for the success of DDR. The reintegration of many ex-combatants in Uganda in the 1990s was made possible by the revitalisation of the economy and the opportunities that this created for ex-combatants.

Africa has a mixed record of successful and unsuccessful DDR programmes. Countries such as Uganda are often cited as examples of successful demobilisation and reintegration, despite the fact that the process there suffered a financial squeeze, and ex-combatants were given limited reintegration assistance. In other countries, such as Mozambique, the lack of a clear disarmament strategy led to a proliferation of weapons, while demobilisation and reintegration were implemented in a haphazard fashion. Restrictive sequencing and phasing of DDR can also sometimes be counter-productive. For example, where there is a preference by parties to retain weapons, such as in Mozambique, it could be necessary to start the reintegration process before completing the disarmament of combatants.

Security Sector Governance and Peacebuilding

Security sector reform and security sector governance involve the construction or reconstruction of security institutions. The manner in which these processes are managed has a great effect on peacebuilding, given the link between the breakdown of security sector governance and the aggravation of conflicts. In many African post-conflict countries, security sector governance has often not been a priority during the transition from war to peace. The primary focus in most African post-conflict contexts, such as Burundi and the DRC, has been on aspects of security sector reform such as stabilising and normalising the security situation through training, retraining, or
professionalising core security actors, particularly the armed forces and the police, in order to strengthen their operational capacity. This process usually follows the signing of peace agreements, DDR, and integration of previously warring armed factions into national security forces. Concerns have, however, been expressed that external actors have directed security sector reform and governance, thus undermining local ownership and the creation of contextualised programmes in parts of Africa, such as in Liberia between 2003 and 2005.

While operationally effective security forces are important for the provision of improved security, the piecemeal approach to revitalising the security sector contains significant pitfalls. The promotion of effective security sector governance, including the construction or reconstruction of civilian security management and oversight bodies\(^28\) (legislative, advisory and financial) and appropriate civil society involvement, has often been neglected. For example, the DRC’s internationally driven processes between 2005 and 2010 have lacked these aspects of security sector governance.\(^29\) Many African parliaments also lack the capacity and authority to direct, regulate, and oversee security institutions in a comprehensive and effective manner.

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Exaggerating the importance of the operational capacity of military and police forces has sometimes diverted attention from strengthening justice and rule-of-law institutions such as prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, the judiciary, human rights commissions, ombudsmen, and customary/traditional justice systems. The contribution that continental and regional protocols can make to the democratic governance of security has also not been fully realised, as demonstrated by the incidence of military coups d’etat in several African countries – Madagascar, Mauritania, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau – in 2008 and 2009.

Security sector governance should be linked to transitional justice. Justice-sensitive approaches to security sector governance can facilitate the establishment of legitimate, professional, accountable security institutions that can promote and protect human rights. Yet, security sector governance and transitional justice have often been disconnected in most post-conflict situations in which security actors have committed human rights abuses. Such disconnection can undermine the prevention of future human rights violations by national security institutions.

The incidence of sexual and gender-based violence in countries such as the DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone makes the incorporation of gender issues into the construction and management of security institutions essential. Increasing the number of female recruits, preventing gender-based human rights abuses, and collaborating with women’s organisations can potentially help to promote the operational effectiveness of the security sector, thus increasing a sense of local ownership and strengthening civilian oversight of this sector.

Non-state, local justice and security networks and mechanisms, such as the gacaca courts in Rwanda, the bashingantahe traditional legal institutions in Burundi, and the magamba healers in Mozambique, have played pivotal roles in some African post-conflict contexts. These can include: community-based security fora, private security companies, and private militaries. Customary and traditional justice systems are sometimes the only accessible, legitimate, and operational institutions to administer justice to local communities after protracted conflicts. While these non-statutory mechanisms may provide security and justice for some, they are also capable of generating insecurity for others, making effective regulation and oversight necessary.

4. Justice, Human Rights, and Peacebuilding

The International Criminal Court: A Peacebuilder in Africa?32

The Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in July 2002 and is informed by the ideology that there can be “no peace without justice”. The court’s statute views justice as individualised rather than communal; criminal rather than distributive; and punitive rather than restorative.

Four African countries affected by conflict – Uganda, the DRC, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) – have been experimental cases for the ICC’s “no peace without justice” principle. The governments of Uganda, the DRC, and the CAR invited the ICC to intervene, while Sudan was referred to the ICC by the 15-member UN Security Council. In December 2003, Uganda’s government referred its long-standing military foe, the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), to the newly-established ICC. The move effectively represented an attempt to use international criminal law as a weapon to defeat the LRA. The Ugandan military intensified its military offensive, ostensibly in support of ICC arrest warrants against the LRA. Since the court’s case against the LRA depends on the Ugandan government’s support, the ICC has not yet been able to lay charges against state actors who may also have committed atrocities.

In Sudan, the ICC indicted and issued an arrest warrant against the country’s president, Omar al-Bashir, in March 2009, for alleged massive war crimes in the country’s Darfur region, where an estimated 300,000 people have perished since 2003. The government in Khartoum has denounced the ICC as a Western instrument for regime change. By contrast, rebel groups in Darfur such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and factions of the Sudan Liberation Army have embraced the court as an ally, and argued that it would be immoral to negotiate with a government led by a ‘war criminal’.

While supporters of the ICC have noted that its involvement in such cases has the potential of facilitating mediation processes and conflict settlement, many observers have also expressed concern that the court could ultimately impede peace. In Uganda, the Juba peace talks of July 2006 started after the ICC unsealed five arrest warrants for LRA commanders (including leader Joseph Kony) in October 2005. However, the final peace agreement had still not been signed in April 2010. Kony has been given several opportunities to sign the deal, but failed to appear at the signing ceremonies. Excusing himself from attending, Kony referred to the fate of Charles Taylor, the former Liberian president who was granted political asylum in Nigeria in August 2003, but was nonetheless later transferred to the Special Court for Sierra Leone in March 2006. Kony has continued to demand guarantees for his future security and further clarifications on the relationship between the peace agreement and the ICC arrest warrants.

In response to criticism that the ICC’s ‘no peace without justice’ claim might have intensified or prolonged conflict in countries such as Uganda and Sudan, court officials have argued that their mandate involves justice and not peace, and, that it might be too early to judge the court’s contribution to peace since its cases involve ongoing conflicts. Indeed, the Rome Statute of 1998, which entered into force in July 2002, rarely mentions peace as a goal of the ICC. The court is not by definition a peacebuilder. Peace should be regarded as a positive incidental outcome of the ICC’s cases and not as its raison d’être.

Human Rights and Peacebuilding

Strengthening the rule of law and the promotion and protection of human rights can contribute to sustainable peace in the aftermath of armed conflicts. Human rights violations are both significant causes and prominent features of several African conflicts, such as those in Burundi, Rwanda, the DRC, Uganda, and Sudan. National, regional, and external actors have therefore designed various mechanisms to promote and protect human rights as part of peacebuilding efforts in Africa. These initiatives include human rights monitoring, advocacy and reporting, normative programmes, capacity- and institution-building, and human rights education and training.

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Several post-conflict African countries such as Sierra Leone have established national human rights commissions to promote a human rights culture and prevent a relapse into conflict due to recurrent human rights violations. Limited financial resources have, however, undermined the potential of such commissions to discharge their mandates effectively. The Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone has been hampered by financial difficulties since UN Peacebuilding Commission funding ended in July 2008. Overall, care must be taken to ensure that the promotion and protection of human rights in the challenging context of post-conflict countries does not result in unintended consequences such as threatening fragile peace processes in countries such as Sudan and Uganda.  

The AU’s evolving continental human rights system has the potential to set standards for preventing conflicts and building peace across Africa. The system includes a 1998 protocol to establish an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which entered into force in January 2004. The court’s first judges were appointed to sit in Arusha, Tanzania, in January 2006. A further protocol to merge the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights with the African Court of Justice into a single court was adopted in 2008. However, by April 2010, only two countries (Libya and Mali) had ratified the protocol – far short of the 15 signatories needed for it to take effect. This has left the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights with continued responsibility for ensuring the restoration and protection of human rights in post-conflict African countries. The commission’s special rapporteurs and working groups are empowered to gather information on human rights situations relating to their mandate. Unlike the country mechanisms established by the UN Human Rights Council, the commission’s special rapporteurs hold only thematic mandates covering areas such as prisons and conditions of detention; human rights defenders; the rights of women in Africa; freedom of expression; refugees and internally displaced persons; and asylum-seekers. More importantly, the AU’s Policy Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development of 2006 recognises that human rights, justice, and reconciliation are critical areas for sustainable peace and development in African countries.

The UN recognises that respect for human rights is a necessary condition for peacebuilding. Since 1990, human rights field officers have been deployed to conflict and post-conflict situations in Rwanda, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti. Contemporary, multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions also now include human rights dimensions. For example, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) contains a human rights and protection section which works with national institutions and civil society to try to ensure that human rights are promoted and protected in all of Liberia’s counties. UNMIL has recorded progress in monitoring and reporting human rights violations, child protection, and the establishment of national human rights institutions, including technical and advocacy support for the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in July 2002. However, a number of human rights challenges remain that are essentially linked to Liberia’s weak judicial system.

37 African Union, Policy Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa.
5. Gender and Peacebuilding

Engendering Peacebuilding

Placing the issue of gender at the heart of peacebuilding programmes makes it possible to integrate the concerns and experiences of both women and men effectively. It is important to focus attention on the comprehensive international and continental framework set up specifically to address the marginalisation of women in peace processes.


Principal strategies for mainstreaming the issue of gender have included: addressing the impact of conflict on women – especially in relation to sexual and gender-based violence; supporting women’s full participation in, and ownership of, peacebuilding and recovery processes; and ensuring that national priorities for recovery – political, social, and economic – redress past inequalities and positively contribute to gender equality. Involving women and gender expertise in peacebuilding activities is essential for reconstituting political, legal, cultural, and socio-economic structures in order to deliver greater gender equality. Peacebuilding initiatives also present an opportunity to redress gender discrimination and past injustices and to set new precedents. Opportunities can be enhanced or constrained significantly by the kind and extent of the international community’s peacebuilding priorities and resources.

Gaps still exist between the normative international framework for engendered peace and security, and its implementation. Gender-based violence has not been eliminated by provisions for the protection of women and children in peacekeeping mandates, the deployment of female peacekeepers, and the presence of gender advisers in such missions. Gender and peace activists have thus often expressed concern that efforts at peacebuilding will remain incomplete while sexual and gender-based violence persists. The dire position of women during and after conflicts is often exacerbated by the added pressures of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, poverty, natural disasters, and environmental degradation. In some post-conflict situations, women lack protection and/or access to public services, justice, economic security, and citizenship. Post-conflict justice and security sector reform programmes have also been criticised for inappropriately considering women’s security primarily as a ‘human rights’ or ‘women’s’ issue rather than as a security sector imperative. The gender-specific impacts of macroeconomic, labour, and social protection policies also often remain largely unaddressed during periods of recovery from conflict.

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42 Jennifer F. Klot, ‘Women and Peacebuilding’.
The implementation of relevant commitments and guidelines is partly hampered by the absence of effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. This is compounded by national weaknesses caused by a frequent lack of funding, bureaucratic inefficiency, and the fragmentation of responsibility for women’s issues across a number of UN agencies. Lack of progress can also be attributed to a lack of understanding of the real purpose and intention behind UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008) and other UN resolutions on women, peace, and security. Further obstacles to progress are presented by hierarchical – especially patriarchal – systems which exacerbate gender discrimination and the maltreatment of children during armed conflicts.

Placing gender at the heart of peacebuilding processes should be seen not simply as the inclusion of women in these initiatives, but as a broader transformation of structures, policies, perceptions, attitudes, patriarchal beliefs, norms, and relationships. It is therefore misleading to confine gender equality merely to the number of women occupying positions of power. Critical mass, although necessary, is insufficient and should be viewed as just a first step towards achieving gender equality. Further measures need to be put in place for identifying legal and social barriers to the participation of women in peace processes. Importantly, quotas “should not overshadow long-term strategies that address women’s socio-economic marginalisation.”

Ms Yasmin Sooka, Foundation for Human Rights, Johannesburg, South Africa

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44 Heidi Hudson, ‘When Feminist Theory meets Peacebuilding Policy’.
The Case of Sierra Leone\(^{47}\)

Turning to a case study, the signing of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement signalled the beginning of the end of a decade-long conflict in Sierra Leone. The case of Sierra Leone, where women have been both victims and perpetrators, shows that women play different roles during various stages of conflict. As perpetrators, women participated in armed groups in which they served as combatants, killers, spies, messengers, porters and looters. As victims, women suffered a range of human rights violations such as killing, mutilation, torture, abduction, sexual slavery, and rape. An estimated 250,000 women were subjected to rape, sexual slavery, and other crimes of sexual violence during the conflict in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2000.*

The dominant perception of women as victims obscured their role as peacebuilders. The case of Sierra Leone also demonstrated the key role that women’s peace activism can play in helping to end conflicts and to instigate democracy in African countries. As peace activists, women took on the roles of mediators, trauma-healing counsellors, and political lobbyists in an attempt to address the main causes of violence and to find ways of transforming key political relationships. Women also played important roles in helping to reintegrate young ex-combatants into local communities, deliver humanitarian aid to populations in need, and organise feeding programmes for women in camps. Two major women’s groups – Women Organised for a Morally Enlightened Nation, and the Sierra Leone Women’s Movement for Peace – were influential at the two National Consultative Conferences in 1995 that pressured the National Provisional Ruling Council military junta into holding elections and handing over power to Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in 1996.

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The UN Peacebuilding Commission adopted Sierra Leone as one of its first focus countries, and, in January 2007, its Peacebuilding Support Office and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) jointly convened a National Consultation for Enhancing Women’s Engagement in Sierra Leone. The women’s national consultation enlightened women leaders and civil society organisations about the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and set out important policy recommendations. These included the provision of physical, psycho-social, and economic support for survivors of sexual violence, including immediate access to fistula surgery, and testing and treatment for HIV/AIDS and other sexually-transmitted diseases. Addressing the needs of children born of rape was also recommended as a priority. Other recommendations included: the creation of safe houses for young female survivors of sexual and gender-based violence and the provision of training for female counsellors to support them; 50 percent quotas for the participation of young women in youth employment schemes; and special programmes for girls not reached by DDR programmes.

The selection of the Mano River Women’s Network for Peace as one of two civil society representatives on the UN Peacebuilding Fund National Steering Committee represented a commitment to women’s participation in the Peacebuilding Commission’s work. The Commission has played an effective role in facilitating gender-aware legal and judicial reforms, and is credited with providing much-needed political support to ensure the long-overdue adoption of a legal framework that outlaws domestic violence and seeks to ensure women’s rights to inherit and own property. However, as with many attempts to place gender at the heart of political, social, and economic processes, the passing of gender-sensitive legislation in Sierra Leone has not been able, by itself, to eliminate gender-based violence and gender inequality in the short-term. Promoting gender equality for peace also requires a host of other simultaneous interventions guided by a holistic perspective.
6. Pan-African Institutions

The AU and NEPAD Post-Conflict Frameworks and the African Development Bank


The AfDB’s Fragile States Facility runs three grant programmes for post-conflict countries: a Supplemental Support Window consisting of $272.4 million in 2008; an Arrears Clearance Window consisting of $120 million in 2008; and a Targeted Support Window of $27.2 million in 2008. A Post-Conflict Country Facility (PCCF) was established in 2004 with the purpose of assisting eligible countries in clearing their arrears. This facility, which is closely linked with that of the World Bank and the IMF, has helped countries such as Burundi and Congo-Brazzaville to qualify for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Programme and, more recently, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. Burundi was the first beneficiary of the PCCF and gained access – valued at $826 million – to its HIPC programme in September 2005. This initiative sought to promote stability in Burundi by supporting the resettlement of internally displaced persons, infrastructure development, and the improvement of healthcare and education. The AfDB has also helped to implement a national project in Burundi to restore electricity infrastructure damaged during conflict in the country since 1993. Countries such as the DRC, Liberia, and the Comoros have also benefited from the PCCF.

AfDB funding has further supported the construction of Sierra Leone’s Bumbuna hydroelectric power plant, which is expected to provide electricity to 8,000 consumers in three towns. The Bank has also backed the Mano River Union (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea) and Côte d’Ivoire Sub-Regional HIV/AIDS Project for refugees and internally displaced persons. Host communities have provided voluntary counselling and testing services to over 3,200 people as part of the project. Such AfDB initiatives have a direct impact on local populations and help to establish peace and stability after conflicts. The Bank works closely with the AU, as NEPAD’s de facto implementation and financial management arm.
The AfDB has also helped the ECOWAS Peace and Development Support Project that was launched in March 2006. This backing demonstrates the Bank’s support for NEPAD’s African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, particularly its drive to expand the peacebuilding capacity of Africa’s regional economic communities. The AfDB’s West Africa Peace and Development Support Project crafts and implements regional strategies to prevent conflict, and also promotes development programmes to repair infrastructure damaged by war. Programmes are further geared towards strengthening institutional capacity in post-conflict states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.

NEPAD and the AU developed post-conflict reconstruction frameworks in June 2005 and July 2006 respectively. The frameworks provide an overall strategy which countries can adapt to develop their own context-specific plans. The AU’s framework was crafted to take account of the evolving continental peace and security architecture, including the AU’s 15-member Peace and Security Council, a strengthened AU Commission, the Union’s conflict early warning system, its Peacekeeping Support Facility, and its Panel of the Wise. This framework identifies five key peacebuilding areas: security; political transition, governance and participation; human rights, justice and reconciliation; socio-economic development; and resource mobilisation. The system involves many actors including the AU, NEPAD, regional economic communities, civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and the private sector. The AU and NEPAD emphasise the importance of building capacity in post-conflict countries in order to facilitate local ownership and sustainable programmes. Co-ordination, however, needs to be improved between the AU and NEPAD secretariats based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and in Midrand, South Africa, respectively. In addition, both organisations lack sufficient peacebuilding resources and capacity.
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding as Statebuilding: the Case of the Pan-African Ministers Conference of Public/Civil Service

Africa’s post-conflict reconstruction and development agenda is related to issues of political governance and public administration. The Pan-African Ministers Conference of Public/Civil Service, set up by African Ministers of Public Service and Administration in 1994, illustrates how non-state actors can contribute to post-conflict reconstruction and development processes by reinforcing the delivery and administration of public services. Since 1996, the conference has helped to set the continent’s statebuilding agenda by focusing on improving the effectiveness of post-conflict governance, service delivery, and public administration. The pan-African ministers have identified African mechanisms that recognise the importance of sound political governance and public administration at national and local levels and how these can contribute to successful peacebuilding on the continent. The mechanism includes the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development draft policy framework of 2006 and NEPAD’s 2001 Foundation Document on Conditions of Sustainable Development in Africa. The AU and NEPAD undertook to support conference initiatives such as the Africa Public Service Charter of 2001, which aims to strengthen the capacity of African Ministers of Public Service to support development efforts on the continent. The charter commits African governments to behave ethically and adhere to high standards of governance, transparency and accountability in public service administration.

The pan-African ministers have also formulated a Building of Capable States strategy, which advocates measures for public service reconstruction, macro-organisation of states, and devising anti-corruption measures that are consistent with those contained in NEPAD’s Governance Initiative. The ministers further aim to help African governments to develop capacity to implement sustainable institutional and policy measures that can mobilise resources to support domestic development; adapt, for domestic use, the AU and NEPAD’s agendas for continental development, democratic governance, and peace and security; and promote continental integration. The pan-African ministers have supported a developmental state concept that encourages African governments to intervene in the economy supported by effective and accountable public administration institutions. This approach supports the decentralisation of power and resources to local governments in order to allow proximity to local populations in delivering social services and promoting local democracy. Political commitment and leadership, adequate financial resources, and sufficient technical and managerial capacity are also required for planning, budgeting, and implementation and monitoring at local government level. Partnerships between the state, the private sector, and civil society are also important for supporting democratic governance, public service delivery, and socio-economic development. The Pan-African Ministers Conference has organised an Africa Public Service Day – held on 23 June every year – to underscore and publicise the purpose of civil service reform. The day also stresses the need to inculcate and nurture “good governance”, efficient public service delivery, and reconstruction of the public sector to meet Africa’s challenges more effectively.

The conference further recognises the importance of engaging with Africa’s five key regional economic communities (SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD, ECCAS, and the AMU) in the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the Africa Public Service Charter. The involvement of these regional economic bodies in enhancing continental public administration could also deepen regional integration in Africa.

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7. Case Studies: Central Africa and the Great Lakes

Peacebuilding in Central Africa: Chad and the Central African Republic

The UN Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda was expanded in 2008 to include a fourth African country – the Central African Republic. The CAR, described by some as an “aid orphan”, had experienced protracted violent conflict since independence in 1960 and still faces an array of political, socio-economic, and security challenges.

Peacemaking efforts by regional and international actors failed to convince the political factions within the country to agree on a path to reconciliation and sustained peace until 2005. Sensing a chance for stability, the UN announced that year that a Peacebuilding Support Office would replace the UN Mission in the CAR in order to step up support for peacebuilding efforts in the country. Regional organisations such as the Community of Sahel Saharan States, and the Economic Monetary Community of Central Africa, as well as the Economic Community of Central African States, were also involved in this process as part of FOMUC – a Central African multinational force created to restore order in Bangui after a failed coup attempt in 2002. The European Union Force (EUFOR) later deployed troops in the CAR and Chad. The European Union military operation was deployed from January 2008 to March 2009, before it was taken over by the UN. These efforts have been driven largely by France – one of five veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council – in an area that it considers to be a key sphere of influence.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission identified four important peacebuilding priorities in the CAR: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants; security sector reform; the promotion of “good governance” and the rule of law; and the establishment of development hubs. However, concern has been expressed that the local actors in the CAR do not own the peacebuilding process in their country. A DDR steering committee has since been established, with the UN Peacebuilding Fund releasing $4 million to kick-start the process. The country also plans to establish a National Committee on Human Rights. Peace efforts in neighbouring Chad have also encountered significant challenges. Chad is ranked fourth on the 2009 Fund for Peace Failed States Index. The dire situation in the country is aggravated by its entanglement in a regional security complex also involving the CAR and Sudan. With the exception of the 1999 Khartoum Reconciliation Agreement, a series of pre-negotiation deals – mainly struck between the government and rebel forces between 1992 and 2005 – all failed. Peace initiatives, involving the Chadian and Sudanese governments without including Chadian rebel groups, have also been attempted. However, both the 2009 Doha Agreement and 2008 Dakar agreements failed. The governments of Libya and Qatar have continued to try to mediate between the governments of Chad and Sudan.

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62 Briefing to the UN Security Council by the UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Lynn B. Pascoe, June 2009.
Most of Chad's territory has been destabilised by rebel groups and banditry. The situation in eastern Chad has been especially severe, with humanitarian aid required for thousands of refugees. The country has long been recognised as an area of important geo-strategic significance. The discovery of oil in 1993 – which currently accounts for 90 per cent of Chad’s exports – has increased the significance of its role within the region. Other resources such as cotton, and especially minerals including diamonds, bauxite, silver, uranium and titanium, add to the country’s potential for economic growth. However, despite such natural endowments, the private sector is virtually non-existent in Chad. Control of the state is viewed mainly in terms of wealth creation and accumulation. The economic woes of President Idriss Déby’s government have also been exacerbated by continued political instability which has meant that the government is often the weaker partner in negotiations with international actors, frequently left with little choice but to sign unfavourable economic deals.

Negotiating Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Lusaka Peace Protocol of 1999, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue of 2001 to 2002, and the 2002 Pretoria Agreement, which partly ended a far-reaching conflict in the DRC that had drawn in six countries of the region and led to an estimated 3 million deaths, are widely considered as successes for regional mediation efforts. Regional actors led the peace efforts, which were, importantly, supported by international actors, including the UN. Eminent Southern African leaders, including former presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola, and Ketumile Masire of Botswana, were instrumental in brokering the peace accords. South Africa provided significant logistical and financial support for the all-inclusive Inter-Congolese Dialogue of 2001/2002. The success of peacemaking efforts would also not have been possible without the will and support of key Congolese stakeholders.

The continuing insecurity in some parts of the DRC in 2009 – notably in Ituri and Kivu provinces – stalled the progress of international peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The violence showed that the Lusaka Peace Agreement and Inter-Congolese Dialogue had not adequately addressed underlying issues and major grievances such as ethnic tensions and competition over resources. These mediation efforts have also been criticised for neglecting transitional justice issues. Another concern has been that these efforts have focused on the international and regional aspects of the conflict in the DRC at the expense of important national issues such as the persistence of weak and poor governance capacity, especially in rural areas where there are often few formal government structures.

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8. Case Studies: West Africa

Statebuilding and Elections in West Africa: Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire

During the past twenty years in Sierra Leone and Liberia, local, regional, and external actors have shown that they can establish partnerships to implement statebuilding and elections that promote context-specific peacebuilding and manage political tensions. In contrast, neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire has demonstrated the limitations of internationally sponsored statebuilding processes.

In Sierra Leone, external support for a national action plan was at first rhetorical. The plan sought, among other things, to restore security, reform the army and police, strengthen national justice institutions, and regulate a diamond sector tainted by “blood diamonds.” Limited international assistance – the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) represented the only significant intervention after 1991 – led to a resumption of conflict in 1998. The conflict continued until the Lomé Peace Accord of July 1999.

The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and Britain – the former colonial power and one of five veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council – only adopted robust and aggressive peacekeeping measures and intensified their engagement after the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) took 500 UN peacekeepers hostage in May 2000. The new approach laid a basis for significant partnership between local and international state-building actors to construct legitimate and functioning state institutions, including in priority sectors identified by the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Tensions between Britain and UNAMSIL after the hostage crisis, the rivalry between Britain and Nigeria over leadership of the process, and fissures around the role of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, were all constructively addressed. The security-first approach advocated by London also helped to stabilise the country.

Unity of purpose and collaboration between local and international actors around the agenda laid out by the government in Freetown only unravelled when Sierra Leone’s government resisted programmes for addressing corruption, public revenue management, and service delivery imposed by Britain’s Department for International Development (DFID).

The conduct of elections in Sierra Leone in 2007, five years after the formal end of the country’s civil war, was a major milestone in peacebuilding efforts. An independent national election commission managed the election without UN assistance. Reconstructed security forces provided appropriate support to the election commission. However, despite the success of the government and its international partners in many areas, Sierra Leone also demonstrated the limits of international intervention in the transformation of war-torn...
societies. External actors failed to change the political relations and agendas underlying previous conflicts. For example, the voting patterns in the 2007 elections, in which the major parties – the northern-based All People’s Congress (APC) and the south-eastern based Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) – retained control over their traditional constituencies, demonstrated the continuing dominance of ethnicity and regionalism in the country’s politics.

In Liberia, external actors drew lessons from Sierra Leone’s experience of statebuilding. The need to establish security nationwide was identified and satisfied through the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia in 2003. It was also recognised that conducting national elections without changing the underlying political landscape would be counter-productive. To lay the foundation for building legitimate state institutions and conducting elections, international actors in Liberia, including ECOWAS and the UN, neutralised ‘spoilers’ such as Charles Taylor and other status quo elements including former government of Liberia forces, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). UNMIL and other international actors then partnered a benevolent local coalition of human rights activists and pro-democracy forces to create a political framework conducive for organising credible elections. Successful elections, in line with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2003, opened a window of opportunity for Liberians to own the statebuilding enterprise. President Ellen Sirleaf Johnson, elected in November 2005, took the initiative and singled out four priority statebuilding areas to which international assistance could be directed: security; revitalisation of the economy; “good governance”; and delivery of basic infrastructure and services. A Reconstruction and Development Committee was established to oversee the government’s short-term poverty reduction strategy and to co-ordinate external aid.
Tensions arose between local and international actors, with the Liberian government taking a negative view of the largely internationally driven Governance and Economic Management Programme agreed upon before 2005 elections with Liberia’s previous, transitional government. In particular, the programme’s provision for the deployment of international experts with co-signatory authority in Liberia’s public revenue management was viewed as unduly intrusive by President Sirleaf-Johnson’s government.

Unlike Sierra Leone and Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire demonstrated the pitfalls of international assistance in the area of statebuilding. Ivorian government resistance to international intervention can be explained by its view that international actors such as the UN were close to France – the former colonial power. President Laurent Gbagbo’s supporters expressed concern that the Gallic intervention in the country’s civil war – backed by 4,600 French troops – was informed by neo-colonial objectives.

Arguments about identity and citizenship issues have been central to statebuilding initiatives in Côte d’Ivoire. Recognition by the Ivorian parties that a military solution was not the right approach to adopt, contributed to the building of consensus for a domestic political solution. The support of ECOWAS, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, and the AU for an internal solution resulted in the signing of the 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Accord by President Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro, leader of the rebel New Forces. France and the wider international community were effectively excluded from this African-led mediation process. Notwithstanding problems of implementing the peace accord’s provisions – such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; the extension of the state’s administration to the rebel-controlled North; and the relaunching of mobile courts – the agreement opened up space for the resolution of the country’s identity and citizenship problems. Frequently postponed national elections had still not been held by May 2010.  

The Management of Natural Resources and Peacebuilding in Nigeria’s Niger Delta

Crude oil production and oil revenue management have been at the heart of the conflicts in Nigeria’s petroleum-rich but impoverished Niger Delta region. Disaffection about oil production and the Nigerian government’s formula for allocating oil revenues resulted in the ethnic Ijaw – who comprise half of the Niger Delta’s population – engaging in an unsuccessful attempt to secede from the federation in 1966. The same issues played a role in the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970, sparked by the Eastern region’s proclamation of the Independent Republic of Biafra in May 1967. The end of the civil war, which resulted in over one million deaths, did not eliminate the prominent role that oil has played in the Niger Delta’s system of conflicts.

Since Nigeria’s civil war ended in 1970, ten issues have shaped the relationship between the management of natural resources (mainly oil) and peacebuilding in the political economy of the Niger Delta.

First, the Petroleum Act enacted by the federal government in 1969 vested the entire ownership and control of petroleum in the central government in Lagos. Similarly, the Land Use Act of 1978 dispossessed oil-producing communities of their land. Prior to the Nigerian civil war, communities in the Niger Delta held property rights, and oil revenue was allocated on the basis of an established derivation formula. Although the subsequent centralisation of oil revenue collection and allocation augmented the federal budget, the central government – which is dominated by non-Deltan Nigerians – has often shown scant regard for environmental degradation in the area. The federal government’s dependence on oil revenues, which represent more than 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings, has resulted in collusion between the state and foreign oil companies to the detriment of local populations in the Delta. The inefficiency and corruption characteristic of the modern Nigerian state have crippled the federal government’s development initiatives for the region such as the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission of 1992 and the Niger Delta Development Commission of 2001.

Second, the Nigerian Federal Government’s abdication of its statutory community development role to foreign oil companies, such as Shell, Chevron, and Exxon-Mobil, has arguably transferred the governance of the Niger Delta to these firms. In 2005, a survey of 18 communities in the region showed that 39 per cent of people depended on oil firms for electricity. Competition among communities for the basic amenities provided by foreign oil companies has clearly contributed to conflicts. The blurring of the distinction between the responsibilities of the state and the social responsibility of corporations, coupled with an attendant lack of accountability, have resulted in sustained looting and diversion of oil wealth, as well as violent rent-seeking behaviour.

Third, while the vice-president of Nigeria in 2009, Goodluck Jonathan, was a Niger Delta Ijaw, his office was practically powerless under the domineering shadow of the presidency. Many derided the office as resembling the role of a dutiful “house boy”. It was argued that such political office-sharing was irrelevant to peacebuilding efforts and the development of the Niger Delta. With President Umaru Yar’Adua’s death from illness in May 2010, Jonathan became president, but Nigeria’s political uncertainty continued.

Fourth, while democracy has the potential for promoting peacebuilding, democratic elections in Nigeria since 1990 have been accompanied by increasing youth militancy and violence financed by opportunistic vote-seeking politicians from the Niger Delta.

Fifth, the economic interests of powerful Western countries (Britain, the United States and France), whose firms are benefiting from the status quo, as well as strong resistance from Abuja, resulted in an international reluctance to exert pressure on the Nigerian government to address the Niger Delta crisis as a matter of urgency. Policy recommendations emerging from several conferences to discuss the crisis remain unimplemented.

73 Jedrzej Georg Frynas, Oil in Nigeria, pp. 54-56.
Sixth, no agreement has been reached over the choice of mediator for the Niger Delta crisis. While many have favoured an impartial and credible African mediator such as former UN Secretary-General, Ghana’s Kofi Annan, the government followed a different path. It appointed Nigerian UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari in June 2008, thus upsetting the Delta region’s leaders because they complained that Gambari had served under past military regimes. The opposition led to Gambari withdrawing from the process without engaging with the parties.

Seventh, the existence of militant splinter groups, driven by conflicting interests and vacillating between genuine protest and criminality, makes it difficult to deal comprehensively with the Niger Delta crisis.

Eighth, while the federal government has granted militant groups a series of amnesties under specific conditions, a key challenge remains the planning of a credible and attractive plan for the sustainable social and economic reintegration into local communities of militants who surrender their weapons.

Ninth, the Nigerian government has faced a dilemma: should it sacrifice justice for peace by granting blanket amnesty for violent acts and criminality committed in the Niger Delta? This decision was made by the granting of amnesty in 2009 for the surrender of weapons by militants.

Finally, the violence in the Niger Delta has seriously damaged Nigeria’s oil revenues. The country lost an estimated $61.6 billion to sabotage and oil theft between 2006 and 2008, and Angola overtook Nigeria as the continent’s largest oil producer in 2008. Oil companies and government agencies have resorted to paying militants to safeguard their oil installations and personnel, effectively buying short-term peace at the expense of promoting sustainable peacebuilding in the Delta.
9. Case Studies: Southern Africa

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Namibia, Angola and Mozambique

Three southern African countries — Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique — have experienced UN-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants to create sustainable, secure and peaceful frameworks. In Namibia, local, regional, and international stakeholders worked together to neutralise the challenges to the effective implementation of DDR.

In 1989-1990, the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) — the world body’s first multidimensional peace operation — successfully executed its mandate to supervise Namibia’s transition to independence. This mandate included the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants. The confidence and commitment of local parties to a robust UNTAG presence facilitated disarmament and demobilisation efforts. Over 50,000 soldiers were disarmed and demobilised under UNTAG’s supervision. However, the failure of Namibia’s independent government to plan and implement comprehensive reintegration programmes for the demobilised combatants undermined successful disarmament and demobilisation, and threatened national stability in the post-1990 period.

Dr Gwinyayi Dzinesa, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa


In Angola, local, regional, and international actors collaborated to undermine the potential for DDR to contribute to sustainable peace after two and a half decades of civil war. Two UN Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM II and III of June 1991 to February 1995, and February 1995 to June 1997 respectively) and the Observation Mission in Angola (MONUA) of June 1997 to February 1999, were all derailed by a lack of commitment to the peace process by local parties – particularly Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA). Under UNAVEM II, only 54 percent of the 150,000 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government forces and 24 percent of UNITA’s 60,000 soldiers had gathered at assembly points two weeks before the September 1992 elections, while only 8,800 troops had been integrated into the new Angolan armed forces before the polls.\(^\text{78}\) Loopholes in the poorly-managed disarmament and demobilisation processes allowed the MPLA and UNITA to retain combat readiness and return to war after UNITA rejected the outcome of the 1992 election.\(^\text{79}\) Some countries in the region, such as Togo and the DRC, reportedly colluded in helping UNITA to break UN sanctions.\(^\text{80}\) Similar local, regional, and external forces later undercut the efforts of UNAVEM III and MONUA.

In Mozambique, the presence of a UN mission – UNOMOZ – failed to create sufficient security guarantees to win the confidence of the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the rebel Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and to inspire both sides to adhere to their disarmament obligations under the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique of October 1992. About 100,000 soldiers were demobilised.\(^\text{81}\) Despite collecting only a small portion of an estimated 500,000 to six million weapons,\(^\text{82}\) UNOMOZ left Mozambique soon after the October 1994 election. The failure of disarmament has left the country and region afflicted by a small-arms scourge. The reintegration programme – the major component of which was a two-year cash scheme – did not guarantee the long-term economic revitalisation of demobilised combatants. Against a backdrop of limited clinical and psycho-social support, traditional healing and reconciliation practices facilitated the reintegration of combatants – especially child soldiers – into their local communities.\(^\text{83}\)

### Security Sector Governance in Botswana\(^\text{84}\)

It took Botswana 42 years after it gained independence in 1966 to initiate the development of a national security strategy – which it finally did in 2008. Botswana has so far enjoyed stable civil-military relations. Historically, its security policy has been centralised in the office of the president. Before the 1990s, the policy was geared towards facilitating the country’s defence against the security forces of the former Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe).

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\(^{82}\) Virginia Cantha, *Small Arms in Southern Africa* p. 42.


and apartheid South Africa, which had been pursuing a brutal “total national strategy” to destabilise independent southern African states supportive of African liberation movements, particularly in the 1980s. Although the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 altered the sub-regional geo-strategic framework, Botswana did not carry out a defence review to realign its national security architecture with the changed political circumstances.

Botswana’s record of conducting regular multi-party elections has largely stifled academic debate about the democratic control of its security sector. However, although the security sector has always been subordinated to civilian control, this does not automatically mean the sector is subject to proper democratic control. In 2007, a new intelligence and security framework was established. A code of secrecy underpins the intelligence and security system’s operations, denying key actors access to important information and undermining the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight.

Growing concern has been expressed that Botswana could become a “police state” in which people’s civil liberties are suppressed. In his inauguration address in April 2008, Botswana’s President, General Seretse Ian Khama, said that the nation should be guided by the principles of democracy, development, dignity, and discipline: “the 4 Ds”. Since then, security agencies have been increasingly deployed on Botswana’s roads, supposedly to maintain law and order.

The growing role of serving and retired security officers in government institutions has given rise to fears of a progressive securitisation/militarisation of the apparatus of state. The president and his deputy, General Mompati Merafhe, are both former commanders of the Botswana Defence Force. Several retired military officers have also been appointed to key government positions. Some fear that the country might be moving towards militarised rule and that the discipline stressed by President Khama is of the military type that does not tolerate dissent. The experiences with security sector governance in Botswana show that African countries may face difficult pressures and tensions, even when they are not emerging from civil conflict.

86 Laombana Kanani, “We will Rule this Country Militarily if Need Be - Merafhe”, Echo, 4 September 2008, p.3.
10. Case Study: Eastern Africa

Building Peace in Sudan: A Daunting Task

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005 between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) ended Africa’s longest civil war, which first erupted in 1955. The peace deal is peculiar in that, while it advocates national democratic governance, the promotion and protection of people’s rights, and the importance of national unity; the accord simultaneously recognises the right of the people of South Sudan to self-determination.

The agreement provides for a ‘one country, two systems’ configuration, with a central Government of National Unity and a largely independent Government of Southern Sudan. This arrangement allows the northern and southern regions of the country qualified autonomy and preservation of their distinct cultures and religions until a crucial 2011 self-determination referendum for South Sudan.

While the war in Sudan’s western region of Darfur has deflected global attention and resources from the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, concerns over a return to conflict have focused renewed international attention on South Sudan.

The implementation of the 2005 agreement has suffered setbacks, but real progress has been made in effecting its power- and wealth-sharing provisions.

In terms of power-sharing, 2005 saw the adoption of an interim national constitution, the inauguration of a three-member presidency, and the establishment of a national legislature. Under the agreement, national commissions have been created, including the Ceasefire Political Commission which comprises monitoring teams made up of members of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the SPLA. South Sudan’s constitution, government, legislative assembly, and national commissions have also been established. The creation of executive and legislative institutions in both North and South Sudan has started. The peace deal’s guiding principles for the management and development of the strategic oil sector and sharing of oil revenue have also been implemented. Structural problems in the South have, however, meant that the inflow of petroleum revenues of about $6 billion between 2005 and 2008, has not translated into a visible ‘peace dividend’ for the population at large.

In the area of security, the ceasefire zone along the North-South administrative border has been fairly effectively supervised by the ceasefire monitoring framework, which includes the Ceasefire Political Commission, and a Ceasefire Joint Military Committee comprising the Sudanese Armed Forces, the SPLA, and UN military

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observers, chaired by the force commander of the UN Mission in Sudan, Nepalese general, Paban Jung Thapa. However, mutual distrust between the ruling National Congress Party and the SPLM has affected prospects for the establishment of joint integrated units comprising personnel from the national army and the SPLA, and intended to serve as the nucleus of a unitary national defence force.

The international community has set up two multi-donor trust funds to finance and co-ordinate post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts for both North and South Sudan. By the end of June 2008, 18 humanitarian, recovery and development projects valued at $3.3 billion were being implemented, mainly by 36 UN agencies such as the UN Development Programme, the UN Children's Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the World Health Organisation. Meanwhile, an AU ministerial Committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Sudan has largely failed to mobilise sufficient African funding for identified reconstruction projects.

Although the underlying aim of the donor-funded projects is to achieve a tangible “peace dividend”, which is central to “making unity attractive” for the South, the slow progress of the projects might influence the Southern Sudanese to vote against unity and in favour of independence in the 2011 self-determination referendum. The absence of strong state institutions and infrastructure in South Sudan, however, raises serious questions about the viability of its existence as an independent state. Increasing hostility and a weakening of the mechanisms of dialogue between the North and South Sudan governments could also see a return to armed conflict with catastrophic national and regional consequences. Against such a precarious backdrop, and given the disputes over the findings of Sudan’s 2008 national census, which will be used for delimiting electoral boundaries, pessimism is growing about the implementation and aftermath of national elections in 2010 and the referendum scheduled for 2011.
11. Institutions and Ideologies

The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission:
Problems and Prospects

The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in December 2005 created high expectations in Africa. The Commission was established to fill an institutional gap within the UN system in response to a recommendation by the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which submitted its report to then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in December 2004.

The panel concluded that a failure to invest adequately in longer-term peacebuilding increased the chances that countries would relapse into conflict. It has been estimated that, after the Cold War, almost 50 percent of all countries receiving peacebuilding assistance relapse into conflict within five years, while 72 percent of peacebuilding operations leave in place authoritarian regimes. More than 16 African countries are in the process of implementing peace agreements signed since 1999. The first cases on the Commission’s agenda are all in Africa: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and the CAR. The Commission’s main purpose is to assemble peacebuilding stakeholders to mobilise resources and assist in the formulation of integrated peacebuilding strategies for countries emerging from conflict. A Peacebuilding Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund, which complement the Commission, complete the UN’s present peacebuilding architecture. The four African countries on the Commission’s agenda have all emerged from protracted violent conflicts. A one-size-fits-all peacebuilding approach is impossible due to the different contexts and nature of these conflicts.

High expectations for the performance and effectiveness of the Commission should, however, be tempered by a realistic appraisal of its ambitious goals. Peacebuilding is a long-term process, the results of which should be measured against a long-term perspective.

An early assessment of the Commission’s performance in Africa reveals conceptual, structural, and operational constraints. The lack of a generally agreed definition of peacebuilding and its best practice has led some analysts to view the peacebuilding process as a fractured and decentralised international activity. Low-intensity conflicts that persist in many African countries despite signed peace agreements remain another major challenge. The UN Peacebuilding Commission might fail to address these conflicts effectively since its current...
The conceptualisation of peacebuilding excludes preventive mechanisms. The Commission is also inhibited by its status as an inter-governmental advisory body without secure and consistent funding. The body is under-resourced and under-capacitated, giving rise to concerns that it might become yet another failed, well-intentioned initiative by the UN. The establishment of the Commission creates a basis for closer collaboration between the UN, the AU, Africa’s regional economic communities, and civil society actors on the continent. However, important questions remain as to how best to establish an effective division of labour between all the key actors, and what vision of peacebuilding should guide their activities and programmes on the ground.\(^98\)

Within the UN system, the relationship between the Commission, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council has proved to be complex and problematic. It is feared that the Commission, in its current form, cannot deliver on the transformation required to build durable peace in Africa. Another fear is that the Commission will be hindered by the neo-liberal conception of peacebuilding that informs its work – the premise that democratic institutions and market mechanisms can ultimately provide stable foundations for building peace.\(^99\) Concerns have been expressed that a central role for the Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – and their emphasis on strict fiscal discipline and cuts in social spending, could further constrain the Commission’s post-conflict reconstruction activities.\(^100\) Another concern is that rich countries from the North could use their disproportionate representation on the Commission to promote their own parochial national agendas.

Despite its weaknesses in critical areas, the Commission remains an important initiative that straddles the security and development peacebuilding nexus. The body’s co-ordinating role can enhance regional approaches to dealing with conflict. Regional actors are often brought on board in the Commission’s country-specific meetings.\(^101\) The UN Peacebuilding Support Office and Working Group on Lessons Learned can also inform theory, propose solutions to problems in the field, and help to mainstream peacebuilding into the UN and global system.\(^102\)

\(^101\) “The UN Peacebuilding Commission: Benefits and Challenges”, pp. 46.
\(^102\) The Stanley Foundation, ‘Peacebuilding Following Conflict’.
Financing Peace? The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have provided technical expertise and finance to assist post-conflict reconstruction and development processes in Africa. The Bank has established a dedicated Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, a Post-Conflict Fund, and a Low-Income Countries Under Stress Trust Fund. The involvement of the World Bank and the IMF in peacebuilding initiatives reinforces certain ideas, policies, and priorities. For example, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), designed in the 1980s and imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions in many African countries immediately after conflicts, have been widely criticised. These programmes often tend to constrain post-conflict reconstruction efforts through their emphasis on strict fiscal discipline and cuts in social spending, which often occur at the expense of promoting human development through substantial social investment. Such restrictive economic models often fail to build on the way that people survived economically both before and during conflicts.

The espousal of a normative neo-liberal framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development by the Bank and the Fund has also been widely criticised. Opponents say that such a framework fosters the narrow agendas of the two financial institutions and powerful Western governments at the expense of relevant African-owned programmes. These critics further argue that the promotion of neo-liberal economic policies for Africa entrenches the power of capital over society. According to this critique, such policies tend to focus on formal economic structures, whereas many people’s livelihoods in Africa are based on informal economic activities. Although the World Bank group – through its International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – successfully supported the post-Second World War reconstruction of Europe after 1945, concern has been expressed that African governments have been pressured to implement market-oriented approaches to peacebuilding that exacerbate short-term distributional conflicts. Rapid market reforms that are inappropriate to realities on the ground in post-conflict African countries can also inflame political tensions and encourage a return to conflict.

The World Bank wields disproportionate power in its dealings with potential post-conflict aid recipients. The Bank’s ability to negotiate directly with the leadership of former warring parties provides it with first-hand accounts of the parties’ post-conflict plans. International private economic actors who are not privy to this information rely on the Bank’s stamp of approval before investing heavily in conflict countries. The World Bank can thus use its financial resources and advisory role as leverage over post-conflict African countries desperate to maximise cash injections to alleviate budgetary constraints. Concern has also been expressed that World Bank aid commitments are sometimes disbursed on the basis of political rather than economic considerations.

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107 See, for example, Paris, At War’s End.

The conditionalities imposed on post-conflict governments – especially by the IMF – have been criticised for undermining the sovereignty of states that are borrowing money. This approach could also exclude local ownership of projects that are essential to legitimacy and success. Unsustainable debt burdens shouldered by developing countries have been blamed on excessive credit lines extended by development banks. The World Bank’s approach has, however, shifted from Structural Adjustment Programmes to poverty reduction and reconstruction projects, through its Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Programme. Evidence from the ground, nevertheless, does not indicate improved macroeconomic conditions, a significant fall in debt burdens, or less poverty in these countries.

Participants of the policy advisory group seminar, “Peacebuilding in Post-Cold War Africa”, Gaborone, Botswana

12. Conclusion And Policy Recommendations

Peacebuilding is a complex and intricate process that takes time and consists of many contradictory pressures and objectives. Legitimate hierarchies and an appropriate division of labour among and between peacebuilding actors and programmes need to be established in order to facilitate effective peacebuilding.

This must be based on a better understanding and appreciation of the interplay between the different local, regional, and international actors, as well as the interests that are at stake in peacebuilding initiatives. At times, these interests converge, but sometimes they conflict, so peacebuilding must be recognised as an inherently political activity. There are beneficiaries, but also costs and unintended consequences. These benefits and costs must be properly understood in different peacebuilding contexts. Care must also be taken to ensure local ownership of peace processes, which is central to peacebuilding efforts and initiatives. Local ownership may go a long way to guaranteeing the sustainability of peacebuilding projects and programmes, but a commitment to local ownership also raises questions about which groups and individuals should be included in the process, and which should be excluded. This report’s policy recommendations can contribute to the peacebuilding process in Africa, if adapted and implemented by the relevant stakeholders. These ten recommendations are:

- First, external partners should ensure that national parliaments in Africa have the capacity and authority to regulate and oversee national security institutions and strengthen civil-military relations in a comprehensive and effective manner. A stronger engagement with civil society is also necessary to enhance the capacity of legislatures to deliver in this area;

- Second, African governments must ensure that they adequately understand the obligations and implications of ratifying international justice instruments and making referrals to the International Criminal Court. In this regard, African civil society actors must ensure that African governments are held accountable in this area through such bodies as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; as well as other AU organs and institutions including the AU’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the Pan-African Parliament, NEPAD, and the African Peer Review Mechanism;

- Third, the decision about appropriate transitional justice mechanisms must be made taking local needs into account, while learning from experiences from other parts of the world. Each country’s post-conflict needs are distinct, and transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions and war crimes tribunals must respond to each post-conflict country’s specific set of circumstances in a way that promotes both peace and justice;

- Fourth, the AU and Africa’s regional economic communities must identify their own comparative advantage in the area of post-conflict reconstruction and development initiatives in order to be able to contribute effectively to the success of peacebuilding in Africa. Lacking the resources of the UN, the World Bank and the IMF, these bodies should prioritise areas such as strengthening state institutions, promoting democratic governance and economic growth, and enhancing socio-economic development.
Fifth, African governments must deliver on their commitment to implement on the ground international instruments such as UN Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security in order to support peacebuilding efforts on the continent. With regard to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, a broader definition of “combatants” should be used to encourage women who were general “helpers” of armed forces to participate actively in DDR processes. Considering the prevalence of gender-based violence and the consequent spread of HIV/AIDS in post-conflict societies, DDR programmes should include a comprehensive system to address the psychological effects of violence and conflicts on women.

Sixth, consideration should be given to funneling more external financing of post-conflict peacebuilding through the African Development Bank, which in many ways could operate as NEPAD’s implementation and financial management arm. Such a process must complement the role of external donors, such as the UN, the World Bank and the IMF, in ways that strengthen African decision-making in peacebuilding processes.

Seventh, international economic institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF should give countries emerging from conflict sufficient time and adequate resources to address immediate post-conflict challenges before they seek to impose Structural Adjustment Programmes. These external efforts must also be aligned to Africa’s peacebuilding structures and institutions such as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Frameworks of the AU and NEPAD in order to ensure greater African ownership and legitimacy.

Eighth, the UN Peacebuilding Commission must improve coordination with other UN agencies and work more effectively with African regional bodies and civil society. Although the Commission is mandated to act mainly as an advisory body, there are four key areas that require intervention for effective peacebuilding in Africa: mobilising resources; developing and recommending reconstruction strategies; helping to build political, judicial and administrative institutions; and coordinating the activities of important peacebuilding stakeholders.

Ninth, local involvement in mechanisms such as the UN’s Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies and Strategic Peacebuilding Frameworks, as well as the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, should go beyond national governments and the co-opting of self-appointed elites. The aim should be to ensure emancipatory local ownership of these processes. This can be done through greater involvement of civil society and the establishment of new mechanisms for consultation and participation. Such engagement should also go beyond existing state institutions and customary local authority structures, and needs to be linked more closely to existing state structures and external peacebuilders; and

Finally, it is important for all relevant stakeholders to promote and ensure a better understanding of the hierarchy and power relations that prevail among the wide array of domestic, regional and external peacebuilding actors in order to establish appropriate complementarity, division of authority, and a more effective division of labour for peacebuilding efforts in Africa.
Annex I

Agenda

Day One Wednesday 26 August 2009

09h00-09h30 Welcome and Opening

Dr Adekeye Adesaja, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa
Professor Mpho Molomo, Director, Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone
Dr Devon Curtis, Lecturer, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, England

09h30-11h00 Session I: Peacebuilding in Africa: Theory and Practice

Chair: Professor Balefi Tsie, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Botswana

Speakers: Dr Devon Curtis, Lecturer, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, England
"Whose Peace? Politics, Power and the Peacebuilding Context"
Dr Musifiky Mwanasali, Senior Political Affairs Officer, UN Mission in Sudan
"Building Peace: The Case of Sudan"

11h00-11h15 Coffee Break

11h15-12h45 Session II: Strengthening the Security Sector

Chair: Professor Mpho Molomo, Director, Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Botswana

Speaker: Dr Paul Omach, Senior Lecturer, Makerere University, Uganda
"Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration"
Professor Eboe Hutchful, Executive Director, African Security Dialogue and Research Centre, Accra, Ghana
"Security Sector Governance"

12h45-13h45 Lunch
13h45-15h15 Session III: Justice and Human Rights

Chair: Ms Yasmin Sooka, Director, Foundation for Human Rights, Johannesburg, South Africa

Speakers: Ms Sarah Nouwen, Doctoral Researcher, University of Cambridge, England
"The International Criminal Court and Peacebuilding in Africa"
Dr Mireille Affa’a Mindzie, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa
"Human Rights and Peacebuilding"

15h15-15h30 Coffee Break

15h30-17h00 Session IV: Gender and Peacebuilding

Chair: Dr Khabele Matlosa, Research Director, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa

Speakers: Dr Sheila Bunwaree, Lecturer, University of Mauritius
"Gender and Peacebuilding"
Dr Martha Cheo, Lecturer, Bells University of Technology, Ogun State, Nigeria
"Gender and Peacebuilding: the Case of Sierra Leone"

17h00 -17h15 Coffee Break/Drinks


Chair: Ms Maureen Isaacson, Journalist/Assistant Editor, Sunday Independent, Johannesburg, South Africa

Speakers: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa
Ambassador James Jonah, Former United Nations Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs
Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Former Deputy Director, International Labour Organisation

19h30 Dinner
Day Two        Thursday 27 August 2009

09h00-10h30    Session V: Institutions and Ideologies

Chair:        Dr Michi Ebata, Dialogue Financing Facility Adviser, United Nations Development Programme, Harare, Zimbabwe

Speakers:     Dr Funmi Olonisakin, Director: Conflict, Security and Development Group, King's College, London, England
              Ms Ekaette Ikpe, Research Associate: Conflict, Security and Development Group, King's College, London, England
              Professor David Moore, Associate Professor, Anthropology and Development Studies, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
              “Financing Peace: The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund”

10h30-10h45    Coffee Break

10h45-12h15    Session VI: Pan-African Institutions

Chair:        Ms Margaret Kilo, Unit Head, Fragile States Unit, African Development Bank, Tunisia

Speakers:     Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of Department, International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
              Professor Chris Landsberg, Lecturer, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
              “Peacebuilding as Statebuilding: Assessing the Initiatives of the Pan-African Ministers of Public Service”

12h15-13h15    Lunch
13h15-14h45 Session VII: The Great Lakes and Central Africa

Chair: Dr Devon Curtis, Lecturer, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, England

Speakers: Dr. Gérard Prunier, Independent Consultant
“Peacebuilding in Central Africa: Chad and Central African Republic”
Professor Mwelwa Musambachime, University of Zambia
and former Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations
“Negotiating Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”

14h45-15h00 Coffee Break

15h00-16h30 Session VIII: West Africa

Chair: Mr William Byrd, Adviser, Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group, the World Bank, Washington D.C., United States

Speakers: Dr Comfort Ero, Deputy Director, International Centre for Transitional Justice, Cape Town, South Africa
“Statebuilding and Elections in West Africa: Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire”
Dr Aderoju Oyefusi, Lecturer, University of Benin, Nigeria
“The Management of Natural Resources and Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta”

19h30 Dinner
Day Three  
Friday 28 August 2009

09h30-11h00  
Session IX: Southern Africa

Chair:  
Mr Tanki Mothae, Director, SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, Gaborone, Botswana

Speakers:  
Dr Gwinyayi Dzinesa, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa  
“Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Southern Africa”

Professor Mpho Molomo, Director, Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone  
“Lessons Learned from Security Sector Reform in Botswana”

11h00-11h15  
Coffee Break

11h15-12h15  
Session X: How to Produce an Academically Rigorous and Policy-Relevant Book from the Seminar

Chair:  
Mr Glenn Cowley, former Publisher, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, South Africa

Speakers:  
Dr Devon Curtis, Lecturer, University of Cambridge, England  
Dr Gwinyayi Dzinesa, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

12h15-12h45  
Completing Evaluation Forms and Coffee Break

12h45-13h30  
Session XI: Rapporteurs’ Report and Way Forward

Chair:  
Ambassador James Jonah, former United Nations Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, New York, United States

Rapporteurs:  
Dr Gwinyayi Dzinesa, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa  
Ms Elizabeth Myburgh, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

13h30  
Lunch
Annex II

List of Participants

1. Dr Adekeye Adebajo  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town, South Africa

2. Dr Mireille Affa’a Mindzie  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town, South Africa

3. Major Kenamalie Badubi  
   Botswana Defence Force  
   Gaborone, Botswana

4. Mr Jonas Bergström  
   Swedish International Development Agency  
   Stockholm

5. Dr Sheila Bunwaree  
   University of Mauritius  
   Mauritius

6. Dr William Byrd  
   World Bank  
   Washington D.C., United States

7. Dr Martha Cheo  
   Bells University of Technology  
   Ogun State, Nigeria

8. Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse  
   Vice-Chairperson  
   National Development Planning Commission  
   Accra, Ghana

9. Mr Glenn Cowley  
   Former Publisher, University of  
   KwaZulu-Natal Press  
   Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

10. Dr Devon Curtis  
    Department of Politics and  
    International Studies,  
    University of Cambridge, England

11. Dr Gwinyayi Dzinesa  
    Centre for Conflict Resolution  
    Cape Town, South Africa

12. Dr Michi Ebata  
    United Nations Development Programme  
    Harare, Zimbabwe

13. Dr Comfort Ero  
    International Centre for Transitional Justice  
    Cape Town, South Africa

14. Mr Yazeed Fakier  
    Centre for Conflict Resolution  
    Cape Town, South Africa

15. Dr Catherine Gegout  
    University of Nottingham  
    England

16. Professor Eboe Hutchful  
    Wayne State University  
    Detroit, United States

17. Ms Ekaette Ikpe  
    King’s College  
    London, England

18. Ms Maureen Isaacson  
    Sunday Independent  
    Johannesburg, South Africa
19. Ambassador James Jonah  
Former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs  
New York, United States

20. Mr Wouter Jürgens  
Royal Netherlands Embassy  
Pretoria, South Africa

21. Mr Ditlhapelo Keorapetse  
University of Botswana  
Gaborone, Botswana

22. Professor Gilbert Khadiagala  
University of the Witwatersrand  
Johannesburg, South Africa

23. Ms Margaret Kilo  
African Development Bank  
Tunis, Tunisia

24. Professor Chris Landsberg  
University of Johannesburg  
South Africa

25. Mr Gabriel Malebang  
University of Botswana  
Gaborone, Botswana

26. Mr Tanki Mothae  
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation  
Southern African Development Community  
Gaborone, Botswana

27. Professor Mpho Molomo  
University of Botswana  
Gaborone, Botswana

28. Professor Mwelwa Musambachime  
University of Zambia  
Lusaka, Zambia

29. Colonel Marianne Muvangua  
Ministry of Defence  
Windhoek, Namibia

30. Dr Musifiky Mwanasali  
United Nations Mission in Sudan  
Khartoum, Sudan

31. Ms Elizabeth Myburgh  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town, South Africa

32. Ms Sarah Nouwen  
University of Cambridge  
England

33. Dr Robert Okello  
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region  
Bujumbura, Burundi

34. Dr Funmi Olonisakin  
King’s College  
London, England
35. Dr Paul Omach  
Makerere University  
Kampala, Uganda

36. Professor Bertha Osei-Hwedie  
University of Botswana  
Gaborone, Botswana

37. Dr Aderoju Oyefusi  
University of Benin  
Benin City, Nigeria

38. Dr Gérard Prunier  
Independent Consultant  
Paris, France

39. Dr Tomaz Augusto Salomão  
Executive Secretary  
Southern African Development Community  
Gaborone, Botswana

40. Mr Ross Sanoto  
Office of the President  
Gaborone, Botswana

41. Dr David Sebudubudu  
University of Botswana  
Gaborone, Botswana

42. Ms Yasmin Sooka  
Foundation for Human Rights  
Johannesburg, South Africa

43. Major Steve Thaga  
Office of the President  
Gaborone, Botswana

44. Professor Balefi Tsie  
University of Botswana  
Gaborone, Botswana

45. Ms Dawn Nagar  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town, South Africa

46. Ms Fatima Maal  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town, South Africa

Conference Team

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## Annex III

### List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>All People’s Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Centre of African Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCR</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOCC</td>
<td>Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (African Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOMUC</td>
<td>Multinational Force in the Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly-Indebted Poor Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGA</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Observation Mission in Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCCF</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Country Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLPP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
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<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (Namibia)</td>
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</table>
The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

African perspectives on the United Nations (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa’s democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.

Other publications in this series (available at www.ccr.org.za)

VOLUME 1
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S SECURITY

VOLUME 2
SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA

VOLUME 3
THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA’S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

VOLUME 4
A MORE SECURE CONTINENT

VOLUME 5
WHITHER SADC?

VOLUME 6
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY

VOLUME 7
BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

VOLUME 8
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA
This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA
BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE
This policy and research seminar held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006 developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of democratic practice, sustainable development, and peace and security.

VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN A NEW SUDAN
This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOSS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION
This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AFRICA
This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyze and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS MEDIATION EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA
This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.
This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, ‘ethnic cleansing’ or crimes against humanity.

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacemaking and military co-operation, and migration.

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

This seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.

This policy seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.

This seminar held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 19 and 20 May 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 54 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.
Notes
Peacebuilding is of special relevance to Africa: nearly half of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War have been in the continent. The term “peacebuilding”, which entered public use some time ago in UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s seminal 1992 report An Agenda for Peace, has gained currency in recent years. The policy seminar took a fresh look at the current peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions that are mandated to build peace. The seminar was organised around the premise that a better appreciation of the interplay between local, regional, and global institutions and ideologies can lead to more effective peacebuilding in Africa.